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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines how sentimentality, as a term central to film criticism, has been 
mobilized, denigrated, quarantined or ignored over 300 years of aesthetic debate. It 
responds to the often vexed question of what the sentimental means, by unpacking the 
concept’s intellectual and artistic history, tracing a transition from the Enlightenment 
use of sentimentality as a positive concept denoting pedagogy and moral feeling, to its 
entrance into the modern vernacular as a term connoting its own excess, as a function 
of its alleged appeals to indulgent or unearned pathos. A key question of the research 
concerns whether the sentimental can be recuperated within contemporary moving-
image culture once we are re-familiarized with its early (lesser known about) critical 
applications. I contend in such a vein that the unpacking of such positive aspects of 
the sentimental very much colours our critical understanding of such cinematic 
figures as Charlie Chaplin, Steven Spielberg and those in their wake, both in terms of 
their films and the reception of those films. I argue that the early, classical and post-
classical periods of cinema can be significantly differentiated in terms of how 
sentimental cinema fares critically, providing new insights into such intellectual 
spheres as naturalism, modernism and postmodernism in relation to the cultural 
reception of cinema. Theories of emotion (especially in relation to spectatorship and 
film theory) are also examined closely up to what I argue to be a now established, and 
indeed, valorised melodramatic ‘mode’ of contemporary mainstream cinema, as 
applicable to Hollywood and beyond. As a theoretical tradition that both validates 
‘feeling’ in its pedagogical and idealist aims while remaining problematic 
ideologically, I show how the sentimental demands to be understood alongside the 
most contemporary of critical positions, not least in terms of the critical turn towards 
affect and the body. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
SCOTTIE – You both hid behind there, mmm?... 'til everything was 
clear... then sneaked down and drove back to the city. And 
then? You were his girl. What happened to you? Did he ditch 
you? Oh, Judy!! When he had all her money, and the freedom 
and the power...  he ditched you? What a shame! But he knew 
he was safe. You couldn't talk. Didn't he give you anything? 
 
JUDY – (faintly) Some money. 
 
SCOTTIE – And the necklace. Carlotta's necklace. That was your 
mistake, Judy. One shouldn't keep souvenirs of a killing.  
You shouldn't have been that sentimental. 
 
 
 
At the denouement of Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958, USA), standing with Judy 
(Kim Novak) at the top of the bell tower, James Stewart’s Scottie delivers his final 
judgement concerning Judy’s conduct, now that he has finally gathered together the 
details of the murder for which he was unwittingly set-up as witness. Judy has taken 
pity on him for the part she played in impersonating the now-murdered wife of Gavin 
Elster and encouraging Scottie’s adoration and obsession for her depiction of a 
vulnerable, psychologically troubled Madeleine. Agreeing to be dressed up once again 
as the woman she had already impersonated in the film’s first act (before the real 
Madeleine’s murder) allows Scottie to unravel the mystery, the key clue constituted 
by her putting on the necklace that belonged to Madeleine without Scottie having 
instructed her to do so.  
 
But what does Scottie mean here when he accuses Judy of sentimentality? Is it merely 
an experienced detective’s advice that an accessory to murder should never have kept 
incriminating evidence of their criminal act? Or does this judgement carry more 
valences? It might suggest for instance that Judy should not have participated in an 
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impersonation that was otherwise so stringently overseen by Scottie himself. Or that 
she should not have felt the feelings of care or even love towards the distraught 
Scottie that allowed her to assist him in this way, motivated as much by pity for him 
as genuine love. Equally, perhaps she is admonished here for the poor moral character 
she exhibits for ever wearing a dead woman’s jewellery and certainly for wearing it 
after the latter’s death that she herself has caused. Finally, Scottie may in fact be 
addressing himself more than Judy with these words, rueing his ever allowing himself 
to be emotionally drawn into a web of lies and murder, of allowing a detective’s 
aptitude for reasoned, shrewd deduction to be clouded by his vulnerable emotional 
needs (love for Madeleine) and psychological frailties (his recently acquired fear of 
heights). 
 
In such respects, the ‘sentimental’ represents a diverse set of questions and concerns 
that relate to moral character, to the emotions and to the visual in contemporary 
aesthetic discourse. Now widely used to connote a sense of its own excess, as in the 
attribute of the ‘grossly sentimental’ deployed by so many critics, such a term is also 
‘over- determined’ by its having had key pertinence to a wide set of aesthetic 
questions. The use of the term in the above scene for instance reveals a tension 
inherent to theories of the sentimental that will be examined in detail below – that 
between reason and emotion. Scottie is presented to us at the beginning of Vertigo as 
the ideal Enlightenment subject, an eligible bachelor and well-meaning private 
detective whose all-American charm and common sense are marred only by an 
unfortunate police accident that has left him with profound vertigo. Madeleine is 
presented as a quintessentially sentimental paradigm of female virtue in distress, lost 
in melancholic nostalgia for a long-dead ancestor (Carlotta Valdes) and seemingly 
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emotionally unequipped for survival in the rationalized metropolis of San Francisco. 
Yet ironically it is Madeleine (or rather Judy) that belongs to and serves the 
calculating menace of the city and Scottie that enters a lovelorn reverie and 
obsessional melancholia the minute he has seen her, the tragedy of the film resting 
indeed on a fundamental non-coincidence between their two subject-positions 
throughout. The final scene represents a moment that sees the two characters swap 
roles in relation to reason and emotion, where Scottie is finally allowed to resume his 
long-lost role of reasoned, sanguine detective and Judy reveals for the first time an 
affection for him uncompromised by pity or an ulterior motive of monetary gain. 
However, a relationship between them is just as untenable owing to an impossible 
contradiction between Judy’s sentimentality and Scottie’s hard-won rationality. If 
their love depends throughout the film on mistaken identities, false communication 
and fantasy, reality at the film’s end delivers repugnance and recrimination, and 
delivers the film’s second deathfall from the bell tower. A sentimentality that seemed 
throughout the film to be connoted by images of love, sadness, romance and the 
sublime (red sequoias, bell tower, the Golden Gate Bridge) turns out to be marred by 
the uncanny presence of death, doubles and repetition, signified by the blood-red ruby 
necklace worn by three dead women. 
 
Yet what would Vertigo be without its thematization of distortion, lies and emotional 
manipulation? If the sentimental becomes the underpinning for much of the fantasy, 
desire and tragedy of the film, it is because its philosophical ideals, and its failures, 
resonate with those of aesthetics writ large. In its reversals and counter-reversals, the 
film serves as a philosophical working through of the ambitions of what philosophers 
in the eighteenth century termed ‘moral sense’, convinced as they were of the power 
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of ‘pity’, ‘compassion’ and ‘sympathy’ (invoked by art or otherwise) to inform, 
improve and produce a cultivated citizen. The sentimental, as literary or theatrical 
genre, and as the more pervasive social affect of ‘sensibility’, concerned itself above 
all with the theatrics of suffering of figures that remain virtuous against all 
circumstances. Yet while sympathy for figures of suffering and pity could inspire us 
to behave more humanely, charitably and with fine sentiments, problems were 
identified concerning the truth-claims not only of the sentimental person, object or 
artwork that courted sympathy, but also the spectator that claimed to have been 
moved (implicitly towards virtue) by it. Just as Madeleine’s invocation of pathos in 
Vertigo turns out to be motivated by a devious plan of exploitation and murder, so the 
sentimental quickly became distrusted as a site of genuinely assured ‘moral 
sentiment.’ Just as Scottie’s own apparently moral emotions in relation to a troubled 
woman become qualified by trademark Hitchcockian desire, voyeurism and fantasy, 
so the ‘cult of sensibility’ was often deemed to slide into cultish morbidity or self-
regarding fetishism. If pathos could be staged in the service of a morally ambiguous 
or debased agenda, a key Enlightenment linkage between signifier and signified could 
no longer be assumed. Indeed, another aspect of Scottie’s rebuke of Judy, and 
certainly the most deeply felt, stems ultimately from his profound sadness that she 
ever agreed to embody the paradigm of virtue in distress that is the Madeleine of the 
first act. Once again, albeit in more descriptive terms, she should not have been ‘that 
sentimental’.  
 
Such are the complex foundations of a term that for many now merely connotes the 
trite, the mawkish and the manipulative in relation to a host of films, plays, novels and 
magazine articles. The chapters below seek to critically examine such contemporary 
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manifestations of the sentimental in film specifically, for it has arguably been the 
cinema and its own enactments of the sensual that provide a particularly fertile ground 
for theorizing visual art’s engagement with the spectator and his/her emotions. 
Informed by a central question concerning how and why the sentimental has come to 
court such derision as a byword for emotional manipulation, I seek to identify and 
historicise the textual signifiers, tropes and cultural figures associated with the term, 
leading inevitably although by no means exclusively to the genealogy of an 
undeniably kindred tradition, that of melodrama. Indeed, another goal of the 
discussion below is to explore the contours between the sentimental and the 
melodrama in a more thoroughgoing way than is usually undertaken, not so much in 
order to provide a definitive contrast between the two traditions but rather to produce 
an enriched and nuanced understanding of their interdependence. Furthermore, in the 
light of an enhanced understanding of the concept, I ask how, or under what aesthetic 
conditions, the sentimental might be recuperated from its now rather debased valence, 
analysing its continued applications (derogatory or otherwise) in modern film 
criticism and theory.   
 
Literary and Historical Studies of the Sentimental 
The ‘sentimental novel’ as a genre of the 18th century, usually referring to the novels 
of such British authors as Samuel Richardson, Tobias Smollett, Henry Mackenzie and 
Laurence Sterne, has been in currency as a literary term since the early 20th century. 
Understood as a key cultural signifier of the ‘Age of Sensibility’ of the 1740s and 
1750s, the genre has been extended to works in other countries of a similar period, 
such as Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther and Rousseau’s La Nouvelle 
Heloise, each work implicated in the period’s obsession with the refined, melancholic 
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emotions that the novel could elicit in its reader. The term has been further 
appropriated for later periods too, notably in reference to revivals of the sentimental in 
such American novels as Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin among many imitators, the 
German Bildungsroman and of course, in the many novels of Charles Dickens, 
particularly of his early period. 
 
While examples of the genre have thus become particularly wide-ranging in terms of 
period and nation, key attributes of sentimental narrative remain largely consistent, 
not least in terms of the form’s (often vexed) insistence on stock characters and 
clichéd situations. R.F. Brissenden suggests ‘virtue in distress’ as its principle theme, 
and most scholars agree that the rhetorical thrust of the sentimental derives from its 
often ‘moralistic’ or ‘improving’ purposes, as exemplified by the pedagogical aims of 
the ‘conduct book’ sub-genre.1  Its key trope was commonly the figure of the 
sentimental hero or heroine whose innocence, idealism (and often chastity) render 
them ‘too good’ for the selfishness and pragmatism of the real world, often resulting 
after great struggle in a redemptive, yet tragic death. Unlike the Romantic hero, the 
sentimental hero possesses far less of a compulsively self-destructive or socially 
contrarian persona, more childlike and idealistic than the jaded, tortured souls of that 
later era’s literature and poetry.2 
 
Yet it was precisely owing to the sentimental novel’s invocations of elevated feeling 
and admiration for a figure so idealized, dependent as it was on a particularly 
                                                
1 See R. F. Brissenden, Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade, 
Macmillan: London, 1974. 
 
2 For a thorough introduction to the culture of sensibility and its tropes, see Janet Todd, Sensibility: An 
Introduction, London and New York: Methuen, 1986.  
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moralistic construction of the human capacity for emotion and its propagation by such 
novels, that the sentimental reached its cultural heyday. Moreover, if it later became 
increasingly implicated as a defining feature of kitschy, ten-a-penny stories and plays 
(and later of course, films), it arguably never lost such connotations of the moral and 
improving. Such associations with the artistically insignificant and non-literary has 
not however deterred thoroughgoing explorations of the sentimental age (in both 
Britain and France3), the ‘Cult of Sensibility’ recognized also as a key period in the 
history of the novel and moral philosophy. Through rubrics that are examined in more 
detail in the following chapter, the ‘moral sense’ philosophy of such figures as 
Shaftesbury, Hume and Smith have been explored as theoretical precursors to the 
sentimental novel or sentimental play. 4 A primary assumption of ‘moral sentiment’ 
theory concerned the possibility that the classical dichotomy of Reason and the 
Passions (on in modern terms, cognition and emotion) might be allied rather than 
opposed, their antagonism established certainly since as early as Plato’s denunciation 
of poetry and its appeals to unwarranted emotion in The Republic and other works.5  
Historically situated in the aftermath of the English civil war, the decline of feudal 
power and libertine wit, moral sentiment theory supplants the self-interested 
pragmatic philosophy of Hobbes in favour of a more moralistic, humanistic set of 
principles inspired by the psychological liberalism of Locke.6 Aligned from the start 
also with the values of an expanding urban bourgeois class, the sentimental model 
                                                
3 See Anne-Vincent Buffault, A History of Tears: Sensibility and Sentimentality in France, 1700-1900, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1991, for a thorough account of sensibility in French society. 
 
4 John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988; Michael Bell, Sentimentalism, Ethics and the Culture of Feeling, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
5 Plato, The Republic, London: Penguin Classics, 2007. 
 
6 See Todd, Sensibility, pp. 24-30. 
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becomes understood as the definitive code of a society now inspired by ideologies of 
family and domestic contentment alongside fantasies of social mobility, popular 
democracy and mutual sympathy.7 
 
In such respects, and as explored further below, the sentimental represents a complex 
and in many ways contradictory concept for literary studies, its aesthetic connotations 
of mass art and kitsch offset by its historical importance to the development of 
literature and theories of literary reception. Numerous studies continue to be 
undertaken on the concept that are rather less focused on methodologies of textual 
analysis in relation to literature, theatre or film, and approach the term from more 
autonomous perspectives of analytical philosophy and philology. While such studies 
will not be examined as primary sources in this study, they nevertheless remain 
valuable contributions to an understanding of this particularly freighted of terms.8  
With regards to the cinema in particular, only a handful of studies have chosen to 
consider film within the rubric of the ‘sentimental’ specifically. Charles Affron’s 
Cinema and Sentiment largely overlooks the specificity of the sentimental in favour of 
a largely ‘New Critical’ examination of cinema’s power for sensation tout court, an 
approach that was somewhat overshadowed by debates in film theory concerning the 
spectatorship, ideology and gender dynamics of melodrama.9 (see below). Lea Jacobs’ 
                                                
7 For an account of the association between a cross-national sentimental culture and American 
Revolutionary ideals, see Sarah Knott Sensibility and the American Revolution, Omohundro Institute, 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009. 
 
8 See Michael Tanner, ‘Sentimentality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 77, (1976 - 1977), 
pp. 127-147; Mary Midgley, ‘Brutality and Sentimentality’, Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 209 (July 1979), 
pp. 385-89; Mark Jefferson, ‘What is Wrong with Sentimentality?’, Mind, Vol. XCII (368) (1983), pp. 
519-529, Deborah Knight, ‘Why We Enjoy Condemning Sentimentality: A Meta-Aesthetic 
Perspective’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 411-420; 
Robert C. Solomon, In Defense of Sentimentality, Oxford University Press US, 2004.  
 
9 Charles Affron, Cinema and Sentiment, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
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The Decline of Sentiment, however, follows a more recent call for more historically 
sensitive accounts of cinematic melodrama, by examining what she claims as a shift 
away from early cinema’s sentimental ideology towards the new realism of the 
Hollywood film in the 1920s.10  Approaching cinema through the lens of literary 
sentimentality has also been profitably undertaken by James Chandler, who extends 
his concept of ‘sentimental vehicularity’ to the films of Griffith and Capra,11 work 
that importantly underlines the connections between sentimental aesthetics and ‘New 
Humanities’ approaches to cinema and the body, as advanced by such figures as 
Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault (see Chapter Six). 
 
Nevertheless, this thesis proceeds from an assumption that an understanding of the 
sentimental in cinema can, and indeed must, acknowledge and build on the terms of 
the now established and long-running conversation surrounding the genre of 
melodrama. Acknowledged as a direct corollary and successor to the sentimental age, 
melodrama is arguably the chief vehicle of the sentimental through to the modern 
cinematic period. Although important distinctions are acknowledged and adhered to 
below with respect to the two terms, it is crucial nonetheless to account in particular 
for the rich and complex theoretical work undertaken with respect to this ‘genre’ in 
the film theory of the last 40 years.  
 
 
 
                                                
10 Lea Jacobs, The Decline of Sentiment: American Film in the 1920s, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2008. 
 
11 James Chandler, ‘The Languages of Sentiment,’ Textual Practice, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 
21-41. See also Chandler’s forthcoming The Sentimental Mood: From Sterne to Capra. 
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Melodrama and Cinema 
Once the mark of civility of a growing bourgeois class that had found new 
engagements with art through a rubric of shared tears and mutual sympathy, the 
sentimental soon crossed-over to a far wider mass audience of melodrama, a form that 
for Peter Brooks strived to make ‘the world morally legible’.12 For Brooks, another 
literary scholar, melodrama served as a ‘moral occult’ in a ‘post-sacred’ world that 
had lost religious faith, its simple tropes argued to provide the modern world with a 
new mythological system (or ‘melodramatic imagination’) where recognizable forces 
of right and wrong do battle and achieve—or hope for--justice.13 Brooks’ arguments 
have formed an important foundation upon which film melodrama has been theorized 
in the last 40 years, cited directly by Thomas Elsaesser in his seminal article ‘Tales of 
Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama’, published in 1972.14 
Applying Brooks’ aesthetics to film specifically, Elsaesser proposed melodrama as a 
‘mode of experience’ derived from the sentimental novel and popular 19th century 
theatre, a critical, ‘sophisticated’ dimension of which was deemed in particular 
evidence in the ‘family melodrama’ of the 1940s and 1950s. Films by Sirk, Minnelli, 
Cukor and Ray, among others, were claimed to foreground middle-class American 
family life as a site of individual struggle, frustration and inner turmoil, despite the 
nuclear family’s valorization elsewhere within the American culture of the 1950s 
(especially on television). Where an affirmative ‘classical realist’ mode of narration 
(ostensibly adhered to by these same Hollywood films) allowed character desire and 
                                                
12 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama and the Mode of 
Excess, New Haven & London: Yale UP, 1995, p. 42. 
 
13 Ibid., p. 1-15. 
 
14 Thomas Elsaesser, 'Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama' in Bill Nichols 
(ed.), Movies and Methods, London: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 166-89. First published 
in 1972 in Monogram. 
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pleasure to be indulged and ‘sublimated’ by the illusionistic thrust of classical 
narrative,15 melodrama for Elsaesser and other theorists strove to give expression to 
the social and ideological problems lying just below the surface.16 Auteurs such as 
Sirk were argued indeed to be intentionally seeking to foreground such problems 
through the skilful depiction of individuals trapped emotionally within a particular set 
of oppressive familial, social and ideological circumstances. The ‘excess’ of 
melodrama’s formal style and affect, in terms of colour, style, sound design, narrative 
contrivances, symbolism and performance, endowed the melodrama within such 
rubrics with a (modernist) palette of devices for achieving a Brecht-inspired ironic 
distance in relation to the ideology otherwise reproduced in such films.17  With a 
focus in particular on women’s experience as a site of ongoing pathos, such films 
were also polemicized by feminist film theorists as articulations of a specifically 
feminist spectatorship in relation to capitalism, patriarchy, class and family. 
Foregrounding the female experience in American society, melodrama and the 
‘Woman’s film’ (the latter referring to films such as Stella Dallas (Vidor, 1937), Now 
Voyager (Rapper, 1942) and Mildred Pierce (Curtiz, 1945), provided a gendered 
                                                
15 Examples of which Elsaesser provides in relation to the ‘strong actions’ of the traditional Western, 
Gangster or Noir genres, where ‘central conflicts’ are ‘successively externalised and projected into 
direct action’. See Elsaesser, ‘Tales of Sound and Fury’, pp. 177. 
 
16 See also Laura Mulvey, ‘Notes on Sirk and Melodrama’, Movie Vol. 25 (Winter, 1977/78), pp. 53-6; 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Minnelli and Melodrama." Screen Vol. 18, no. 2 (1977), pp. 113-8; Chuck 
Kleinhans, ‘Notes on Melodrama and the Family Under Capitalism,’ Film Reader, No. 3 (1978), pp. 
40-47; D.N. Rodowick, ‘Madness, Authority and Ideology in the Domestic Melodrama of the 
1950s’," Velvet Light Trap Vol. 19 (1982), pp. 40-45.  
 
17 In accordance with psychoanalytic and Marxist (particularly Althusserian) rubrics and associated 
especially with a theory of ‘classical realism’ propounded in various articles in Screen in the 1970s, the 
melodrama displayed hysterical symptoms, betraying an illusion of social normativity inscribed in 
these ostensibly conservative, apolitical Hollywood films, ‘writerly’ (in Barthes’ sense) excesses that 
gave the lie to their illusory coherences.  
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expression of the problematics of female identity with a specifically modernist 
attention to image and ideology.18 
 
The sentimental indeed might be posed as a good candidate for denoting the body of 
ideology (equated from a Marxist perspective with bourgeois or classical realism) that 
melodrama seemed to be subjecting to critique, according to such accounts. Elsaesser 
argued for instance that the stylistic excesses of ‘sophisticated melodrama’ displayed 
a ‘modernist sensibility working in popular culture’ that ironically problematizes the 
‘incurably naive moral and emotional idealism in the American psyche.’19 In such 
respects, cinematic melodrama could be claimed to be providing a set of devices for 
making salient and problematizing a certain reproduction of the sentimental in 
Hollywood’s mode of narration, the latter’s assumed idealism and illusionism 
undermined by melodrama’s displacements and ironies. Problematically however, as 
covered in detail below, the extent to which the sentimental has historically itself been 
considered ‘excessive’ muddies such a dichotomy as norm/critique 
(sentimental/melodrama) considerably, despite their still different genealogies. 
Relatedly, these debates had defined melodrama rather narrowly in order for it to 
serve as paradigm for the polemical and theoretical propositions guiding the 
arguments outlined above. Designated by such theory as a discursive space concerned 
primarily with the ‘family’, the ‘female’ and/or the domestic, melodrama was under 
                                                
18 See Linda Williams, ‘When the Woman Looks,’ in Doane, M.A. et al (eds.), ReVision: Essays in 
Feminist Film Criticism, Los Angeles: American Film Institute, pp. 83-99, and ‘Something Else 
Besides a Mother: Stella Dallas and the Maternal Melodrama’, Cinema Journal Vol. 24. 1 (Fall, 1984), 
pp. 2-27; Mary-Ann Doane, The Desire to Desire; The Woman’s Film of the 1940s, Bloomington: 
Indiana University press, 1987; Gaylyn Studlar, In the Realm of Pleasure: Von Sternberg, Dietrich and 
the Masochistic Aesthetic, Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 
 
19 Elsaesser, ‘Tales of Sound and Fury’, p. 182. 
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particular strain semantically, dependent on a set of constructions that in some ways 
contradicted a more historical or reception-focused understanding of its genealogy.  
 
More recent work has sought indeed to expand the parameters within which 
melodrama has been traditionally understood in film studies, moving the discussion 
away from ideology, spectatorship and the ‘Woman’s film’, towards a more historical 
consideration of melodrama as a ‘mode’ that Barry Langford has noted as being ‘at 
once before, beyond and embracing the system of genre in US cinema as a whole.’20 
Steve Neale’s analysis of reception materials surrounding the release and circulation 
of early film melodramas, showed for instance how an understanding of the genre 
could no longer be confined to the categories of ‘maternal’ or ‘family’ melodrama. 
With the term used as much, if not more so, in relation to early Westerns, crime 
dramas and adventure films, melodrama comes to encompass a particularly wide array 
of early Hollywood films.21 Scholars such as Christine Gledhill and Linda Williams 
have in turn ‘revised’ melodrama from a film genre designating a largely female 
spectatorship to a far more expansive ‘mode’, derived undeniably from 19th century 
melodrama, that for some time has constituted the dominant mode of address of the 
classical Hollywood film, and one that importantly also accommodates a male 
spectatorship.22  Williams, for instance, recognizes melodrama’s logic in such 
traditionally male-oriented tales as Twain’s Huckleberry Finn or films such as Rambo 
                                                
20 Barry Langford, Film Genre: Hollywood and Beyond, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, 
p. 31. 
 
21 Steve Neale, ‘Melo Talk: On the Meaning and the Use of the Term ‘Melodrama’ in the American 
Trade Press’, Velvet Light Trap, Vol. 22 (Fall 1993), p. 66-89. See also Rick Altman’s discussion of 
melodrama as a ‘phantom-genre’ in Film/Genre, London: BFI, 1999, pp. 27-33. 
 
22 Christine Gledhill, ‘The Melodramatic Field: An Investigation’, in Gledhill (ed.), Home is Where the 
Heart Is: Studies in Melodrama and Woman's Film, London: BFI, 1987, pp. 1-39; Linda Williams, 
'Melodrama Revised', in Nick Browne (ed.), Refiguring American Film Genres: History and Theory, 
University of California Press, 1998, p. 42-88..  
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(1982). Once more alluding to the arguments of Peter Brooks, melodrama’s historical 
purpose of making morality ‘legible’ is foregrounded, Gledhill arguing for instance 
that it depicts ‘less how things ought to be than how they should have been’, the form 
resting on tensions between a moral idealism and the representation of social realities 
that too often fall short of such ideals.23 Steve Neale likewise foregrounds the 
temporality of melodrama as one that only comes to a real or imagined resolution (or 
at the very least, recognition) of problems established by narrative at a stage when it is 
too late. A tragic sense of the ‘if only’ is invoked in the idealism of melodrama’s 
narrative closure, one that is always qualified by pathos or mourning for that which 
has been lost or sacrificed to achieve it.24  
 
Sentiment and Cognition 
The debate has thus shifted from a theoretical, polemical engagement with melodrama 
(foregrounding gender and ideology) to a more historical contextualization of 
melodrama’s more wide-ranging aesthetics. An equally important, and certainly more 
strident, shift away from ‘theory’ has been led by scholars working within the sub-
field of cognitive film theory, for whom the sentimental provides a more 
psychologically grounded framework for understanding film emotion.25 Many of 
these scholars would agree with Carl Plantinga’s assertions that scholarly attention 
                                                
23 Gledhill, Home Is Where the Heart Is, p. 21. 
 
24 Steve Neale, ‘Melodrama and Tears’, Screen, Vol. 27, no. 6 (1986), pp. 6-22. 
 
25 See Greg M. Smith, Film Structure and the Emotion System, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003; Ed. S. Tan, Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as an Emotion Machine, 
Barbara Fasting (trans.,), Hillsdale, NJ : L. Erlbaum Associates, 1996; Gregory Currie, Image and 
Mind: Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Torben 
Grodal, Moving Pictures : A New Theory of Film Genres, Feelings, and Cognition, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997; Carl Plantinga, Moving Viewers: American Film and the Spectator's Experience, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. For an effective overall account of the field, see Carl 
Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (ed.), Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and Emotion, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999.   
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should shift away from notions of fiction as emotional escapism (or ‘epistemic 
illusion’) to a more thoroughgoing analysis of the ‘narrative concerns’, ‘hypotheses’ 
and ‘evaluative judgements’ that characterise actual film spectatorship. Theorists such 
as Plantinga argue moreover for how sentimentality in particular might be most 
profitably considered as an ‘ideologically neutral or even beneficial’ form of 
rhetoric.26  
 
In such a vein, Ed Tan and the Nico Frijda approach ‘sentiment’ as an ‘action 
tendency’ as opposed to a specific emotion. The latter argue that sentiment may be 
motivated by various emotions but is in fact best characterised as a ‘change in an 
inner process[…]an abrupt giving up of coping effort or expectation.’27 Although the 
film events (or cues) that determine such affect are extremely varied, they identify a 
common response wherein the spectator has come to feel that he is in a subordinate 
relation to the events before him. 
  
We admit that we are smaller than the events taking place and 
the spectacle we watch, in the magnitude of the sorrow or joy, 
or of the manner in which the protagonists carry their fate[…] a 
sense of being faced with something we have to accept and to 
submit to, as the way things go.28 
 
By situating sentiment as a ‘submission response’, they then provide a theory of why 
the sentimental response runs counter to some well-established doctrines of critical 
analysis. They explain the embarrassment that often characterises the ‘helplessness’ 
                                                
26 Carl Plantinga, ‘Notes on Spectator Emotion and Ideological Film Criticism’, in Murray Smith & 
Richard Allen (ed.), Film Theory and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, USA, 1997, pp. 386-7. 
 
27 Ibid., p. 55. 
 
28 Ibid.,  
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response as an undermining of the spectator’s preferred self-image of being an 
‘autonomous self.’29 Such an attitude, they argue, is traditionally associated with a 
male spectator that feels embarrassed by his tearful response to certain stimuli. As a 
‘submission response,’ they argue that the male, in particular, will resist his tears or 
indeed could even avoid any further situations or viewing situations where such a 
response could be potentially elicited involuntarily.  
 
In such a vein, according to such scholars as Carl Plantinga, established approaches in 
film theory remain wedded to theories that maintain a philosophical cynicism in 
relation to emotion that renews Plato’s original ‘emotional stoicism’ in relation to art. 
Stemming from ‘neo-Freudian’ models of pleasure and desire and the Marxist-
inspired theory of Brecht, and extending onwards to New-Lacanian models and 
postmodern Deleuzian affect theory, Plantinga aligns an orthodoxy of ‘ideological 
film criticism’ with an intrinsic distaste in relation to ‘spectator emotion.’ Whether the 
spectator adopts a critical attitude autonomously or is forced to do so through such 
Brechtian techniques as ‘distancing’ or ‘alienation,’ Plantinga argues (like other 
cognitive scholars) that such theory rests on faulty philosophical assumptions 
regarding the cinema’s influence on spectatorial emotion as a chief tool in 
ideologically regulating the subject.30  
 
However, such allegiance to ‘piecemeal theorizing’ has not prevented scholars like 
Tan and Frijda from identifying melodramatic narrative tropes such as ‘virtue in 
                                                
29 Ibid.  
 
30 This particular application of critical theory, moreover, has come under severe criticism in the last 20 
years of film scholarship, in terms of its alleged failures in addressing issues surrounding filmmaking 
and developments in film technology with sufficient historical scrutiny, as critiqued most forcefully by 
such figures as David Bordwell and Noël Carroll. See note 13.  
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distress’, ‘justice in jeopardy’ or ‘awe inspiration’ as key cues of a ‘sentimental’ 
spectatorial affect.31 In this, such theory corresponds with accounts by Thomas 
Elsaesser, Linda Williams and Christine Gledhill as an acknowledgment of a long 
genealogy, if not ideology, of sentimental representation, from the sentimental novel 
and the stage melodrama through to Stella Dallas (Vidor, 1935) or Close Encounters 
of the Third Kind (Spielberg, 1977). While Tan and Frijda’s area of focus rests on 
how ‘sentiment’ can be understood as a specifically psychological phenomenon, 
centralizing the spectator (and her psychological experience of film) as the chief 
object of enquiry, the cinema is certainly comprehended here as a medium that 
invokes emotions that share continuities with a long history of melodramatic tropes in 
a variety of media.  
 
Such a tradition is also emphasised by Plantinga, who discusses the pleasures of 
‘negative emotions’ in film in both historical and cognitive terms. Citing both 
Aristotelian catharsis and Hume’s discussion of tragedy as key precursors to modern 
theoretical speculation on film emotion, Plantinga rejects a catharsis that involves 
‘purging’ as the mere elimination of (irrational) emotion by art in favour of discussing 
the ‘negative’ emotions invoked by melodrama, such as pity, fear and sadness. If such 
emotions might be deemed ostensibly unpleasant as giving cause to be avoided by the 
subject, Plantinga argues that notionally ‘sympathetic’ films such as his chief example 
Titanic (1997), and many other films including Spielberg’s E.T. (1982) and 
Schindler’s List (1993), allow and encourage the spectator certain ‘fantasies of 
assurance and control’ in relation to their overall narrative logic. The cognitive 
                                                
31 Ed S. H. Tan and Nico H. Frijda, ‘Sentiment in Film Viewing’, in Carl Plantinga & Greg M. Smith 
(eds.), Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and Emotion, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999, pp. 48-64, 261-2. 
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apprehension of love, hope and awe in relation to either form or content serves to 
counter-balance or ‘replace’ the ‘negative’ feelings associated with pathos, in order to 
produce a gratifying experience overall. Moreover, Plantinga deploys psychological 
research in noting how pathos primes the spectator to experience such rhetoric with 
greater intensity than without it, deploying certain affirming tropes of ‘secular 
redemption’, ‘durability of love’ and ‘quasireligious ritual’ to both inspire the 
spectator through feeling via the communication of sentimental values. 32 
 
Of particular interest to the forthcoming discussion concerns the extent to which 
Plantinga identifies the ‘sympathetic’ film as part of a pervasive melodramatic 
tradition inherited by cinema while noting its porosity in relation to what he terms the 
‘distanced’ film. For while the latter is noted by Plantinga as fostering a spectator’s 
emotional detachment through the comedy, fast narrative speed or realism of an 
‘ironic mode’ that pertains to many films, he argues that the two attributes ultimately 
coexist in many films, serving a complex variety of rhetorical aims. While Titanic 
certainly may epitomize a ‘sympathetic’ mode of address, other films may be less 
monolithically sentimental without altogether abandoning its core elements. 
Alongside such observations for Plantinga rest ongoing questions concerning the 
extent to which the sentimental constitutes an ideology in its own right. While 
Plantinga has argued in the past for how sentimentality might be best considered in an 
‘ideologically neutral’ sense, (i.e. as an affect that operates independently of ‘values, 
belief and assumptions’), his discussion turns to and qualifiedly defends critical 
objections to sentimentality thus: 
 
                                                
32 Plantinga, Moving Viewers, pp. 184-96. 
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I would agree that the simplistic vilification of the Other and 
exaggerated and simplistic divisions between good and evil are 
likely to be harmful. So some forms of sentimentality are bound 
to be wrong. Yet in other cases, presenting idealized 
representations may encourage and invigorate the spectator 
towards positive action even while the fiction misrepresents the 
real world.  
[…]Although I am inclined to be suspicious of all sentimentality, 
I would argue that is should not be dismissed tout court as 
ideologically pernicious or cognitively unhealthy; its effects must 
be gauged on a case-by-case basis.33 
 
In the above Plantinga both articulates the possibility of a melodramatic ‘mode’ that 
distorts reality and defends a critical cynicism held in relation to some of its 
ideological consequences, while underlining the importance of reading individual 
films in their specificity as a means of determining the extent to which sentiment is 
operating in ideologically regressive or non-regressive ways. 
 
Revising Melodrama 
In its casting of ‘orthodox’ film theory as a neo-Platonist philosophy that insists on 
the upholding of a reason-emotion dichotomy, the cognitive approach has arguably 
had to overlook some crucial contributions to film scholarship that has sought, like it, 
to analyse the pleasures and affect of the cinema. Nevertheless, a movement away 
from theory, towards historical research on the one hand and cognitive research on the 
other, has been undeniable and continues to inform the research directions of new 
work on melodrama. Such shifts have likewise challenged scholars to address 
‘orthodox’ film theory’s initial approaches to emotion and identification, not least in 
relation to the depiction of the oppressed heroines of melodrama and the ‘Woman’s 
film’. The eponymous heroine of Stella Dallas, for instance, who sacrifices her 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 195. 
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relationship with her daughter so the latter might marry into high society, remains a 
contested figure within such debates, signifying both an expressed hope for, and 
failure to achieve, a better configuration of class and gender relations. In Linda 
Williams’ summary of such debates, she addresses in particular the problematic of the 
tearful response of the ‘emerging liberated woman’ addressed by feminist discourse at 
that time. She writes: 
 
I would say that the entire Stella Dallas debate was over what it 
meant for a woman viewer to cry at the end of the film. Did the 
emotion swallow us up, or did we have room within it to think? 
Could we, in other words, think both with and through our 
bodies in our spectating capacities as witnesses to abjection?34 
 
This summary clarifies some of the sentimentalist issues underpinning this debate, 
situating it around the central problematic of what it meant to be resistant to one’s 
own tears. Carefully revising her own assumption of the time, Williams highlights the 
‘importance of pathos itself and the fact that a surprising power lay in identifying with 
victimhood.’35   
 
Williams in such respects revises some key assumptions concerning the gendered 
spectatorship of melodrama. For earlier feminist theorists, melodrama could situate 
the (implicitly female) spectator in a subject-position of politically ‘masochistic’ 
passivity and resignation as opposed to fostering emotions of (male) oppositional 
indignance or critical irony. By fostering identification with victims and resolving 
conflict within their micro-situations (i.e. the family unit) the melodrama necessarily 
avoids a complete articulation of its socio-political underpinnings, resulting in its also 
                                                
34 Williams, ‘Melodrama Revised’, p. 47. 
 
35 Ibid., 
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being equated with the simplified, the emotive and the ideological (or for some simply 
the sentimental). For proponents of ‘excess’, ironically, it was precisely the 
dominance of pathos (as invoked by the clichéd situations, stereotypes and formulae 
of melodrama) that was as much the problem as the solution, notwithstanding the 
status of such an attribute as a core, and indeed a distinguishing, feature of melodrama 
(and the sentimental) writ large.36   
 
It is indeed with such ironies in mind that Williams now argues for melodramatic 
pathos as a legitimate affect in its own right, freeing it from its being positioned as a 
device of ‘excess’, and echoing indeed some key arguments of the cognitive field. 
Such a re-orientation opens up an important new field for the analysis of melodrama 
(as a film genre and otherwise), grounded in a more historical analysis of its earliest 
forms and critical valences, a field indeed where the sentimental looms very large as a 
guiding rubric. The melodrama debate can indeed be seen to have rehearsed rather 
more longstanding objections to popular genres more generally conceived, where the 
sentimental (in a similar vein to the melodramatic) stands as that which has come to 
represent the formulaic and the emotionally gratuitous in contrast to a more restrained 
‘realist’ style.  
 
In order to understand these wider currents, I would suggest one needs to look even 
further, as this study does, to discussions that go beyond those that have taken film as 
their primary object. It is within literary studies in particular that theorisation of the 
forms taken by high and low culture has predominated historically, with the 
                                                
36 Williams’ chief interlocutor in this regard is E. Ann Kaplan, for whom the maternal melodrama 
invoked a position of masochistic identification. See Williams, 'Melodrama Revised', p. 44-6, and E. 
Ann Kaplan, Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera, New York: Methuen, 1983. 
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sentimental standing indeed as a key term with which such discriminations have come 
to be implemented and understood. Such discussions nonetheless have great relevance 
to film studies, particularly if one is mindful of the discipline’s arguable shift towards 
a historical methodology and a sometime neglect of theatrical melodrama and its own 
antecedents. As a body of knowledge that responds to questions posed by both film 
theory and cognitive theory, I would suggest that the sentimental model provides 
renewed insights in relation to the emotional appeals of film and indeed other media.  
 
The methodology of this project’s first three chapters is informed by its ‘meta-critical’ 
aims of reviewing the intellectual history, or genealogy, of the sentimental tradition.  
By analysing the period antecedent to that of cinema’s arrival, the discussion seeks to 
historicize the thought of particular critics and theorists for whom the sentimental was 
in either direct or more implicit ways vital to theories later inherited by film theory 
and criticism. While textual analyses of specific texts (and in Chapter Three, films) 
seek to draw out the continuities and problematics of the sentimental tradition as 
artistic genre, a focus remains on establishing the critical contours of the term’s 
cultural history. The section’s particular aim is to trace the concept’s fall from grace 
while nevertheless establishing its full theoretical significance in relation to aesthetics, 
and its attendant significance to speculation about the cinematic image in the first half 
of the 20th century. 
 
Chapter One charts the chronology of two strands of sentimental aesthetics in the 18th 
century: ‘moral sentiment’ theory as a philosophical movement and the ‘sentimental 
novel.’ Pathos as connoted by tropes of innocence and virtue, and the textual and 
contextual display of tears are traced as key sentimental concerns of the culture of this 
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period. Such debates set the terrain for how sentimentality becomes a morally 
questionable aesthetic and a term of evaluative derision in this period and future eras, 
while nevertheless never fully evading its roots in an ethics of feeling. 
 
Chapter Two examines the continuance of key sentimentalized tropes in the ‘genteel’ 
art of the Victorian era, while charting the renewal of a sceptical critical dismissal of 
its effects in proto-modernist discourses that pave the way for the 20th century and the 
arrival of cinema. Theatrical melodrama and its influences on the novel (those of 
Dickens in particular) is traced in order to show how sentiment comes to intersect 
with notions of bourgeois subjectivity and the latter’s veneration of an increasingly 
hackneyed set of idealized objects.  
 
Chapter Three traces the limits to which the sentimental constitutes a central cluster of 
critical concerns for writing on film in early to mid 20th century theory. In such a vein 
I explore the thought of some key exponents of ‘classical film theory’, both familiar 
and less well-known texts, using a critical lens attuned in particular to the contours of 
a sentimental aesthetic. While the high-modernism of that historical period is 
traditionally associated with ideals of critical detachment, the non-mimetic and a 
pervasive anti-humanism, I argue that the sophisticated thought of such figures as 
Eisenstein, Benjamin, Bazin or Balázs is less than easily categorized within such 
rubrics.  
 
Having established the contours of sentimental theory in relation to cinema and its 
forerunners, the second section of the thesis maintains a meta-critical goal of 
examining the vicissitudes of the sentimental as it continues on through to the 
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cinematic period. Although the sentimental had certainly crystallized as a term 
denoting kitsch and emotional manipulation by the time of Hollywood’s rise, what 
and how the cinema invokes sentimentality remains a complex and underexplored 
area. At the centre of this debate arguably rests a conflict between the aesthetics of 
modernism and that of a ‘bourgeois’, classical Hollywood tradition (as inherited by 
historical melodrama), yet my analysis time and again reveals the extent to which a 
critical modernism remains highly nuanced in relation to Hollywood’s key 
sentimentalists, as does any clear notion of a designated bourgeois ideology 
underpinning Hollywood film. As proponents of a mass culture rather than a more 
monolithically conceived bourgeois art, these figures (and their appeals to the 
sentimental) might be more productively understood I argue, within a rubric similar to 
that which scholar Miriam Hansen has termed ‘vernacular modernism’, than as a 
merely regressive ideology.37 
 
The second section thus explores specific figures of the cinematic era in order to 
examine the alleged continuities between their work and a sentimental aesthetics, with 
textual analysis of specific films and their modes of reception serving to provide a 
theoretically informed elucidation of such considerations. My choices of Charlie 
Chaplin and Steven Spielberg, despite the wide gulf in time-period between them, 
allows the discussion to chart the success of the sentimental in surviving from the 
period of early cinema to its classical period and beyond. As dominant cultural figures 
of their time period, both figures, I argue, allow us to analyse the cultural work of the 
sentimental as both critical and textual feature. Chaplin’s Tramp comes to represent 
                                                
37 Miriam Hansen, ‘The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism,’ 
Modernism/modernity Vol. 6, no. 2 (1999), pp. 59–77. 
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the figure of virtue threatened by modernity (in its embrace of the machine and the 
functional), thereby becoming a touchstone of Hollywood melodrama. Spielberg’s 
work represents the continuance of such a ‘mode’, operating nostalgically, yet 
pedagogically, in the fallout of New Hollywood’s general ‘decline in sentiment.’ 
Sentiment functions for both I argue as renewed appeals to the human, to compassion 
and to the child-like, if not childish, individuals struggling within technologically 
overwhelming and emotionally sterile modernities of advanced industry, war and 
entertainment. 
 
Chapter Four’s case-study focuses on the reception of Charlie Chaplin as a historical 
landmark of cinematic sentiment in the early period. I explore a key link between the 
sentiment of Chaplin’s features and the tastes of a middle-class audience and how the 
perception of Chaplin as a modernist hero within other critical constituencies 
underlines contradictions concerning his sentimental legacy.  
 
Chapter Five focuses on the work and reception of Steven Spielberg, a film-maker 
that has provoked much serious scholarship as well as ongoing questions concerning 
his trademark sentimentality in relation to children, family, the documentation of 
history and the political identity of America. I examine his critical re-evaluation from 
purveyor of (a reductively formulated) sentimentality to a figure that has provided a 
post-classical and post-auteur cinema culture to a taste of its classical period. 
Artificial Intelligence, Saving Private Ryan and Schindler’s List are analysed as films 
that manifest various versions of Spielberg, sentimentalist (in relation to war, family 
and modern subjectivity) as well as virtuoso craftsman, historical rhetorician and 
postmodern bricoleur.   
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My final chapter looks to those areas of filmmaking where sentimentality is 
commonly presumed to be almost entirely abandoned as an aesthetic priority, often 
representing indeed that which more ‘independent’, arthouse or auteur-driven films 
aspire to oppose on diversely ideological, political and aesthetic grounds. I examine 
the work of Quentin Tarantino, Lars von Trier and Todd Solondz as filmmakers from 
divergent modes of production and reception in order to show how all however might 
be considered within revisionist rubrics of sentimentality.  
 
I argue in the chapters below indeed that, notwithstanding wide-ranging dismissals of 
the sentimental, the latter represents a still fertile mode of discourse for considering 
the emotional mechanics of cinema. Indeed, I would suggest that a discursive grey 
area exists between critical dismissal and euphoric celebrations/recuperations of 
melodramatic pathos, requiring a more fine-tuned, media-specific and historically 
sensitive analysis of its tropes and paradigms. As a body of theory that both validates 
‘feeling’ in its pedagogical and idealist aims while remaining problematic 
ideologically, the sentimental requires a renewed critical scrutiny. In relation to film, 
the sentimental represents both that which the medium was almost destined to 
embody in terms of its eclectic sensual palette, while at the same time a property of 
predecessor arts that many might have wished film to one day overcome entirely. In 
such respects, I have situated my discussion specifically around the aesthetics of 
cinematic and political modernism, examining how the sentimental might be 
considered to conflict with modernist aesthetics, at the same time that they share 
certain historical precursors and aesthetic concerns. A key assumption in such regards 
is that such tensions between the minimalist and the mannered, fact and fiction, 
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restraint and excess, reason and emotion, frequently imply one another in their own 
signification, an interdependence that a film such as Vertigo so eloquently reveals as a 
key to the sentimental itself. Reason cannot operate independently of emotion and 
where one becomes a dominant over the other, a set of tragic misrecognitions and 
disruptions eventually serve to restore narrative stability and psychical equilibrium.  
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Chapter One 
 
The Rise and Fall of Sentimentalism in the 18th Century  
 
 [...]for, you must know, that what we admire in you, are truth and 
nature, not studied or elaborate epistles. We can hear at church, or 
read in our closets, fifty good things that we expect not from you: 
but we cannot receive from any body else the pleasure of 
sentiments flowing with that artless ease, which so much affects 
us when we read your letters. Then, my sweet girl, your gratitude, 
prudence, integrity of heart, your humility, shine so much in all 
your letters and thoughts, that no wonder my brother loves you as 
he does. 
          LETTER XII - From Lady Davers to Mrs. B 
          Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded, by Samuel Richardson (1740)1 
 
 
The above praise of Richardson’s (1689-1761) heroine Pamela exemplifies the 
rhetoric of the 18th century sentimental novel and provides an insight into the early 
meaning of ‘sentiment’ that is distinct from its modern, often pejorative connotations. 
Sentiments, and the sentimental novel, were meant to cut through the artifice of cant 
and mannered prose, revealing more genuine, benevolent impulses of virtuous human 
subjectivity. At the same time, however, such qualities are appreciated as attributes of 
an always rare virtue, the possessor of which is subjected to suffering and social 
marginalization, recognition of their virtue far from guaranteed. Thus while Pamela’s 
virtue would be eventually ‘rewarded’, Richardson’s subsequent novel Clarissa would 
be far more pessimistic: 
Let me repeat that I am quite sick of life; and of an earth in which 
innocent and benevolent spirits are sure to be considered as aliens, 
and to be made sufferers by the genuine sons and daughters of that 
earth.2 
 
                                                
1 Vol. 2, London: J.M Dent, 1955, p. 32. 
 
2 Samuel Richardson, Clarissa; or, The History of a Young Lady, first published in 1747, London: 
Penguin, 1985, p. 1020. 
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The above lament of the eponymous heroine indeed equally epitomizes sentimental 
rhetoric in its invocation of pathos for one that lives a life of virtue and innocence in a 
world of cruelty and greed. Clarissa refers to her own plight in which she has been 
persistently pursued, tortured and raped by the rakish aristocrat, Lovelace. Contrary to 
the high hopes of an Enlightenment philosophy of natural benevolence, Clarissa’s 
virtue and attendant suffering fail to change the corrupt forces that surround her until 
too late, including her avaricious family and lecherous suitor. Like Pamela, Clarissa 
becomes a paradigm of what R.F. Brissenden, in his account of the British ‘novel of 
sentiment’, termed ‘virtue in distress.’3 Moreover, if Pamela’s rewarded virtue was 
exemplary, Clarissa’s virtue-in-distress was even more so for the Puritan Richardson, 
conveying ‘sentiment’ through the pathos of martyrdom. 
 
Where a contemporary meaning of the ‘sentimental’ is offered by the OED as an 
‘indulgence in superficial emotion,’4 ‘sentiments’, for Richardson, are always ‘moral 
and instructive.’5 His novels were accompanied by a plethora of guidebooks and 
manuals that advised readers on how to best interpret them and discover in them 
‘maxims’ for their own proper moral conduct.6 To be ‘sentimental’ or to exhibit 
‘sensibility’ would be related in the mid-18th century to a certain sympathy towards 
                                                
3 R. F. Brissenden, Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade, 
Macmillan: London, 1974. 
 
4 The full OED definition of ‘Sentimental’ is as follows: ‘Of persons, their dispositions and actions: 
Characterized by sentiment. Originally in favourable sense: Characterized by or exhibiting refined and 
elevated feeling. In later use: Addicted to indulgence in superficial emotion; apt to be swayed by 
sentiment.’ 
 
5 Such as in Richardson’s A Collection of the Moral and Instructive Sentiments, Maxims, Cautions, and 
Reflexions, Contained in the Histories of Pamela, Clarissa, and Sir Charles Grandison, C. Hitch and L. 
Hawes, 1755. 
 
6 Ibid., 
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society’s victims, a benevolent impulse towards reform and the alleviation of 
misfortune. It would become the mark of bourgeois civility, the approval and tearful 
enjoyment of the capacity for sympathy with others’ tales of woe. However, the first 
recorded instance of the use of the word ‘sentimental’ as reported in the OED is by a 
close correspondent of Richardson, Lady Bradshaigh, who enquired of him in a letter 
from 1749,  
What, in your opinion, is the meaning of the word sentimental, 
so much in vogue among the polite... Every thing clever and 
agreeable is comprehended in that word...I am frequently 
astonished to hear such a one is a sentimental man; we were a 
sentimental party; I have been taking a sentimental walk.7 
 
It is telling that this quotation expresses confusion as to the term’s exact meaning. For 
no sooner had it been invented than ‘sentimental’ becomes a byword for a whole 
array of concepts, characterising a variety of activities. Where, ‘moral sentiments’, 
for Richardson, were available to anyone that learns the Christian message from his 
novels and guides, ‘sentimental’ appears to originate in a ‘polite’ and voguish milieu 
that names its own supposedly distinctive capacity for sentiment. Hence the OED’s 
definition of ‘sentimental’ as referring, at least in an ‘original’ and ‘favourable’ sense, 
to persons ‘characterized by or exhibiting refined and elevated feeling.’ Clarissa’s 
moral elevation becomes a pleasing symbol for the elevated status of those whom the 
Romantic poet Robert Southey, in 1823, would refer to disdainfully as the 
‘sentimental classes.’8  
 
This sentimental ideal would be in vogue for much of the mid-18th century in Britain, 
France and Germany. It was a stance toward emotion strongly identified with the rise 
                                                
7 Lady Bradshaigh in Samuel Richardson, The Correspondence of Samuel Richardson, (1804) Anna 
Laetitia Barbauld (ed.), New York: AMS Press Inc., 1966, IV, p. 282. 
 
8 Robert Southey, The Quarterly Review, 28, 1823. 
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of the novel (although sentimental tropes were certainly present in all art forms 
including poetry, theatre and painting).  It was also integral to much of the 18th 
century’s moral philosophy, especially in its concerns with the possibility of a 
virtuous subject in an increasingly urban society. It would signify, most centrally, an 
inexorable link between emotion and morality, as distinct from a morality determined 
solely by reason (see below). Sentimentality became part of an Enlightenment 
optimism in the benevolent impulses of man, mediated by Christian and philosophical 
values, producing a sentimental literary hero or heroine exhibiting in all contexts an 
exemplary capacity for moral judgement. Rather less optimistically, however, such 
virtue would render the subject at odds with cruel, worldly forces. To accept, with a 
tear in one’s eye, the pitfalls and hopes of a perilous, moral engagement with the 
world would come to exemplify the ‘sentimental’ sympathies of the age. 
 
This chapter will trace the concept of sentimentality as it reached its apex in moral 
philosophy and canonical literature in order to historically situate the vexed and 
confused place of the sentimental in contemporary art, art criticism, and popular 
media.  What, exactly, did sentimentality mean to those who would use it as a basis 
for their literary art?  What philosophical and/or didactic value was it thought to 
have?  How, and why, did it fall out of favour with high-minded artists and thinkers 
so soon after it came into vogue?  How also did it live on?  I will begin with a 
discussion of the historical context of the idea of sentimentality in 18th century moral 
philosophy, primarily as it played out in Britain. Such figures as the Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1631-1713), David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) 
emerge as important theorists of ‘moral sentiment’ as it became known, all concerned 
with the role of the ‘passions’ in ethics. The sentimental trend in moral philosophy is 
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echoed in the rise of what has become known as the ‘sentimental novel’ in Britain, 
and so it is to the novels of Samuel Richardson and Henry Mackenzie that I then turn. 
The chapter will then explore the reception of British novels such as Richardson’s in 
France and consequently the French understanding of ‘sensibilité’, as discussed by 
Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and then both celebrated and critiqued by his philosophe 
contemporary Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). The discussion will lastly 
consider the suspicions of tearful enjoyment of art in Britain that came to concretize 
the meaning of sentimentality as it is widely understood today, the term largely 
failing to escape its connotations of mawkish self-indulgence as a function of 
rhetorical manipulation.  
 
 
  
The Seeds of Sentimentality: Hobbes and Locke 
 
R. F. Brissenden claims that the sentimental ideal was an individual in whom ‘reason 
and feeling were properly balanced.’9 The belief in the possibility of this balanced 
and therefore virtuous subject was thought of as a key paradigm in Enlightenment 
philosophy. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke (1632-
1704) posits that individual human ‘Experience’ is the source of all knowledge, a 
main contention of empiricism. The knowledge one gains is of either ‘external 
sensible objects’ or ‘the internal operations of our minds.’10 Gaining knowledge of 
the former would correspond to ‘sensation’, of the latter to ‘reflection.’ This contrasts 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 24. The genealogy of both concepts will be discussed below. 
 
10 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Tegg, 1836, p. 51. 
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with a rationalist tradition that argues for the existence of ‘innate ideas,’11 of 
knowledge present in the mind at birth, rather than gained through sense experience.  
 
The mere mention of ‘Sensible objects’ immediately invites speculation as to what the 
subject may have to experience, which may not be determined by introspective 
reflection alone, in order to become a moral being.  For Locke, the answer is 
unequivocal:  
That we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or 
diminish pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the possession 
of any other good, or absence of any evil.12 
 
Locke believes that the experiences of pain and pleasure are essential to our becoming 
moral beings, as the idea of the good is entirely allied with that which elicits pleasure 
or diminishes pain; in other words, he posits a psychology of self-interest.  At first 
glance, such a psychology would seem to promote little more than warring self-
interested parties rather than moral and socially-minded beings; but Locke’s solution 
to this problem resides in imagining a ‘law-maker’ with the power to reward and 
punish – i.e. mete out pleasure and pain, so that human self-interest conforms to the 
social.  This lawmaker for Locke may be a state power, but since such authorities are 
eminently corruptible, Locke’s ultimate legislator and judge is God, and his laws 
consist of vague but immutable Judeo-Christian values. 
 
According to Locke’s philosophy, then, people educated in the fundamentals of a 
divine law of benevolence and social justice, and consequent divinely rewards and 
punishments, will incline towards obedience and moral goodness.  But Locke would 
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 71. 
 
12 Ibid., p. 146. 
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still have to contend with the question of why the promise of heaven or hell—eternal 
pleasure or pain—so frequently failed as a sufficient motivator for human behaviour.  
In other words, why would anyone, possessed with rational choice, choose sinful 
behaviour over that which would lead to the greater good?  Locke responded to this 
query by reaching to the emotions to fill the gap left by the intellect.  A person would 
have to experience not only knowledge of the greater good, but desire for it: ‘the 
uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present 
enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it.’13  Without this feeling, this passion, a 
person cannot rationalise moral choices whose benefits are quite distant; in order to 
arouse this desire, a person must reflect on the good continually until it becomes 
second nature.14 
 
Locke’s theory followed a time of great social turmoil in England encompassing 
religious, political and economic conflicts. The 17th century produced a bloody civil 
war in England where religious and political tolerance was undermined by the 
necessity to make stark choices of allegiance between royalist Cavaliers and 
parliamentary Roundheads. The despotic military rule of Cromwell as Lord Protector 
had been ended with the Restoration of a less powerful monarchy (Charles II and 
subsequently James II). Locke was himself a physician to the First Earl of 
Shaftesbury, one of the first parliamentary Whigs that campaigned determinedly 
against the Stuart dynasty and its alliance with Catholicism. Locke’s famous Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding was first published two years after the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 (where James II was overthrown) and the enacting of the Bill of 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 147. 
 
14 See the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on ‘John Locke’ for discussion of the 
indispensability of emotion in Locke’s ethics. 
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Rights, to which he contributed many central ideas. By the time William and Mary 
were ‘constitutional’ monarchs (a monarchy with minimal influence on parliament), 
feudalism would be finally surpassed by capitalism - symbolized by the creation of 
the Bank of England in 1694. 
 
The cruelties of the absolutist rule of the Stuarts were represented in a culture of 
courtly wit and libertinism. A feudalist aristocracy that runs amuck to the detriment of 
the lower classes was illustrated in some Restoration drama and was exemplified by 
the poetry of John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester and others in the court of Charles II. 
The figure of the libertine would connote a misogynistic male aristocrat that considers 
himself intellectually and legally free of moral restraints. Seducing women without 
any further commitments such as marriage or family, he would be a recurring figure 
in the following century’s literature and drama as embodied by Mr. B and Lovelace in 
Richardson’s novels.  
 
The civil chaos and aristocratic excesses of the 17th century would also be mirrored 
by the ‘egoistic’ philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), emphasising the 
inherently self-interested nature of man and a default ‘state of nature’ of conflict and 
war. Hobbes’ philosophy and his well-known work, Leviathan, published in 1651, 
emphasises the inevitable brutality of man who acts only in the interest of self-
preservation and whose life is best described as ‘nasty, brutish and short.’15 As a 
result, war becomes the most natural state for man to be in, where the ‘two Cardinall 
vertues’ are ‘Force, and Fraud’.16 His solution to this anarchic ‘state of meer 
                                                
15 Thomas Hobbes and Richard Tuck, Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 89.   
 
16 Ibid., p. 90. 
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Nature’17 is Leviathan, an absolute authority or sovereign to which all men must defer 
and which subjugates their inevitably destructive and conflicting instincts.  
 
The context for the proposal of this tyrannical form of governance was indeed the 
threats to the sovereignty of the king in 17th century England. As parliament and those 
it represented in the commercial sectors of society grew more powerful, the 
absolutism of the king became questioned in economic and moral terms. The 
monarchy’s chief rival in an earlier medieval period would have been the Church and 
the dogmas of Catholic authoritarianism. England, however, had already broken away 
both religiously and monetarily from such authority and great power had become 
vested in the monarch. Hobbes was a vehement Royalist who defended the power of 
the sovereign in rational terms, believing that choice and free will had to be 
surrendered by a country’s subjects once an absolute ruler had been chosen. Leviathan 
would not be subject to legal constraints – the rule of law’s chief function, in fact, 
would be in forcing Leviathan’s subjects to be kept entirely under his authority. 
Hobbes believed this to provide the only hope for harmony among inevitably warring 
individuals. Indeed, the civil war that followed between Charles I and parliament in 
the 1640s was attributed by Hobbes to the flawed division of power between monarch 
and parliament. 
 
It would be quite misguided to say that the historical events of 1688 and the 
publication of Locke’s Essay proved the Hobbesian doctrine wrong. Although such 
events produced better social conditions for many citizens and a less turbulent 
political and religious climate, the ascendancy of the doctrine of a balanced 
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 140. 
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Enlightenment subject brought with it its own problems. It would carry over to the 
next century, with renewed urgency, the debate as to how to characterise the ideal 
subject of this newly democratized and urbanized environment. 
 
The Importance of Benevolence: The 3rd Earl of Shaftsbury  
 
The sentimental literature that would, in the mid-18th century, move readers and 
theatre audiences to tears, would espouse virtues that had been valorised by a variety 
of discourses antecedent to it. Such themes as charity to the poor, virtue as its own 
reward, a woman’s chastity and the capacity for pity and compassion would be 
established as key markers of the benevolence of mankind by the time of the 
publication of Richardson’s first novel in 1740. There were others aside from Locke 
that had been far more vociferous in their repudiation of Hobbesian notions. To assert 
the selfish nature of the human spirit was contrary to various core Christian beliefs. 
20th century scholars such as C. A. Moore and R. S. Crane find opposition to both 
Hobbes and Christian orthodoxy in the writings and preachings of various theological 
schools such as the Latitudinarians, Cambridge Platonists and the Deists, all 
prominent in the last quarter of the 17th century.18 While more orthodox Christian 
groups were antagonized by the recent scientific discoveries in physics or astronomy, 
these more moderate groups would regard them as a means to better understand the 
divine . The deistic proposition, according to Moore, was that ‘the Deity is 
sufficiently revealed through natural phenomena, and that reason unaided is capable 
of forming an adequate notion of God.’19  The ‘Latitude-men’, as Crane refers to 
                                                
18 R.S. Crane, ‘Suggestions Toward A Genealogy of the "Man of Feeling"’, ELH, Vol. 1, No. 3 
(Dec., 1934), pp. 205-230; C. A. Moore, ‘Shaftesbury and the Ethical Poets in England, 1700-1760,’ 
PMLA, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1916), pp. 264-325. 
  
19 Moore, ‘Shaftesbury and the Ethical Poets in England’, p. 267. 
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them, would also oppose the Puritan doctrine of the limited importance of moral 
works (such as charity) as compared to a compulsory faith in god. He goes on to 
argue that many preachers at the time would have been sermonizing on the 
importance of charity and having benevolent feelings towards man. One of these 
‘divines’, as they were called, John Tillotson (1630-1694), writes in a typical vein, 
‘How much better it is to do good, to be really useful and beneficial to others.’20 
 
Both the liberal doctrines of Locke and the theological trends of the 17th century 
would be combined and popularized in the writings of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 
3rd Earl of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury, like the Deists, was concerned about the 
theological doctrines of reward, punishment and self-preservation that underpinned 
both Christian orthodoxy and Hobbes’ arguments. In both, the subject is provided 
with incentives to living a moral life through obedience to either a vengeful deity or 
an omnipotent sovereign. In both, the subject cannot be trusted to his/her own good 
inclinations. Shaftesbury’s main assertions, however, state that a life of virtue can be 
followed through instinct rather than having to be enforced by a system of incentives 
and penalties. His work was to be particularly influential for later philosophers such 
as David Hume and Adam Smith (discussed below). His Characteristics21, published 
in 1711, was a much read work throughout the early 18th century.  Shaftesbury’s 
confidence in the subject’s instinctual drives towards benevolence contrasts sharply 
with Hobbes’ image of a self-interested and inevitably destructive figure. 
Benevolence would be manifest by the subject’s ‘affections’ for everyday social 
activities such as:   
                                                
20 Cited in Crane, ‘Suggestions Toward A Genealogy of the "Man of Feeling"’, p. 211. 
 
21 Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 
(1711) Lawrence E. Klein (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
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parental Kindness, Zeal for Posterity, Concern for the Propagation 
and Nurture of the Young, Love of Fellowship and Company, 
Compassion, mutual Succour, and the rest of this kind.22  
 
Here, Shaftesbury makes clear that benevolent feelings such as ‘love of fellowship’ 
and ‘compassion’ are just as instinct-driven as self-preservation and reproduction.  
Indeed, benevolence, exemplified by this variety of social virtues, was a natural 
inclination that his hypothetical ‘creature’ would not need reasoning, education, or 
coercion to access:  
Let us suppose a Creature, who wanting Reason, and being unable 
to reflect, has, notwithstanding, many good Qualitys and 
Affections; as Love to his Kind, Courage, Gratitude, or Pity. ’Tis 
certain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting Faculty, it will 
at the same instant approve of Gratitude, Kindness, and Pity;23 
 
 
Shaftsbury thus believed not only that unselfish emotions were instinctual, but also 
that were one to acquire a ‘reflecting Faculty’ it would support those same benevolent 
emotions, such as ‘gratitude’ and ‘pity’ as well as corresponding behaviours, such as 
kindness. Cognition and altruistic affect were allied rather than opposed.  
 
For his hypothetical ‘Creature’, there moreover could be nothing ‘more amiable’ than 
a ‘shew or representation of the social Passion’24; a benevolent subject would 
inevitably enjoy watching or observing real ‘shows’ or fictional ‘representations’ of 
generosity and kindness.25  For Shaftesbury, such representations have more of a 
purpose than mere entertainment – they instill virtue. 
 
                                                
22 Shaftesbury, ‘Characteristics’, p. 192. 
 
23 Ibid., p. 182. 
 
24 Shaftesbury, Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, (1699), David Walford (ed.), Manchester: 
Manchester University Presss, 1977, p. 32. 
 
25 ‘Social Passion’ is Shaftesbury’s term for the unselfish, i.e., social instinct. 
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 So that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; 
yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others 
do[my italics], so as to take notice of what is worthy or 
honest[my italics]; and make that Notice or Conception of 
Worth and Honesty to be an Object of his affection; he has not 
the Character of being virtuous;26 
 
 
In other words, for Shaftesbury, to be benevolent was not necessarily to be of 
‘virtuous character.’  One did not need to reflect to be naturally benevolent, but to 
become a truly virtuous character, one needed to reflect on one’s own and others’ 
actions, and have a second-order affection for benevolence itself.  In accordance with 
Locke’s dyad of sensation and reflection, Shaftesbury regards the witnessing of 
virtuous actions of others as complementary to a reasoned reflection on one’s own 
actions, and fundamental to the shaping of a virtuous character. Indeed, suggested in 
Shaftesbury’s notion of the observation of moral behaviour is a key premise of 
aesthetics:  
Thus are the arts and virtues mutually friends and thus the science of 
virtuosos and that of virtue itself become, in a manner, one and the 
same.27 
 
 
For Shaftesbury, ‘the arts’ and ethics are aligned, as evidenced by the notion that 
artistic beauty and moral beauty were ‘one and the same’. Moral experience was 
equivalent to aesthetic experience - both involved a perception of, and openness to, 
beauty.  
 
At times, Shaftesbury’s writings seem to advance the notion of an infectious 
transmission of benevolent emotions between subjects that would later be taken up by 
Hume. For Shaftesbury, the ‘Admiration or Love of Order, Harmony and Proportion’, 
                                                
26 Shaftesbury, Inquiry, p. 18. 
 
27 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, p. 150. 
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presumably either represented in art or as theoretical concepts would be ‘naturally 
improving to the temper.’ Considering, then, that a subject’s virtuous character must 
be formed by observation and reflection, a kind of education, Shaftesbury faced a 
problem of how to disentangle such a learning process from any notion of authority, 
given his disinclination for benevolence based on incentives. He describes a liberal 
education thus: 
Yet the same Master of the Family using proper Rewards and gentle 
Punishments towards his Children, teaches them Goodness; and by 
this help instructs them in a Virtue, which afterwards they practice 
upon other grounds, and without thinking of a Penalty or Bribe. And 
this is what we call a Liberal Education and a Liberal Service: the 
contrary Service and Obedience, whether towards God or Man, 
being illiberal, and unworthy of any Honour or Commendation.28 
 
 
The above description contrasts sharply with a Hobbesian language of absolute 
submission to authority. The transition from obedient child to self-regulating, liberal 
adult is described with the adjectives ‘gentle’ and ‘proper’, suggesting that the child’s 
benevolence might perhaps lie only just below the surface. However, it seems 
inconsistent for him to argue that behaviour determined by ‘Obedience’ is wholly 
‘illiberal’, whilst his liberal adult seems still subject to a kind of internalised and 
unconscious obedience. Rewards and punishments are not totally dispensed with in 
Shaftesbury’s moral universe but ought only be applied as a carefully controlled 
pedagogy for children. For adults, virtue might no longer rely on anything as crude as 
a ‘Penalty’ or ‘Bribe’ yet it is left ambiguous as to what ‘other grounds’ there may be 
for it to thrive.  
 
                                                
28 Shaftesbury, Inquiry, p. 39. 
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Shaftesbury would furthermore set limits on the scope of his code of gentility, writing 
that philosophy is best conducted in a ‘Circle of Good Company’ composed 
exclusively of the ‘better sort’. The elitist in Shaftesbury was less optimistic about the 
usefulness of the passions in the everyday ‘sort.’ Indeed, much criticism of 
Shaftesbury sees him as a complacent aristocrat that regards the characteristics of his 
own class as exemplary.29 For it is when he speculates upon passions ‘raised in a 
multitude’30 (passions that every member of society can indulge in) that he alludes to 
their all too easily turning to ‘panic’. For him, it can bring ‘disorder’ to ‘the general 
society of mankind’ and, problematically in relation to his own ruling class, 
sedition.31 Such anxieties about an emotional openness that might cross class 
boundaries indeed represent early expressions of what in later centuries would 
become a far more commonplace debate about the emotions mediated by mass 
culture, and indeed the cinema. Whether foreshadowing critiques of the stale, 
mawkish Victorianism of the following century, or of Hollywood entertainment and 
the ‘culture industry’ of the century following that, this would certainly not be the last 
time that the idea of an ‘open-access’ sentimentality gives pause to elitist intellectuals. 
 
Moreover, despite valorising the benevolent emotions and seeing them as instinctual, 
Shaftesbury did not go so far as to regard them as a substitute for ‘Reason’, and still 
advised caution in allowing the passions free reign. In addition to possibly causing 
sedition, an: 
                                                
29 See Robert Markley, ‘Sentimentality as Performance: Shaftesbury, Sterne, and the Theatrics of 
Virtue’, in Felicity Nussbaum and Laura Brown (eds.), The New Eighteenth Century, London: 
Methuen, 1987. pp. 210-30. 
 
30 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, p. 10. 
 
31 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, p. 52. 
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over-great Tenderness destroys the Effect of Love, 
and excessive Pity renders us incapable of giving succour. Hence 
the Excess of motherly Love is own’d to be a vitious Fondness; 
over-great Pity, Effeminacy and Weakness;32 
 
 
Shaftesbury believes in the above that emotions could be both fallible and excessive. 
‘Beyond a certain degree,’ even ‘kindness’ and ‘love’ could become ‘vitious’. There 
is also little doubt, from the above, that Shaftesbury also preferred such ‘Excess’ to 
remain tied to his idea of femininity. 
 
Shaftesbury’s philosophy remains cautious therefore with respect to the sometimes 
overpowering effects of emotion, in that he would never go so far as to posit 
emotional display in the subject as the only evidence of genuine moral subjectivity. 
Shaftesbury’s moralism and its contradictions set the template for a debate concerning 
how virtue can be evidenced by, and communicated between, subjects. The human 
inclination for benevolence would, for him, be characterised by kind and 
compassionate emotions learned by genteel custom (even if this must imply the 
customs of a particular social class), which would be most in evidence in its relation 
to benevolent and charitable displays such as ‘parental kindness’ or ‘nurture of the 
young.’ However, as much as the facilitation of good ‘sentiments,’ through moral 
pedagogy and civilized custom, constituted vital components for a civilized society, 
the passions nevertheless remained unpredictable if they went unchecked. 
  
Sensibility: Addison and Hume 
 
Shaftesbury’s above reference to an ‘over-great Tenderness’ and ‘Effeminacy’ would 
foreshadow later concerns with ‘sensibility’, the latter term referring indeed to a very 
                                                
32 Shaftesbury, Inquiry, p. 15. 
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comparable attribute.  In 1711, in an article from the Spectator, Joseph Addison 
would argue: 
 
Modesty..is a kind of quick and delicate Feeling in the Soul... It is 
such an exquisite Sensibility, as warns a woman to shun the first 
Appearance of every thing which is hurtful.33 
 
In the above, ‘sensibility’ denotes a sense that aids the subject’s intuitive powers, that 
would facilitate a particular alertness to nuance and particularities, as if it were a fine 
instrument that is easily blunted or made inaccurate. The use of ‘delicate’ would 
become a key adjective for how sensibility and its implicit benevolence would come 
to be regarded throughout the century. It immediately suggests a vulnerability in one 
that possesses it. Addison asserts that the use-value of a ‘sensibility’ is for protection 
against that which is ‘hurtful’, yet the status of such hurt remains ambiguous. If such 
hurt exists irrespective of whether one has sensibility to detect it, then the latter would 
seem to be an advantage in detecting it at its ‘first appearance.’ Conversely, if such 
hurt exists only as detected by a delicate sensibility, the latter might well be 
considered a mixed blessing.  
 
In his 1742 essay ‘Of the Delicacy Of Taste And Delicacy Of Passion’, the 
philosopher David Hume would also apply the ‘sensible’ to a subject with a certain 
potential for suffering: 
 
 SOME People are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, 
 which makes them extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, 
 and gives them a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as 
 well as a piercing grief, when they meet with misfortunes and 
 adversity.34 
                                                
33 Joseph Addison, The Spectator. No. 231 
 
34 David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, E. Miller (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 
1985, p. 3-4. 
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This capacity for sensibility implies in the above passage the same perceptual 
propensities as Addison’s ‘exquisite sensibility.’ However, it again seems a cause for 
celebration mixed with some unease as to the ‘Sorrow’ that it leaves one open to. In 
his Treatise of Human Nature,35 in 1739, writing on ‘Goodness and Benevolence,’ 
Hume aligns a similar term, ‘tender sentiment,’ with a subject that is ‘actuated’ by 
‘Love.’ It remains ambiguous what Hume means by ‘actuated’, for we can infer both 
a direct experience of love towards oneself or a witnessing of a benevolent act of love. 
However, its effects upon the subject would be described with a vocabulary similar to 
the writing style of the ‘sentimental novel’:  
  
The tears naturally start in our eyes at the conception of it [Love]; 
nor can we forbear giving a loose to the same tenderness towards the 
person who exerts it. All this seems to me a proof, that our 
approbation has, in those cases, an origin different from the prospect 
of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others.36 
 
 
For Hume, tears are evidence of a subject’s genuine approval of a benevolent concept, 
such as love. The contemplation of such concepts affect us more deeply than when we 
contemplate either self-oriented or social goals. To follow this logic the more one has 
tears, the more one is contemplating moral concepts that transcend those of ‘utility 
and advantage.’   
 
Hume was a major figure of what has since become known collectively as the 
‘Scottish Enlightenment’ including other philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson, 
Lord Kames and Adam Smith, all of whom would contribute to the formulation of 
                                                                                                                                       
 
35 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), London: OUP, 1973. 
 
36 Ibid., p. 604. 
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‘moral sense’. With the publication of the Treatise, Hume would follow Shaftesbury’s 
legacy in applauding ‘goodness and benevolence.’ However, as in the above citation, 
Hume argues that ‘love’, which is elsewhere referred to as ‘sympathy’37, cannot be 
explained solely on the grounds of a perceived utility to society. He believes 
sentiments to arise through a ‘spark of friendship’ that is felt by the subject and from 
which all social behaviour should be derived. Writing on the human capacity for 
‘sympathy’, he argues that ‘no quality of human nature is more remarkable.’38 The 
closeness of friends and acquaintances, the harmony of their passions and beliefs 
communicated within close contact and cultured discussion constitute sympathy’s 
templates. Sympathy, would be the ability ‘to receive by communication [others’] 
inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own.’39 
He employs a metaphor of contagion as a means of describing the infectious nature of 
good sentiments, mentioned above, implying that if benevolent emotions were not 
intrinsic to man, their diffusion throughout society would be at least inexorable and 
welcome: 
The passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest 
facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent 
movements in all human breasts. Where friendship appears in very 
signal instances, my heart catches the same passion, and is warmed 
by those warm sentiments, that display themselves before me.40 
 
 
Indeed, the above passage demonstrates a great optimism in ‘friendship’ and the 
easiness with which emotions are transmitted between subjects. The intentions 
underlying the display of ‘warm sentiments’ are always assumed to be transparently 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 316. 
 
38 Ibid.,  
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benevolent. He describes their dissemination as ‘correspondent movements in all 
human breasts’- shared bodily experiences as much as shared beliefs. For Hume, 
being moved, as we would most commonly refer to it, which includes tears of course, 
are genuine expressions of a successfully transmitted passion, more genuine than 
verbal interaction. 
 
In his famous maxim, Hume maintained therefore that reason ought only be ‘the slave 
of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them’.41 This quote is often cited as evidence of Hume’s key contribution to the 
ascendancy of feeling over reason.42 Indeed, this position contrasts with Shaftesbury’s 
appeal to the social ‘affections’ as a means of returning those that are ‘easiest affected 
with pain or pleasure’ to a ‘right balance within, and to maintain them in their duty.’43 
Shaftesbury’s ‘affections,’ for Hume, would probably seem too much governed by 
‘reason’ if their chief task were to restore balance, for balance here seems to valorise 
an absence of reactions to pain and pleasure, and ultimately a less passionate subject. 
Pain and pleasure are precisely what Hume wants to see registered in ‘bodily 
movements’. For him, the visuality of such movements allows them moreover to be 
‘contagious.’  
 
This is fine, as long as warm sentiments or benevolence motivate such movements. 
But what if they are motivated by false beliefs or less noble sentiments? What if they 
                                                
41 Ibid., p. 415. 
 
42 The 20th century scholar Basil Willey argued that Hume’s thought was a water-shed between ‘Nature 
and Reason’ before him and his own ‘Nature and Feeling’. Brissenden, in Virtue in Distress, argues 
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are faked? Passions, within Hume’s rubric, could not be inauthentic in such respects. 
The ‘bodily movements’ become privileged because he regards them as the most 
visible, genuine registration of pain or pleasure. To visibly display one’s passions on 
the body would be the mark of a transparent personality, conveying an honesty in 
expressing pleasure and pain. Such display, for Hume, would signify a ‘delicate 
sensibility.’ Although exhibited only by some individuals, it would reveal exemplary 
honesty and virtue, irrespective of the ambiguous cognitive processes that could 
underpin such feeling. Affect would be more visible than cognition and thus warm 
sentiments could, for Hume, inevitably flourish. Such a scenario of infectious 
benevolent emotions indeed becomes exemplified by the many tearful scenes of the 
sentimental novel, such as the heroine’s famous death in Clarissa death and many of 
Mackenzie’s tableaux, where suffering envelops the scene and is intended to spill 
over into reader reaction. This would be a moral affect transmitted between moral 
characters and between novel and reader. 
 
 
Feminine Sensibility in the Novel: Samuel Richardson 
 
The ambiguity concerning the benefits to the subject of ‘moral sense’ would put the 
condition of women at centre stage for an enquiry into the benevolent condition. By 
1753, Samuel Richardson had published all three of his most celebrated novels: 
Pamela, Clarissa and Sir Charles Grandison. All Richardson’s central heroes and 
heroines are each held up as paradigms of virtue in their fictional worlds. For Pamela 
and Clarissa, such virtue is proved by their exemplary endurance of suffering - for 
Grandison, plot becomes subordinate to acclamations of his virtue by women friends. 
For Richardson, women had a monopoly on ‘sentiment’ which, when pushed to its 
limits, becomes a language of wordless gestures, sighs and weeping, conforming to 
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Hume’s description of ‘delicate sensibility.’ Pamela, in particular had become 
immensely popular, spawning a sequel, the second part of Pamela, and various moral 
guidebooks linked to the story. Pamela’s tale turns on the repeated threats to her 
virtue from her master, Mr. B, and the torments that she must endure in being coerced 
to become his mistress. The story is told through her own letters, recounting the many 
ordeals that she is put through before he gets his way. She is kidnapped, tricked and 
sexually threatened by him but she resists his advances until he finally offers her 
marriage - which she accepts only once he has expressed sympathy for how she has 
been treated. The perception of her suffering, as recounted in her journal, leads him to 
be so touched by her virtue that he reforms his brutal behaviour.  
 
The ‘sentiments’ that Pamela lives by are principles that, when challenged, are 
defended by tearful emotions. Weeping, as the most appropriate response to her 
victimized condition, is time and again underscored as evidence of the value of her 
principles. Where, for Shaftesbury, excesses of effeminate emotion could indicate 
irrationality, Pamela’s wordless sighs and sobs are defended as proof of her 
adherence to the maintenance of her virtue under threat. In such a vein, the 
representation of sensibility as visual spectacle becomes of paramount importance in 
the registration of virtue both on the part of rake and reader alike, and indeed 
foreshadows the intimate relationship between sentiment and the visual that the 
melodrama of later eras (and the cinema of course) would come to exploit in their 
own contributions to the sentimental tradition. 
 
Nevertheless, what converts Mr. B ultimately to sympathy for Pamela are not the 
episodes of her weeping before him but her own sad reflections confided to her 
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journal that he eventually gains access to.  If visual suffering serves to underscore 
virtue in Pamela, it also often fails as much as succeeds in effectuating change in 
those that witness it (until too late). Where written testimony converts the sinful, its 
visual counterpart has limitations, not least owing to its status as sensually engaging 
spectacle. In a more ambiguous vein, sentiment becomes an aesthetic enjoyment that 
exceeds the parameters of the merely morally improving, with a woman’s tears often 
shown to repel and attract (but not reform) the men that elicit them in Richardson’s 
novels. In one of the many scenes in which Mr. B tries to make a sexual advance on 
Pamela, he says to her, 
O how happy for you it is, that you can, at will, thus make your 
speaking eyes overflow in this manner, without losing any of their 
brilliancy!  You have been told, I suppose, that you are most 
beautiful in your tears!44 
 
In the above, competing discourses are contained in how B. interprets Pamela’s tears. 
In one sense, it can be inferred that he finds them suspect, that they signify the skill 
she employs to produce them, one of her ‘Tricks and Artifices,’ as much as real 
virtue.45 However, it is also possible that he is simply saying this as provocation and 
either truly believes in the integrity of her tears or is unsure. At any rate, he finds the 
sobbing Pamela attractive to watch as an aesthetic pleasure. Her tears succeed in 
making him refrain from further attack, although this may be only because he prefers 
the spectacle of her body caught in emotional distress anyway, such that when she 
begins to weep, B. steps back and resumes his gaze at her body, 
See, said he, and took the glass with one hand, and turned me 
round with the other, what a shape! what a neck! what a hand! 
and what a bloom on that lovely face!-— 
 
                                                
44 Richardson, Pamela, Vol. 1, Duncan Eaves & Ben Kimpel (eds.), Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971, 
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A distressed Pamela thus becomes the key fetish object for B., with different parts of 
her body segmented and analysed individually. Visual control and physical control 
fluctuate in such episodes, yet the former form of control is preferable to 
Richardson’s males than the latter – it lasts longer and is more intellectual. The 
dominance of visual possession fulfils an ambiguous role for the author also. It 
becomes a device whereby tears are seen to defend the woman’s chastity (a moral 
affect bringing about a moral outcome) yet they also sustain Pamela’s status as an 
aestheticized spectacle of suffering that prolongs the novel exponentially.  
 
Pamela as a picture of tearful innocence therefore satisfies a problematically 
conflated sexual and moral appetite in rake and reader alike, a possibility that worried 
Richardson and spurred his constant revisions to his novels. For Richardson, the 
recognition of beleaguered innocence in his novels ought to have had a solely 
educational function. Signs of genuine sensibility, weeping and suffering, become 
clearly legible templates for moral correctness. Those that do not recognize it when 
they see it, for Richardson, would be blinded by a disabling cynicism. Hume’s 
hypothetical contagion of benevolent emotions is impeded more than he would have 
liked in Richardson’s novels by the rake’s suspicion of tears. Such suspicions, 
however, are eventually shown to be without foundation and when characters learn of 
their mistaken beliefs, tears also often become proof of their realisation, repentance 
and moral conversion. In Pamela, the heroine is exemplary because, for her, tears are 
never anything else but evidence of character integrity, both in relation to others and 
herself. Tears also identify for Pamela those that have honest intentions towards her, 
and it curiously never occurs to those plotting against her to feign them.  
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When Mr. B eventually reforms his ways, he says he has learned to speak the 
‘sentiments’ of his own ‘heart’.46 Richardson is at pains to highlight an educational 
and reforming function of sensibility – those surrounding Pamela become affected by 
her potential for suffering and learn a sensitivity they had not known. The virtue she 
imparts is not one of complex maxims or stylized verse but simple assertions of her 
beliefs in her own and others’ virtue. When accused of deceit, for instance, Pamela 
says to B., ‘I know I don’t remember all I wrote, yet I know I wrote my heart, and 
that is not deceitful.’47 Later, she defends her husband’s benevolence in writing to 
Lady Davers, B’s sister: ‘His heart is naturally beneficent, and his beneficence is the 
gift of God for the most excellent purposes,’48 In reply, Lady Davers writes, ‘what we 
admire in you, are truth and nature, not studied or elaborate epistles.’49   
 
Unlike Clarissa, Richardson’s second novel, Pamela ends rather happily, if not 
satisfactorily by modern tastes. Pamela becomes accepted into an aristocratic family 
and succeeds in reforming her husband, despite his having an affair in Part II. The 
novel’s full title, indeed, was Pamela or Virtue Rewarded. The term ‘sentimentality’ 
in its modern sense is often applied to unrealistically happy endings, for they produce 
emotions in readers or spectators which are often judged, by more critically distanced 
readers, to be unwarranted by the preceding narrative events. Pamela’s resolution can 
certainly be charged with a sentimentality invoked by a lack of realism. For Terry 
Eagleton, it conforms to a simple scheme of ‘fantasy wish-fulfilment in which 
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abduction and imprisonment turn out miraculously well, the rough beast becomes a 
prince charming and the poor kitchen maid a beautiful princess.’50 In this way, 
Pamela seems to gloss over what could be argued to remain an uneven and sexist 
relationship between husband and wife. It speaks to women’s dissatisfactions but 
ultimately repeats an adherence to patriarchal conventions and ends with an 
artificially optimistic resolution. 
 
However, sentimental emotions would rarely be invoked by a happy ending without 
the prior establishment of pathos, suffering and virtue. Richardson’s second novel 
Clarissa ends with a long and protracted scene at Clarissa’s deathbed and proved in 
its popularity that nothing was so emotive as a martyr’s death, a trope that would 
remain embedded in the sentimental novel. The heroine here fails to reform the ‘rake’ 
Lovelace, with whom she escapes her scheming family that wish her to marry 
someone else for money and status. Lovelace turns out to be a sadistic abductor that 
plots to have her under his full control. Despite her persistent resistance, he both drugs 
and rapes Clarissa, leading eventually to her death owing to a ‘noble heart’ that is 
‘broken.’51 As she dies, the heroine is attended by an audience that for the first time is 
sympathetic to her misfortune - a final realisation of her virtue that comes all too late. 
In one sense, Clarissa suffers, in her words, a ‘death from grief’, a thoroughly 
disheartening end that shows the ultimate retreat of one that cannot participate in a 
hostile, masculinized world. However, the reader is offered consolation by the tearful 
moralizing of those present, such as the formerly rakish friend of Lovelace, John 
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51 Richardson, Clarissa, p. 1206. 
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Belford, who having summarized the scene to Lovelace, exhorts what we should learn 
from Clarissa’s experience: ‘This is penitence! This is piety! And hence a distress 
naturally arises that must worthily affect every heart.’52   
 
Clarissa thus becomes a symbol of virtue not rewarded, but sanctified. Her experience 
becomes paradigmatic of the sentimental mode, for here she becomes a symbol of 
martyred sensibility, of course also invoking its Christian forebear. The final scene 
serves as the climax of a set of events in which suffering becomes the inevitable 
experience for a subject of ‘delicate sensibility’; it is precisely in such scenes that 
virtue is most manifest by being threatened and not recognized. Richardson would be 
explicit on its educative potential, with Clarissa claiming the ‘the school of affliction’ 
as: 
an excellent school … in which we are taught to know ourselves, to 
be able to be compassionate and bear with one another, and look up 
to a better hope.’53  
 
In other words, Clarissa asserts that she has attained self-knowledge and the capacity 
for benevolence, not through the observance of role-models or fidelity to social 
custom, as Shaftesbury would have it, but rather through suffering itself. In being 
moved by suffering, she and others learn to perceive the contours of a non-verbal, 
bodily code of morality. Her words demonstrate the inverted logic of sensibility 
wherein tales of great suffering and defeat can elicit scenes evoking ‘hope’ through 
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shared understanding and tears.54 Clarissa’s sad fate is acknowledged by various 
characters, including Lovelace, as ultimately a ‘triumph.’ 
 
Whereas Hume’s Treatise would not have had anything like the readership of 
Richardson’s novels, the latter would seem to epitomize and animate his concept of 
‘delicate sensibility’. If tears signified sentiments that often failed to be ‘contagious’ 
in relation to other characters in such novels, they would fulfil the compensatory 
purpose of being extremely contagious on the part of the novels’ readership. In 
Richardson’s universe, tears signify both sympathy for an abused sentimental 
principle and connote a genuine and benevolent hope for a better world. As characters 
and readers absorbed such principles as they wept over virtue rewarded, the spectacle 
of suffering and visual representation itself come centre stage for their newly realized 
pedagogical functions. 
 
 
 
France and ‘Sensibilité’ 
 
In France, in 1762, the philosophe Denis Diderot (1713-1784) would write of a 
benevolence felt vicariously through his emotive consumption of Richardson’s 
novels. He claimed that, ‘the passions he portrays are those I feel within me; the same 
things arouse them, and I recognize their force in myself;’55 Moreover, such praise is 
characterised by a strong conviction of the moral worthiness of reading the novels. As 
an elegy to Richardson, who had died in 1761, he would write: 
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How good I was! How just I was! Wasn't I pleased with myself! 
When I had been reading you, I was like a man who had spent 
the day doing good.56 
 
 
The proud celebration of reading as an explicitly moral activity may seem slightly 
absurd and reductive of literature’s wider aesthetic aims by today’s standards, yet 
typifies the values of those that recommended the practice of reading ‘for the 
sentiment’.57 To read of virtuous characters was taken to a logical extreme as a 
vicarious practice of good deeds without the attendant difficulties of doing the same 
in reality. Reading became a moral act through the assumed transmission of virtue 
between text and reader. 
 
In fact, Diderot, in 1755, had offered a definition of ‘sensibilité’ which was 
thoroughly infused with moralistic discourse: 
 
Sensibilité is that tender and delicate disposition of the soul which 
renders it easy to be moved and touched.... It gives one a kind of 
wisdom concerning matters of virtue and is far more penetrating 
than the intellect alone. People of sensibility because of their 
liveliness can fall into errors which men of the world would not 
commit; but these are greatly outweighed by the amount of good 
that they do. Men of sensibility live more fully than others.... 
Reflection can produce a man of probity; but sensibility is the 
mother of humanity, of generosity; it is at the service of merit, 
lends its support to the intellect, and is the moving spirit which 
animates belief.58 
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With this definition of sensibilité, the philosophe asserts the superiority of a subject 
that lives by feeling to one that lives by ‘reflection’ alone. He had translated 
Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue into French, and in his own writings he 
would extol the virtues of a subject that acts with an affective humanity and 
benevolence. 
 
Indeed, France is regarded to have embraced sentimental culture prior to Britain. 
Anne-Vincent Buffault, in A History of Tears59 argues that, in France, the event of 
eliciting tears in public audiences attained the status of a kind of communal ritual 
even by 1730. It would fulfil the sentimental ideal of a shared group emotion. 
Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm argues thus:  
 
Men are all friends when leaving a play. They have hated vice, 
loved virtue, cried together, developed the good and just elements 
of the human heart side by side. They have found themselves to be 
far better than they thought, they would willingly embrace each 
other[…]60  
 
 
In order to satisfy the requirements of this collective ritual, Buffault argues that the 
elicitation of tears became an essential criterion for new plays. She describes how, 
around 1730, a new tragic-comic genre arose, the chief aim of which, by having a 
moving plot that in Gustave Lanson’s words, ‘incites us to virtue in feeling for their 
misfortunes and in applauding their triumphs.’61 The bourgeois family home becomes 
the key setting for the ‘Comédie Larmoyante’ and tearful scenes become highly 
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conventionalised. The misfortune of innocent victims and the defeat of social 
prejudice (such as the victory of virtuous romantic love over class prejudice and 
financial considerations) became common narrative conditions for eliciting tears. 
Like the ‘sentimental comedy’ of British theatre at the time, the form would 
constitute an obvious precursor to the following century’s melodramas.  
 
In 1769, in his Paradoxe sur le Comédien (Paradox of Acting), Diderot would also 
praise a theatrical acting style that had the maximisation of audience emotion as its 
key aim, using techniques such as ‘cries, inarticulate words’ or ‘broken voices’.62 
Aristotle, in his Poetics, famously advised caution about the excessive gesticulations 
of some actors,63 yet Diderot gives the actor the task of accentuating their suffering 
through ‘a splendid aping’, a dramatic style that is larger than life. Thus:  
A gladiator of ancient times is like a great actor, and a great actor is 
like an ancient gladiator; they do not die as people die in bed. They 
must portray before us a different death so as to please us, and the 
viewer feels that the bare, unadorned truth of movement would be 
shallow and contrary to the poetry of the whole.64 
 
In contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in 1758, thought of theatrical sentiment as 
another of the many social conventions that he deplored. He was concerned about the 
theatre spectator that had ‘wept over imaginary ills’ without feeling any inclination 
for applying the same emotions to his own social reality. Rousseau’s portrait of such a 
spectator rests on his scepticism on the moral worth of the theatre: 
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We believe that we are drawn together at a performance, when it is 
there that each of us becomes isolated, it is there that we will forget 
our friends, our neighbours, our dear ones, and direct our interest 
towards fables, weep over the misfortunes of the dead or laugh at 
the expense of the living. But I feel that this language is no longer 
in season in our century.65 
 
In the above passage, the sentimental theatre (and its attendant ‘language’) is 
implicated as another social ill that brings about a state of alienated subjectivity that 
craves only pleasure. Emotional spectatorship at the theatre would indicate a 
corruption of sensibility rather than a pedagogical process, true sensibility deemed by 
Rousseau to reside rather in our real connections with friends and neighbours. In his 
second preface to La Nouvelle Heloise, urban and rural existence are polarized in 
accordance with the above rubric, with the unthinking virtue of the naïve rustic held 
up as the ideal of sensibility in contrast to the mannered, self-indulgent city-dweller. 
Those who live outside an abstracted world of corruption and beyond artificial models 
of sociality are applauded for a natural common sense. His preferred mode of 
representation of such figures is moreover diametrically opposed to Diderot’s 
prescriptions for acting the pathetic scene: 
  
Do you imagine that persons of real sensibility express 
themselves with that vivacity, energy, and ardour, which you so 
much admire in our drama and romances? No; true passion, full 
of itself, is rather diffusive than emphatical. . . . In expressing its 
feelings, it speaks rather for the sake of its own ease, than to 
inform others.66 
 
 
The language of sensibility therefore occupies for Rousseau one extreme of a marked 
opposition between a decadent, emotionalist world and a virtuous form of spiritual 
existence, the latter removed from the former both physically and semiotically. The 
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display of tears becomes suspect, a superficial substitute for a more genuine response 
to social or ethical problems, yet one that can nevertheless be cynically elicited by 
stock scenarios of suffering.  
 
 
 
The British Man of Feeling 
 
In Britain in the 1750s, Diderot’s sentiments would be mirrored by the writings of 
numerous moralists. In an anonymous letter to the journal, Man, would be one of the 
first instances of the use of the term ‘sentimental’, in praise of ‘Moral weeping’: 
 
We may properly distinguish weeping into two general kinds, 
genuine and counterfeit; or into physical crying and moral weeping. 
Physical crying, while there are no real corresponding ideas in the 
mind, nor any genuine sentimental feeling of the heart to produce it, 
depends upon the mechanism of the body: but moral weeping 
proceeds from, and is always attended with, such real sentiments of 
the mind, and feeling of the heart, as do honour to human nature; 
which false crying always debases.67 
 
Crane accompanies the above passage with another by the Scottish moralist David 
Fordyce from 1754, that discusses the ‘Enjoyments’ of a moral subject’s ‘Sympathy’ 
and specifically, the emotional ‘Discharge’ that characterises such moments of 
compassion: 
  
It is such a Sorrow as he loves to indulge; a sort of pleasing 
Anguish, that sweetly melts the Mind, and terminates in a Self-
approving Joy. Though the good Man may want Means to execute, 
or be disappointed in the Success of his benevolent Purposes, 
yet…he is still conscious of good Affections.68 
 
As in Hume, compassionate sorrow is allowed to be ‘agreeable’ and ‘pleasing’ 
because it is never not aligned with the ‘good’ and is always praiseworthy. However, 
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in R. S. Crane’s discussion of the above passage, he points to Fordyce’s ‘complacent 
emphasis’ on ‘Self-Approving Joy.’ The danger of sentiment, as detected by 
Rousseau above and others discussed below, was that it might be more of a 
narcissistic indulgence in self-regarding moralism than a critical engagement with the 
causes of a sorrowful scene. If such a critical exercise required an intellectual analysis 
of the scene as well as an emotional connection to its sadness, how would such 
analysis be possible if the subject is overwhelmed by ‘Anguish’ that ‘melts the 
Mind.’? 
 
Following Richardson’s fame and the public appetite for sentiment, many imitations 
of his novels would proliferate. However, they would suffer from what Brissenden 
refers to as ‘moral bankruptcy,’69 exploiting the pleasures of experiencing tears 
without the ‘psychological realism and moral seriousness’70 of the earlier novels of 
sentiment. Plot and character conventions would be recognized and employed for 
their capacity to elicit emotions. These included the abduction of women or the 
cynical attacks on provincial families by rakish aristocratic men in Henry 
Mackenzie’s The Man of the World or the lament of the impossibility of real 
friendship in the city in Henry Brooke’s The Fool of Quality. The heroes of their 
novels have a similar suspicion of society’s conventions and long for a return to a 
simpler existence. A language of tears, sighs and gestures becomes generic, a 
recurrent convention of representing feelings too deep for verbal expression. Fainting, 
swooning or crying are resorted to frequently, in order to be replicated in the reactions 
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of its own readers who have learned a bodily code that connotes compassion and 
virtue. 
 
Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling, published in 1771, is a frequently cited example of 
how the later novel of sentiment becomes self-indulgent. It would follow the various 
episodes of Harley, a young country gentleman, who without much money goes to 
London to try to get the crown lease of some land adjacent to his own. He fails in this 
endeavour but while in London and on his return home, he meets and is moved to 
tears by a variety of minor characters and their tales of woe. The novel is criticized for 
the artificiality of the central figure, an innocent man that exhibits so much sensibility 
that all his encounters result in the effusion of his own tears; for Brissenden, this 
sentiment becomes a ‘retreat from reality.’ Escape becomes facilitated by sorrowful 
emotion, as it becomes Harley’s only response to the encountering of problems that 
seem ever more insoluble.  
 
The potential for escape is indeed already inscribed in the hero’s distance from each 
sentimental scene. They are constructed as tableaux, divorced from narrative and 
offering moments of aestheticized human contact, for which Harley can do nothing 
but sob. The scene of a man lying forlorn in a debtors’ prison, attended by a 
sympathetic girl is described thus:  
 
A bundle of dirty shreds served him for a pillow, but he had a 
better support - the arm of a female who kneeled beside him, 
beautiful as an angel, but with a fading languor in her countenance, 
the still life of melancholy, that seemed to borrow its shade from 
the object on which it gazed.71 
 
                                                
71 Henry Mackenzie, The Man of Feeling, Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1987, p. 90. 
 
 
 
63 
Mackenzie’s use of the term ‘still life’ is telling, for it refers to the painting 
convention of representing fruit, dead game, flowers or vessels that had been coined 
at the turn of the 18th century.72 The display of the misfortunes of society’s victims 
here becomes an opportunity for aesthetic contemplation. Responsibility for their 
plight is lifted from the outset because the style through which they are represented 
was reserved conventionally for the inanimate and/or the dead. As such they are 
contextualized as objects that cannot possibly benefit from the observer’s moral 
intentions, even if such an observer were to stop sobbing.  
 
In this manner, the pathetic scene is isolated from the rest of the story and seems an 
appeal for an emotion in its own right, without consideration of its context within the 
novel. Mackenzie’s text abounds with such tableaux, scenes of sadness or suffering 
that seek emotional reactions from the reader. Narrative becomes fragmented and 
subordinated to this purpose rather than entering into further analysis of the 
antecedents of these moral outrages, or of possible solutions. The scenes are too 
fleeting for any further discussion of the political circumstances that may underlie 
them. The political thoughts of the man of feeling, Harley, are not clearly presented to 
the reader despite his witnessing of so many tragedies.  
 
Indeed, where politically controversial material is permitted in the text (as in the 
sentimental genre generally), a firm political position is often evaded or undermined. 
For instance, a whole chapter covers Harley’s criticisms of the British colonization of 
India. He asserts that the British ‘conqueror’ of India, exhibits none of the ‘humanity’ 
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or ‘generosity’ that might justify his endeavour such as the offering of financial 
support to Indian families that had lost their men in battle, nor does he refrain from 
the enjoyment of luxuries facilitated by colonization such as ‘lace on his coat’, ‘slaves 
in his retinue,’ a ‘chariot at his door’ or ‘burgundy at his table.’ However, the entire 
speech is undermined by the title of the chapter, ‘The Man of Feeling talks of what he 
does not understand - An Incident.’73 The implication is that Harley’s discourse may 
exemplify sensibility but manifests at the same time an unworldly ignorance of real 
affairs. In this, Mackenzie reveals how his sentimental hero is a figure that lives and 
dies by admirable principles, sentiments indeed, that have no utility in the practical 
world. As a man that takes on the sensibilities normally attributed to the opposite sex, 
the author insists on Harley’s marginalization from worldly affairs. Harley’s 
sensibility and the underlying beliefs that are only partially revealed, for Mackenzie, 
necessitates his relegation to an ineffectual, aesthetic sympathy with the world’s 
cruelties. Indeed, the end of the novel sees Harley follow the fate of many sentimental 
heroes and die young (from an untimely fever). 
 
A critic in the Monthly Review of 1771 approved of the novel, owing to its appeal to 
the emotions. He would argue that ‘the Reader, who weeps not over some of the 
scenes it describes, has no sensibility of mind.’74 The elicitation of tears, at the time, 
was indeed still widely regarded as a worthy aim of fiction that traded in pathetic 
tropes. To exhibit ‘refined feeling’ was still culturally valorised as a literary motif and 
to sob over such tales would be evidence of one’s own sensibility and moral 
correctness. However, growing speculation concerned how the sentimental had 
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become as much a fashionable social convention as a true indicator of a more humane 
culture, a code of emotional display that more likely served to mark out members of 
the higher echelons of society. As a contained aesthetic experience, sentiment could 
be all too easily commodified for the consumption of spectators wishing to indulge in 
the pleasures of sympathy. When writing for the Edinburgh periodical The Lounger, 
Mackenzie himself attacked the literary ‘species called the Sentimental’75 that 
encouraged in readers a ‘sickly sort of refinement’.76 As a trained Edinburgh lawyer, 
he was a far more ‘practical’ man than those he depicts in his novels and suspicious of 
the sentiments that could be fostered by the novel. Yet he still remained a proponent 
of the novel’s mid-eighteenth century sentimental discourse and was celebrated for it. 
Although he and others attacked the excesses of sensibility in rendering readers 
unable or unwilling to operate successfully in ordinary life, they still believed that 
such novels represented the ideals of ‘refinement’ or ‘delicacy’ that befit an 
‘advanced society.’77 As John Mullan argues in his account of 18th century sensibility, 
Harley’s admirable sensibility was the ‘fantasy’ rather than the ‘practice of a complex 
urban society’.78 
 
So the paradox of the protagonist or reader who must retreat from the world and its 
conventions in order to maintain a virtuous, pathetic sensibility did not go 
unquestioned even at the height of the genre’s popularity. In the Man of Feeling itself, 
Mackenzie’s narrator speculates that man’s charitable tendencies might often be 
                                                
75 Henry Mackenzie, ‘Untitled article’, The Lounger, 18th June, 1785. 
  
76 Ibid., 
 
77 William Craig, The Mirror, No. 10, i. 40, cited in John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The 
Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 128. 
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‘more selfish than social.’ The novel’s final paragraph points to a possible 
misanthropy as much as sympathy for the world as the consequence of too great a 
meditation on virtue: ‘every noble feeling rises within me! every beat of my heart 
awakens a virtue!—but it will make you hate the world.’79 Like the ‘sentimental 
classes’ themselves, the ‘man of feeling’ retreats from the world as a political agent 
and arguably perpetuates the aesthetic distance between haves and have-nots, the 
latter requiring a more politically active form of compassion. Unlike Harley however, 
the sentimental spectator was free to ‘hate the world’ without being martyred for the 
cause. 
 
 
 
Sensibility on the Retreat 
 
As a privilege of a cultured elite, enjoyment of sentimentality could be an agreeable 
diversion, and nothing more, among those who presumably would be capable and 
educated enough to control their passions. Even David Hume would eventually set 
limits on the ‘sympathy’ discussed in his Treatise. John Mullan, for instance, notes 
than in Hume’s later work80, he would recognize ‘warm sentiment’ as having a 
particular affinity with aesthetic experience, a ‘peculiarly literary capacity, most often 
to be identified with ‘the great charm of poetry.’’81 Sympathy as affect could not any 
longer be guaranteed beyond the parameters of the artwork and its immediate 
reception. Outside of the consumption of sentimental art, tearful sympathy is implied 
as being far less of a social practice.  
                                                
79 Mackenzie, Man of Feeling, p. 90. 
 
80 Best represented by Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, published in 1751. 
 
81 Cited in Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability p. 43. 
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Hume’s intellectual trajectory therefore demonstrates how belief in sympathetic virtue 
as a social model becomes compromised by the acknowledgement of the pleasure of 
sentiment elicited by the conventions and economies of sentimental fiction and drama. 
It may have been 'remarkable’ to feel sympathy in tragedies with virtuous martyrs, yet 
questions emerge concerning when and for how long this sentimental state of mind 
can be appropriate without becoming self-indulgent. Sentimentality becomes invoked 
in the discrepancy between an idealized or aestheticized benevolence and the realities 
of social existence that seem inimical to it. 
 
Hume’s friend and admirer, Adam Smith, may not have shared the former’s 
scepticism about a rationally conceived benevolence and believed virtue to be a self-
evident choice which could be applicable to all areas of society. His philosophy would 
nevertheless also represent the marginalization of sentimental ‘passion’, not least once 
it is theorized as an affect that can and must be regulated by the cold judgement of the 
‘impartial spectator’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1759. Such a 
‘spectator,’ representing ‘dignity’, ‘honour’ and ‘unalterable laws’82 observes the 
subject and enforces a dispassionate behaviour. This behaviour, Smith argues, might 
be different from the behaviour informed by the subject’s other perception of reality, 
one that is based on ‘his natural, his untaught and undisciplined feelings’, in relation 
to which Smith accords the ‘spectator’ moral authority. Theorized moreover as 
internal rather than external to the subject, the concept of ‘impartial spectator’ gives 
the subject the capacity and indeed the obligation to overrule his own passions if 
necessary. Deploying a musical metaphor for instance, Smith argues that the 
                                                
82 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (1759), Filiquarian, 2007, p. 184. 
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‘sharpness’ of a subject’s passions can and must be modified to a reasonable pitch for 
the benefit of the ‘harmony of society.’ 83 Indeed, in contrast to the theorists discussed 
above, yet echoing once more Shaftesbury’s caution towards effeminacy, Smith 
would argue that, ‘the delicate sensibility required in civilized nations sometimes 
destroys the masculine firmness of the character.84 
 
In one sense Smith’s philosophy is reassuring if we regard the passions as potentially 
excessive and liable to abuse by sentimental drama and literature. However, we return 
immediately to the problem of how to arrive at the correct judgement of our conduct 
if it must be dependent on a disinterested assessment of possible behaviours. We are 
now in a position where we can no longer trust reason nor feelings. Smith’s answer to 
this would arrive with his prescient metaphor for a society of disciplined subjects – 
‘an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand 
agreeable effects.’85 The ‘division of labour’ presaged by such a model and elaborated 
further in Smith’s better known The Wealth of Nations recommends a society that 
functions reasonably well from a ‘sense of utility, without any mutual love or 
affection…’ In such a society, appropriate conduct would be best exemplified through 
a conservative maintenance of the status quo and with due respect paid to ‘established 
powers and privileges’ and an idea of ‘justice’ rather than benevolence. A sensibility 
posed by Smith as ‘artificial commiseration’ is ‘perfectly useless’, for: 
 Those who affect this character have commonly nothing but a 
 certain affected and sentimental sadness, which without reaching 
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 the heart, serves only to render the countenance and conversation 
 impertinently dismal and disagreeable.86 
 
It is here that we reach an impasse in the philosophical celebration of individual 
benevolence and its power to redeem society. The off-hand cautions of Shaftesbury 
and Hume against the ‘extremes’ of feeling take centre-stage for Smith and urge him 
and those who would follow to heed Hobbes’ advice and once again subjugate the 
passions to the necessities of social life. Indeed, according to the literary scholar 
Michael Bell, it is precisely with this loss of faith in the power of individual goodwill 
that sentimentalism attains its modern connotations: 
Once the social order comes to be seen as a complex impersonal 
process changeable only by collective political will, then any appeal 
to individual feeling begins to seem necessarily, structurally, 
sentimental.87 
 
So whether through the ‘impersonal’ processes of new economic theory or the mass 
political movements in America and France at the end of the 18th century, hopes for 
the personified Enlightenment subject had become eclipsed by faith in collective will, 
declarations of rights and scientifically approved means of distributing wealth. 
Redemption through the individual subject’s sensibility would remain a sentimental 
fiction. 
 
Satire and Irony 
In France, the meaning of sensibilité would remain stable yet ‘sensiblerie’ would be 
coined, at some point in the 1780s to refer to its false or affected manifestations. The 
poet Mercier, in 1799, would describe it thus: 
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Some time before the Revolution, people of fashion had adopted a 
certain sentimental philosophy (“une certain philosophie 
sentimentale”) which was the art of dispensing with being virtuous. 
This philosophy had its jargon, its sensibilty, its accent, even its 
gestures.88 
 
In Britain, the same concept would come to be termed ‘sentimentality’. In his 
philological study of the word ‘sentimental’ in the 18th century, 89 Erik Erametsa 
describes how a major turning point for the term can be located in the publication of 
Sterne’s A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy, a novel that wittily 
equivocates on the virtues and shortcomings of its protagonist’s self-conscious desire 
for sympathetic (and sexual) interactions with other characters. ‘Sentimental’ indeed 
became effectively a brand name for a genre, with the word itself appearing in many 
titles and a certain subjectivity encapsulated by that term becoming the fashion of the 
time. Many imitations followed Sterne’s novel with titles such as The Delicate 
Distress, Excessive Sensibility, and The Curse of Sentiment.90  Trading on pathos that 
could be represented in fleetingly episodic form, sentimental narratives modified the 
classical conventions of tragedy for their protagonists. Raymond Williams, for 
instance, argues in Modern Tragedy that scenes of suffering are given a particular 
moral dimension in 18th century tragic forms, wherein the ‘tragic 
catastrophe[…]moves its spectators to moral recognition and resolution’ (as in 
Clarissa) or ‘can be avoided altogether, by a change of heart’91 (as in Pamela). 
Williams is critical, however, of the often ‘static’ forms of morality represented in 
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works from the period and the ‘merely dogmatic’ representation of ‘good and evil.’ 
As ‘repentance and redemption’ became the driving forces of 18th century narrative, 
Williams is critical not of the period’s ‘moral emphasis’ per se, but the rigidity with 
which morality came to be represented and understood. 
 
Regarded increasingly as self-indulgent, excessive and shallow to the point of inanity, 
sensibility and the novel of sentiment would become parodied by such writers as Jane 
Austen as early as 1790 with Love and Friendship. The novella provides a brief but 
incisive glimpse at the conformism and amorality of gentility and a form of 
subjectivity that applauds one’s own sentimentalism as a model of conduct. 92 
Arguably the most ‘modern’ responses to sentimentality would be manifest in texts 
where an ironic distance is inscribed in relation to its tropes. Particularly subtle in 
such regards would be Sterne’s approach to the sentimental, where ‘sympathy’ and 
weeping are bracketed as social practices deployed for a variety of rhetorical and self-
interested purposes by self-conscious characters. In Sentimental Journey, Yorick’s 
account of his encounter with Madame de L*** contain clues that this narrator is 
motivated by multiple impulses towards her, both sexual and sympathetic, insisting on 
his own ‘benevolence’ whilst simultaneously alluding humorously to his lust. The 
fictional narrators of A Sentimental Journey, and Tristram Shandy, exhibit ironic self-
consciousness towards their own accounts, demonstrating awareness of their own 
contradictory desires and thereby nuancing, if not effacing, the moralistic ambitions 
of the novel. Sterne provides neither a model of conduct in his protagonists yet nor are 
they objects of simple satire. In this, the novel demonstrates what John Mullan refers 
                                                
92 Austen’s novella parodies the epistolatory sentimental style, targeting especially the self-
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to as a ‘sociality’, both on the part of the author’s ironic mode of address and 
character’s self-knowledge.93  
 
This chapter ends therefore at a point where the ambitions of the sentimental novel are 
not so much ridiculed wholesale but significantly reined in by the extent to which 
sentimental tropes had become subject to cliché and abuse. In summary, debates 
concerning the sentimental in the Enlightenment culture of the 18th century reveal a 
central tension between its conceptualization as a pedagogical and emotion-driven 
mode of moral improvement, and emerging discourses that begin to question the 
validity of ‘moral sense’ and the didactic rhetoric with which it was both commended 
and enjoyed. If it was largely manifest as a reflection of the tastes and fashions of a 
‘cult of sensibility’ or a cultured quasi-aristocratic elite, philosophers of ‘moral sense’ 
were also arguing for its universal value as a more democratically available faculty. 
Yet these same intellectuals, whether Shaftesbury, David Hume or Adam Smith, came 
also to often less than optimistic conclusions concerning the widespread ‘utility’ of 
sentiment in what would surely follow in the era of Bentham and Mill. Moreover, the 
excesses of the sentimental were already becoming apparent both in terms of the 
increasingly hackneyed tropes with which the sentimental mode of reception could be 
reproduced and the ease with which tears, pity and other ‘effeminate’ emotions could 
be invoked by the literature, theatre and painting of the time. Visual culture provided 
certain paradigms for sentiment, the face in tears becoming almost undeniable 
evidence of virtue and the sentimental tableau (whether delivered by a visual medium 
such as painting or within literature) serving to epitomize the contagious properties of 
sympathy, pity and fellow-feeling. At the same time, spectacle was also that which 
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exceeded the sentimental, delivering a more eclectic set of pleasures than could be 
contained within the increasingly stagnant parameters of the moral or the improving. 
The sentimental, or in Terry Eagleton’s terms, ‘The Law of the Heart’,94 became only 
one of many aesthetic pleasures, and an increasingly dubious one at that, while 
nevertheless still laying significant terrain for later aesthetic movements, notably 
Romanticism. The sentimental tradition would also be reproduced in the visual and 
non-visual melodramas of the following century, yet it would retain the status allotted 
to it by the end of the 18th century as a mode that not only had to be consumed ‘for the 
sentiment’, but was always in danger of seeming to offer little else. 
 
                                                
94 For a detailed account of sentiment’s centrality to modern aesthetics, and its continuities with later 
concepts, see Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, London: Blackwell, 1990, pp. 31-69. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Dickensian meets Modernity:  
Sentimental Cultures in the 19th Century 
 
 My experience gave me a right to feel suspicious in regard to all 
so-called "unselfish" tendencies, in regard to the whole of 
"neighbourly love" which is ever ready and waiting with deeds or 
with advice. It seems to me that they are signs of weakness, 
examples of the inability to withstand an incitement – it is only 
among decadents that this pity is called a virtue. What I reproach 
the pitiful with is, that they are too ready to forget modesty, 
reverence, and the delicacy of feeling which knows how to keep 
at a distance; they forget that this sentimental pity stinks of the 
mob, and that it is but a step removed from bad manners[...] 
    Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo (1888)1 
 
 
The previous chapter shows how sentimentalism represented a set of aesthetic 
and ethical discourses that crystallize in the eighteenth century around notions of 
benevolence and moral cultivation amidst celebrations of the subject’s emotional 
improvement by art. Yet it becomes clear from Nietzsche’s writing how sentimental 
idealism had also retained an aura of cloying unfreedom, shallow humanism and 
ineffectual moral purpose as the 20th century fast approached. Sympathy had been 
foregrounded as an emotion-driven transmission of moral principles between subjects 
and between subjects and texts, while the ‘cult of sensibility’ testified to the great 
power of literature and drama in enhancing, or rather questionably ‘proving’ the 
‘sensibility’ of its readers and spectators. Yet ambiguities concerning the role of 
pathos led to anxieties arising simultaneously as to what kind of ‘sickly’ enjoyments 
might be derived from a fiction or drama if sentiment becomes a pleasure in its own 
right, irrespective of its effects on ethical behaviour. ‘Moral sense,’ ambiguously 
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conceptualized as both innate to the human soul yet in some way dependent on 
disinterested processes of learning, sympathy or justice, would thus continue to 
present a problem to aesthetic debates still raging at the advent of the cinema. 
 The culture of Charles Dickens, I argue, becomes a paradigm for the 
development of this sentimental Victorian culture by the turn of the 20th century. 
Paradoxically, cinema would also represent the first true expression of this popular, 
sentimental culture (and one often enough debased for its sentimentality in the 20th 
century), and I  suggest, like Eisenstein would in the 1940s, that we might consider 
Dickens’ output, popularity and eventual critical denigration as its key cultural 
antecedent. The sheer popularity of Dickens’ work would ensure the enormous impact 
of his novels on future literary, theatrical and cinematic forms while representing the 
prototype for a culture accessible to, and appealing largely to the tastes of a newly 
emergent modern public sphere. This chapter seeks to examine Dickens as a heuristic 
for the emergence of a mass culture that became heavily associated with the advent of 
cinema at the dawn of the 20th century. Emerging alongside principles of democratic 
society and artistic imperatives of conveying morality clearly and with emotional 
openness (as forged by the melodrama discussed below), Dickens’ output epitomizes 
the sentimental tradition inherited by such figures as Chaplin, Griffith, Capra, Ford 
and Spielberg. This applies not only to Dickens’ novels themselves (which alone 
rehearsed in the mid-19th century those key sentimental tropes identifiable from the 
previous century), but also to the ‘Dickensian’ models of response to literature of 
Victorian society. While texts and contexts are both inherited from the parlours of the 
18th century, they are taken up by a new reading public and become key signifiers of 
Victorian culture. I argue that the common public outpourings of emotion at the 
reading of literature (such as Dickens’) would come to epitomize the democratic spirit 
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and its affective registers in the modern era. Notions of empathy, morality and ‘virtue 
in distress’ become key ideological components of 20th century early mass culture 
while becoming the chief pariahs of its intelligensiae.  
 
Literary culture’s evaluations and critiques of Dickens’ work after its own period of 
emergence are also crucial to comprehending the development of critical responses to 
this new mass culture as crucial signs of how the cinema itself would be shaped and 
theorized. Dickens’ alleged transition to a more critical or emotionally detached mode 
of writing as his career progressed and the arguments that both constructed and 
commended such ‘sophistication’ will be traced in this chapter as a means of 
identifying the factors that contributed to the now established association between 
sentimentality and the formulaic, gratuitous or manipulative. As expressions of a 
social group marginalized ideologically  by Dickens work, new elites continue to find 
intellectual vapidity in melodrama’s sentimental rhetoric, seeking solutions that lie in 
the interstices between modernism and realism. Whether represented by the writings 
of F.R. Leavis, Aldous Huxley, Oscar Wilde or G.B. Shaw, Dickens’ work is 
subjected to a discriminating sensibility that identifies the vulgarity of popular taste in 
his work. Conceptualizing the Dickensian ‘lapse’ into sentimentality or bathos also 
allows such proto-modernists to construct Dickens anew, emphasising the quality of 
key works or techniques over others in accordance with aesthetic imperatives that 
may not have existed in Dickens’ own time, whether under the banner of socialist 
critique, an emerging literary theory and modernism or just old-fashioned snobbery. 
In all such cases, the dismissal of Dickensian sentimentality bespeaks an emotional 
austerity and critical seriousness held in opposition to popular art’s democratization of 
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emotion in the 20th century. The latter process arguably begins with the melodramatic 
theatre. 
 
The Difference of Melodrama 
Discussions of sentimentalism in the cinema most commonly revolve around the 
multi-layered concept of melodrama. If this term denotes a genre, it is one that is 
composed of various discourses that vie for centrality. For genres to be understood as 
such at all, they must usually be represented by certain configurations of textual, 
thematic or historical markers that can demarcate them in distinctive ways. 
Melodrama, however, is particularly resistant to stable classification. It is little 
wonder, therefore, that perhaps its most stalwart ally is the equally mystifying and 
multivalent concept of emotion. 
 
Anxieties about subjectivities, ideologies and escapist pleasures evoked by art have 
underpinned much critical discourse surrounding melodrama within contemporary 
moving image culture. Melodrama has struggled to be taken seriously as a critically 
respectable genre for a variety of reasons that pertain to issues of gender, class, race 
and notions of modernity, as well as to the specifics of how film itself evokes 
pleasures or, in more general terms, affect. Scholars have traced melodrama back to 
its development in the 19th century as an accessible theatrical and novelistic form, 
intended for a new, urban mass audience.  Providing a mix of pathos, emotive 
storytelling and sensational turns of narrative, melodrama came to dominate the 
popular stories and scandals of the time. Evoking what Peter Brooks terms a new 
‘moral occult’ in a ‘post-sacred’ world that had lost religious faith, the simple tropes 
of melodrama are argued to provide the modern world with a new mythological 
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system where recognizable forces of right and wrong do battle and achieve—or hope 
for--justice.2  
 
Although it is clear that the 18th century had already laid the foundations for 
melodrama in its fictional battles of virtue between society’s victims and powerful, 
yet corrupt quasi-aristocrats, much has been discussed in terms of how melodrama 
also heralds the ascendency, at least in moral terms, of the bourgeoisie over feudalist, 
autocratic privilege.3 Reflected in the French and American revolutions of the late 18th 
century, a new class represented itself as both morally righteous and determined to 
effectuate change in actual society rather than hope for redemption and reward in the 
afterlife. Brooks’ seminal account of classical stage melodrama in the 19th century, 
The Melodramatic Imagination, aligns the form historically with the advent and 
composition of a post-revolutionary French society. The ideals of that revolution were 
compromised by the bloody events that followed, events that would come to illustrate 
the persistence of authority and power in society. The flawed success of the French 
revolution rendered Rousseau’s philosophy as overly-idealized in its veneration of 
‘nature’ over ‘civilization.’4 Given that nature, as such, could never be recovered, not 
even by the overthrow of an entire class, society was deemed incapable of ridding 
itself of hierarchical power relations. An inescapable ‘civilization’ was underpinned 
                                                
2 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry James, Melodrama and the Mode of 
Excess, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 1-15. 
 
3 See Thomas Elsaesser, 'Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama' in Bill 
Nichols (ed.), Movies and Methods, London: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 166-89; 
Christine Gledhill, 'The Melodramatic Field: An Investigation.' in Christine Gledhill (ed.), Home is 
Where the Heart Is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's Film, London: BFI Publishing, 1987, pp. 
1-39; Linda Williams, 'Melodrama Revised', in Nick Browne (ed.), Refiguring American Film Genres: 
History and Theory, University of California Press, 1998, p. 42-88. 
 
4 See Rousseau’s Émile (1762), where civilization is theorized as a corrupting influence that the child 
must be protected from until a certain age.  
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by structures of authority and dominance; victims and oppressors seemed inscribed in 
the very fabric of society.5  
 
The advent of melodrama nevertheless signalled a victory for the common man in 
terms of how public theatrical entertainment expanded to accommodate all groups in 
society. In France, melodrama’s roots stemmed from the arts of pantomime, 
acrobatics and musical theatre; these had once been unlicensed artforms in French 
society. Gesture, music and spectacle were just as salient as dialogue in these artforms 
and set a template for visually encoded tropes of morality with which cinema would 
find such close affinities from its inception.6 These forms all eschewed a neo-classical 
set of aesthetics emanating from the established practices of the licensed theatres. 
Long associated with a tradition of courtly entertainment of the 17th century by such 
dramatists as Corneille, Racine and Moliere along with aesthetic principles applauded 
by writers in England such as Dryden and Pope, neo-classical theatre concerned itself 
with great aristocratic heroes, most often of the ancient world. Tragedy and comic 
satire were its chief forms and its rhetoric was thought to accord with the ‘age of 
reason’ and enlightenment principles of order and rationality.7 Its audience was 
diffuse but famously also incorporated the royal court and the king himself in France.   
                                                
5 For a detailed account of the changing emotional landscape of France before, during and after the 
revolution see Anne Vincent-Buffault, The History of Tears: Sensibility and Sentimentality in France, 
Teresa Bridgeman (trans.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 
 
6 For general accounts of key productions and the central thematics of 19th century theatrical 
melodrama, see David Grimstead, Melodrama Unveiled: American Theatre and Culture, 1800-1850, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968; Robert Heilman, Tragedy and Melodrama: Versions of 
Experience, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968; Frank Rahill, The World of Melodrama, 
University Park: Penn State University Press, 1967. 
 
7 See M.H Abrams’ entry on the ‘Neo-Classic and Romantic’ for a useful cursory distinction between 
the two traditions, in A Glossary of Literary Terms, Boston: Heinle & Heinle, 1999. The ‘Neoclassic’ 
recognizes a ‘cosmic order’ that dictates a given ‘natural hierarchy’ in life that sets certain limits on the 
subject’s freedom. A certain ‘avoidance of extremes’ characterized neo-classic aesthetics, and was 
extended therefore to excesses of feeling in the subject, or perhaps more significantly for the present 
discussion, implied certain equivalences between emotions and aesthetic excess.  
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The ‘wit’ of Moliere’s comedies encapsulated the neo-classical ideal through the 
playwright’s mockery of characters that reject the logic and reason deemed to be the 
foundation of enlightened society, in the name of their own egoism. In the Bourgeois 
Gentleman, for instance, Moliere satirizes a man with newly acquired wealth that 
wishes to pass himself off in aristocratic society. His comical failure to do so owing to 
continuous gaffes and embarrassments spoke of society’s intolerance and rejection of 
the individual that attempted to break out of his social class. Likewise, The 
Misanthrope conveys the story of a man whose moral extremism leads him to reject 
social graces and genteel affectations despite his desire to gain the love of a woman 
within that society. His failure to do so, and his eventual retreat to a desert island 
away from society, once again signals the intractability of social convention and the 
need to temper one’s own emotions of disgust or boredom towards that society if one 
wishes to survive. 
 
As the 18th century progressed, the lives of bourgeois characters became more 
accepted and desired for theatrical representation, especially in England, where 
‘domestic’ tragedies and ‘sentimental comedy’ allowed audiences to see 
unremarkable middle-class characters (as distinct from great classical tragic heroes) 
overcome obstacles of class or wealth to achieve domestic, familial happiness. The 
‘sentimental’ of this genre alluded to a greater emphasis on the emotions of its 
characters while in the grip of their narrative predicaments. A famous example such 
as Sir Richard Steele’s The Conscious Lovers (1731) sees the hero thwarted from 
marrying his love (the orphan Indiana) owing to their social disparity, only for it to be 
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revealed at the play’s climax that her father is alive and she has the social position 
after all to be suitable for marriage. The play’s morally unambiguous characters, 
didactic address and emphasis on a tearful reunion scene between father and daughter 
came to exemplify the features of ‘sentimental comedy,’ with ‘comedy’ indicating 
more the genre’s light heartedness and optimism than any intended laughter from the 
audience. In fact, Steele prioritized the genre’s ‘sentimental’ elements over any 
comedic aspects when he commended this kind of drama as eliciting a ‘joy too 
exquisite for laughter,’8 revealing a disdain (widespread by that time) for the 
licentious wit of an earlier generation’s comic theatre and its cynicism towards 
‘respectable’ society. A new puritan veneration of benevolence, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, was manifest in the theatre too, with a didacticism that sought more than 
anything else to excite the virtuous emotions of pathos from its audiences. 
 
The melodrama of the 19th century had its roots therefore in the democratization of 
the theatre’s mode of address, both in terms of the various social classes that were 
now represented and the extent to which social hierarchies no longer determined or 
constrained the freedoms of its heroes. The didacticism of the previous century’s 
sentimental drama had prioritized ‘virtue’ above social position, and the established 
codes of conduct associated with one’s social position became dissociated from—and 
often shown to be detrimental to--the recognition of virtue. A related element to the 
ascendency of a new mode of expression in the melodrama was the division between 
the ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ theatres in both France and England at the turn of 
the 19th century. Licensing laws allowed the spoken word only in properly licensed 
theatres while unlicensed venues initially relied on dumb-show and musical 
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accompaniment to convey narrative. While music took on a greatly heightened role in 
entrances, exits and other spectacles throughout such productions, facial and bodily 
gesture became essential skills for actors in conveying emotions that could not be 
communicated through the spoken word (a style of acting which is clearly discernible 
in the performances of the silent cinema, which of course borrowed heavily from 
traditions of theatrical melodrama).  
 
These founding properties of melodrama, at its purest a non-literary form, predisposed 
it to a close affinity with the expression of human emotion. This fact is often obscured 
by the parallel development of the genre’s other key elements, which included 
emphases on dramatic spectacle, improbable plots and stock characters. Yet 
melodrama’s vital link with the sentimental comes with the extent to which extremes 
of human emotion became codified and comprehended as chiefly visual phenomena. 
While the spoken word dominating the legitimate theatre allowed emotional restraint 
and theatrical decorum to be maintained, both in terms of acting and theme, 
melodrama traded on the raw emotions of desperate, demonstrative characters. Thus 
melodrama’s key conflicts often revolved around the virtuous poor, oppressed and 
pursued by villainous aristocrats, and later, rich industrialists.9 Just as Richardson’s 
heroines resorted to tears of despair as the last available response to their ordeals at 
the hands of rich masters, so virtue came to be associated with the victimized heroes 
of a cruel and oppressive Britain or France. Sensational turns of narrative, such as 
twins-separated-at-birth (e.g., adaptations of Dumas’ The Corsican Brothers), 
                                                
9 Dickens’ work provides perhaps the best examples of the substitution of industrialists or capitalists 
for roles initially applicable to aristocrats, such as Josiah Bounderby in Hard Times or Ebenezer 
Scrooge in A Christmas Carol. 
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mistaken or disguised identities, love triangles and stage-fights provided grist to the 
emotional mill. 
 
As an ‘illegitimate’ theatre, melodrama forged a new code of moral identity based on 
a visual language of good and evil. Associated particularly in France with such 
dramatists as Guilbert de Pixérécourt, in Germany with August von Kotzebue and in 
America with Dion Boucicault, melodrama’s simple allocation of moral greatness to 
one set of characters and moral baseness to another became a structure that provided 
moral clarity, Peter Brooks argues, to a public that had come to find such certainties 
scarce in their own society. Poetic justice, where the good are recognized and 
rewarded while villains are found out and punished, fulfilled the reader’s or 
spectator’s own wishes in relation to such Manichean polarities. However, there were 
also several narratives that eschewed such simple instances of poetic justice, 
favouring instead the tragic tropes of martyred characters that are too good for the 
world, exemplified by the character of Little Eva in the original novel and the many 
stage adaptations of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
 
Whether upheld literally through the survival and victory of virtuous characters, or 
more symbolically, through appeals to the transcendent victories of virtuous 
characters in death, a modified poetic justice became a central concern of this theatre. 
In a similar vein to Brooks’ arguments concerning melodrama’s struggle for ‘moral 
legibility’, Frederic Jameson, while not naming melodrama specifically in his 
Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture, argues that popular entertainment (his 
example is The Godfather’s first two parts) must convey 'our deepest fantasies about 
the nature of social life, both as we live it now, and as we feel in our bones it ought 
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rather to be lived’ (my italics).10 Its moral purpose rests on efforts to resolve the 
tensions between how things are in society and how things ought to be. The film 
scholar Christine Gledhill agrees on the dual logic of melodrama’s rhetoric, in that it 
contains the sad truths of contemporary life yet simultaneously attempts to represent a 
Utopian vision of the world that transcends those conditions. However, she shifts the 
tense of melodrama from the future or conditional to the nostalgia of an irrecoverable 
‘golden past’, arguing that it depicts ‘less how things ought to be than how they 
should have been.’11 Looking back at 19th century melodrama as an essential 
component to what she and fellow film scholar Linda Williams recognize as a 
persistent ‘mode’ in contemporary Hollywood cinema, Gledhill sees the form as 
resting on tensions between a moral idealism and the representation of social realities 
that too often fall short of such ideals. Arguing for the latter’s realism as being as 
constitutive of melodrama as the former, Gledhill has underlined the flaws of 
arguments that facilely oppose melodrama to realism, concluding that the elicitation 
of emotions such as pathos constitutes a variant of realism rather than its antithesis.12 
The genealogy of the realism/emotion binary is further investigated below as a chief 
hallmark of modern intellectual thought as it has emerged from the 19th century, with 
such movements as naturalism and modernism. 
 
Melodrama, as distinct from classical tragedy, thus represented if not always the 
successful rescue of virtue from the dangers of modern society, then at least the 
                                                
10 Frederic Jameson, ‘Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture’, Social Text, No. 1 (1979), p. 147. 
 
11 Gledhill, Home Is Where the Heart Is, p. 21. 
 
12 See Christine Gledhill, ‘Between Melodrama and Realism: Anthony Asquith's Underground and 
King Vidor's The Crowd’, in Jane Gaines (ed.), Classical Hollywood Narrative: The Paradigm Wars, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992, 129-67. 
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possibility of the recognition of that virtue at its most vulnerable. Where tragedy 
represented a hero’s downfall as attributable to an internal flaw, melodrama posits 
flaws as external, socially-derived and redeemable by human action. Its imperatives 
are double-edged, in that the subject must be both humble and all-too vulnerable 
before cosmic obstacles, yet obliged to do what he/she can to overcome them, even at 
the risk of failure. We can see that an 18th century novel like Clarissa was already a 
melodrama avant la lettre, as it too posed a tension between the cruel facts of society 
and the idealism of the martyred heroine for whom death is presented as a cosmic 
release from suffering. Despite rewards in the afterlife and the apparent intention of 
Richardson to prescribe religious faith, her death carries the pathos of 
punishment/reward from even the highest power. The heroine is both venerated at the 
character level for her undying faith and simultaneously punished for her goodness at 
the narrative level. Clarissa, like melodrama, both constructed and mourned the 
erasure of idealized benevolence from society.  
 
On a semantic level, melodrama contends with ‘sentimental’ as the generic label for 
this form of theatre, and both words are often employed for similarly pejorative ends 
in relation to similar artistic devices. Just as ‘sentimental’ is often used to implicitly 
convey the sense of its own excess, melodrama has also traditionally been vilified for 
being ‘overly melodramatic’.13  The fields of meaning for the sentimental and the 
melodramatic also often exceed associations with any particular textual genre, lending 
both terms a vagueness that can sometimes undermine their claims to useful meaning. 
However, it should be emphasised how the two words possess different genealogies 
and attributes, despite how they represent traditions that clearly have come to overlap 
                                                
13 See Linda Williams, Playing the Race Card, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 10-11. 
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at a variety of discursive levels. For instance, Lea Jacobs, in her account of the decline 
of a ‘sentimental’ cinema in 1920s Hollywood, differentiates between sentimentality 
and melodrama as follows:  
The two things are not the same despite the fact that many 
melodramas are sentimental. The literature of sentiment predates 
melodrama, and there are melodramatic traditions that are not 
sentimental.14 
 
Arguing therefore for the historical discrepancies between the two traditions, Jacobs 
goes on to find ‘sensationalism’ as the chief distinguishing feature between them, 
citing research on various publications of the early 20th century film industry that 
largely equated melodrama as a general term applied to the action, spectacle and 
special effects that came to characterize so much Hollywood cinema. 15 This 
‘sensationalist’ aesthetics corresponds less with the didactic and maudlin 
‘sentimental’ genres and more with a tradition of ‘blood and thunder’ melodrama as it 
developed in 19th century theatres, which certainly by the middle of that century had 
come to predominate with increased investments in elaborate stage mechanics and 
special effects, then to be successfully transposed to cinema at the outset of the 
following century.16  
 
Melodrama in the more narrow sense of its being concerned chiefly with pathos, 
family, children and virtuous sacrifice (its more sentimental variants) has certainly not 
                                                
14 Lea Jacobs, The Decline of Sentiment: American Film in the 1920s, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2008, p. 277. 
 
15 See Steve Neale’s ‘Melo Talk: On the Meaning and the Use of the Term ‘Melodrama’ in the 
American Trade Press’, Velvet Light Trap, Vol. 22 (Fall 1993), p. 66-89. 
 
16 For detailed accounts of the transposition of theatrical melodrama’s conventions to the early cinema, 
see Frank Rahill, The World of Melodrama (cited in note 6); Ben Singer, Melodrama and Modernity: 
Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001; Ben 
Brewster and Lea Jacobs, Theatre to Cinema: Stage Pictorialism and the Early Feature Film, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998. 
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been forgotten, least of all by scholars in film studies that have sought to analyse the 
rhetoric of such ‘melodrama’ within the rubric of a variety of political and aesthetic 
identity debates (see Chapter 3). Following on from the championing of melodrama as 
a ‘women’s genre’ by feminist critics in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Steve 
Neale have also identified this sentimental variant of melodrama and its affective 
registers as having far more to do with influences as seemingly diverse as the drame 
of Diderot’s poetics and ‘The Cult of True Womanhood’ of the 19th century 
(discussed below) than with the dynamism and hysteria of sensational melodrama.17 
The ‘commendable’ moral ideas and feelings transmitted by the sentimental comedy 
or melodrama remain to this day recognizable as instances of ‘sentiment’ (such as in 
the homely, folksy It’s a Wonderful Life viewed on Christmas Eve to cite an 
appropriately clichéd example). Conversely, the consolidation of melodrama as a 
mode arguably heralded the prioritization of the ‘sensational’ as much as the 
sentimental as it came to encompass a myriad of features aimed at exciting spectator 
emotion, albeit still staged around the moral opposition of good versus evil. The 
sensational novel or play thus connoted a wider variety of emotional involvement than 
the benevolent empathy prescribed initially for its truly sentimental variants. 
Melodrama would come to provoke emotions of hope, envy, nostalgia, laughter, 
sadness and anger through a heady mix of sensational thematics, fuelling what Linda 
Williams now regards as melodrama’s inherent oscillation between ‘action’ and 
pathos’.18 The sensationalism and sentiment of melodrama (and the Hollywood 
cinema that followed in its wake) represents an ambiguous consequence of the ‘cult of 
sensibility’. The experience of being moved becomes of course a key attraction of 
                                                
17 Neale, ‘Melo Talk’, p. 75. 
 
18 Linda Williams, Playing the Race Card, p. 19. 
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melodrama, as it had with sensibility. However, as a code of spectatorship, the affect 
of melodrama was more eclectic by being less limited to the helpless, overwhelmed 
tears of sentimental pathos 
 
That melodrama clearly concerned itself with ‘moral legibility’ for theatre goers 
should not obscure the sense therefore in which its emotional repertoire was rather 
more diverse than the ‘sentimental’ as such, even though the latter was commonly 
incorporated within it, or extrapolated from it. Reading ‘for the sentiment’, as Johnson 
termed it, became a particular reading strategy that, although hugely popular, was one 
of various moods accommodated by the melodrama. For instance, here is Thackeray 
commenting on a mid-19th century production of de Kotzebue’s popular 1798 
melodrama The Stranger as its chief heroine delivers a tearful speech:  
She began her business in a deep sweet voice. Those who know 
the play of the Stranger are aware that the remarks made by the 
various characters are not valuable in themselves either for their 
sound sense their novelty of observation or their poetic fancy. In 
fact if a man were to say it was a stupid play he would not be far 
wrong. Nobody ever talked so. If we meet idiots in life as will 
happen it is a great mercy that they do not use such absurdly fine 
words. The Stranger's talk is sham like the book he reads and the 
hair he wears and the bank he sits on and the diamond ring he 
makes play with but in the midst of the balderdash there runs that 
reality of love of children and forgiveness of wrong which will be 
listened to wherever it is preached and sets all the world 
sympathizing.19 
 
The above passage illustrates the sentimental as arising at particular junctures 
within the drama, where ‘fine’ sentiments are expressed combining emotive gesture 
and pathetic verbiage. Like Johnson, Thackeray denies the value of such plays in 
terms of any sense of their logic or poetry, but rather commends the pathos that 
                                                
19 William Makepeace Thackeray, The History of Pendennis: His Fortunes and Misfortunes, His 
Friends and His Greatest Enemy, Houghton Mifflin, 1890, p. 36. 
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they elicit to the ‘world’, as a function of a select set of thematics such as the love 
of children and the forgiveness of wrong. The sense of a public outpouring of 
emotion is particularly important here also, for the novel continues with an account 
of the theatre-goers as they come to a ‘favourite’ passage: 
 With what smothered sorrow, with what gushing pathos Mrs 
Haller delivered her part[..] when she came to this passage little 
Bows buried his face in his blue cotton handkerchief after crying 
out “Bravo.”  
All the house was affected. Foker for his part taking out a large 
yellow bandanna wept piteously. As for Pen he was gone too far 
for that.20 
 
Collective sorrow at heartfelt expressions of love and sadness was therefore still a 
very popular mode of public spectatorship at this time in the 19th century, 
although constituting only a particular mood or temporality within the larger 
melodramatic structure. These emotive features of melodrama appealed to a huge 
new swathe of society that had not partaken in the prior century’s genteel practice 
of novel-reading.  A theatre that had freed itself of the exclusivity of the social 
elites now catered to the sentimental proclivities of an ever increasing theatre-
going public, while also accommodating desires for the excitements of ever new 
sights and sounds, the arrival of cinema constituting a remarkable advance in such 
terms.  
 
Dickens: Melodrama and the Genteel 
Alongside huge theatrical attendance, the increasing literacy levels seen by the 19th 
century would account for the continued popularity of the novel and its chief 
melodramatist, Charles Dickens. As with the reception of Richardson’s Pamela, the 
                                                
20 Ibid., p. 37. 
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outcome of Dickens' stories became public events, as illustrated by the famous story 
of New Yorkers greeting people newly arrived from England with enquiries as to 
what became of Little Nell in Dickens’ latest instalment. Much has been written on 
how much the theatre influenced Dickens, as much as or to an even greater extent 
than the work of prior novelists.21 Such novels as The Old Curiosity Shop, Dombey & 
Son, Oliver Twist and A Christmas Carol all traded on standard sentimental tropes 
such as the victimized child (Little Nell, Oliver Twist, Paul Dombey), emotive 
rhetoric and tearful public gatherings (the death of Little Nell). Aligned with such 
conventions was the idealisation of the poor and the equating of poverty with virtue, 
which has been widely understood as a key Dickensian and Victorian sentimental 
vice.22 Wider melodramatic conventions included sensational plot reversals (the 
revelation of Oliver Twist’s high birth at the end of Oliver Twist, for example), 
mistaken identities, great heroes and memorably appalling villains.  Nineteenth 
century scholar Sally Ledger discusses Dickens’ sharp oscillation between laughter 
and tears as another chief indicator of Dickens’ appropriation of melodrama for the 
novel. Arguing that shifts of register from laughter to pathos ‘owes some of its power 
to the force of contrast’, Ledger defends the richness of Dickens' writing on the 
grounds of the myriad responses that his novels must have engendered in its reading 
public.  
 
                                                
21 See Sally Ledger, ‘"Don't be so melodramatic!" Dickens and the Affective Mode’, Interdisciplinary 
Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century, no. 4 (April 2007) and Rick Altman, ‘Dickens, Griffith & Film 
Theory Today’, South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1989), reprinted in Jane Gaines (ed.). 
Classical Hollywood Narrative: The Paradigm Wars, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992, pp. 
9-47. 
22 See Daniel Born, The Birth of Liberal Guilt in the English Novel, Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995, p. 82, which discusses how ideologies that align poverty with virtue are 
argued to assuage the guilt of adherents to the liberal project and its reliance on the maintenance of 
class and wealth hierarchies.  
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Dickens’ work is also widely regarded to have taken on ‘darker’ themes as his career 
developed, with greater emphases on socio-political satire and social realism. This 
assessment, which canonizes Hard Times, Great Expectations or Little Dorrit over 
Dickens’ earlier novels, indicates the extent to which his propensity for melodrama 
had been thought to have given way to a more ‘mature’ period and suggests a 
presumed mutual exclusivity between melodrama and a more cerebral, emotionally 
detached or indifferent style of writing.23 The advent of this theoretical binary 
between the naturalism of the later novels and the emotionalism of the early works 
has been itself historicized, particularly in terms of the literary markers of novelistic 
quality that had crystallized at the start of the 20th century in relation to canonical 
works and authors (from which Dickens himself had initially been wholly excluded). 
As the melodramatic was coming by that time to be increasingly deemed a hackneyed, 
kitschy artform, suitable only for a mass public with ‘genteel’ or ‘Victorian’ tastes in 
relation to art, a shift had occurred in terms of what it represented as a category of 
taste. 
 
Melodrama shared a similar critical context as the sentimental by the turn of the 
century--with Dickens charged with indulging in both. The seeds of this cynicism in 
relation to the sentimentality of Dickensian melodrama were already apparent in its 
own century. As discussed above, sentiment had always also signified the notion of its 
own excesses. The quintessential sentimental crime in the 18th century was that of the 
tearful theatre spectators that wept at the pathetic resolution of problems of virtuous 
                                                
23 The highly influential delineation of a ‘great tradition’ of English literature by F.R. Leavis, for 
instance, consolidated a canon of novels that largely eschew melodramatic elements, excluding 
therefore Dickens, Hardy and Sterne. Dickens’ Hard Times, was the sole selection from the latter’s 
oeuvre that, in Leavis’ estimation, displayed ‘serious’ writing (The Great Tradition, London: Penguin, 
1993). 
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innocents at the theatre while remaining indifferent to the plight of poor beggars that 
they would have encountered in their daily lives. As with Rousseau, the theatre could 
be deemed a potentially corrupting cultural apparatus that could distract or inure its 
patrons from the realities and injustices of their own society, as discussed in Chapter 
1. The problematic of sentimentality thus always surpassed the text itself and 
concerned itself with the ethics and actions of the spectator as a moral entity distinct 
from the artwork.24 While melodrama came to designate a genre of emotive theatre, 
the sentimental occupied an increasingly indeterminate field, signifying a category of 
taste and a concomitant subjectivity as much as a genre. It is manifest as much by the 
reception of melodramatic works as by the works themselves. 
 
Despite the sensationalism of his novels, Dickens himself was perhaps one of the best 
observers of how sentimental affect could be deemed a vice rather than a virtue. As 
early as 1840, he himself wrote of the ‘sentimental’ in terms very different to 
Thackeray’s depiction of a tearful theatrical audience. In The Old Curiosity Shop he 
provides this brief sketch of Nell’s friend, Kit, as he sadly inspects the now vacated 
shop that had once provided sustenance for Nell and her grandfather:  
 It must be especially observed in justice to poor Kit that he was 
by no means of a sentimental turn, and perhaps had never heard 
that adjective in all his life.  He was only a soft-hearted grateful 
fellow, and had nothing genteel or polite about him; 
consequently, instead of going home again, in his grief, to kick 
the children and abuse his mother (for, when your finely strung 
people are out of sorts, they must have everybody else unhappy 
likewise), he turned his thoughts to the vulgar expedient of 
making them more comfortable if he could.25 
 
                                                
24 For an extended discussion of the sentimental problem in nineteenth-century culture, see Michael 
Bell, Sentimentalism, Ethics and the Culture of Feeling, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
25 Charles Dickens, The Old Curiosity Shop, Wordsworth Classics, 1995, p. 105-6. 
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This fascinating passage reveals how a sentimental disposition could be deemed 
contrary to the virtue that it may once have betokened. No longer associated solely 
with a public (theatrical or otherwise) that is harmonized by shared feelings of 
benevolent sympathy, the sentimental denotes attributes of gentility and politesse that 
undermine its earlier association with true moral feeling. To be ‘soft-hearted’ and 
‘grateful’ is contrasted with the ‘sentimental turn’ where once they might have been 
coterminous. Dickens’ account instead reveals the sentimental as sharing the 
superficial aspects of gentility, the underside of which is characterized precisely as the 
cruelty of abusing even one’s own family members. The familial context, hidden from 
the public arena, represents a place where the sentimental mask can be lifted, allowing 
gentility to give way to violence as its truer form. Dickens ironically opines that to 
attempt to help others now paradoxically becomes a ‘vulgar expedient,’ once more 
indicating a disparity between behaviour connoting simple human benevolence and 
contemporary modes of tasteful conduct. 
 
As an affectation of a ‘finely strung’ class, Dickens clearly is in sympathy with those 
that, he suggests, might never have heard of the word ‘sentimental’ or learnt its codes. 
Melodrama is here employed as a means of discriminating between the virtuous poor 
(Kit is an illiterate odd-job boy) and a bourgeois/upper class corrupted by wealth 
(exemplified in this novel by Daniel Quilp) yet made seemingly respectable by 
genteel codes of sentimental conduct. Such conduct now also exceeds the bounds of a 
purely theatrical spectatorship, such as that outlined by Thackeray, for Kit is here 
shown to have been made genuinely sad merely by the ‘cold desolation’ of an empty, 
dusty space that had once been a place of familiarity and comfort. Dickens’ denial of 
Kit’s capacity for the ‘sentimental’ as a means of assuring the reader of the truth of 
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Kit’s feeling reveals moreover sentimentality as a mode in life, not one merely 
confined to the reception of art. Sharing attributes with the ‘moral sense’ of the 
previous century (that commended the subject’s good emotions as a function of 
witnessing good deeds), sentiment still operates here at the level of vision, yet with a 
now negative, almost threatening valence. Sentiment undermines the integrity of true 
pathos in almost any scenario of social injustice, sitting uneasily between self-
indulgence and the social conformity of a corrupted class. 
 
Perhaps Dickens most excoriating attack on a spurious gentility came in his analysis 
of the codes of high society and gentlemanly conduct in Great Expectations, where 
Pip is coerced into abandoning his working-class childhood at a provincial 
blacksmith’s forge in order to pursue the life of a London gentleman, at the behest of 
a mysteriously anonymous benefactor. For all the education and refinement that Pip 
experiences in London, Dickens shows how honesty and the capacity for love become 
necessarily cast off in the urban, genteel environment, while the true determinants of 
Pip’s identity and most of the solutions to the novel’s mysteries derive from the 
people of Pip’s childhood. The influence of both Magwitch the escaped convict, Pip’s 
real benefactor, and Miss Havisham, Pip’s mistaken benefactor, loom large in the 
novel for their respective economic and psychological impact. Both challenge Pip to 
reconcile a newly-acquired gentility with his capacity for love and kindness, while the 
melodramatic logic of the novel makes this all but impossible.  
 
When Pip weeps as he leaves his town for London the first time, Dickens writes of the 
semiotic value of tears as follows: 
Heaven knows we need never be ashamed of our tears, for they are 
rain upon the blinding dust of earth, overlying our hard hearts. I was 
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better after I had cried than before,—more sorry, more aware of my 
own ingratitude, more gentle.26 
 
With such a privileging of tears, the capacity to weep becomes a test of moral 
integrity in the novel, which in turn is gauged by the extent to which characters are 
close to their truly loved ones as opposed to the objects of their own narcissistic 
vanities. As Magwitch makes Pip wealthy through his business successes in Australia, 
the extent of Pip’s moral descent are illustrated by his cruelly effete treatment of his 
old friend, Joe Gargery. When Joe comes to visit Pip in London, Dickens creates a 
pathetic scene of social embarrassment and snobbery on Pip’s part, leading him to 
avoid Joe at his next visit to his home-town. When Joe causes the latter to shed tears 
once again at the admission of their emergent disparity in social class and appearance, 
Pip bemoans the obsession that turns him away from such tears, his love for the ever-
elusive and heartless Estella and his attempts to adopt her snobbish perspective on all 
things: 
But I never thought there was anything low and small in my 
keeping away from Joe, because I knew she would be 
contemptuous of him. It was but a day gone, and Joe had brought 
the tears into my eyes; they had soon dried, God forgive me! 
Soon dried.27 
 
With Miss Havisham and Estella the key proponents of upper class society in the 
novel, they in fact offer Pip neither wealth nor love, yet Pip is seduced by the signifier 
of a gentility with no signified. Havisham exemplifies a corrupted sentimentality most 
clearly in her compulsive prolongation of her own trauma of spurned love. Having 
been cruelly jilted at the altar, and living a life of gothic stagnation in the dilapidated 
country estate, Satis House, where the clocks have long stopped (and dressed still in 
her wedding dress, obsessed sentimentally with her past), she plots to have Pip 
                                                
26 Charles Dickens, Great Expectations, Wordsworth Classics, 1992, p. 132. 
 
27 Ibid., p. 200. 
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experience unrequited love through her ‘heartless’ prodigy, Estella. A chilling scene 
of Pip’s encountering Estella once again as a grown woman at Satis House illustrates 
the moral ambiguity of sentimental spectatorship, as Havisham watches her two 
pawns coming together to symbolize an ostensibly perfect union that she knows can 
never be consummated emotionally. She is particularly attentive to Pip’s gaze at 
Estella, entreating him to notice her appearance as ‘less coarse and common’ as a 
means of proving Estella’s suitability for love (and marriage). When she orders Pip 
repeatedly to ‘love her’, Dickens demonstrates the threatening voice of a genteel high 
society that feeds on ‘high emotions’ as melodramatic spectacle while disregarding 
the meanings and consequences of activating such emotions in real individuals. 
Superficially, he and Estella are as good as married, yet Dickens shows how 
appearances of ‘genteel’ love fail to accord with emotional reality. 
 
When Pip accedes to Havisham’s encouragement, falling for Estella, he imagines a 
compatibility between his emotional needs and his place in society. The novel 
undermines this by illustrating how society’s ‘great expectations’ for individuals fails 
to accord with either their happiness or their needs for real love. Estella, a desirable 
prize in high society, in fact represents the disinterested rationality of the marriage 
market; she admits to Pip that she ‘has no heart’, and no tolerance of ‘sympathy—
sentiment—nonsense.’ Programmed emotionally by Havisham, she rejects his 
proposals of love and instead enters a mutually loveless and violent marriage with 
Pip’s hated rival, the well-off Bentley Drummle, as a spiteful riposte to Pip’s 
affection. When she reveals to him her plans to marry Drummle, Pip’s desolation 
provokes identification on the part of Havisham which he (as narrator) describes as ‘a 
ghastly stare of pity and remorse.’ As he comes to mirror her own desolation, 
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Havisham is shown finally to reveal the signs of her own traumatized subjectivity. 
The sympathetic identification that occurs between them is depicted as dependent on 
the destruction of two human beings - no good can come of it. As Dickens writes of 
the ‘sentimental’ subjectivity in The Old Curiosity Shop, the only goal of the 
sentimentalist is to transfer his/her unhappiness to others, to ‘have everybody else 
unhappy likewise.’ Havisham exemplifies such sentimental gentility, which as such 
becomes somewhat of an oxymoron, for it comes to denote the aspirations of a class 
that is too corrupted and corrupting to exhibit real sentiment as such. 
 
The Cult of True Womanhood   
The end of Great Expectations remains famously ambiguous concerning the outcome 
of Pip and Estella as a couple. Dickens has been reported to have been undecided as 
to whether to conclusively unite them in happiness or to persist with the consequences 
of Estella’s froideur towards Pip. The original ending sees her re-married to a 
Shropshire doctor once the abusive Drummle has died yet Dickens was aware of his 
public’s desires for a more optimistic outcome. Having discussed the ending with his 
friend, the novelist Edward Bulwer Lytton, he created the happier yet still ambiguous 
ending where Pip meets Estella outside the ruins of Satis House, yet this time sees ‘no 
shadow of another parting from her.’ Posing the possibility of their not parting ever 
again, Dickens implies a change of heart in Estella that the novel had so far refused to 
demonstrate. The possibility of redemption indeed forms a key thematic problem for 
Dickens here, and it is an issue that Dickens seems to struggle with throughout his 
writing. Whether characters have the potential to change for the better or are 
consigned to invariable moral valences determined at the outset of the novel remains 
for Dickens a vexed question about the human condition and its moral vicissitudes. 
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Estella’s trajectory echoed ongoing debates during the century concerning the innate 
virtue of womanhood and the desirability of women that lived by codes of genteel 
virtue. She represents clear deviance from—and a critique of--ideals of feminine 
sensibility. If the ideal was a devoted and subservient companion to a respectable 
gentleman, Estella is shown to be a product of that system made dysfunctional, for it 
is Havisham (a woman that was initially courted and proposed to on the grounds of 
her family wealth rather than genuine love as such) that inscribes a subversion of such 
genteel feminine codes in Estella. When she marries Drummle, Estella knows that her 
prospective partner, like the system through which they are to be united, is marred by 
imperfection and cynicism, in contrast to Pip’s naive faith in the happy co-existence 
of love and wealth. The lack of ‘sentiment’ exhibited by Estella is shown to emanate 
from failures in prior interpersonal relations, the corrupting influence of greed and the 
worlds of finance and law that legitimate it. By this point in Dickens writing, as Terry 
Eagleton explains, the writer had shifted to a recognition that the human suffering 
depicted so vividly in his novels were attributable to flaws in the ‘system’ of 
‘industrial capitalist society’ rather than to the evils of specific individuals within such 
systems.28  
 
By demonstrating the influence of material concerns on the emotional relations 
between people, Dickens contributes towards the subversion of the genteel codes of 
feminine behaviour that advanced notions of innate traits and dispositions in female 
identity. Barbara Welter explains in a classic article on the era’s ‘Cult of True 
Womanhood’ how pamphlets, magazines and books of the early to mid-19th century 
                                                
28 Terry Eagleton, Introduction to Hard Times, London: Routledge, 1987, p. 10. 
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persisted in the valorisation of a sentimental ideal of femininity emanating from the 
18th century; the “Cult of True Womanhood” is posited as an ideology that permeated 
the ‘Victorian’ gender consciousness. For Welter, its four ‘cardinal virtues’ were 
‘piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity.’29 Emphasising the woman’s domestic 
and motherly role and subordinate status to her husband, the cult of ‘True 
Womanhood’ expounded a moral idealism with regard to women which also elicited 
anxieties about the corrupting influence of the world upon them, necessitating their 
protection and isolation. As long as women were prevented from reading the ‘wrong’ 
kinds of literature or engaging in overly intellectual pursuits, 30 the ‘cult’ ensured that 
women would remain a naive yet moral anchor for family, husbands and the world. 
Welter explains, citing a pamphleteer, Mrs Gilman, that a woman was deemed quite 
able to handle a man’s abrasiveness because: 
...in her heart she knew she was right and so could afford to be 
forgiving, even a trifle condescending. "Men are not unreasonable," 
averred Mrs. Gilman. "Their difficulties lie in not understanding the 
moral and physical nature of our sex. They often wound through 
ignorance, and are surprised at having offended." Wives were 
advised to do their best to reform men, but if they couldn't, to give 
up gracefully. "If any habit of his annoyed me, I spoke of it once or 
twice, calmly, then bore it quietly."31 
 
So where women were advised to remain stoical, unfazed repositories of virtue, men 
                                                
29 Barbara Welter, ‘The Cult of True Womanhood’, American Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 
1966), p.152. 
 
30 Ibid., This indeed extended to their reading habits, in which novels were to be treated with caution as 
opposed to works of ‘religious biography,’ and other literary forms that did not interfere ‘with serious 
piety.’ Constructions of a literature intended for women through an exclusive attention to sentimental 
tropes of domesticity or the family has continued to shape much critical discourse and has been 
challenged in only more recent re-assessments of the period. Like the 18th century’s ‘novel of 
sentiment,’ a body of scholarship has labelled this period of 19th century American literature with the 
generic descriptor of the ‘sentimental,’ opposing its peddling to mass/feminine tastes to the work of the 
great Romantic novelists such as Hawthorne, Emerson or Melville. See Herbert Ross Brown, The 
Sentimental Novel in America 1789-1860, New York, Pageant Books, 1959 [c1940]; Fred Lewis 
Pattee, The Feminine Fifties. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940; Ann Douglas, The Feminization of 
American Culture, New York, Knopf, 1978. 
 
31 Ibid., p. 160. 
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were expected to blunder through life in a struggle for wealth, power and sustenance 
for their families. Ethics were best left at home, where they could be indulged by an 
impractical sex, shielded from the cruelties of a utilitarian world.  
 
Similar ideologies would come to apply to children also, as childhood became 
removed from the sphere of work as child labour laws were reformed as the century 
progressed. As children became more sheltered in the family home, their symbolic 
value changed from a monetary order to a sentimental one, becoming endowed with 
the values of innocence, virtue and unworldliness, as exemplified by the Little Nells 
and Tiny Tims of Victorian literature. If the Artful Dodger was the archetype of the 
child-adult streetwise survivor in Dickensian London, Oliver Twist was his Utopian 
double: uncorrupted, innocent and ultimately permitted, through a melodramatic deus 
ex machina, to rise above the cruelties of lower-class life and live the life of a child.32  
 
Such sentimental ideals of the 19th century provide an interesting context for a 
character like Dickens’ Estella. Denied of her childhood innocence at Satis House, 
Estella as an adult becomes incapable of recovering the sentiment required of a 
Victorian woman and wife (unless the happy ending is to be believed). Her rejection 
of ‘sentiment’ and ‘sympathy’ as ‘nonsense’ speaks of a certain cynicism that the 
ideology of ‘True Womanhood’ would have been at pains to eliminate from female 
consciousness, preferring a wife’s moral idealism to a jaded familiarity and contempt 
                                                
32 Thorough accounts of transformations in the social valence of children and their increased 
idealization in the 19th century are provided in Henry Jenkins, ‘Introduction: Childhood Innocence and 
Other Modern Myths,’ in Henry Jenkins (ed.,) The Children’s Culture Reader, New York: New York 
University Press, 1998, pp. 1-37; Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger, ‘Children, Childhood, and Change in 
America, 1820-1920,’ in Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger et al., (eds.,) A Century of Childhood, 1820-
1920, Rochester, NY: Margaret Woodbury Strong Museum, 1984, pp. 1-32; Viviana A. Zelizer, 
Pricing the Priceless Child, New York: Basic Books, 1985. 
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for the world. Such an ideology preferred a ‘womanly,’ naive forgetfulness of life’s 
injustices and inequities to the brooding, hysterical scorn of Havisham and Estella. 
However, while the original virtue of gentle sympathy becomes a threatened, and 
greatly enhanced, virtue in Great Expectations, it is a pragmatic, heartless world that 
is implicated in its demise. Its flaws and injustices cannot be defeated by naive 
hopefulness alone and indeed such unworldly optimism could hamper the 
emancipatory hopes of the age. For such reasons, sentiment becomes a particularly 
limited and regressive faculty for writers and philosophers towards the end of the 19th 
century, and a particularly feminized and infantilising one. 
 
Cynicism and Modernism 
That social critique of the late 19th century equated a blinkered bourgeois humanism 
with the feminine should come as no surprise given the implicitly masculinist 
imperatives of debunking the complacencies of Victorian society. In Europe and 
America, indictments of a ‘genteel’ society founded on worthy yet ineffectual liberal 
principles were expressed by a wide range of largely male intellectuals that bemoaned 
the sentimental ideology of a humanistic, enlightened progress that failed to address 
society’s profound problems. The American poet and philosopher George Santayana 
in 1911, for instance, attributed an inadequate literary and intellectual culture in 
America to ‘A Genteel Tradition’ that is explicitly gendered: 
The American Will inhabits the sky-scraper; the American Intellect 
inhabits the colonial mansion. The one is the sphere of the 
American man; the other, at least predominantly, of the American 
woman. The one is all aggressive enterprise; the other is all genteel 
tradition.33  
 
                                                
33 George Santayana, ‘The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy,’ (1911) in Douglas. L. Wilson 
(ed.,) The Genteel Tradition, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 40. 
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While Santayana may chiefly have had in mind the New England high culture (poetry, 
prose and philosophy) based on the privileged, distanced sentiments of a comfortable 
upper-middle class, his indictment of the American intellect as a feminized sensibility 
extended these flaws to a wider national psychology. Ruled, to his mind, by 
anachronistic pieties and the optimism of the founding fathers of a bygone era, he 
described American poetry as ‘grandmotherly in that sedate spectacled wonder with 
which it gazed at this terrible world and said how beautiful and interesting it all 
was.’34 While the male world of laissez-faire capitalism proceeded excluded any 
ethical design from its culture, its cloistered intelligentsia were thought to indulge in a 
culture far removed, physically and logically, from the American dynamism of free 
enterprise. The romantic ‘wonder’ of such a tradition was deemed ill-founded and 
incompatible with the realities of a modern life that exemplified, as a growing number 
of pre-war intellectuals were coming to believe, urban degradation and alienation as 
much as human progress and equality.35 Governed by similar observations in Britain, 
the critic Lytton Strachey would set himself the task of knocking revered 
establishment figures of the Victorian era off their pedestals in his ‘Eminent 
                                                
34 George Santayana, ‘Genteel American Poetry,’ (1915) in Douglas. L. Wilson (ed.,) The Genteel 
Tradition, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 73.  
 
35 Later American writers such as Van Wyck Brooks (America’s Coming of Age, 1915) and later, 
Malcolm Cowley (After the Genteel Tradition, 1937) would similarly express disdain with regards to 
the ‘genteel’ tastes of turn-of-the century American high culture and its associations with political 
conservatism. H.L. Mencken’s ‘Prejudices’ (1920) is another key work in this regard. In more recent 
literary theory, Ann Douglas’ classic study on the 19th century’s ‘feminization of American culture’ 
locates the many strands of a similarly genteel culture in influences as diverse as Calvinism (as does 
Santayana), the sermons of protestant churchmen and the ascendency of women novelists, such as 
Harriet Beecher Stowe (see The Feminization of American Culture, referenced above). The 
‘sentimental power’ of such works as Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) and 19th century sentimental culture 
have since been re-evaluated and celebrated, notably by Jane Tompkins, Sensational Designs: The 
Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860, New York: Oxford UP, 1985, pp. 122-46). A more 
recent and less evaluative account is provided by Lauren Berlant in a historicization of sentimentality 
and its associations with female identity, aesthetics and feminized ideas of justice (see ‘The Subject of 
True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics’, in Jodi Dean (ed.,) Cultural Studies and Political Theory, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000 and The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of 
Sentimentality in American Culture, Duke University Press, 2008. 
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Victorians.’36 His biographical account of Florence Nightingale provides evidence of 
the autocratic, single-minded arrogance of an upper-class pillar of Victorian society as 
opposed to the meek and compassionate ‘lady of the lamp’ that ceaselessly nursed the 
soldiers at the Crimea. Examining a representation of her that had traded on 
sentimental notions of the virtuous maiden’s unalloyed benevolence, Strachey 
presents her flaws to call attention to the ‘Victorian’ vice of idealization of women, 
and its distortions of reality. Associated with other Bloomsbury group stalwarts such 
as Virginia Woolf and Sir Leslie Stephen, Strachey’s ideas of modernization and 
political reform applied equally to changing the ossified literature and ideology 
inherited from the previous century as it did to political action.   
 
Even within the 19th century, though, when Oscar Wilde wrote that ‘one must have a 
heart of stone to read the death of Little Nell without laughing,’ a sceptical self-
consciousness with regard to the sentimental reception of Victorian melodrama was 
clearly in evidence. Recognizing the trope of the dying, innocent child as an 
opportunity for Victorians to feel righteous indignation at the world’s wrongs, Wilde 
detaches himself from ‘reading for sentiment,’ reorientating the entire practice as 
comically anachronistic. Nell’s death, treated now as an artifice of literature where 
once treated by the aforementioned New Yorkers as a virtually real event, one gets the 
sense in Wilde’s quote that, for a certain readership, any original experience of 
sentiment has worn thin and its tropes become laughably clichéd.37 George Bernard 
                                                
36 Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians, Penguin Classics, 1990, first published in 1918. 
 
37 Wilde’s famous aphorisms included two quips on sentimentality: 
 
“A sentimentalist is simply one who desires to have the luxury of an emotion 
without paying for it.” (Epistola, In Carcere Et Vinculis, Ian Small (ed.), 
Oxford, Clarendon press, 2000.  
“Sentimentality is merely the bank holiday of cynicism.” (Selected Letters, Rupert Hart-Davis 
(ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1979, p. 501. 
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Shaw expressed a similar disdain for the Manichaeism of Dickens' earlier novels, such 
as where a fragile Nell represented the ideals of moral perfection crushed by the 
machinations of heartless profiteers and sadists. In his 1912 preface to Hard Times, a 
novel noted as indicative of Dickens’ turn to ‘serious’ social critique, Shaw 
commends Dickens’ muting of his earlier novels’ melodrama: 
You must therefore resign yourself, if you are reading Dickens's 
books in the order in which they were written, to bid adieu now to 
the light-hearted and only occasionally indignant Dickens of the 
earlier books, and get such entertainment as you can from him now 
that the occasional indignation has spread and deepened into a 
passionate revolt against the whole industrial order of the modern 
world. Here you will find no more villains and heroes, but only 
oppressors and victims, oppressing and suffering in spite of 
themselves, driven by a huge machinery which grinds to pieces the 
people it should nourish and ennoble, and having for its directors 
the basest and most foolish of us instead of the noblest and most 
farsighted.38  
 
Shaw notes in the above that the Dickens of mild social satire, or more commonly the 
application of poetic justice with regards to flawed individuals or ‘individual 
delinquencies,’ has given way to a much more profound condemnation of the whole 
‘order’ that underlies British life. Using such language as ‘industrial’, ‘machinery’ 
and ‘directors,’ Shaw highlights the institutions of the 19th century’s unfettered 
industrial development as the root cause of systemic failure, and Dickens’ chief 
referents. With the hindsight of the late 19th /early 20th century movements for social 
emancipation, Shaw sees Dickens’ shift from melodrama to social realism as 
analogous to British society’s own increasingly developed awareness of its social 
degradation and reliance on systemic exploitation in that same century. Applauding 
Hard Times for its scathing depiction of a fully realized industrial town and its 
                                                                                                                                       
 
38 George Bernard Shaw, ‘Introduction to Hard Times,’ reprinted in George Ford and Sylvere Monod 
(eds.), Hard Times New York: Norton, 1966. 
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endemic oppression of workers, Shaw argues that the 19th century saw a ‘Great 
Conversion,’ from a belief in the greatness of empire and British civilization of the 
century’s first half to the disillusion and calls for social reform of the latter half--a 
transition from the optimistic, imperial history of Macauley to the social critique of 
William Morris. Similar to the critiques of Marx, Carlyle, Ruskin and Carpenter, 
Shaw sees the advent of Socialism as the key corollary of Dickens abandonment of 
sentiment, comparing The Old Curiosity Shop and Hard Times as follows: 
The Old Curiosity Shop was written to amuse you, entertain you, 
touch you; and it succeeded. Hard Times was written to make you 
uncomfortable; and it will make you uncomfortable (and serve you 
right) though it will perhaps interest you more, and certainly leave 
a deeper scar on you, than any two of its forerunners.39 
 
Claiming a greater difficulty for the reader of Dickens’ more biting commentaries, 
Shaw, as a playwright himself, equates the sentimental tragedy of Old Curiosity Shop 
with a popular, entertainment function that Hard Times eschews.40 Art’s more noble 
purpose is now to provide social critique of a corrupt society that urgently needs 
reform, no longer simply a guide to virtuous conduct transmitted to the reader as 
moral instruction. However, he is still aware of the popularity of melodrama and the 
‘simple pleasure’ it elicits in the reader. He opposes the appeals of the sentimental to 
those of a more critical order, likening the former to the attractions of the ‘merry-go-
                                                
39 Ibid., 
 
40 F.R. Leavis had praise only for Hard Times, claiming its superiority over all of Dickens’ other 
novels, and considered it the only work that justified Dickens inclusion in ‘The Great Tradition’ of 
English literature that incorporated Jane Austen, George Eliot, Henry James and Joseph Conrad. Apart 
from Hard Times, all of Dickens’ other novels underlined his ‘genius’ as a ‘great entertainer’ while the 
latter novel is the only work that indicates ‘a sustained seriousness.’ Dickens was also targeted in 1930 
by Aldous Huxley for alleged lapses into sentimentality in the latter’s Vulgarity in Literature: 
Digressions from a Theme, Chatto and Windus; 1st edition, 1930. 
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round’ and the latter to a ‘battle’, with the former always still drawing ‘a bigger 
crowd.’41  
 
Equating the simple pleasures of melodrama with those of mass taste, Shaw comes to 
employ a binary of high art/low art that has long endured in the 20th century and 
beyond, where the ‘crowd’ is thought to resist the radical messages and meanings of 
socially critical art in favour of the consoling optimism of sentimental melodrama. 
Although he deems a novel like Hard Times as ‘no less attractive’ than popular 
melodrama, he is clearly conscious of its attracting a more radical and select group for 
its readership than for the latter, one that has already accepted the doctrines of a 
Carlyle or a Morris, if not perhaps a Marx. The period of critical indictment of 
Victorian society that began with critics of the late 19th century came to dominate elite 
intellectual and literary spheres, yet was structured around concerns for the 
emancipation of the common man or proletariat through a more accurate or ‘realistic’ 
representation of the world’s ills and injustices.42  
 
If such struggles were waged in the name of the working classes, writers such as 
Shaw were circumspect as to how socially critical literature could actually inspire 
radical action, and by whom, given the limited popularity of being made to feel 
‘uncomfortable’ as such. Likewise, if the intellectual climate was dominated by the 
                                                
41 Shaw also applauded the plays of Ibsen for the same reasons, for such work also target the staid and 
oppressive conditions of Victorian domestic life as determinants of marital dissatisfaction and failure, 
such as in A Doll’s House or Hedda Gabler. 
 
42 Lea Jacobs charts the emergence of literary ‘naturalism’ in early 20th century America as a key 
precursor to its manifestations in the Hollywood cinema of the 1920s, which she argues demonstrates 
an overall ‘Decline in Sentiment.’ See also Henry May, The End of American Innocence: The First 
Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959. To give a wider sense of 
its manifestations in world theatre in late 19th/early 20th century and for a penetrating critique of 
naturalism, see Raymond Williams, Drama from Ibsen to Brecht, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1969. 
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writings of not only Marx but Nietzsche and Freud also, disillusion with modernity 
extended not simply to its economic determinants but to also to its underlying 
philosophy and the human psyche itself.43 As socialist principles and ‘realist’ 
aesthetics may have been limited by their own reliance on a bourgeois ideology of 
human progress, this time in its idealization of the working class, the emergent high 
modernism (around 1890-1930) sought a more profound response to modernity by 
challenging the whole notion of ‘verisimilitude’ in naturalistic art. If naturalism, 
despite its rebuttal of sentimentality, still conveyed a world steeped in ideology, 
modernism searched for the lost, ‘natural’ coherences amidst the chaotic disorder of 
the present. The historical avant-gardes, from the Surrealists through to the 
Bloomsbury group, were united in their abstractions from the everyday and mimetic, 
unseating any notion in any sense of an ordered, comprehensible world. The 
problematics of sentimentality and notions of the perceived inadequacies of an 
improving literature (through regressive tropes of benevolent innocence) paled in 
significance compared to the more pressing debates concerning representation itself 
and high modernism’s more radical set of solutions.44   
 
                                                
43 Nietzsche’s notorious atheistic nihilism and corresponding loss of faith in objective reality (such as 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Clancy Martin, Continuum, 2005) paved the way for high-modernist 
aesthetics and has become particularly pertinent to postmodern thought. Freud’s introduction of the 
unconscious and psychoanalytic theory severely undermined humanistic philosophies that posited the 
achievability of mankind’s redemption (through class struggle or otherwise). Civilization and its 
Discontents, written in 1930, makes explicit the subject’s unconscious inimicability to civilization, the 
latter always constraining the psychical impulses of the former. (trans. and ed. James Strachey, New 
York: Norton, 1989).  
   
44 From Eliot’s The Wasteland and Joyce’s Ulysses to Picasso’s paintings, modernist styles are 
characterized by fragmentation and attention to the formal properties of the medium in question, 
signifying a nostalgia for a lost mode of rational order, be it in mimeticism or realism. See also Hugh 
Kenner, The Pound Era, University of California Press, 1971; Andreas Huyssen, After the Great 
Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986; 
David Perkins, A History of Modern Poetry: Modernism and After, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1976. 
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However, a key problematic for all aesthetic responses to the transformation in 
industrial modernity concerned the ‘alienation’ that had come to subsist in the 
Western world, whether the result of the encroachment of capitalist logic within the 
fabric of society or, in a simpler yet related sense, the limits to human freedom 
enforced by industrial society. Under all such rubrics, the efficacy of socialist or other 
political interventions seemed limited by the sheer scale and rapidity of the social 
transformations of the previous century, with such pessimism reaching its apotheosis 
with the outbreak of World War I. If the sentimental connoted the inevitability of 
harmony, closeness and benevolent feeling among humankind, ‘alienation’ was its 
antithesis and its coinage marked a profound disillusion with Victorian ideals of 
tearful communion and the recognition of virtue.45 As such, while the work of a 
mature Dickens was considered by Shaw and others to commendably provide an 
appropriately hard-edged and evocative account of a newly fragmented and 
bewildering modernity, modernist ‘high’ cultures would be predicated on a more 
radical abandonment of sociality tout court, their notorious difficulty (and emotional 
coldness) seeming only to reflect and compound an already alienated world. 
However, with all such strands of modern literature and art eschewing the 
sentimentality of ‘respectable’ and popular entertainment, the new movements of 
literary naturalism and modernism would go some way in dismissing sentimental 
vernaculars and their ‘moral legibility’. Despite this, the cinema would prove a potent 
platform for the continuance of such apparent anachronisms, giving a new and ever 
                                                
45  ‘Alienation’ as a concept was first introduced by Marx (Entfremdung in German) in his Manuscripts 
of 1844, referring to the separation of things that would have been in harmony in a pre-lapsarian (or 
pre-capitalist) world. Social alienation as a consequence of urbanisation and industrial capitalism 
would become a key concept to theories of modernity, as expounded by later German sociologists such 
as George Simmel, such as in his Philosophy of Money (German: Philosophie des Geldes, 1900) and 
Ferdinand Tönnies’ Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887). 
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more urgent cause for their denigration or exclusion from radical discourses in 
relation to the new medium.  
 
Victorianism meets the Cinema 
Social reformers and other intellectuals were far from united as far as attitudes to the 
newly emergent cinema were concerned. Even Shaw, who was excited by the 
potential of the new medium, refers to the cinema in 1914 in terms of both its sinister 
allure as well as the potential social gains for the innovations in mass communication 
that it heralded: 
Now, the cinema tells its story to the illiterate as well as to the 
literate; and it keeps his victim (if you like to call him so) not only 
awake but fascinated as if by a serpent's eye. And that is why the 
cinema is going to produce effects that all the cheap books in the 
world could never produce.46 
 
Wary somewhat of the ‘serpent’s eye’, a metaphor suggesting the screen’s illicit 
temptations and its ability to return the look of the spectator, the writer here 
acknowledges the great power of the cinema to stimulate the spectator and occupy her 
attention like no other, while aware of the democratic accessibility of this new 
institution and its creation of a new public sphere. If its content had so far failed to 
achieve the quality of an Ibsen or a mature Dickens, its harnessing of a huge public’s 
desires and aspirations inspired excitement in many intellectuals as to its future role in 
society.47 However, scepticism was expressed elsewhere regarding the cinema and its 
                                                
46 George Bernard Shaw, ‘The Cinema as a Moral Leveller: George Bernard Shaw on the Role of the 
Cinema’, extracts taken from New Statesman, 27th June 1914, online version accessed on 24th February 
2009 at http://www.newstatesman.com/society/2007/05/cinema-morality-shaw-boy 
 
47 Tom Gunning, for instance, notes that Maxim Gorky’s disdainful reaction to an early Lumière 
projection in 1896 was unusual in its pessimism compared to a more generalized excitement about the 
new technology of cinema (see ‘An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous 
Spectator’, in Linda Williams (ed.,) Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995, p. 117-8. 
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explosive popularity. As much recent scholarship on the reception of early cinema and 
pre-cinema has revealed, the great artform of the 20th century was initially regarded 
with disdain by various disparate sectors of society that deemed it too vulgar for 
respectable society, dangerous to young minds or lacking in educative qualities. As 
Lee Grieveson’s account of early film censorship argues, the mainstream American 
cinema as it developed in the early 20th century was shaped by a matrix of ‘legislative 
and reform activism’ that shaped the kind of artform it should become, particularly in 
moral terms.48  
 
A key trend to isolate for the purposes of this study is the theoretical transition from an 
early cinema of the side-show or the nickelodeon to the mainstream classicism that 
crystallized as the cinematic audience came to gradually include the initially 
suspicious middle classes. Cinema was first associated with the cheap fairground 
attraction through the sheer novelty of the moving-image, trick film or gimmicky 
short, and the popularity of the nickelodeons produced middle-class anxieties about 
the immoral activities taking place onscreen and off; a substantial body of scholarship 
identifies and accounts for cinema’s rise in social prestige via its negotiations with a 
matrix of moral discourses, incorporating race, class, gender and taste. With the 
eventual ascendency of the censorship board, the feature film and classical editing 
techniques, arguably culminating in the work of the first great feature director D.W. 
                                                
48 Lee Greiveson, Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early-Twentieth Century America, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. See also Russell Merrit’s account of the rise in social 
prestige of early cinema in ‘Nickelodeon Theaters 1905-1914: Building an Audience for the Movies’, 
in Tino Balio (ed.,) The American Film Industry, Madison: University of Wisconsion Press, 1976, pp. 
83-102. Tom Gunning surveys the rise of a morally respectable cinema in America over the course of 6 
years between 1903 and 1909 in ‘From the Opium Den to the Theater of Morality: Moral Discourse 
and the Film in Early American Cinema’, in Lee Greiveson & Peter Krämer (eds.,) The Silent Cinema 
Reader, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 145-154. See also William Uricchio and Roberta E. Pearson, 
Reframing Culture: The Case of the Vitagraph Quality Films, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1993. 
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Griffith, the whole issue of making cinema suitable for the public sphere has been 
shown to have been shaped by key moral debates, increasingly dominated by the 
values of a respectable, bourgeois constituency. Thus, the incorporation of sentimental 
ideologies within the discursive matrix of cinema once again became a crucial element 
in the satisfying of commercial and social priorities. The influence of theatrical 
melodrama as distinct from the realism or naturalism of the Victorian novel has been 
widely debated in relation to the ascendency of Griffiths and other early feature 
directors.49 Whether attributable to the ‘classical realist text’50 or the melodrama, the 
consolidation of Hollywood cinema principles clearly emphasised the moral and 
improving purposes behind its incorporation.51  
 
The curtailment of cinema’s ‘unseemly’ or ‘vulgar’ elements, both onscreen and in its 
exhibition contexts, indeed constitutes one significant point of departure in identifying 
sentimentality as a key element in augmenting the respectability of Hollywood 
cinema. If storytelling in the manner of the established theatre or novel became a top 
priority in attracting or maintaining the patronage of such audiences, ‘moral legibility’ 
became a key means of catering to Victorianesque tastes. As Ch. 4 will demonstrate, 
the evocation of sentimental responses in relation to the films of Chaplin or Griffiths 
                                                
49 While adaptation of the novels of Dickens, Zola, Tennyson or Shakespeare for the cinema has been 
perceived as indicative of early cinema’s move towards a more ‘realist’ mode and away from the 
narrative structure of melodrama with its coincidental turns of narrative (see Bordwell, Staiger, and 
Thompson, Classical Hollywood Cinema, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) recent 
scholars contest the mutual exclusivity of these two aesthetics. See Rick Altman, ‘Dickens, Griffith & 
Film Theory Today’, see note 22; Christine Gledhill, ‘The Melodramatic Field’, and Linda Williams, 
‘Melodrama Revised’, see note 4).  
 
50 A term first coined by Colin MacCabe in relation to established conventions of narrative construction 
dictating Hollywood cinema (Colin MacCabe, ‘Realism and the Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian 
Theses’, Screen Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 7-27. Along with Noel Burch’s concept of an 
‘Institutional Mode of Representation’ (see Life to those Shadows, Ben Brewster (ed. & trans.), 
London: BFI, 1990, 6-42) the dominance of such conventions are attributed to the dominance of 
bourgeois ideology in the critical years of the cinema’s formation.   
 
51 See note 46. 
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were highly significant factors in the success of those filmmakers over others, despite 
the realist or modernist elements of their work more often highlighted by discussions 
of early cinema’s aesthetics. The valorisation of family and the virtuous man or 
woman, the innocence of childhood and the abandonment or reformation of vice were 
borrowed wholesale from the previous century’s melodramatic traditions, for these 
tropes were recognized as the principal formulae for creating contemporary, popular, 
‘mainstream’ entertainment at the time. If, as Lee Greiveson argues, Hollywood 
cinema emerged from a balancing act between the commercial priorities of 
entertainment and social requirements that it educate or morally instruct, melodrama 
and its common recourse to sentimental codes brokered such a compromise most 
effectively in the name of an audience increasingly composed of middle-class 
individuals with a still strong attachment to Victorian values. While intellectual 
traditions such as ‘naturalism’ had already gained significant ground in relation to the 
‘higher’ cultures of the novel and theatre, their effect would not be felt so markedly in 
Hollywood until as late as the 1920s, as Lea Jacobs argues--a period that she terms 
‘The Decline of Sentiment.’52 
 
However, if the cinema was initially thought of as failing to achieve the more 
sophisticated aims of social critique, verisimilitude or moral improvement, returning 
audiences to dumb astonishment as opposed to detached, critical consciousness, 
‘realist’ criteria became themselves signifiers of aesthetic conservatism to many 
modernists. Within a larger discussion triggered by the emergent modernists’ 
optimism and radicalism towards modernity as it arose in the mid to late 19th century, 
cinema was promising despite its reproduction of the sentimental, or even owing to a 
                                                
52 See note 15. 
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kind of sentimentalism theoretically evacuated of its connotations of ‘moral’ feeling 
and conduct as such. The cinema’s popular manifestation as the new platform for an 
outdated, moralistic Victorianism would be discounted as an anachronism, yet the 
cinema was considered exciting for its unique expressiveness of both thought and 
feeling, and for its potential to reintegrate spectator and world. By jettisoning 
regressive ideologies of taste that were thought to intervene in the reception of art 
(through unique formal properties), the sensuous (if not sentimental) properties of 
cinema, under this rubric, would lend themselves to a more radical mode of reception. 
The cinema’s affinity with the tastes of ‘the mob’ as distinct from those of respectable 
society was something to be celebrated and reinforced, for here was a newly emergent 
public sphere ready for the medium’s innovative dissection and demythologization of 
reality itself. For the early film theorists of the new century, the cinema could be 
understood indeed to be reconfiguring aesthetic and political reality. Even though 
early cinema’s narratives would oftentimes be considered as throwbacks to the 
heights of Victorian sentiment—a mode which even Dickens was understood to have 
surpassed or at least nuanced—the radical change in medium, from written word to 
moving image, promised a more formalist progressivism at the level of perception 
itself. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
The Sentimental and Cinematic Modernism 
 
 
In the last two chapters, sentimentality has been examined as a central critical concept 
to philosophy, literature and drama in the 200 years leading up to the advent of 
cinema. With core concerns relating to the reason/emotion dichotomy, emotional 
pedagogy and the aesthetics of pathos, the sentimental represents a particularly 
significant body of theory and practice within which to conceptualize the new 
medium. Speculation on the spectatorship of cinema has been animated by similar 
questions to those of moral philosophy and sentimental literature on an ethics of 
compassion and sympathy in relation to the reception of art, not least as examined 
within rubrics of gender, genre and ideology. The extent to which the latter 
constituted an ethic at all has perhaps been the central question for critics speculating 
on the values of sentimental and melodramatic traditions inherited by cinema. 
Dismissed as Victorian (and Enlightenment) anachronism or celebrated as a central 
concept of aesthetic ideology, debates concerning the sentimental are not so much 
resolved but re-energized and reconfigured by the advent of film. If the sentimental 
was associated from the start with the kitschy, the cloying and the emotionally 
excessive, the range of critical responses and artistic solutions it continued to elicit 
would range from the dismissive to the genuinely inspired. With tendencies towards 
the melodramatic and unarticulated, its tropes challenge the very Enlightenment logic 
out of which it grew while nevertheless daring to denote a set of principles allied with 
Enlightenment obsessions for moral and didactic clarity.  
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Reflecting Kracauer’s concerns about capitalism’s inherent irrationality in modernity, 
sentimentality (like the Tiller Girls and the ‘Mass Ornament’) was and is perhaps too 
‘rational’ in a world of moral relativism and nihilism value, and finds an ambiguous 
ally in the cinema. This chapter looks to cinema’s early period of reception in order to 
see the extent to which its capacities adhered to ideas of modernity (and modernism) 
as they were emerging at this time. Astoundingly connotative of the ‘new’ in its 
technological modes of action and consumption, cinema nevertheless signified a 
status of hybrid artform rather than new art, reproducing or ‘re-mediating’1 older 
artforms. The sentimental, within such rubrics, inevitably becomes a sign of  
attachments to the past both in terms of subject matter and spectatorship, yet would 
nevertheless retain the same appeal and significance as in earlier periods. If the 
modernism introduced in the last chapter becomes the chief aesthetic objection to that 
signified by the sentimental, I argue that it is a particular strain of ‘high-modernism’ 
that demands rupture with the past and old methodologies, a schism that is neither 
sustained nor desired as the century reaches a post-war era of ideological 
rapprochement and aesthetic integration. Melodrama indeed becomes accepted in all 
but name as a ‘dominant’ mode for Hollywood cinema, as it had for the theatre and 
literature of preceding centuries, and becomes a principal focus for film theory, that 
aimed above all to nuance and interrogate its founding divisions of formalism and 
realism, truth and artifice, the abstract and the concrete. 
 
This chapter seeks to show how theories of cinema as a paradigm of a redemptive and 
explosive modern technology would come to sit in tension with strongly held 
                                                
1 A coin termed by Jay David Bolter and David Grusin in relation to digital technology’s 
reconfiguration of television, cinema and photography in Remediation: Understanding New Media. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999. 
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considerations of its collaboration with models of regressive sentimentality (levied in 
particular at moralistic representations of the human subject), producing an extended 
and ongoing debate as to its essential attributes in modernity. By the time of ‘classical 
film theory’ in the early-to-mid 20th century, sentimentality as a concept had come to 
betoken an illegitimately produced art in the reception of cinema and other artforms, 
with ‘man’ and the emotional excesses attached to his representation deemed a 
principal aesthetic flaw (a notion that would in no small way inform some central 
modernist positions, such as in Eisenstein’s repudiation of Griffith’s ‘sentimental 
humanism’). Yet while the theory of such figures as Eisenstein, Theodor Adorno, 
Walter Benjamin or the writers of Close-Up magazine manifest a long-established 
continuity with a high-modernist discourse of ‘rupture’ with a sentimental past, as 
introduced in the previous chapter, close analysis of even well-known texts reveals an 
incomplete abandonment of what might be deemed the humanist or sentimental 
principles underpinning such theory and their counterparts in the texts themselves. 
Moreover, other major film theorists, such as André Bazin or Béla Balázs seem far 
less oblique in their attachment to what we may rightly consider a humanist, if not 
sentimental aesthetics, while their theory nevertheless engages vitally with that of 
more resolutely modernist interlocutors. 
 
Montage/Hollywood 
An important metaphor for the sentimental/modernist dichotomy indeed becomes the 
US itself (and implicitly Hollywood) as a burgeoning global superpower at the turn of 
the 20th century, representing at once both the old and the new. Staged as an 
opposition between the technologically robust or functional and the superfluously 
humanist and politically regressive, the comments of the Soviet filmmaker Sergei 
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Eisenstein in relation to America capture vividly such conflicts between high-
modernism and the sentimental. He captures the America represented by Griffith in 
his 1943 essay ‘Dickens, Griffith and Film Today,’ by claiming: 
In order to understand Griffith, one must visualize an America 
made up of more than visions of speeding automobiles, speeding 
trains, racing ticker tape, inexorable conveyor belts. One is 
obliged to comprehend the second side of America - America the 
traditional, the patriarchal, the provincial. And then you will be 
considerably less astonished by this link between Griffith and 
Dickens.2  
 
Thus in the latter stages of his life and career, the filmmaker and theorist perceives a 
key division in American culture, two ‘faces of America’ that contribute equally and 
vitally to the national psyche. ‘Super-Dynamic America’ represents the nation’s 
pioneering of new technologies as essential components of fully rationalized modern 
life, with ‘speeding trains’, Griffith’s cinema and a kinetic culture serving as 
exemplary symbols of modernity.3  ‘Small Town America’ conversely represents the 
pastoralism, traditionalism and sentimentality of a nation that hangs back from such 
visions of the contemporary, one that is more content with established social 
structures and ensconced in a hegemony of bourgeois, Victorian, middle class 
values.4 Eisenstein poses Charles Dickens and D.W. Griffith as exponents of both the 
modernity and sentimentality of their respective cultures, yet applied to their work, 
the dynamic ‘parallel action’ of cross-cutting scenes (theorized as a precursor to 
                                                
2 Sergei Eisenstein, Film Form: Essays in Film Theory, New York: Harcourt, p. 198. 
3 Ben Singer identifies this alignment of cinema and other dynamic features of modern, urban 
experience as an important strand of ‘culturalist’ film theory that posits a causal or correlative 
relationship between such phenomena and transformations in human perception. David Bordwell has 
critiqued some of the central assumptions of this ‘modernity thesis’.  See Ben Singer, Melodrama and 
Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, 
Ch. 4; David Bordwell, On the History of Film Style, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997, 
p. 140-149.   
4 If this latter sensibility was for George Santayana in the previous chapter a feminized gentility, 
Eisenstein nevertheless perceives the ‘patriarchal’ in an otherwise similarly conceptualized American 
provincialism. 
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Soviet-montage) is largely valorised over the positive depictions of liberal bourgeois 
characters, the unredeemed victimhood of a lower class and a confused scheme of 
‘virtue rewarded’. Griffith’s ‘classical’ style is deemed by Eisenstein both vital to 
cinema history yet necessarily inferior ideologically. A modernism in cinematic 
technique is compromised or undermined by a ‘way down East’ attitude of middle 
class morals and manners, or what he further down critiques as a ‘sentimental 
humanism.’  
 
Eisenstein’s valorisation of cinema’s technological dynamism on one level accords 
with a Soviet and modernist project of revolutionary innovation in the service of 
transforming an unjust bourgeois world. In this respect, Eisenstein’s theory and 
practice self-consciously serve as paradigms for political change, a contemporary art-
form galvanized in the service of a contemporary socio-political narrative of radical 
change. Yet what remains in Eisenstein’s essay is a sense of his residual fascination 
with Western culture as a totality, evinced by a recognition that cementing the 
connection between Dickens and Griffith involves considerations of both their 
technical innovation along with their place in a historically humanist or liberal 
tradition. There is thus also doubt and caution as to how the modern(ist) and the 
sentimental can or should ever be extricated from one another.  
 
Scepticism towards America’s pastoralism is equally expressed in Eisenstein’s 
allusions to a New York apartment in the same essay, a passage that expands upon his 
approval of a Western culture that has adopted modern, rationalized technologies over 
the nostalgic objects of its past. He describes a ‘good old provincialism[...]nestling in 
clusters around fireplaces, furnished with soft grandfather chairs and the lace doilies 
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that shroud the wonders of modern technique: refrigerators, washing-machines, 
radios.’ Revealed here is Eisenstein’s doubt as to the clear demarcation between the 
two Americas, to the extent that ‘provincialism’ ominously pervades an apartment in 
what was regarded as the foremost urbanized city of the world.5 There is secondly a 
clear scepticism as to the function of these kitsch objects other than to ‘shroud’ the 
innovations of current technology. Where the refrigerator or washing-machine 
signifies utility and function, the fireplaces and doilies signify the outdated kitsch of 
people’s private dwellings. While the machines belong in a futurist everywhere, the 
kitsch objects are rooted in the nostalgic spaces of the past - at best decorative and at 
worst, ideologically regressive.  
 
Eisenstein’s varied and fragmented responses to American filmmaking and culture 
manifest therefore a central tension between the (foreign) intellectual’s disdain for the 
cinema’s alleged subordination to commercial priorities, a cult of the star (or 
individual) and its concomitant aesthetic of sentimentality, and an infatuated 
admiration for its films and the big players that he would meet while in New York and 
California. While no doubt influenced by Hollywood’s ultimate rejection of his 
screenplay for an adaptation of Dreiser’s American Tragedy, his ‘Dickens’ article 
exemplifies in many ways a conflict between what may be regarded historically as a 
European, high modernist position with regards to the technologies of political 
modernity (including of course the cinema) and a residual respect, if not reverence, 
for the cultural humanism that produced such cinematic pioneers as Dickens, Griffith 
and Chaplin. This ambivalence as to elements of cinema deemed excessive, 
                                                
5 Writing on the perceptual ‘trick’ of the New York skyscraper, Eisenstein finds the provincial America 
of private dwellings to be also inscribed in them, enough to find them ‘cosy, domestic, small-town.’ 
(Film Form, p. 197). 
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conservative, pathetic or humanist, is central, I would suggest, to comprehending the 
sentimental tradition as it persisted in the cinematic age of the early to mid-20th 
century. For while theories of the cinema were closely aligned, as with Eisenstein, 
with modernist impulses towards the rationalized or revolutionary deployment of 
cinema as a self-reflexive technology of perceptual and political change, the realities 
of a burgeoning mass culture that remained in thrall to human stories, emotions, moral 
values and melodramatic optimism would continue to dominate cinema aesthetics as 
it had with previous arts. I suggest therefore that cinema’s theorization as a 
technologically mediated rupture with the past involved an ongoing negotiation with 
the medium’s perceived collaboration with a sentimental aesthetics. Moreover, I argue 
below that some of the best-known film theorists of that era realised the implications 
of such a problematic despite considerable adherences to the austere radicalism of the 
high modernist moment. 
 
The Modern Subject 
Another key question in this debate, as in previous eras, concerned the role that 
cinema should play in transformations of subjectivity. The sentimental, as in previous 
centuries, comes to denote a model of spectatorship for a complacent subject or class 
that resists the radical potentials of art as a device for change, and art’s sometime 
complicity with such a model. Pathos would be experienced in the reception of 
sentimental art without any concomitant change in the subject’s moral treatment of 
the world, the latter assumed as a first priority for any substantive political change. 
Yet at the crux of such arguments, as we have seen, is a theory that still bestows 
importance to agency, or more philosophically, free will at the level of the subject. 
While sentimental art was deemed to allow, or indeed encourage, the subject to feel 
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the pleasures of sympathy or virtue without earning it (i.e. without altering 
consciousness), superior art could transform the subject politically or ethically, 
prompting him or her to exert a significant influence upon the social sphere within 
which s/he interacts. The cinema arrives at a moment, however, when this notion 
itself has come into question as a naively ‘humanist’ position. Determining whether a 
work of art is sentimental becomes redundant if the teleology of an ethical subject is 
itself inadequate. This problematic of an ethical subject extends to the moral 
individuals, families or social groups depicted within the novel, the play or the film 
themselves, the idealisation of whom comes to be deemed anachronistic and once 
again the indulgence of a cosseted middle-class. 
 
An important strand of modernism would therefore posit technology as the only hope 
for mankind in modernity, where an alienated subject has become an insignificant 
element operating within larger structures of knowledge and power. Only as part of a 
larger critical mass does the subject recover any significance. The novelty of cinema 
gives cause for such euphoric exclamations as to its central role to social change – a 
grand new medium put to the service of a grand narrative of collectivism. A writer 
like Walter Benjamin in 1927 posits the importance of cinema in its deployment as a 
‘collectivist’ technology, in what could be deemed a dry run for his famous Artwork 
essay of 1935.6 He deems nothing less than the technological innovation of film itself 
a ‘violent fissure’ in ‘art’s development’, a ‘new region of consciousness’ that is 
revolutionarily autonomous from its application by man, because: 
                                                
6 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’ in Harry Zorn (trans.) 
Illuminations, London: Pimlico, 1999, pp. 211-44.  
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[…]the important, elementary moments of progress in art are 
novelties neither of content nor of form; the revolution in technique 
precedes both.7 
 
As a formalist position that equates a paradigm shift in technology with the 
redemption of the ‘mass’ or ‘proletariat’, Benjamin’s claim necessarily overlooks the 
individual, either as the creator or the crucial subject of film. The ‘individual’ only 
becomes significant as a test-case of the larger social and ideological structures that 
govern his/her behaviour. Apartments or ‘furnished rooms’ also feature significantly 
in this essay, as in Eisenstein’s above, except here they are not the repositories of new 
technologies admixed ambiguously with regressive kitsch but the ‘hopelessly sad’ 
reminders of individual, atomized (bourgeois) existence that need to be ‘exploded’ by 
the cinema’s reconfiguration of space and time. An ‘old world of incarceration’ is 
transformed to a technologized utopia of collectivist rationality and freedom. While 
Shaw in the last chapter regards the cinema as a potentially useful vehicle for socialist 
ideas and themes, Benjamin advances technology itself as the messianic saviour of 
such aims, excluding man entirely from the project of his own redemption. 
  
And yet, film theory was formulated in a world that seemed far from ready to abandon 
‘regions of consciousness’ that had been inherited from long traditions of the 
sentimental or realist novel, the melodrama, the ‘well-made play’ and the classical 
Hollywood film. The ascendency of Hollywood clearly attested to the sentimental 
valences of mass culture, wherein the ‘mass’ could still be addressed as individual 
subjects with unique experiences, desires, thoughts and beliefs. Sympathy or empathy 
with characters (identification) remained a key attraction of a cinema that accentuated 
                                                
7 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Discussion of Russian Filmic Art and Collectivist Art in General,’ in The 
Weimar Republic Sourcebook, Martin Jay, Anton Kaes, and Edward Dimendberg (eds.), Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995, p. 626. 
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what other artforms had already delivered on a grand scale. The famous montage 
sequences of Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin, a film applauded by Benjamin, would 
be inconceivable without the crucial reaction shots of particular individuals, caught up 
in the joys and agonies of a crushed proletarian uprising. In a similar vein, much as 
though Benjamin celebrates the destruction of alienated bourgeois existence through 
the explosive force of cinema, one is moved as much by his description of those 
atomized, solitary lives as much as by his revolutionary desire for filmic perception to 
transcend it. One must recognize that at least in a pervasively philosophical sense, 
sentimentalism is manifest in both cinematic practice and theory. This should lead us 
to question what the political stakes were of such ruptures within the ‘hopelessly sad’ 
life of the subject, if the capacity for pathos would be itself exploded in Utopian 
efforts to efface the subject. 
 
Early British Film Theory: Close-Up 
Urging a radical restructuring of the worldwide film industry and the forging of a film 
practice for the sake of developing film for itself, the writers of Close-Up wrote 
extensively on the spectatorship inspired by a new cinematic praxis, with ideas that 
stand as significant precursors to the spectatorship theories of the 1970s. 
Unashamedly avant-gardist in its aims, the magazine was preoccupied with form 
itself; it advocated for allowing the medium an idealized autonomy from commercial 
constraints, and for the spectator to have a far more active and skilled role in the 
construction of meanings supposedly purer than those permitted by the commercial 
cinema. The latter, deemed to be mired in the clichés and formulae of sentimentalism, 
indulges the spectator’s sense of virtue rather than urging him to think or create. In 
this vein, a canon made up of Battleship Potemkin, Joyless Street, The Student of 
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Prague among others is praised by the magazine’s founding editor Kenneth 
Macpherson as exhibiting ‘pure form, every single attribute of photographic art, 
miracles to work in tone and tone depths, light, geometry, design, sculpture...pure 
abstraction all of it.’8 
 
As ‘pure abstraction’, cinema thus promises to deliver the world in a reconfigured, 
cinematically essential state. Through such procedures as ‘contrast, merging and 
dissociation’, Macpherson suggests that his canon of recommended films transform 
the subject’s perception of the world in a way that modernists would consider closer 
to an original or more authentic mode of consciousness. One of Close-Up’s most 
frequent writers, H.D., writes of the spectator’s ‘inner speech’, an underlying code 
with which the abstractions of the modernist art film correspond more effectively. She 
would thus similarly conceptualize the cinema as a medium that best serves itself as a 
paring down of reality towards essential forms. Her comparison of film with 
hieroglyph, as in Eisenstein’s writings in reference to Japanese ideographic writing, 
presumes cinema’s analogous affinity for the juxtaposition and montage of images in 
the service of a universal language of cinema. H.D. describes the figure of a woman 
from the Russian film Expiation as follows: 
She has a way of standing against a sky line that makes a hieroglyph, that 
spells almost visibly some message of cryptic symbolism. Her gestures are 
magnificent. If this is Russian, then I am Russian.9 
 
                                                
8 Kenneth Macpherson, ‘As Is’, Close Up, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1927), pp. 15-16, cited in Laura 
Marcus, The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007, p. 346. 
 
9 H.D. ‘Expiation’, Close-Up, Vol. 2, No.  5 (1928), reprinted in James Donald, Anne Freiberg & Laura 
Marcus (eds.), Close Up 1927-1933: Cinema & Modernism, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1998, p. 126. 
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As an evocation of animal postures and closeness to nature, the image she describes 
conveys truth despite superficial ugliness. In a way that is ‘psychic, compelling, in a 
way destructive’ the realism of such imagery is considered qualitatively superior to a 
bourgeois aesthetics of the ‘beautiful’ or the picturesque. Where a ‘shapeless’ cinema 
is limited by its inclusion of ‘extraneous’ non-essential elements, H.D. sees the 
cinema as an ideal of artistic ‘restraint,’ filtering out all superfluities. Aligning cinema 
with the simplicity of ‘light,’ she argues for a ‘classic’ aesthetic that paradoxically 
befits modernity through its avoidance of ‘exaggeration,’ ‘elaborate material’ or 
‘waste.’  
 
Such claims regarding the specificity of cinematic art correspond with the formalist 
film theory of such figures as Rudolph Arnheim, who would also claim virtue for the 
cinema in its deviance from the subject’s normal perception of the world. Rejecting 
the cinema’s deliverance of the photographic world as an excessive ‘likeness’, 
Arnheim claims,  
There is serious danger that the filmmaker will rest content with 
such shapeless reproduction. In order that the film artist may 
create a work of art it is important that he consciously stress the 
peculiarities of his medium. This, however, should be done in 
such a manner that the character of the objects represented 
should not thereby be destroyed but rather strengthened, 
concentrated, and interpreted.10 
 
Emphasising the cinema’s proper role as enhancement or interpretation of reality, 
Arnheim rehearses a ‘specificity thesis’ as to the unique role that any artform must 
play in order to constitute itself as real art.11 With editing, the cinema justifies its 
                                                
10 Rudolf Arnheim, Film as Art (1932), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957, p. 35. 
 
11 For a critique of the assumptions underlying the ‘specificity thesis’, see Noël Carroll, ‘The 
Specificity Thesis’, in Leo Braudy & Marshall Cohen (eds.), Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory 
Readings, Oxford: Oxford University Press,, 5th Edition, 1998, p. 322-28. 
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claim as art through its manipulation of a reality that arrives at the lens in ‘shapeless’ 
form, that is, without any as yet artistic design. Reality becomes the raw material that 
needs to be worked on, much as the sculptor chips away at rock to create a new 
artistic object.  
 
Other modernists, such as the contributors of Close-Up are useful to consider in 
relation to such theory as Arnheim’s, particularly in the manner that they account for 
this undesired, ‘shapeless’ aspect of reality, which I suggest comes to overlap 
theoretically with what are deemed the sentimental excesses of American and other 
national cinemas. As with Eisenstein and other Soviets discussed below, some of 
whose writings were translated and published in Close-Up, the articulation of film’s 
role as art is a central preoccupation of these writers, with the established cinema (in 
America and England especially) explicitly or implicitly deemed a conservative and 
uninspired deployment of filmic resources. Their cynicism in relation to the 
hackneyed formulae of the Hollywood film corresponds to related notions of a 
moribund, non-essentialized cinema. The rehearsal of tired clichés inherited from old, 
non-cinematic traditions becomes analogous to the camera’s unfiltered registration of 
raw reality. The magazine’s chief financial backer and contributor Bryher would write 
disdainfully of Hollywood when she claims that ‘it can produce kitsch magnificently 
but cannot produce art.’12 Her reimagining of how Eisenstein’s The Battleship 
Potemkin would be remade in Hollywood lists a slew of sentimental devices ranging 
from the heroine’s survival through love for an ‘old father-mother-grandparent,’ ‘love 
                                                                                                                                       
 
12 Bryher, ‘The Hollywood Code’, Close Up, (September & December 1931), cited in Close Up 1927-
1933: Cinema & Modernism, p.28. 
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at first sight’ between hero and heroine, marriage as a happy ending witnessed by 
great crowds foregrounded by ‘children with doves.’13   
 
Kenneth Macpherson expresses similar sentiments in his first editorial for the 
magazine, ‘As Is’, in 1927, where he dismisses Hollywood’s ‘atrocious domestic and 
wild west dramas’ for their recourse to the upbeat and formulaic. German 
Expressionism instead promises something different through what he describes as its 
‘curious details, watchfulness, harking at claustrophobia.’ Macpherson commends the 
quality of such films’ as Pabst’s Joyless Street and Lang’s Metropolis on the grounds 
of their representation of the ‘REAL,’ where other critics would perceive only 
preoccupations with the ‘morbid.’ This notion of the real would relate strongly to the 
magazine’s central aim of advancing a cinema that would speak to a subject 
irrespective of differences in class, nationality or race. The creation of the ‘real’ is 
deeply associated with what is deemed the silent film’s universal comprehensibility. 
With the publication of Close-Up spanning the transition from silent to sound, the 
writers would serve as first hand witnesses of cinema’s transition from what was often 
deemed an internationalist language of moving images and united consciousness 
(whether commercially produced or not) to films produced almost exclusively for 
national audiences with the establishment of the talkie. The advent of synchronous 
sound and the talkie, as for Eisenstein, represented in many ways an overall 
regression towards an aesthetic verisimilitude that would once again threaten to 
occlude the ‘real’ as such.14     
 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 29. 
 
14 Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandroff’s famous ‘Statement on Sound’ was itself published in the 
October 1928 issue of Close-Up. 
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Such a universalist aesthetic, pared-down of sentimentalized cultural particulars, 
would naturally find a theoretical counterpart for the magazine’s contributors in 
Freud’s theory of dreams. As the dream-work synthesises disparate images through 
economies of condensation and displacement, the unconscious similarly seemed to 
aspire to the simple yet transformative possibilities of pure light. Anticipating later 
theory’s concerns with film’s relation to psychoanalysis and symbol, film was 
similarly considered to be underpinned by a symbolic language that would speak 
directly to the unconscious yet undeniably real fantasies of mass society.15 Cloaked in 
the ‘waste’ of superficial data (or inscribed in the ideology of Althusser’s later 
formulations16), such fantasies remain repressed and encouraged to remain so by the 
analogously unfiltered noise of everyday life and its counterpart in the platitudes of 
conventional cinema. The ‘Kitsch’ and the ‘sentimental’, according to the 
psychoanalyst Hanns Sachs (who served as analyst for several of the Close-Up 
contributors and wrote for the journal) would likewise be theorized as a body of work 
that largely fails to engage with the unconscious in such direct ways as H.D.’s cinema 
of ‘restraint.’ Describing the predictability of the kitsch film’s emotional itinerary, 
Sachs writes: 
Owing to the skill with which the distribution of the emotions is 
anticipated, the public are indeed saved a good deal of worry, 
including that of choice, but at the same time the free development 
of the emotions is restricted; the possibility of lifting them by 
degrees out of the unconscious and letting them have free play is 
done away with. The process must have the minimum of psychic 
activity and must never be arrested.17 
                                                
15 For instance, H.D. writes that ‘the film is the art of dream portrayal and perhaps when we say that we 
have achieved the definition, the synthesis towards which we have been striving.’ In the ‘Borderline 
Pamphlet’) 
    
16 See Althusser’s writings on the analogies between ideology and the dream in Lenin and Philosophy, 
and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001. 
 
17 Hanns Sachs, ‘Kitsch’, Close-Up, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 1932), reprinted in Close-Up 1927-1933: 
Cinema and Modernism, p. 266. 
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In the above, the sentimental is argued to not so much ignore unconscious desire and 
fantasy but rather inhibits their coming to consciousness. While ‘lifting’ emotions to 
consciousness requires the ‘development’ or ‘psychic activity’ elicited by the 
hieroglyphic aesthetic praised by H.D. among others, kitsch is argued to keep the 
spectator mired in conscious thought despite the possibilities of the film-viewing 
process. Kitsch comes of a failure to follow Ezra’s Pound’s modernist imperative to 
‘make it new’ and instead conveys the same as that which already resides in a 
collective conscious. Deprived of the richness of the visual world by sentimental 
constraints, the spectator of kitsch maintains (and complacently enjoys) the self-
perpetuating emotional schemata to which he is accustomed while remaining 
blissfully unexposed to transformative data.  
 
Aligning the ‘plainly legible signposts’ of the formulaic film with a pandering to the 
‘dullest intelligence,’ Sachs goes on to demonstrate the elitist underside of the notion 
of film as universal language. Anticipating Roland Barthes’ theory of the ‘writerly’ 
versus ‘readerly’ text, the unconscious is posed as a repository of emotions that 
require ‘development’ through the film’s activation of creative, ‘writerly’ processes. 
Film fulfils this function by paradoxically becoming what H.D. terms a ‘cryptic 
symbolism’, requiring a spectator’s ‘intelligence’ in order to decipher meaning. While 
such theory rests on the assumption of a universally comprehensible language of the 
cinema, the sentimental kitsch film is critiqued somewhat paradoxically on the 
grounds that it is excessively easy to understand, or too ‘readerly’ in Barthes’ terms. 
 
Macpherson writes similarly of ‘absorption and creation’ as twin processes in the 
spectatorship of film, with the intellect serving a crucial role in mediating between the 
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active and passive elements of film spectatorship. Disturbed by the passivity of 
cinematic spectatorship at the time, ‘dope’ is employed as metaphor for the cinema’s 
prevention of the ‘real consideration of problems, artistic, or sociological,’18 Emotions 
are posed elsewhere as problematic in relation to the creative process of film-viewing, 
as indicated in Bryher’s praise for Eisenstein’s October: 
Perhaps it is because its entire appeal is to the intellect - not to the 
emotions solely, but to the brain, which is beyond emotion- the 
super or over-conscious, that is habitually so starved. 19 
 
An intellectual engagement with film is valorised in the above as at least as crucial an 
element to spectatorship as the medium’s appeals to emotion, the latter deemed 
particularly superficial and gratuitous when elicited by the spectatorship of kitsch 
Hollywood productions. Opposed to the emotions evoked by the formulaic is a more 
profound consciousness (‘inner speech’) that responds to aspects of the film that more 
essentially express the ‘real’ in the nexus between image and the spectator’s 
consciousness.  
 
However, if ‘emotions’ in the above seem stigmatized, it is owing to a 
conceptualization of consciousness (named ‘intellect’) that I would suggest is 
conflated with what we often understand precisely as emotion. An important paradox 
emerges when one considers that the above repudiation of kitsch and its 
sentimentality is motivated by modernist ideals of a universalist language of cinema 
and its implicit promotion of communication between cultures. It is paradoxical 
because this latter ideal is itself a central tenet of moral sentiment theory. Recalling 
                                                
18 ‘Dope or Stimulus’, Close Up, Vol. 3, No.  3 (September 1928), p.61, cited in Marcus, The Tenth 
Muse, p. 326. 
 
19 Bryher, Film Problems of Soviet Russia, Territet, Switzerland: POOL, 1929, cited in Marcus, The 
Tenth Muse, p. 339. 
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H.D.’s assertion that ‘If this is Russian, then I am Russian’20, what becomes at stake 
in advocating a cinema of juxtaposition, economy and symbolism remains the process 
of identification itself. As much as such a modernist cinema is advocated as an appeal 
to the ‘intellect’, a criterion that has often been aligned with detachment or 
‘difficulty’, the necessity of bringing together a spectatorship divided by race, class, 
nationality and gender clearly underpins its wider project. The original premise of 
such theory is after all an assumption of the failure of the ‘word’, and in a related 
vein, Enlightenment reason, to effectively bring about such ideals as radical 
identification between subjects across traditional divides. This ideal, related as it is to 
sentimental theory (that which posits the transmission of ‘good’ sentiments between 
subjects), problematizes any simple categorization of Close-Up’s modernism as a 
plainly unsentimental body of theory. The magazine rehearses once again a conflict 
between what is deemed a sentimentalized, formulaic representation of such ideals 
(children with doves?) and avant-gardist (and at times elitist) attempts to start anew, 
motivated in no small way by those self-same ideals.  
 
Eisenstein and Dickens 
Russian films of Eisenstein and Pudovkin were highly revered above all by the Close-
Up milieu because, compared to the commercial cinemas of America, Britain and 
other European countries, such films were deemed to manifest the essential properties 
of cinematic art, in relation to which the spectator is posed as a vital intellectual force 
that creates as much as consumes meaning. The BBFC’s strict regulation of Russian 
cinema in the UK was bitterly opposed by Macpherson and Bryher and revealed, in 
                                                
20 H.D. ‘Expiation’, Close-Up, Vol. 2, No. 5 (1928), reprinted in Close Up 1927-1933: Cinema & 
Modernism, p. 126 
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their view, the conjoined political biases and philistinism of censor and film industry. 
Representing for them the best filmmakers of the era for their ‘intellectual’ principles 
of filmmaking, such figures as Eisenstein, Kuleshov, Vertov or Pudovkin were 
considered to be serving purposes in many ways antithetical to the extravagant 
Hollywood and stagnant English cinema. In both theory and practice, the Soviets 
delivered the challenging and new where other national cinemas were deemed content 
to follow formulae, kitsch and sentiment. Nevertheless, this ‘intellectual’ cinema 
manifested similar ambiguities to those introduced in the theory of Close-Up with 
regards to the place of the sentimental in its corpus. Eisenstein’s theory in particular 
seems to encapsulate the modernism of that critical moment yet nevertheless provides 
a rich perspective of that era’s incomplete break from older aesthetic traditions. 
 
Eisenstein formulated a distinctive form of cinema that differed markedly from other 
national cinemas, despite acknowledged influences from the American cinema, 
particularly the classical editing techniques of D.W. Griffith. Much of Eisenstein’s 
theory rested on particular irreconcilable tensions, as exemplified perhaps by the 
oxymoronic phrase ‘sensuous thinking,’ which demonstrated his efforts to theorize a 
cinematic art that was in a sense both more cerebral yet more emotionally engaging 
than that of his predecessors. This phrase, employed in his theoretical writings in 
reference to ‘pre-lingual’ cultures such as the Aztecs or the Toltecs, illustrates 
Eisenstein as a figure that presciently regards film as a medium that communicates in 
a radically different order from that of the written or spoken word.21 Both pre-
linguistic yet radically infused with meaning, the cinematic image had the potential to 
revolutionize art and the world. Rejecting linear narratives, traditional acting styles, 
                                                
21 See Eisenstein’s Immoral Memories, Herbert Marshall (trans.), Boston: Houghton, 1983, p. 211. 
 
 
 
133 
realistic central characters of themes of collectivity of Soviet life, Eisenstein’s work 
was highly innovative in its search for an ‘intellectual’ cinema that strove to stimulate 
the spectator with revolutionary ideas.22  
  
Yet seen within the milieu of the now infamous Soviet Proletcult, however, there are 
reasons to see Eisenstein as less condemnatory of ‘humanist’ cinematic practices in 
his theorization of a new cinematic spectator compared to contemporaries such as 
Dziga Vertov. Eisenstein may have coined the term ‘Cine-Fist’ as metaphor for the 
forceful impact of his filmic rhetoric upon a spectator that needed to have regressive 
ideological illusions destroyed, yet he would remain acutely aware of the pertinence 
of ‘bourgeois’ American cinema to ‘montage’ theory and practice throughout his 
career, as borne out by his qualified valorisation of Griffith, discussed further below. 
Vertov’s practice demonstrated similar commitment to shot juxtaposition and poetics 
in aid of producing a similarly Marxist interpretation of the represented world, yet his 
theory explicitly proclaimed the primacy of a realist aesthetic diametrically opposed 
to bourgeois forms. As a newsreel and documentary filmmaker, Vertov coined the 
term ‘Cine-Eye’ as the chief metaphor for a body of work that would aim to depict the 
‘life caught unawares’, an aesthetic he would consider opposed to the ‘film-drama’ 
and the ‘bourgeois fairy-tale scripts’23 of capitalist society. 
 
                                                
22 Of course, Eisenstein’s greatest filmic achievements such as The Strike and Battleship Potemkin 
necessarily thematized Marxist ideology through the highlighting of the victories of the Russian 
proletariat in accordance with Soviet Socialist principles, yet such thematic parameters would 
inevitably become constraints to a filmmaker that wished to experiment with form and avoid the 
conventions of Stalinist dictates on state art. 
 
23 See Vertov’s polemics in ‘Kino-Eye’ (1926), reprinted in Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, 
trans. Annette Michelson, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 60-79. 
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While both filmmakers were thus similarly committed to ‘montage’ as a forceful 
transformation of spectator consciousness, Vertov would explicitly critique human 
psychology in favour of a logic dictated by electricity and machines, aligning his 
project with the transformation of a ‘bumbling citizen through the poetry of the 
machine to the perfect electric man.’24 With the movie camera serving as a 
‘mechanical eye,’ a superior reality was posed as having been made available to the 
modern cinematic spectator, who no longer required the alleged ‘fiction’ or 
‘psychologism’ practiced by the bourgeois literature and theatre of the time. In the 
polemical manifesto of 1922, for instance, Vertov invites the reader to ‘flee,’ 
 [...]the sweet embraces of the romance 
 the poison of the psychological novel 
 the clutches of the theatre of adultery 
 to turn your back on music25  
 
Insisting that ‘man’ as such falls short of the ‘precision’ of machines (a ‘stopwatch’ is 
given as example), Vertov advocates man’s temporary exclusion ‘as a subject fit for 
film.’26 This logic fuels Vertov’s criticism of Eisenstein’s Strike and Battleship 
Potemkin, which for Vertov represented the continuance of the ‘acted film’ and so 
remained antithetical to Kino-Eye aesthetics.27  
 
Despite beginnings in the theatre and his adoption of a notionally narrative cinema, 
Eisenstein’s deployment of montage aesthetics would nevertheless conform to 
imperatives very much akin to Vertov’s theory, similarly seeking to differentiate the 
Soviet cinema from its predecessors through the forceful constructions of filmic 
                                                
24 Vertov, ‘We: Variant of a Manifesto’ (1922), reprinted in Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, p. 
8 
 
25 Ibid., p. 7 
 
26 Ibid., 
 
27 Vertov, ‘The Factory of Facts’, 1926, reprinted in Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, p. 58. 
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meaning.28 His critique of the ideology of the individual, for instance, would extend to 
problematizing the valorisation of the ‘star’, not only as hero of the bourgeois drama 
but also in terms of artistic contributions to the filmmaking process. In reference to 
the bourgeois West, Eisenstein would remark that ‘someone has to be the ‘star.’ One 
person. Yesterday it was the actor. This time let’s say it’s the cameraman. Tomorrow 
it will be the lighting technician.’29 Opposing such systems to Soviet collectivity and 
equality, Eisenstein would emphasise ‘unity’ as the aesthetic horizon of Soviet 
montage, whereby the individual heroic character would be effaced by the proletarian 
mass. Applied more formally, the film shot was analogously only endowed with 
complete meaning through its juxtaposition with other shots and cinematic effects. At 
least in his initial films, therefore, it is rare for central protagonists to emerge with 
which to identify emotionally, as a spectator might have done in relation to linear 
narratives and focalized protagonists in Hollywood cinema. Eisenstein’s ‘montage’ 
technique would be justified theoretically through appeals to cinema’s abstract 
qualities of rhythm, tempo and synaesthesia as distinct from notions that highlighted 
its affinity for representing the human, such as in the theory of Balázs or Bazin, 
discussed below. 
 
However, Eisenstein’s examination of D.W. Griffith as a key influence on his 
aesthetics in ‘Griffith, Dickens and Film Today’ reveals theoretical tensions between 
formalist and what Dudley Andrew terms ‘organicist’ impulses in Eisenstein’s 
                                                
28 While Eisenstein engaged in ongoing debates with Vertov as to the function and aesthetics of the 
new cinema, much of this conflict has been attributed to the fierce competition for funding and prestige 
in the Soviet Union of that era. See Annette Michelson’s introduction to Kino-Eye: The Writings of 
Dziga Vertov, p. xlvi-l.  
 
29 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘Béla Forgets the Scissors’, 1926, reprinted in Richard Taylor (ed.) The Eisenstein 
Reader, London: BFI, 1998, p.68. 
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thought. Written in 1944, Eisenstein had already by this point made The General Line, 
Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible, all works that saw him compromise with the 
Socialist Realist School’s demands for character, plot, focalized heroes and moral 
legibility, in an effort to assuage charges of formalism from his contemporaries. 
Nevertheless the article reiterates key tenets of Eisenstein’s original conception of 
montage as manifest in the films and theory of his early career. He argues that Griffith 
inherits a tradition of narrative construction from Dickens that was to be admired both 
for the evocative characters he creates and for the parallel editing and cross-cutting 
between scenes. Discussing the scene that sees Oliver Twist leave his well-to-do 
grandfather’s house on an errand only to be abducted by Nancy, Fagin and Bill Sykes 
- Eisenstein analyses the sequence as the narrative switches between the abductors 
(now with Oliver) and Brownlow as he waits in vain for Oliver’s return. For 
Eisenstein, the oscillation between ‘storylines’ enhances the emotional impact of the 
narrative overall, whereby ‘one (the waiting gentlemen) emotionally heightens the 
tension and drama of the other (the capture of Oliver).’ This leads Eisenstein to 
construct Dickens as cinematic avant la lettre, alluding to the latter’s mastery of 
melodrama in the novel as a key factor to Griffith’s success in the cinema. Eisenstein 
accounts for Dickens’ and cinema’s successes as follows: 
What were the novels of Dickens for his contemporaries, for his 
readers? There is one answer: they bore the same relation to them 
that the film bears to the same strata in our time. They compelled 
the reader to live with the same passions. They appealed to the 
same good and sentimental elements as does the film (at least on 
the surface); they alike shudder before vice, they alike mill the 
extraordinary, the unusual, the fantastic, from boring, prosaic and 
everyday existence.30  
 
                                                
30 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘Dickens, Griffith and the Film Today’ (1944), reprinted in Eisenstein, Film Form, 
p. 206. 
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In this passage, Dickens’ employment of ‘parallel action’ inspires the same technique 
in Griffith’s films and thereby achieves the same levels of success with their 
respective publics. We see here Eisenstein’s clear recognition of cinema’s 
melodramatic roots and its evident popularity as mass culture. Yet his qualification ‘at 
least on the surface’ provides an insight as to how the Dickens/Griffith style is 
deemed to differ from Soviet montage at least theoretically. For while Eisenstein 
recognizes the popularity of the liberal-humanist aims of representing virtue 
triumphing over vice, there is a sense in which such aims have become anachronistic 
or at least limited in relation to a modernist-socialist project. Eisenstein indeed 
expresses his surprise, in a footnote, that ‘as late as 1944’ Griffith maintained the 
above aims as the ‘chief social function of filmmaking.’ While this may have defined 
the Dickens/Griffith axis of story construction, Eisenstein affirms his own innovations 
in film technique as serving more explicitly political objectives. While he regards 
both figures as precursors to the ‘montage’ that would inspire he and his Soviet 
colleagues, Griffith is argued to have reached a ‘standstill’ with ‘parallel action.’ 
Eisenstein furthermore applies this status of standstill to Griffith’s thematics and 
politics also: 
In social attitudes Griffith was always a liberal, never departing far 
from the sweet sentimental humanism of the good old gentlemen 
and sweet old ladies of Victorian England, just as Dickens loved to 
picture them. His tender hearted film morals go no higher than a 
level of Christian accusation of human injustice and nowhere in his 
film is there sounded a protest against social injustice.31 
 
Asserting Griffith’s status as an artist of the ‘bourgeois world,’ Eisenstein is 
ambivalent about such sentimental technique for while Griffith achieves ‘magnificent 
pathos’ in Way Down East or Broken Blossoms, Eisenstein also attributes Griffith’s 
                                                
31 Ibid., p.233-4.  
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moral failures to the same sentimental politics, demonstrated for him in the racism of 
Birth of a Nation or the Manichean metaphysics of Intolerance. What then follows in 
the article is a complex discussion of the differences between American and Soviet 
technique where political ideology is centralized as the determining factor in shaping 
cinematic style. He argues that Soviet ideology facilitates ‘qualitative’ innovations in 
technique that most expressly problematize American pretences at ‘objectivity’. In 
order to achieve full political expressivity as a means of achieving social 
transformation, ‘montage’ is argued to have required a more ‘full, conscious, 
completed’ use, entailing above all the shaping of filmic reality with meaning as 
opposed to the passive registration of bourgeois truths through anachronistic 
storytelling. While ‘parallel action’ displays the seeds of a dynamic film logic in 
American film culture, it remains mired in a social and aesthetic conservatism, not 
permitting art to be ‘freed from narrow commercial tasks’ and inhibiting the 
metaphorical and truly political freedoms that come with the deployment of a true 
‘montage image.’ Thus: 
Griffith’s cinema does not know this type of montage 
construction. His close-ups create atmosphere, outline traits of the 
characters, alternate in dialogues of the leading characters, and 
close-ups of the chaser and the chased speed up the tempo of the 
chase. But Griffith at all times remains on the level of 
representation and objectivity and nowhere does he try through 
the juxtaposition of shots to shape import and image.32 
 
In the name of ‘import,’ Eisenstein advances Soviet montage as a technique that 
breaks down the bourgeois values sustained by Griffith’s films. A chief binary in this 
argument is that of ‘rich and ‘poor,’ a hierarchy that for Eisenstein also dictates the 
formal parameters of Griffith’s film culture. While he recognizes the centrality of the 
binary to melodramatic aesthetics, he rejects what he argues to be Griffith’s analogous 
                                                
32 Ibid., p.240. 
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‘dualistic picture of the world’ which, for both he and Dickens, prevent their ‘moving 
beyond these divisions.’ The ‘parallel’ structure is argued to work differently in 
Soviet cinema, where via the application of Hegelian/Marxist dialectics in shot 
composition and editing, the meaning of film shots are modified by the context within 
which they are represented.33 With shots representing the ‘thesis’ or ‘antithesis’ 
elements of the dialectic, Soviet montage seeks to generate meanings through 
combination, juxtaposition and ‘synthesis’ of images that lacked sufficient meaning as 
discrete units.  
 
Eisenstein’s main criticism of Griffith thus emerges as the complacency with which 
his films represent a world replete with meaning and truth, having evaded the 
obligation of modifying such meanings through cinematic form. This for him defied 
Marx’s central maxim that people should change history rather than merely 
understand it. Where Soviet cinema generates meaning in accordance with 
revolutionarily metaphorical principles, American cinema is deemed to reproduce the 
complacent fixed meanings of bourgeois society. If we return once more therefore to a 
dichotomy introduced at the start of this chapter, Eisenstein’s discussion of Griffith’s 
representation of two ‘faces of America’, both ‘Small Town America’ and ‘Super-
Dynamic America,’ Eisenstein’s attitude is ultimately one of cautious inspiration. The 
dynamism of the crowds, stock-market, traffic and skyscrapers of New York are 
analogized with the ‘dizzying action’ of Griffith’s set pieces and the montage of his 
own epics. An aesthetic of urban chaos, movement and porosity, its ‘montage’ is 
posed as antithesis to the sedate charms of American provincial life, which Eisenstein 
                                                
33 This has been aligned with structuralist notions of the single shot attaining full meaning only through 
its insertion in the chain of shots that it becomes part of in a film’s narrative, see Robert Stam, Film 
Theory: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. 38. 
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nevertheless notes sceptically as an ineradicable crux of the culture. While the former 
technique lends itself to the working through of ‘injustice’ through cinema, its 
embeddedness in American life limits it to addressing individual destinies (‘human 
injustice’) as opposed to deeper political change (‘social injustice’), for the latter 
would supposedly require a wholesale forfeiting of a sentimental culture founded on 
hierarchy.  
 
However, if montage aesthetics are opposed to all that is less than technologically 
innovative and functionally worthwhile to rhetorical imperatives, Eisenstein is 
nevertheless highly ambivalent about a related element of American sentimentality, 
which he discusses in relation to the ‘intimate’ aspects of Dickens and Griffith’s 
work. The ‘intimate’, employed above in the article in reference to their attention to 
life-like characters, provokes Eisenstein’s admiration for art that can reveal the truths 
of real people, a dangerously ‘realist’ notion for one of the most notorious formalists 
in film culture. As he notes evocative memories of the ‘inimitable bit-characters’ in 
these films and novels ‘who seem to have run straight from life on to the screen,’ he 
notes with admiration the ‘particular method’ these artists employ for representing the 
human condition. While he notes the skill with which such characters are rendered by 
these artists, he betrays a sense of wonder at the realism of both central and peripheral 
characters, and how evocatively they conjure up the ‘atmosphere’ of the novel or film 
they are part of. It is here that perhaps Eisenstein’s montage theory is most under 
strain, for here he seems to confess the joys of engaging with characters drawn from 
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life and praises the intimacy required of the author or filmmaker that seeks only to 
represent humanity truthfully.34  
 
Praising the evocativeness of characters drawn from life undermines formalist 
imperatives of constructing meaning out of raw material that struggles for 
significance. While the ‘cine-fist’ necessarily ruptures existent reality with its own 
ideological stamp, Eisenstein’s meditation on character reveals an attention to human 
qualities extrinsic to the constructivist act. By discussing various examples of realistic 
characters both in terms of the ‘fascinating and finished images’ of Griffith’s cinema 
or the one-dimensionality of Dickens’ incidental characters, the intimacy of character 
depiction (and implicitly the whole notion of spectatorial engagement with characters) 
comes to sit in tension with an aesthetics of ‘attraction’ and ‘montage’ that locates 
meaning only in the film artists’ synthesis of disparate and otherwise meaningless 
elements. While Eisenstein swiftly moves on to dealing with the ‘second side of 
Griffith’s creative craftsmanship’, namely parallel action and the montage that it 
inaugurates, he leaves a sense of unresolved admiration for the ‘intimate’ aspects of 
Dickens’ and Griffith’s art (despite denunciations of their ‘humanism’).  
 
Because these same ‘good old gentlemen’ and ‘sweet old ladies’ of a ‘provincial’ 
Anglo-American world represent for Eisenstein the complacent bourgeois world, he 
would struggle with character engagement and its indispensability to his own work. 
There is recognition, in other words, that the human body constitutes a vital 
component to Eisenstein’s own desired goals with regards to cinematic spectatorship. 
                                                
34 In James Chandler’s account of Eisenstein’s essay, the notion of ‘small-town’ America is directly 
associated with the close-up. See James Chandler, ‘The Historical Novel Goes to Hollywood: Scott, 
Griffith, and Film Epic Today’, in Robert Lang (ed.), The Birth of a Nation: D.W. Griffith, director, 
Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994, p. 226. 
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Despite America and the USSR’s montage cultures and their respective decentring of 
the individual, the subject nevertheless constitutes an emotionally evocative 
component of cinema, even if cinema must necessarily for Eisenstein focus on 
elements of larger socio-political import. His own compromises with the dictates of 
the Socialist Realist school (the need for a standard hero in narrative film) and 
abandonment of the epics of his early career reveal a filmmaker and theorist that 
genuinely struggled with the formalist principles he pioneered so effectively. While 
his machine-like, constructivist technique revolutionized what was in his estimation 
an often dull, uncinematic application of the movie camera in other cinemas, 
Eisenstein and his contemporaries came to need more convincing as to why the 
‘human’ needed to be so radically decentred and defamiliarized by the new art. 
 
One must be cautious however in implicitly claiming Eisenstein within a tradition that 
in many ways seems antithetical to his own montage theory. The enormous 
scholarship that has been undertaken on his work testifies to a highly complex attitude 
with respect to emotional responses to film, with a scholar such as Peter Wollen 
expressing criticism at his own premature perceptions of a disjuncture between the 
constructivist, semiotic montage theory of an early Eisenstein and the Wagnerian 
‘synaesthesia’ of his later writings. While the later aesthetic’s introduction of ‘sound 
and colour’ seemed, in the context of a 1970s theoretical radicalism, to be merely 
Eisenstein’s compromise with Stalinist demands (or his own desires) for 
conventionalism, Wollen highlights continuities of Eisenstein’s theory throughout his 
later writings, wherein the polyphonic or synaesthetic attributes of film are recognized 
from an earlier point than is assumed. While Wollen notes the contrast between 
Eisenstein’s early principles of formalist abstraction with his later interest and work 
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with dance, the human figure and music, he argues how these latter developments 
confirm Eisenstein’s lifelong concerns with an aesthetic of the ‘sensuous thinking’ 
described above. So while Wollen notes how at one point Eisenstein even loses 
interest in an overly ‘ideological’ cinema in favour of the ‘real bodies and real 
movement’ of the theatre, he continues that such doubts nevertheless reinforce the 
sense of Eisenstein’s obsession with an aesthetic (whether cinema of theatre) that 
would engage the spectator both emotionally and intellectually. Such affect is 
described by Eisenstein in terms of both ‘ecstasy’, ‘pathos’ and even the ‘pathetic’ in 
his later writings35, yet he would nevertheless maintain a distinction between 
emotions of identification and those inspired by ‘action’. ‘If we wish the spectator to 
experience a maximum emotional upsurge, to send him into ecstasy’, he argues,  
 we must offer him a suitable “formula” which will eventually 
excite the desirable emotions in him. 
The simple method is to present on the screen a human being in the 
state of ecstasy, that is, a character who is gripped by some 
emotion, who is “beside himself.” 
A more complicated and effective method is the realization of the 
main condition of a work of pathos – constant qualitative changes 
in the action – not through the medium of one character, but 
through the entire environment. In other words, when everything 
around him is also “beside itself”. A classical example of this 
method is the storm raging in the breast of King Lear and 
everywhere around him in nature. 36 
 
If this passage rehearses Eisenstein’s preferred site of cinematic affect as the ‘super-
dynamic’ and the ‘environment’, it should also alert us to the distance between 
Eisenstein’s modernism and the ‘simple method’ of the sentimental. While the latter 
method of course works with partial success, there is more than a suggestion here that 
                                                
35 See the last collection of Eisenstein’s writings compiled in Nonindifferent Nature, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 
36 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘Organic Unity and Pathos in the Composition of Potemkin’ (1939), reprinted in 
Problems of Film Direction, Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004, p. 7. 
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character ‘ecstasy’ must necessarily be accompanied, and is largely justified, by the 
larger movements captured by film. While a contemporary director such as Steven 
Spielberg would no doubt agree with such a claim when one considers his investment 
in the great spectacles of his films, key ideological differences remain between the 
two filmmakers that may account for the sentimental charges made against the latter’s 
work (discussed in detail in Ch. 5.) If the modernist politicism of Eisenstein’s epic 
work has traditionally removed him from such criticisms, this is precisely what is 
considered lacking in Spielbergian ‘ecstasy’, despite key aesthetic parallels between 
the two. 
 
 
Frankfurt School Aesthetics 
If, with hindsight, Eisenstein’s innovations have been fully incorporated into a 
sophisticated set of editing techniques that are now commonplace to contemporary 
cinema, Hollywood and beyond, the above discussion highlights how his place in film 
studies is attributable to the crucial links between the political and aesthetic concerns 
that underpin his theory. It is within this rubric that sentiment functions as the pariah 
of a rationally conceived constructivist model, a complacent allegiance to regressive 
political models that resist the progressive impulses of the Soviet age. Nevertheless, 
we see in the above also how such theory and practice cannot, and up to a point, has 
not been considered in isolation from deeper considerations of cinematic affect 
evoked by a cinema, theorized as progressive or not. Similar tensions are manifest in 
the theory of ‘Frankfurt School’ intellectuals, for whom the repudiation of a 
sentimental American culture may have constituted an even greater imperative given 
the different political climate of their own societies, where socialist revolution had 
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crucially not taken place. While theorists such as Walter Benjamin, Siegfried 
Kracauer or Theodor Adorno would advance some of the most sophisticated accounts 
of cinema as a mass-cultural phenomenon with widely varying degrees of optimism, 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s 1944 post-war theory of the ‘Cultural Industry’ stands as 
the clearest indictment of mass culture’s complicity with the repressive mechanisms 
of capitalism and the commodity form. Within this rubric, cinema is judged 
negatively as a ‘dependent art,’ dependent that is on the capitalist system of banks, 
electric companies and film companies that collude in producing ‘entertainment’ that 
reifies the existing conditions of production in favour of an upper class cushioned by 
wealth and capital. While for other theorists such as Balázs (and to an extent 
Benjamin and Kracauer), cinema had the capacity to function artistically or 
progressively through various appropriations or negotiations with the sentimental, 
both cinema and the sentimental become major institutions of a regressive mass 
culture within the rubric of the ‘Culture Industry’. 
 
 
Furthermore, positing a subject dominated by Fordist and Taylorist standards of 
identity, Adorno and Horkheimer transfer the surface attributes of the commodity to 
human identity itself. Just as Marx writes of the commodity as a sign that represents 
yet effaces the alienated labour that produces it37, so the subject himself takes on the 
same attributes of self-alienation and misrecognition, while allegedly held in thrall to 
the commodity culture that perpetuates such (mis)cognitions as consumer products.38 
                                                
37 See Marx’s opening chapter of Capital for his account of ‘commodity fetishism.’ 
 
38 Echoed in Althusser’s theory of ‘interpellation’, that in turn draws on the concept of misrecognition 
in Lacan’s mirror stage theory. See Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in 
trans. Ben Brewster, Lenin and Philosophy & other essays, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 
127-86.  
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The subject of capitalist ideology under this rubric emerges not as a zombified, 
passive recipient of a dictatorial mass culture but rather one whose expectations and 
desires are determined by capitalist commodification. Structuring desire and identity 
in accordance with the commodity, an authentic, self–conscious subject becomes 
antithetical to templates determined by the mass culture. ‘Personality’, Adorno and 
Horkheimer conclude at the end of the ‘Cultural Industry’, ‘scarcely signifies 
anything more than shining white teeth and freedom from body odour and 
emotions.’39 Emotions in this rubric are thus also subject to manipulation, remaining 
within the control of the capitalist culture that channels which form they will take 
through displacement onto commodity forms. Adorno and Horkheimer focus their 
scepticism particularly on the sadistic laughter and appetites for violence of the 
cinema audience, as opposed to the more pathos-driven emotions, yet this only serves 
to compound their condemnation of the cinema’s nefarious pleasures, with 
sentimentality implied in its wider sense of regressive, immoral emotions tout court.  
 
Nevertheless, a critique of ‘virtue in distress’ is manifest in their criticism of cartoons, 
owing to the regressive emotions they inspire in the spectator, with cartoon violence 
argued in particular to habituate the spectator to his own victimized existence in 
modern, industrial society. Accustoming the subject to the ‘new tempo’ of modern life 
and its attendant ‘breaking down of all individual resistance’, Adorno and Horkheimer 
account for the ‘thrashing’ of Donald Duck in reference to the sado-masochistic 
                                                                                                                                       
  
39 The homogenous character of mass identity under Fordist standardization is problematized by 
theories of postmodernist culture, where difference is fueled by capitalism’s ability to cater to diverse, 
niche markets, suggesting ostensible heterogeneities of (consumer) identity. See ‘Interview with Stuart 
Hall’, in Fredric Jameson, Ian Buchanan, Jameson on Jameson, Duke University Press, 2007, p. 113-
134. 
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desires of an audience that must ‘learn to take their own punishment.’40 Virtue in 
distress here becomes a means of conditioning the subject to the unjust violence 
inherent to capitalist, industrial society as distinct from an aesthetic that could found 
moral subjectivity through a spectatorship of sympathetic identification. Identification 
instead functions as the sado-masochistic pleasure of, (a).violence perpetrated on a 
commodified, aestheticized other, distanced from the spectator as an image-
commodity and, (b). confirming the subject’s place in that same system of oppression.  
 
Adorno’s partial solution to this politically regressive mechanisation of society would 
lie with the ‘autonomous’ artwork that displays an attention to modernist 
fragmentation, disunity and a negation of its own mode of address. Kafka’s prose and 
Schoenberg’s music, in their deviations from traditional art’s alleged pretensions to 
‘harmony’ or ‘totality,’ represent for Adorno the only hopes for art, through their 
negation of its original, allegedly naïve purposes. In giving the lie to what Adorno 
elsewhere terms ‘the totality of a rounded temporal experience’41, autonomous art 
would differ radically from dependent art through its modernist rejection of 
‘mimesis’, which would be most commonly implied in Adorno’s thought as the mere 
imitation of existing forms inscribed by a capitalist logic. It is here that Adorno’s 
thought rehearses ideas already apparent in the theory of Walter Benjamin, yet about 
which the two forcefully debated in correspondence, often coming to divergent 
conclusions. In Benjamin’s thought it is the complex concept of ‘aura’ that contains 
both the promise and the futility of sentimentality in mass culture.  
                                                
40 Adorno & Horkheimer, ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’, in trans. Edmund 
Jephcott, Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (ed,). Dialectic of Enlightenment, Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002, p. 
110. 
 
41 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, trans. Shierry Weber, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983, p. 265. 
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While both theorists were deeply concerned with the consequences of ‘mechanical 
reproduction’ (with cinema posed by Benjamin as a prime instance), it is Adorno’s 
theory that most forcefully maintains the wholesale inadequacy of mass culture for 
revolutionary purposes. Benjamin’s Artwork essay far more optimistically poses the 
destruction of the traditional, bourgeois artwork’s ‘aura’ as a progressive consequence 
of film’s ‘mechanical reproduction’. A new mode of vision is inaugurated that yields 
a ‘sentimentality’ that is both critical and liberatory. In his One-Way Street of 1928, 
Benjamin applauds a new ‘sentimentality . . . restored to health and liberated in 
American style’ when referring to that new subjectivity engendered by the wall 
advertisements and cinema of an Americanized culture.42 It would be the 
disintegration of auratic distance promised by mass cultural media that for Benjamin 
could result in such affect precisely owing to technology’s collapsing of subject and 
object. Writing of a transformation such that ‘people whom nothing moves or touches 
any longer learn to cry again’, Benjamin theorizes a progressively sentimental 
engagement with an inevitably self-reflexive technology. While, as expanded on by 
Susan Buck-Morss, the commodified world or image ‘anaesthetizes’ the subject to the 
world’s oppressive realities (the factory, war, commodity culture) cinema offers to 
reintegrate subject with object, resensitizing the subject to a world ruptured by 
technology.43 In contrast to the sado-masochism of Adorno’s spectator, sentimental 
emotions in Benjamin’s rubric are deemed the humane response to the realisation of 
                                                
42 Walter Benjamin, ‘One-Way Street’ (1928), Edmund Jephcott (trans.), in (eds.), Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996, p. 476. 
 
43 Buck-Morss poses Benjamin’s essay as a response to the ‘anaesthetizing’ effects of commodity 
culture on an industrialized society that threatens the modern subject with the bodily dangers of the 
factory, war and their attendant technologies. See Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: 
Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay Reconsidered‘, New Formations, No.20 (1993), pp. 123-143. 
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the pathetic human subjectivity that must live in the bourgeois world, or at the very 
least, a crucial catalyst to revolutionary action. 
 
Even Mickey Mouse, a quintessential product of modernity, is inscribed for Benjamin 
by an uncanny, dream-like fusion of the technological and the human. Miriam Hansen 
discusses how Benjamin poses the possibility of a ‘therapeutic’ function to the 
emotions that the mouse would elicit in the spectator, as an evocation of the subject’s 
response to ‘military and industrial technology.’44 Adorno’s response to Benjamin’s 
essay is to question the assumption of film’s absence of aura. In a letter responding to 
his reading of a draft of Benjamin’s Artwork essay, a Disney character becomes chief 
evidence of the ‘highly suspect degree’ to which film displays an ‘aural character’: 
Your dig against Werfel gave me pure pleasure. But if you take 
Mickey Mouse instead, things are far more complicated, and the 
serious question arises as to whether the reproduction of every 
person really constitutes that a priori of the film which you claim 
it to be, or whether instead this reproduction precisely belongs to 
that ‘naïve realism’ whose bourgeois nature we so thoroughly 
agreed upon in Paris.45 
 
Posing Mickey Mouse as paradigm of the ‘naïve realism’ that sustains a ritualistic, 
‘auratic’ reception of film (that Benjamin wishes to eliminate from the experience of 
art), Adorno could not accept film’s capacity for transforming subjectivity. In some 
ways guilty of the same cultural conservatism as the more right-wing intellectual 
figures of the day in his seemingly outright dismissal of the medium, his scepticism 
oscillates in this letter between a repudiation of film in general and a more focused 
                                                
44 Hansen nevertheless notes the fearful caution that possibly motivates such Utopian visions of the 
Disney character, ambivalence on the part of Benjamin as to whether laughter at Mickey Mouse 
connotes ‘therapeutic discharge or prelude to a pogrom.’ See Miriam Hansen, ‘Of Mice and Ducks: 
Benjamin and Adorno on Disney’, South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 92 (January 1993), pp. 27-61. 
 
45 Letter from Adorno to Benjamin (II), London, 18th March 1936, accessed online at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/11510904/Adorno-Letters-to-Walter-Benjamin, visited June 4th 2009. 
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attention on what are posed as its more sentimental variants. While Mickey Mouse 
may have served as the epitome for Adorno of film’s affinity for naïve realism, for 
reasons analogous to those in reference to Donald Duck, it is an ostensible indictment 
of film’s mimetic anthropomorphism that motivates his critique here. Such an 
aesthetic cannot remain confined to Disney or the cartoon, for Adorno’s wider 
critique implicates such realism as a more pervasive force of political regression in 
film generally. Elsewhere in his letter, it is the semblance of ‘technicality’ that must 
be proved by film in order to escape the charge of ideological reification, echoing the 
formalist positions of Eisenstein or Balázs. For instance, commenting on his visit to 
the film studios at Neubabelsberg, he bemoans the lack of ‘technicality’ in the feature 
film (formal devices of close-up, montage) in favour of a ‘reality’ that is ‘everywhere 
constructed with an infantile mimeticism and then ‘photographed’’.46  As long as film 
maintained its imitative relation to the world as a cover for its ideological operations, 
it could never for Adorno engage in the aesthetic negation deemed necessary for 
revolutionary change. 
 
Despite this dismissal of ‘dependent art’, Adorno would elsewhere express far from 
Utopian optimism with regards to an ‘autonomous’ high-culture, specifically owing to 
its necessary mechanism of negation with regards to mimetic art. Elsewhere in his 
letter to Benjamin, he refers to the (dependent) ‘cinema’ and the (autonomous) ‘great 
work of art’ as ‘torn halves of an integral freedom, to which however they do not add 
up.’47 Autonomous art is limited by its being defined by its formal negation of 
mechanical reproducibility, an exclusivity forged by its relation to capitalism and thus 
                                                
46 Ibid., 
 
47 Ibid., 
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compromised and constrained by the necessity of its own structural autonomy. While 
both ‘bear the stigmata of capitalism’ and ‘contain elements of change’, the 
impossibility of their aesthetic reintegration becomes a problem for both forms. While 
mass culture provides the legibility and reproducibility of mimetic representation, the 
latter’s exclusion by modern art dooms it to another kind of non-meaning, particularly 
in terms of its exclusivity from the wider public sphere of mass consumption.48 
Benjamin would echo such sentiments in his own writings as precisely those problems 
that pertain to the aura of the ‘unique’ work of art that ‘autonomous’ art only served 
to reproduce. As the ‘hidden’ holy object of ancient religious practice represents for 
Benjamin a foundational logic of auratic experience, Adorno’s ‘autonomous’ art is 
similarly argued to assert ‘cult value’ as opposed to dismantling the sustained aura 
that remains in its reception. In both instances, the ritualistic elements of their 
reception inhibit the revolutionary destruction of bourgeois aesthetic value that 
technologies of mechanical reproduction threaten promisingly to subvert. As a 
‘theology of art,’ Benjamin critiques the reception of ‘unique’ art, as manifest for him 
in the ‘cult of beauty’ and ‘l’art pour ‘l’art’.  Characterised by a ‘distance’ that 
traditionally separates bourgeois spectator and aesthetic object, an auratic experience 
serves to sustain the aesthetic object as sentimental ‘myth’, with the analogous 
ideological force of the commodity.  
 
Conversely, film’s penetration of this aesthetic ‘distance’ would for Benjamin allow a 
materialist dissection of previously obscured realities, and the politics that underpins 
                                                
48 Adorno has been critiqued often enough for his negativistic indictment of mass culture, yet his theory 
has undergone significant re-readings that question what seems an initial dismissal of any kind of 
alternative artistic practice. See Miriam Hansen, Introduction to Adorno, ‘Transparencies on Film’, 
New German Critique, No. 24/25, Special Double Issue on New German Cinema (Autumn, 1981 - 
Winter, 1982), pp. 186-198. 
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them. He advocates a radical aesthetic experience of the moving-image as something 
far more akin to a scientific analysis of ‘hidden’ realities in a manner very similar, and 
some argue indebted, to Balázs’ theory of the ‘face of things.’49 However, Benjamin 
makes explicit that film’s capacity to unlock such secrets constitutes a radical bid for 
freedom under conditions that he and Adorno would agree were governed by the 
perceptual dominance of the commodity and its complicity with the oppression of the 
labour class. The freedom to ‘calmly and adventurously go travelling’ at the cinema 
would be aligned with its promise to ‘burst this prison world asunder’, referring 
unmistakeably to the conditions of bourgeois capitalism and the structures of 
perception and memory dictated by it. Asserting that ‘the camera introduces us to 
unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses’50, Benjamin 
would influentially suggest an analogy between the subject’s attainment of self-
knowingness in psychoanalysis and the demystification of material reality through 
film’s unique scientific dissection. Like other theorists discussed above, Benjamin 
was enthralled by the close-up and slow-motion in their capacity to yield hidden 
truths from ‘familiar objects,’ while montage promised to reconstitute the world’s 
image as never before. The revolutionary potential of film would come with the 
‘shock’ with which such ‘technicality’ altered the spectator’s consciousness as distinct 
from the contemplation required by bourgeois art, such as painting. Contrasting the 
two artforms, Benjamin argues that the ‘painting invites the spectator to 
contemplation’ because,  
                                                
49 Laura Marcus notes corresponding theories of an ‘optical unconscious’ between Balázs and 
Benjamin in Close-Up: Cinema and Modernism , p. 242. 
 
50 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in (trans. Harry Zorn) 
Illuminations, p. 238. 
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before it the spectator can abandon himself to his associations. Before the 
movie frame he cannot do so. No sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is 
already changed.51 
 
With contemplation of the object connoting too much of the auratic experience, the 
‘shock’ of the moving-image would for Benjamin entail disrupted cognition, with the 
spectator confronted with an ongoing stream of new images. Through the techniques 
of image juxtaposition, enlargement, etc, ‘shock’ would alter perception by forcing 
the spectator to experience reality in a qualitatively different way. While bourgeois 
contemplation poses man’s capacity to arrive at a rational, ethical subjectivity through 
perception of the beautiful or the good (or even nothing at all), Benjamin obliges a 
confrontation between man and the material world that is unprecedentedly 
aestheticized by technology, and made superior in the following terms: 
For the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the 
turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means, that is, 
by contemplation, alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, 
under the guidance of tactile appropriation. 
The distracted person, too, can form habits[…]. 
Benjamin in the above suggests a radical potential in film’s ‘tactile’ address through 
its enforcement of ‘habit’ as opposed to the cognitive activity of contemplation. In 
place of cognition, film forces a necessarily ‘distracted’ subject to engage in filmic 
reality in order that critical consciousness becomes a second-nature response rather 
than that arrived at through contemplation by the bourgeois subject. If the latter is 
deemed to be mired still in the data of the ideologically self-evident and cannot arrive 
at truly revolutionary consciousness, the ‘distracted’ masses could yet be capable of 
such consciousness precisely by being open to the effects of mass technology as 
‘tactile appropriation’. Free of the bourgeois subject’s sentimental reverence for 
                                                
51 Ibid., p. 230. 
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cognition as contemplation, the subject of mass culture is thus considered more 
porous to film’s revelation of political realities. 
 
Benjamin nevertheless still deems capitalist ideology to have permeated existing film 
culture of the era in irredeemable ways. He rehearses similar objections to the 
sentimentality of a naively realist commercial cinema as other writers discussed 
above, including Adorno. Cinematic conventions that reinsert ‘aura’ into a potentially 
revolutionary medium would need to be eliminated in order to facilitate film’s higher 
purpose. The ‘cult of the movie star’ is thus seen as a conservative response to the 
‘shrivelling of the aura’ in successfully reintroducing the ‘phony spell of a 
commodity’ to film spectatorship. Commodity and the film ‘personality’ conspire in 
Benjamin’s view to render cinema into an object of contemplation, reasserting the 
dominance of bourgeois aesthetics in a mass medium. Benjamin equally perceives 
‘cult value’ in the ‘human countenance’ as manifest in the portraiture of early 
photography. By employing photography (and implicitly film) as a means of retaining 
the ‘aura’ of ‘loved ones, absent or dead’, Benjamin suggests the undermining of the 
true purposes of these technologies in favour of their employment in the maintenance 
of ‘myth’ or ‘magic’, all of which served to sustain the dominance of the commodity.  
Commending the evidentiary quality of Atget’s photos of empty Parisian streets, 
Benjamin clearly favours the use of the new technologies for their evocation of 
‘hidden political significance’ as opposed to their affinity for the anthropomorphic 
and its sentimental valences.  
 
In these respects, Benjamin’s Artwork essay reveals the influence of Bertolt Brecht, 
whose own writings and theatrical technique would similarly assert the primacy of 
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political materialism over the emotional manipulation of the era’s bourgeois theatre. 
With ‘defamiliarisation’ or making strange [verfremden] posited as the principal 
aesthetic imperative of this radicalized, didactic art, ‘empathy’ with characters is 
considered a regressive mode of reception that impedes the critical activation of the 
spectator. In ‘What is Epic Theatre?’ Benjamin commends Brecht’s use of 
‘interruption’ and ‘gesture’ as a means of breaking up the illusion of naturalistic 
drama. Corresponding with his idea of the deployment of ‘shocks’ , Benjamin 
compares the gestures of the ‘epic drama’ specifically with the ‘images on a film 
strip’ such that:  
The songs, the captions, the gestural conventions differentiate the 
scenes. As a result, intervals occur which tend to destroy illusion. 
These intervals paralyse the audience’s readiness for empathy. 
Their purpose is to enable the spectator to adopt a critical attitude 
(towards the represented behaviour of the play’s characters and 
towards the way in which behaviour is represented).52 
 
So Brecht and Benjamin discourage the play’s capacity for illusion and absorption in 
the name of activating the spectator’s critical consciousness. While an auratic, 
illusionistic theatre reproduced the conditions of oppression through its seamless 
attention to narrative, identification and Aristotelian catharsis, ‘epic theatre’ would 
call attention to the artifice of such conventions. ‘Empathy with the hero’ here is 
discouraged in favour of ‘astonishment’ with regards to the ‘circumstances within 
which he has his being.’53 To ‘uncover those conditions’ through which characters are 
represented attains more importance than the narrative conditions within which they 
are depicted. In such respects the actor in Brechtian theatre was encouraged to emerge 
out of character at certain moments in order to break the illusion of reality, just as an 
                                                
52 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, trans Anna Bostock, London: NLB, 1973, p. 21. 
 
53 Ibid., p. 18. 
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aesthetics of ‘shock’ would aim via the cinema to reveal the constructed nature of 
‘familiar’ experience.  
 
Benjamin and Brecht’s overall aim of making ‘what is shown on the stage 
unsensational’ corresponds with minimising the sentimental aspects of ‘dramatic’ 
theatre through strategies of estrangement. The application of ‘making strange’ would 
focus on the necessities of changing aesthetic reception. Unlike Eisenstein’s cinema, 
where thought becomes an attribute of ‘intellectual montage’ itself, Brecht’s work 
would allow the spectator to think owing to the play’s incompleteness and emotional 
distancing. Benjamin thereby opposes ‘the use of theatre to dominate the masses by 
manipulating their reflexes and sensations’ with a theatre where audiences are 
constituted by ‘collectives freely choosing their positions.’54 By calling on the 
otherwise ‘complacent’ spectator to process deliberately interrupted, elliptical and 
incomplete information, Benjamin advocates once again the critical training of a 
subject whose perceptions of socio-political realities outside of the theatre are 
qualitatively transformed by an ongoing exposure to non-auratic art.  
 
A tension in Benjamin’s work is manifest therefore between his messianic 
valorisation of film technology per se and his responses to an auratic cinema that 
surrounded him. If film destroys ‘aura’ as the very condition of its mechanical 
reproducibility, Benjamin faces the problem of the sentimental-as-auratic elements 
that continue to be inscribed in cinema. While Adorno saw this as reason to condemn 
the entire medium in the ‘Culture Industry’, Benjamin’s emphasis on film’s potential 
for progressive perceptual transformation suggests a shift towards questions of 
                                                
54 Ibid., p. 10. 
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critical-reading that has been echoed by many more recent theories of mass culture 
and alternative film praxis. The Artwork essay overlooks to some extent the 
appropriation of film by capitalism and a bourgeois aesthetics of sentiment, yet also 
considers the alternative possibilities of film praxis in relation to the forging of a new 
kind of critical spectatorship. His approval for the Brechtian style both undermines his 
optimism for the technology of film per se and serves to better articulate the 
sentimental elements that for him hamper film’s critical reception.  
 
Moreover, the underlying rubric of Benjamin’s writing on the ‘Utopian’ aspects of 
mass technology is a rehearsal of notions of film’s capacity for the formal 
reconfiguration of reality articulated by other formalist theorists. Revealing aspects of 
an otherwise moribund, commodified world that are as elusive as the subject’s own 
unconscious desires and fantasies, film’s vital role is ‘illumination’ via a mode of 
critical integration. A pejorative sentimentality (both for him and Adorno) applies to 
the dangers of film’s conveyance of ‘myth’ despite this capacity for ideological 
demystification and as a direct consequence of its deployment without ‘technicality’. 
Whether by evoking the ‘uncanny’ of Mickey Mouse’s negotiations with modernity 
or the defamiliarisation of Brechtian disruptions of narrative and character 
identification, a politically regressive sentimentality is subverted and undermined 
through the intervention of the film apparatus in producing a critical spectatorial 
mass. In these respects, such Weimar thinkers still adhere to a formalist theory of film 
wherein the medium must still justify itself on the grounds of its ‘artistic’ treatment of 
reality. Even if for Benjamin the medium serves above all to allegorize the impact of 
modern technologies on the human psyche, critical or artistic consciousness would not 
be possible without its intermediary function. It is on this very premise that Realist 
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film theory would reconfigure film’s essential assets in favour of those pertaining to 
its ontology as opposed to its capacity for reshaping reality, wherein sentimentality 
shifts towards a field of meaning connoted by the dangers of conveying realities 
distorted by film technique. 
 
André Bazin  
For André Bazin, the importance of cinema was to be gauged by the extent to which 
the medium could capture reality without modification, and the human struggles for 
freedom captured by the post-war Italian Neorealist cinema exemplified the spirit 
with which such reality should be conveyed. Much of the revered contemporary 
cinema of his day had reached an aesthetic impasse for Bazin, owing to what he 
deemed a disrespectful distortion of pro-filmic reality in favour of fabricated, 
ideologically-inflected myth, divorced from a more authentic historical reality. 55 One 
kind of cinematic sentimentality for Bazin, as for others, would be implicated in such 
dissociation between image and reality, the production of the ‘imaginary’ as opposed 
to the ‘real’. While modernists would generally advocate greater interventions on the 
part of the medium between these two elements, Bazin notoriously seeks to collapse 
them. In this respect, Italian Neorealism was deemed to deliver the gritty realities of 
post-war Italian life through an aesthetic that necessarily eliminated the stylistic 
excesses of Soviet modernism or the overly stylized classicism of Hollywood and 
French cinemas. However, the virtues of Neorealism for Bazin were also bound up 
with the ‘love’ of the auteur for characters oppressed by harsh social conditions. In as 
much as a sympathetic engagement with such characters becomes a vital key to the 
                                                
55 As Dudley Andrew argues, while prior film theory held film up as a painterly ‘frame’ that invites the 
artist to create, film for Bazin now served as a ‘window’ onto the world, offering thus a much needed 
re-engagement with social and political reality (see The Major Film Theories, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). 
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political relevance of these films, a cultural humanism emerges in Bazin’s theory that 
conflicts with certain high modernist assumptions concerning cinematic spectatorship. 
 
An example of how montage and the sentimental are implicated with one another in 
Bazin’s theory is manifest in his critique of Jean Tourane’s Une Fée pas comme les 
autres where live footage of animals is subjected to editing, voiceover and narrative in 
the service of anthropomorphized spectacle. While Bazin is careful not to denounce 
what he considers a human predisposition for the anthropomorphic, he claims 
Tourane operates at its ‘lowest level’ owing to his reliance on ‘trick’ and ‘illusion’. A 
key problem of creating such stories comes down to a question of ontology: 
The apparent action and the meaning we attribute to it do not exist, 
to all intents and purposes, prior to the assembling of the film, not 
even in the form of fragmented scenes out of which the setups are 
generally composed. I will go further and say that, in the 
circumstances, the use of montage was not just one way of making 
this film, it was the only way.56  
 
In accordance with his theory of the ontological essence of cinema, if a film evidences 
the distortion of pro-filmic reality to the extent that it cannot exist without such 
distortion, such a film constitutes a fatal deviation from reality. Bazin disdainfully 
affirms that Tourane’s ‘naïve ambition’ is to achieve little more than ‘to make Disney 
pictures with live animals’, suggesting that, as with Disney’s animal characters, a 
spectator is tricked into anthropomorphic identification by an illusory cinema 
divorced from reality.57  
 
                                                
56 André Bazin, ‘The Virtues and Limitations of Montage’ in Hugh Gray (trans.), What is Cinema? 
Vol. 1, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, p. 45. 
 
57 Ibid. p. 43. 
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It is worth emphasising that Bazin’s critique aims not to attack the sentimental 
spectator but the filmmaker that seeks to exploit the former’s capacity for 
anthropomorphic perception. With the article concerning itself with children’s 
literature and film generally, Bazin outlines a theory of best practice that necessitates 
respect for the authenticity of the image while not entirely abandoning basic cinematic 
devices – the ‘imaginary’ is a cinematic constant, but for Bazin, it must also ‘include 
what is real.’ Authenticity becomes the guarantee that the spectator is engaged with a 
reality that lends itself to the spectator’s imaginary even prior to its capture by the 
camera, with cinema enhancing that process as opposed to creating it through 
excessive trickery. Unlike the ‘zoomorphism’ of Tourane’s animals, Bazin praises 
Lamorrisse’s ‘red balloon’ tale, as the story allows itself to remain a ‘pure creation of 
the mind.’ In other words, Bazin claims that the spectator has a predisposition for a 
sentimental engagement with the image while nevertheless maintaining that its abuse 
all too often results from cheap simulations of that otherwise imaginative process. 
 
Bazin applies a similar logic to his analysis of Neorealism itself, where the 
sentimental once more pertains to sympathetic and imaginative engagement with 
‘realist’ narrative yet remains a danger of cinema’s excessive emotional engagement 
as a consequence of excessive editing styles.  In this context, Bazin discusses 
narrative construction in De Sica’s Umberto D.  In as much as the film could be 
argued to use melodramatic conventions, Bazin’s paraphrases the criticisms of other 
critics who see the film as a ‘populist drama with social pretensions’ However, unlike 
such critics, Bazin notes the reductiveness of accusations of the film’s sentimentality. 
He argues that a central concern of their critiques rests on how the film’s evocation of 
‘pity’ in the spectator arises out of the manipulation of plot developments in relation 
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to an ostensibly pathetic central protagonist (i.e., the hero’s unmistakeable suffering is 
shown to be causally related to mistreatment by cruel antagonists). In as much as the 
film concerns itself with the  protagonist’s loneliness and poverty (a retired, penniless 
pensioner and his faithful dog), Bazin agrees that the film belongs to a tradition of 
melodrama. He claims however that the film does not accentuate ‘pathos’ for its own 
sake, preferring instead to convey events in the protagonist’s life, some of which are 
pitiable (being thrown out of his flat owing to rent arrears) and others that are not (his 
comic stay in hospital owing to a harmless angina). Thus, for Bazin, the film conveys 
man’s downfall due to the ‘the lack of fellow-feeling that characterizes … the 
‘middle-class’ and succeeds in producing a variety of emotions in the spectator, not 
just an exclusive ‘pity.’ Bazin counters the critics by applauding the film’s emotional 
eclecticism--an important attribute of Neorealism, and, as we have seen, of 
melodrama generally.  
 
Bazin goes on to bracket the above discussion (and his own contributions to it) as a 
‘lapsing back into traditional critical concepts’, that is, dramatic construction. With 
narrative and character constituting the two main factors of such analysis, Bazin 
claims an exclusive attention to the ‘dramatic’ as superfluous to the true aims of 
Umberto D (and film generally). Thus he writes: 
If one assumes some distance from the story and can still see in it a 
dramatic patterning, some general development in character, a 
single general trend in its component events, this is only after the 
fact. The narrative unit is not the episode, the event, the sudden 
turn of events, or the character of its protagonists; it is the 
succession of concrete instants of life, no one of which can be said 
to be more important than the other, for their ontological equality 
destroys drama at its very basis.58 
 
                                                
58 ‘Umberto D: A Great Work’ in What is Cinema? Vol.2, p.81. 
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Bazin in the above applauds the film not for its plot or its characters but for the 
fidelity with which it captures the reality of the depicted events. If the dramatic 
elements of Umberto D are still manifest to the spectator (or to the critic that is ready 
to claim sentimentality), Bazin concludes that such attributes, shared with theatrical 
and novelistic forms, come secondary to the film’s more unique achievement of 
‘ontological equality’. This latter attribute has little to do with the construction of 
story in dramatic terms, and refers more to the success with which the film conveys 
‘concrete instants of life.’ Whether pity is still evoked by the film becomes a 
secondary concern also, trumped by the necessity of maintaining a style that is 
unencumbered by the ‘dramatic’ concerns of more conventional narratives. 
Describing a scene that dwells on the young maid waking up and going about her 
chores, Bazin asserts that such mundane moments are free of an ‘art of ellipsis’ that 
‘organizes the facts in accord with the general dramatic direction to which it forces 
them to submit.’59 Drama becomes implicated as a simplistic rendering of reality, a 
‘construction’ that must be minimized in order that ‘life might in this perfect mirror 
be visible poetry, be the self into which film finally changes it.’60  
 
For Bazin then, it is not so much the emotions generated by ‘drama’ that are attacked 
but, as with the Tourane’s animated films, the means by which they would be elicited 
by styles of cinematic rhetoric that deform reality to an excessive level. As Dudley 
Andrew notes, Bazin’s notorious claim that cinema ‘is also a language’ rests on the 
notion of what Bazin considers its more significant attribute of indexicality, an 
attribute deemed distinct from its function as language, both in its modernist and 
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Hollywood dialects. While cinema’s linguistic function risks its manipulation by 
oppressive, repressive or sentimental ideologies, respect for the indexical reality of 
the image serves for Bazin as a stylistic priority that defends the medium from the 
dangers of abstraction. In these respects, Bazin’s realism remains as austere towards 
dramatic categories as the modernists’, still favouring the conveyance of a politically 
vital reality to the ‘lapsing back’ towards anachronistic forms. Whether the 
sentimental signifies emotion shown by characters within narrative, or those evoked 
in spectators becomes a question belonging to another aesthetic debate in relation to 
media that still rely existentially on abstraction, unlike the cinema. Whereas 
modernists such as Benjamin or Brecht criticize techniques of conventional drama 
and identification in favour of a non-auratic cinema that should transform our usual 
perceptions of reality, it is precisely this reality that Bazin wishes to retain in an 
unmodified state. So while the ‘dramatic’ seems repudiated by both camps, Bazin’s 
emphasis on the cinema’s ontology implicitly leads him to a greater acceptance of 
sentiment than the formalists. Whereas the latter seek to eliminate aura through a 
medium-specific film-language, Bazin’s preference for pro-filmic reality crucially 
leaves affect inherent in such phenomena available to the spectator as long as it stems 
from a faithful, unimpeded process of cinematography.  
 
One may also presume from the above that Bazin had little interest in the emotions 
elicited by, or depicted within films, so long as they remained respectful of 
ontological reality. However, more than any of the theorists so far discussed, Bazin’s 
rhetoric in praise of neorealist films is suffused with references to the sentimental 
values of their directors. In another article in praise of De Sica,61 Bazin applauds the 
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‘love’ and sense of ‘poetry’ evoked by such films as Bicycle Thieves or Miracle in 
Milan, virtues that he deems constitutive of a proper auteur. Posing a humanism of 
‘courtly and discreet gentleness’ or ‘liberal generosity’ as key to the Neorealism of De 
Sica and other Italian directors, Bazin positions them within a long line of humanist 
directors that includes Vigo, Flaherty, Renoir and most especially, Chaplin.  All the 
above for Bazin exercised the ‘tenderness’ or ‘sentimental affection’ required of a 
cinematic auteur. Noting for instance that if Chaplin’s work were transposed into 
cinema, ‘it would tend to lapse into sentimentality’, he nevertheless poses just such 
aspects of the director’s work as testament to the latter’s artistry and a chief attribute 
of the cinema itself. Writing of a ‘quality of presence’, the ‘radiation of tenderness’ or 
‘an intense sense of the human presence’ in the work of such auteurs, Bazin affirms a 
distinctly humanist set of elements as crucial to cinematic representation. He confirms 
most explicitly Chaplin’s place in this cinematic sentimental tradition in the following 
description of the latter’s oeuvre, for instance:  
[…]cruelty is not excluded from his world; on the contrary, it 
has a necessary and dialectic relationship to love, as is evident 
from Monsieur Verdoux. Charlie is goodness itself, projected 
onto the world. He is ready to love everything, but the world 
does not always respond.62  
 
While the above clearly confirms Bazin’s approval of a sentimental aesthetic, what 
remains problematic is how such humanism is posed in relation to Bazin’s more hard-
edged notion of Neorealism as an abandonment of the contrived, melodramatic 
tendencies suggested by an ‘art of ellipsis’. A qualified answer can be offered by 
observing that while such a sentimental aesthetic as ‘virtue in distress’ is made central 
here, and historicized as an important cinematic tradition, Bazin retains a certain 
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catholicity as to the kinds of emotion that should inspire such work and to those such 
work should evoke. As with Umberto D, sympathy remains a complex of thoughts 
and emotions available to auteur and spectator, in contrast to a singular pity for its 
protagonist. Instead, Bazin advocates a spectatorship characterized by a ‘dialectic’ 
between subjectivity (feeling ‘love’ for realistic characters) and objectivity (the 
witnessing ‘cruelty’ as well as its causes and consequences). In a discussion of 
Antonioni’s Cronaca di un amore, he notes the film’s ‘expensive sets’ and 
‘melodramatic narrative’ but praises the realism of the film’s characters, such that the 
Italian director:  
builds all his effects on their way of life, their way of crying, of 
walking, of laughing. They are caught in the maze of the plot like 
laboratory rats being sent through a labyrinth.63 
 
Bazin’s praise here underlines the importance of human emotion to this film, yet it 
also implies an engagement with human behaviour aligned with the realism of 
scientific observation. While Benjamin claimed the scientific attributes of the cinema 
as a means of theorizing mass visuality as modified by technology, Bazin employs the 
metaphor of the observed maze to characterise the activity of the liberal, neorealist 
auteur. Given that ‘crying’ or ‘laughing’ are inevitable manifestations of human 
emotion captured by the camera, they must not be excluded from the realist film, for 
such emotions guarantee the authenticity of the human activities represented. In 
advocating a quasi-scientific model of sympathy, however, Bazin’s Neorealism 
remains a generous and courtly practice that cannot be too emotionally involved with 
its subjects. For De Sica too, Bazin commends in the auteur-director a detached kind 
of sympathy rather than empathy in relation to character:  
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[...] but the affection De Sica feels for his creatures is no threat to 
them, there is nothing threatening or abusive about it. It is courtly 
and discreet gentleness, a liberal generosity, and it demands nothing 
in return. There is no admixture of pity in it even for the poorest or 
the most wretched, because pity does violence to the dignity of the 
man who is its object. It is a burden on his conscience.64 
  
Bazin’s praise of De Sica’s approach here rehearses a key problem of the sentimental, 
for while his language evokes the key virtues of sentiment, his message enforces an 
identificatory process of sympathetic detachment over one of empathy, the necessity 
of understanding over and above emotional contagion between spectator and 
character. The cinema permits a ‘gentle’ examination of the world motivated by 
‘affection’, ‘love’ or ‘poetry’, yet its best practice for Bazin would stop short of 
permitting the ‘violence’ of pity. Bazin’s outline of De Sica’s ‘love’ is suggestive of 
the sensibility an auteur must feel in relation to the humanity depicted in his films, yet 
it must also be a virtue that restrains the impulse to manipulate the spectator’s 
perspective towards excessively empathic reactions, which all too often arise for 
Bazin from styles of narrative that overly abstract from the reality of depicted events.  
 
However, as much as Bazin deems the representation of real, hostile conditions and 
an uncaring society a vital task of Neorealism, his praise for central characters 
repeatedly, as we have already seen, emphasises the necessity of their well-meaning 
benevolence, even to the point of excess. Although the spectator is entreated not to 
‘pity’ such put-upon heroes as Chaplin’s tramp, Umberto D or Ricci from Bicycle 
Thieves, Bazin’s praise for the underdog as a necessary rhetorical weapon for change 
seems implicit in his essay on De Sica. Even here, though, Bazin is cautious about an 
overly idealized perception of the hero. The sympathy one should have for virtuous 
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characters becomes nuanced by comments such as those that follow his discussion of 
Chaplin’s ‘goodness,’ where he compares the latter to De Sica. 
Chaplin also chooses his cast carefully but always with an eye to 
himself and to putting his character in a better light. We find in De 
Sica the humanity of Chaplin, but shared with the world at large.65 
 
As opposed to Chaplin’s having ‘an eye to himself’, Bazin suggests his preference for 
a virtue that is shared by humanity at large, albeit one that might be exemplified by 
pathetic protagonists like the tramp. Because, Bazin implies the underdog continues to 
at risk for excessive identification when singled out as an idealized symbol of 
benevolence, Bazin prefers De Sica’s Miracle in Milan with its depiction of an entire 
group of homeless people divested of their homes and living a poor but honest life in 
a shanty town of their own making. Emphasising the mass as opposed to the 
individual, this film resembles Eisenstein’s own epics of mass struggle, their shift 
away from the virtuous hero. Bazin’s argument places value on such a shift and 
reveals his caution with regard to a hero that is overly idealized above other 
characters. Nevertheless, as discussed above, respect for the indexical properties of 
the image and the thematization of benevolence in the virtuous poor, whether 
represented as an individual or as the group, become key corollaries in Bazin’s 
appreciation of Neorealism. 
 
 
Béla Balázs 
If Bazin expresses caution as to the idealisation of a moral hero, the stakes are raised 
by the theory of Béla Balázs, for whom truth was revealed above all by the cinema’s 
attention to the human face alongside an affinity for conveying the narrative trajectory 
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of a hero. In many ways, Balázs’ theory complements Bazin’s in its emphasis on 
cinema’s affinity for revealing and explaining the complexities of human nature, yet 
for Balázs, a shift of focus away from the individual threatens to destabilize that 
capacity. Balázs’ emphasis remains on the expressivity of man as distinct from the 
abstract, anti-imitative models of the modernist avant-gardes or the human behaviour 
captured by the ‘objective’ documentary. Nevertheless, his discussion of cinema’s 
representation of the human is communicated once more in scientific terms, 
qualifying the extent to which the spectator’s engagement with the individual should 
be idealized or sentimental.  
 
Balázs has often been considered a modernist or formalist owing largely to the period 
and location within which he wrote (1920’s Weimar Germany) and a recurrent 
emphasis on cinema’s necessary transformations of pro-filmic reality. Recent 
scholarship however has problematized easy categorization of the theorist in either the 
formalist or realist camps, along with other theorists such Epstein, Vertov and 
Kracauer.66 While his admiration of the close-up suggests a modernist’s attention to 
editing, his cinematic humanism requires a realist’s focus on the referent. The 
revelation of life’s hidden details, particularly the nuances of human emotion and 
gesture, become cinema’s special vocation for Balázs, producing a modern human 
subject more attuned to visual signs of emotion. Balázs’ humanist metaphor for the 
aesthetic he perceives as central to cinema is encapsulated by the title of Theory of the 
Film’s most well-known sections on the close-up, ‘The Face of Things.’ Asserting 
that normal human perception leads us to ‘skim over the teeming substance of life’, 
Balázs argues that the camera ‘has uncovered that cell-life of the vital issues in which 
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all great events are ultimately conceived.’67 The face here serves as metaphor for the 
anthropomorphized significance of film, a benchmark for the richness that the close-
up is able to convey. 
 
Balázs’ discussion of children and animals as cinema’s newly found objects extends 
this deep concern with cinema’s ability to reveal particularly authentic aspects of the 
world. While arguing that their representation forged a new style rather than a 
language of cinema, he writes of both with an almost mystical attachment to the 
authenticity of their gesture. While adults could be ‘stage-managed’ to act in pre-
determined ways, Balázs writes of the autonomy of children and animals from what 
he describes elsewhere as ‘severe rules that govern grammar’ that he considered to 
potentially govern gesture or expression. When children act in films, Balázs argues: 
This is not acting- it is a natural manifestation of youthful 
consciousness and it can be observed not only in the human 
young but in the young of other species as well. It is a 
transposition such as occurs in dreams, or in a trance.68 
 
While facial expression and gestures were already rich in ‘polyphony’ for Balázs, 
children or animals were guarantors of an emotional realism in their freedom from 
convention. While Balázs avoids praise for the realism of non-actors over actors (he 
prefers the close-ups of such film actors as Asta Nielson or Falconetti to the 
supposedly objective expressions of non-actors), his descriptions of the fairy-tale like 
otherness of children, animals and native savages suggest a latent fascination with an 
‘inaccessible nature and inaccessible fairyland’ connoted by them. If such passages 
undermine his own distinction between a filmic style and a filmic language, his thesis 
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gains strength in its overall veneration of a curious spectator enthralled by cinema’s 
delivery of a ‘microphysiognomy’ that is beyond linguistic constraints.  
 
What emerges in Balázs’ thought therefore is the saliency of physiognomy and 
gesture, created by the tensions of dramatic action (narrative) and, relatedly, freedom 
from a kind of emotional barrenness, as applied either to dispassionate filmmakers, 
insensitive spectators and indeed, untrained actors. With such sub-titles as ‘Education 
in Physiognomics’ or ‘Sound Explaining Pictures’, Balázs’ aims very much accord 
with a humanistic goal of better understanding between people via film’s 
unprecedented ability to convey the nuances of subjectivity. Responding to Soviet 
methods of creating images of mismatched emotional reactions (his example is the 
use of a mother’s reaction to her child’s pram overturned inserted by Eisenstein as the 
reaction shot of a woman facing the barrel of a gun), Balázs writes: 
This method is always a deception; it is rendered possible only by 
the fact that our physiognomic culture is not as yet sufficiently 
sensitive to be able to differentiate between terrors induced by 
different causes[...]The close-up which has made us so sensitive to 
the naturalness of a facial expression will sooner or later develop 
our sensitivity further, so that we shall be able to discern in a facial 
expression its cause as well as its nature.69  
 
Balázs here goes some way in expressing not only his disdain for the ‘fanatics of 
“naturalness”’, but also makes salient his central aim of educating the spectator in a 
new cinematic lingua franca of human emotion. The stakes of this endeavour are 
couched in the necessity of averting the kinds of cruelty that emanate, for Balázs, in 
the Soviet directors’ narrow-minded inattention to emotional nuance. Such disregard 
for the integrity of human emotion in favour of its role in a supposedly superior 
synthesis of meaning grated Balázs in terms that vary between the ontological 
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(mismatched actual and represented emotions), humanitarian (the directors’ emotional 
callousness) and educational (the spectators’ exploited ignorance of the sham owing 
to a lamentable insensitivity to emotion). If emotional meanings could be correctly 
depicted and then adduced by newly sensitized subjects, Balázs implies that the 
cinema constitutes man’s best hope for mutual understanding. As a universalized 
language of human emotion and gesture, cinema promises to emancipate man from 
the ‘severe rules’ of abstracted meaning that prevented the emergence of a truly 
popular art. Thus he would argue that: 
…it will probably be the art of the film after all which may bring 
together the peoples and nations, make them accustomed to each 
other, and lead them to mutual understanding. The silent film is 
free of the isolating walls of language differences. If we look at 
and understand each other’s faces and gestures, we not only 
understand, we also learn to feel each other's emotions. The 
gesture is not only the outward projection of emotion, it is also its 
initiator.70 
 
With language differences posing for Balázs, as for many other theorists, a great 
challenge to ‘mutual understanding’, cinema (especially silent cinema) directly 
addresses the spectator’s conscious and unconscious. By revealing ‘hidden’ emotions, 
film would make visible to the spectator truths that had as yet remained occluded by 
surface appearances. With such descriptions as the ‘the hidden mainsprings of a life 
which we had thought we already knew so well’,71 Balázs insists that cinema 
constitutes more than just a quantitative increase in perceptual information; it creates 
a qualitative change. Anticipating counter-arguments that the close-up still only 
shows new details of pro-filmic objects as opposed to necessarily providing new 
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meanings, Balázs goes on to justify the semiotic value of the cinema’s detailed 
scrutiny: 
The close-up may sometimes give the impression of a mere 
naturalist preoccupation with detail. But good close-ups radiate a 
tender human attitude in the contemplation of hidden things, a 
delicate solicitude, a gentle bending over the intimacies of life-in-
the-miniature, a warm sensibility. Good close-ups are lyrical; it is 
the heart, not the eye, that has perceived them.72 
 
Balázs’ sentimental language in the above passage reveals the underlying impulse in 
his theory to emphasize the role of human consciousness in the deployment of the 
close-up. While inadequate close-ups reveal little of extra significance, the good 
close-up is motivated by ‘intimacies’, whether on the part of the spectator or the 
filmmaker. Anticipating Bazin’s theory of the benevolent auteur, Balázs’ theory of the 
close-up requires a concern for meaning founded in a ‘tender human attitude’ towards 
the world, as opposed to an appetite for increased detail for its own sake. Emotional 
investment suggests the filmmaker’s benevolent impulse to show the world in new 
ways; the ‘mere naturalist’ is posed as a non-artistic cataloguer of visual facts in the 
name of a kind of dispassionate taxonomy.  
 
One can see how Balázs’ aesthetic dismay over both documentary and avant-garde 
practices derive from this above notion of detached filmmaking. He argues that the 
avant-garde seeks to represent nothing but ‘absolute visuality’73 or the ‘poetry of 
things’74 while the documentary seeks an objective and impartial registration of 
reality. Narrative remains for him therefore the key intermediary between excesses of 
the subjective and objective, particularly when bound by the necessity of representing 
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a ‘hero’. The mass epics of Eisenstein, the Vertovian documentary or the ‘abstract’ 
avant-garde film all abandon, for Balázs, this necessary ‘individualization’ in favour 
of an aesthetic of the ‘the natural or the logical’, with the following consequences: 
The trouble was that if an artist renounces individualization, what he 
achieves is not something of universal validity; it is on the contrary, 
complete disintegration.75  
 
Balázs condemns the subordination of narrative and the presentation of ‘human 
destinies’ to what he deems elitist styles because it comes at the cost of 
comprehensibility and coherence. Only by treating the ‘fable’ or ’story’ as ‘a closed 
entity’ (i.e. an adherent to narrative form) could the filmmaker hope to give best 
expression to filmed material. The ‘hero’ provided for Balázs the ideal emotional 
anchor for the registration of ongoing changes in narrative, without which the film 
would risk disintegration. If these prejudices reveal Balázs’ somewhat conservative 
conception of film’s ideal practice as based on a logically flawed valorisation of 
narrative over other devices of representation, they nevertheless emphasise his 
humanist concerns. Problematically overlooking the constructed nature of narrative 
itself, ‘dramatic action’ retained the ‘face of things’ for Balázs compared to the avant-
garde’s exclusive attention to form itself or the documentary’s fetishization of 
objectivity or naturalism. As distinct from the latter practice for instance, Balázs 
commends the use of trained, experienced actors over the non-actors of documentary 
precisely because the former were for him better able to convey the nuances of facial 
and gestural emotion. While using non-actors would bring an apparent ‘objectivity’ to 
the film, the richness of human expression and its ‘polyphony’ would be lost without 
the actor’s ability to create physiognomic or bodily meanings. 
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However, despite his emphasis on the ‘intimacies’ of good film-making, Balázs’ 
model of spectatorship, as with Bazin’s metaphor of a ‘maze’ and Benjamin’s ‘optical 
unconscious’, is likened to the accuracy of scientific observation. Thus in cinema’s 
depiction of family drama: 
The micro-tragedies in the peace and quiet of ordinary families 
were shown as deadly battles, just as the microscope shows the 
fierce struggles of micro-organisms in a drop of water.76 
 
If the above suggests, as with Bazin, the possibility of the scientist’s vantage point 
and an implicit emotional impartiality, the two writers both share an enthusiasm for 
human conflict as the preferred object of analysis. While Balázs is far less concerned 
with the ontological realism with which such human conflict is staged, there is a 
shared consensus as to the need for cinema’s scrutiny of human behaviour. The 
implication for both theorists however is the possibility of representing ‘fierce 
struggles’ and the darker side of human nature as much as morally exemplary 
behaviour. Despite the ‘warm sensibility’ with which Balázs encourages our 
encounter with life up close, he writes of what we may find in terms of moral realism, 
such as in his description of film’s rooting out of a ‘capable liar’: 
In vain does his mouth smile ever so sweetly the lobe of his ear, 
the side of a nostril shown in isolated magnification reveal the 
hidden coarseness and cruelty.77 
 
If cinema’s truthfulness must necessarily convey the moral baseness of the human 
condition, such as in the lies, cruelty and coarseness of superficially moral characters, 
Balázs nevertheless endows cinema with the moral imperative of revealing it and 
enabling the spectator to exercise superior discrimination, in relation to onscreen and 
offscreen characters. With this level of realism guaranteed by the cinema, Balázs is 
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more than content to permit such a model as ‘virtue in distress’ as a legitimate 
characteristic of the narrative hero. A scorned sentimental trope in other artforms 
often owing to the one-dimensionality with which the object of sympathy is drawn, 
pathos lends itself to cinema’s vivid analysis and thereby facilitates moral legibility. 
Charlie Chaplin, for instance, becomes a paradigm for Balázs of the heroic individual 
thwarted by an ‘inhuman society’, his ‘golden-hearted’ nature in no way diminished 
by the clarity with which the cinema delivers the tramp as ‘shiftless, blundering’ and 
even ‘cunning.’  With such characters serving as moral anchors for narrative action, 
melodrama becomes, as Linda Williams has suggested, a deeply embedded ‘mode’ of 
Hollywood storytelling, with ‘action’ and ‘pathos’ contributing in equal measure to 
the resolution of conflict between good and evil and the recognition of moral virtue. 
Cinema, with its affinity for the close-up, the human face, and an incomparable 
capacity to invoke an omniscient spectator through editing, becomes the medium of 
choice for melodrama’s articulation of ‘moral legibility.’ Invoking the moral realism 
discussed by Bazin, Balázs and others above, the subject represented by such figures 
as Chaplin’s Tramp  remains a potent signifier of humanity victimized by 
‘mechanization and capitalism’, the plucky hero that asserts his right to life despite 
the status of perpetual misfit, played for Balázs with a ‘melancholy optimism’ that 
‘expresses the opposition of all of us to an inhuman order of society.’78  
 
In short, therefore, the sentimental remains a latent presence in much of the discourses 
surrounding film as it emerged as a dominant medium in the early-to-mid 20th 
century. Despite, or in many ways owing to, the repudiations of kitsch, mass or 
bourgeois tastes or simplistic character engagements that informed the critiques 
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analysed above, the sentimental comes to represent much of what a certain hard-
edged set of modernisms, formalisms and realisms sought to problematize and 
transform. At the same time, the philosophical ideals that motivate such critiques are 
time and again shown to be rather less than inimical to sentimental values of universal 
communication, sympathy for those oppressed by economic disparities and the 
significance of art’s humanist function. If as a practice, the sentimental and its 
reproduction in the cinema were, or indeed are, all too often considered to devalue 
such ideals for the sake of cheap, unearned emotion and/or bourgeois entertainment, it 
is vital to bear in mind the extent to which it retained critical importance in the 
cinematic era. 
 
Such indeed can also be seen in evidence in much of the cinema that is analysed in the 
chapters that follow. As many of the theorists examined above knew so well, cinema 
was exceptional in its capacity for emotion and rhetorical power, and so it is to some 
of the major sentimentalists of the cinematic era that the discussion now turns. 
Charting the early, classical and post-classical eras respectively, a key question that 
informs the analysis below concerns the extent to which sentimental ideology informs 
these auteurs’ rhetorical purposes and how it is deployed in relation to the priorities of 
gaining, maintaining and emotionally inspiring a mass audience.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Chaplin, Sentimental Tastes and the Biopic 
 
In a scene from Richard Attenborough’s Chaplin, a 1992 biopic of the early 
filmmaker and star, an elderly Chaplin (Robert Downey Jr.) recounts to his biographer 
(Anthony Hopkins) how he ‘invented’ the Tramp character that would bring him so 
much success in the early days of Hollywood. The sequence begins with the younger 
Chaplin’s entrance into the wardrobe at Hollywood’s Sennet studios, his gaze 
immediately drawn by the hat that would become essential to the Tramp costume. In a 
parodic style that supports the biographer’s later judgement of the scene as ‘bullshit’, 
the hat glows with a purple tint superimposed as a special effect and an entranced 
Chaplin advances balletically towards it, having been ‘possessed’ by the synechdocal 
‘him’ (the Tramp). With gentle music and soft-focus camerawork, the scene is infused 
with conventions connoting the dream-sequence, explicitly acknowledging its 
artificial status and comically parodying the form. The hat advances magically up 
Chaplin’s arm to his head, followed by the famous cane, that rattles in its holder for 
Chaplin’s attention, and having done so, flies out to his hand. As a recounting of the 
formation of the Tramp, the scene becomes a complex fusion of self-conscious 
mythmaking, echoing the biopic’s ideology in relation to Chaplin’s genius while 
remaining aware of its own stylistic fallacies or excesses for the contemporary cine-
literate spectator. With the film oscillating between the young Chaplin and the latter-
day Chaplin (both played by Downey Jr.), the film underscores the extent to which the 
sequence’s truth is possibly threatened by the subjective bias of its teller and the 
conventions of the biopic genre itself, both sharing sentimental attributes. The heavy 
stylization described above at one level humorously draws attention to the artificiality 
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of the elder Chaplin’s account, yet also represents a self-consciousness on the film’s 
part as to the extent to which it wishes to remain within a genre known for 
sentimentality. The sequence ends when Chaplin’s biographer thus accuses the elder 
Chaplin of situating the whole process in ‘purple’ prose (with an off-screen ‘bullshit, 
and you know it’). With the biographer refusing to go along with the artificial 
excesses of the modern biopic’s revision of historical facts, the elder Chaplin argues 
back, ‘but the truth was so boring, George,’ after which follows the apparently real 
history of the Tramp’s formation, where Chaplin bumbles through the wardrobe 
trying on many different items bearing little relation to the Tramp costume, before 
finally finding the costume after all. The music changes from strings to that of the 
archetypal silent film’s chase-sequence, suggesting the rushed and provisional 
realities of the creative process, the predominance of work and effort as opposed to a 
magical interpellation of character.  
 
Both modes, the sentimental and the comic, therefore contend for dominance in the 
construction of the Chaplin legend and serve in many ways antithetical purposes in 
this scene. Both modes are stylistic glosses in relation to the story at hand, yet they do 
so in rhetorically disparate ways, both serving also to repress key socio-historical 
factors that would necessarily have contributed to the Tramp’s formation.  The comic 
mode accentuates the extent to which the Tramp was created through chance, where 
items are combined in slap-dash fashion with little concern outside of the need to look 
comedic. Now speeded-up in comic fashion, the sequence corroborates how ‘boring’ 
the elder Chaplin finds it, the Tramp’s destiny and iconicity shown to have been of 
very little consideration to his younger self. The sentimental slow-motion mode 
emphasises precisely that iconicity, invoking a nostalgia that also privileges and 
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flatters the spectator’s cultural memory and grounds the Tramp in more meaning than 
the notion of a randomly selected set of clothing and props. Moreover, by privileging 
Chaplin’s being called upon to assume the ‘him’, the sentimental sequence allows the 
Tramp to belong to the spectator and the Hollywood myth factory as much as to 
Chaplin or the particular historical conditions out of which he arose. The film, as a 
biopic, shows us his actual life in the slums, pubs and music halls of early century 
London, yet this later scene serves to remove us from such conditions in favour of an 
altogether more auratic experience. Chaplin as a historical entity competes with the 
Tramp as a media icon belonging to a global image culture. 
 
So potent is this need for myth that the comic sequence ends with a return to the 
sentimental mode with which it began, except with irony now dispensed with entirely. 
As a now fully costumed Chaplin-as-Tramp selects his oversized shoes from the 
basket, the leitmotif of gentle strings returns as Chaplin gingerly picks the shoes up 
and ponders their excessive significance in relation to the Tramp’s iconicity, once 
again privileging the spectator’s knowledge of their import and re-introducing the 
theme of their magically ordained rightness. Looking into his reflection as a near 
finished-product in an off-screen mirror, Chaplin slowly smiles, his recognition of 
himself-as-icon that invokes destiny once again. Selecting then a small moustache 
and, having stumbled on the shoes, adopting the Tramp’s walk (like at the climax of 
The Tramp [1915], away from camera), Chaplin is now ‘Chaplin.’ Like the sequence 
in Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) that sees Judy return to Scotty’s (and the spectator’s) 
exact vision of Madeleine on the day of her death, the Tramp is constructed as a 
fetishized object, yet one belonging to the image culture of Hollywood itself. While 
Vertigo is far more emphatic as to the darkly perverse forces that underscore the 
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spectator’s (and Scotty’s) desire for the rightness of Madeleine’s image, Chaplin 
allows the spectator to become immersed in the myth-making process as part of a 
biopic’s linear narrative of individual success. Where Vertigo’s spiral of fetishistic 
desire underlines the dangers of fantasy and re-constructed memory, Chaplin’s mode 
of address invites the spectator to share a sense of communal recognition with 
everyone that has ever seen and loved the Tramp, and implicitly, the Hollywood 
movie.  
 
With the film having thus stumbled into a ‘boring’ comic sequence, owing to a self-
conscious acknowledgement and disparagement of its own myth-making, a return to 
the sentimental style underscores the complex renunciation that takes place with the 
re-construction of the fetish object. As in the famous psychoanalytic dictum of 
fetishistic disavowal,‘I know very well, but nevertheless,’1 Chaplin’s creative act 
must correspond with the cultural memory of a contemporary Hollywood audience, 
despite being acknowledged as an impossibility that only cinema’s magic tricks can 
overcome. Chaplin senses the rightness of the Tramp just as the spectator of Chaplin 
feels as much as understands the genesis of such an icon. Chaplin aims to thereby 
appease the ‘hip’ irony of a contemporary cinematic spectatorship while ultimately 
retaining the affect of a reverential biopic with its concomitant recourse to a 
sentimental aesthetic. Despite evidence to the contrary, such an aesthetic wants us to 
believe that the Tramp was intended, reflected upon, ‘meant to be.’ 
 
In this chapter, I seek to analyse how such tensions between the Tramp’s comic 
realism and moral stylisation have pertained to the Tramp from his inception, as 
                                                
1 Translated from Octave Mannoni’s oft-cited ‘Je sais bien, mais quand même . . . ,’ in Clefs pour 
l’imaginaire ou l’autre scène, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969, 9–33. 
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demonstrated by the scene discussed above. Just as this scene oscillates between two 
different orders of representation, I show how significant modifications to the figure 
of the Tramp itself in Chaplin’s early period demonstrate a similar dynamics 
concerning Tramp’s reception as a figure of sentiment. With the Tramp re-crafted by 
Chaplin himself into a figure of sentiment and pathos to complement the slapstick and 
violence of his early shorts, such a transition is animated by key questions emerging 
from the ‘sentimental’ period itself, where sentiment emerged as the moral feeling of 
a ‘gentleman’ that can no longer secure a place in a newly middle-class dominated 
society. Brought in line with the theme of the virtuous soul, whose sentiments are too 
rarefied and whose capital insubstantial, the Tramp instantiated a unique 
reconciliation of sentimental and modernist values, fuelling intense critical 
speculation in relation to his own import and that of the cinema at the time of his 
reception. I argue moreover that Chaplin’s iconicity and renewal in such films as 
Chaplin testify to enduring alignments between Hollywood and a sentimental 
tradition that continues to thematize the individual’s struggle in society and the moral 
lessons therein.  
 
As such, Chaplin’s own story comes to represent the moral concerns of his own films, 
and persists as an object of fascination to a film culture invested in emotional 
pedagogy. I contend that the same sentimental processes that were at work in his own 
self-fashioning in the 1910s persist in his continued critical relevance and the creative 
appropriations of his legacy today. With the sentimental remaining a key property of 
Chaplin, Chaplin’s critical significance endures not in spite of, but precisely due to 
his promulgation of a sentimental tradition, allowing the past to be re-articulated in a 
present now characterised by high media literacy and postmodern irony. With the 
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biopic representing for many critics a ‘deeply conservative genre’, often as a function 
of its recourse to sentimentality in the portrayal of great historical figures,2 Chaplin’s 
life and work both ‘fit’ the general requirements of the genre as suitable material, a 
rags-to-riches narrative and the entire tradition of the ‘troubled’ artist. Yet through 
further analysis of Chaplin, I show that the biopic itself, particularly in terms of its 
deployment of pathos, also struggles to address the particular socio-historical 
conditions that produce Chaplin and Hollywood, not least as co-products of such 
cultural phenomena as Fordism, Taylorism and the Great Depression. The biopic as 
such demands both a reverential focus on the individual and his achievements and 
engagement with political or historical concerns, communicating through multiple 
discourses rather than the more unilateral mode assumed of the naively sentimental 
film. Thus, our understanding of sentimentality can be fine-tuned and made more 
media-specific than most deployments of the term in relation to Chaplin suggest.  
 
 
The Gentleman Tramp 
 
Any discussion of Chaplin’s sentiment must consider the extent to which Chaplin’s 
films have been considered to have developed in line with the tastes of a desirable 
(lucrative), ‘genteel’ audience between the 1910s-1920s. Chaplin began his cinematic 
career under the direction of Mack Sennet at Keystone studios in 1914 and appeared 
continually as the Tramp, an ideal character for the slapstick talents he had honed in 
the London music halls. Amidst growing fame, he gradually gained increased control 
over the direction of his films and in the following years signed new contracts with 
                                                
2 See Carolyn Anderson & John Lupo, ‘Hollywood Lives: The State of the Biopic at the Turn of the 
Century’, in Steve Neale (ed.), Genre and Contemporary Hollywood, London: BFI, 2002, pp. 96-7. 
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Essenay and then Mutual as both central performer and director for the many shorts 
produced during the rest of the 1910s. Such a high level of control over productions 
has been considered a chief factor in how the Tramp figure became subject to 
‘refinement’, particularly once at Mutual. It has been well established by Chaplin 
biographers and critics in relation to Chaplin’s Keystone/Essenay/Mutual period (the 
many shorts that preceded his first feature, The Kid in 1921 for First National) that a 
key development occurs in Chaplin’s Tramp persona from the thieving, lecherous and 
rather violent tramp of the Keystone and early-Essenay period to the well-meaning yet 
romantically vulnerable loner of his later shorts and features.3 If the slapstick antics, 
chase-scenes and kickabout humour are never eliminated from Chaplin’s oeuvre, 
films from as early on as The Vagabond (1916, Mutual) The Bank (1915, Mutual) and 
The Immigrant (1917, Mutual) incorporate parallel narratives of romance and 
unrequited love with Chaplin’s leading lady (played by Edna Purviance) that allow 
him to share pathos as much as humour with the audience.  
 
A brief consideration of a Keystone film illustrates the extent to which Chaplin’s 
archetypal character began as a notably unsentimental protagonist. In Twenty Minutes 
of Love (1914, Keystone) for instance, the Tramp (wearing an uncharacteristically 
sneering facial expression and puffing on a cigarette) enters a park and observes a 
romantic couple embracing on a park bench. Finding their behaviour laughably 
ridiculous, Chaplin mimics their facial expressions and embraces and kisses the tree 
he’s standing next to as a parody of their courtship. When the couple seem not to 
notice and carry on what they’re doing, the Tramp’s face turns back to one of envious 
                                                
3 See Charles Maland, Chaplin and American Culture: The Evolution of a Star Image, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp, 14-24; Michael Woal and Linda Kowall Woal, ‘Chaplin 
and the Comedy of Melodrama,’ Journal of Film and Video, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Fall 1994), pp. 3-15. 
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menace before approaching them to disrupt their behaviour more effectively. While 
this last facial expression certainly confirms Chaplin’s displeasure at their coupling (a 
vital element of the ‘sad loner’ persona that would remain integral to the character), it 
is his recourse to parody and then to direct confrontation that overshadows, or indeed 
effaces, the pathos of his character. Moreover, the remainder of the film charts a 
rather Hobbesian matrix of relationships between its characters, where romantic 
attachment is shown to be predicated on material gain. Another couple in the park 
pause their embraces at the woman’s request that the man produce a token of his love, 
which leads the latter to steal a pocket-watch from a man sleeping on a bench. The 
Tramp’s intervenes in turn by stealing the pocket-watch off the thief in order to woo 
the latter’s girlfriend by presenting her with a twice-stolen watch as though to give as 
a gift. Successfully won over by a gift from an entirely new suitor (the Tramp), the 
woman’s response further confirms the fickle conditions upon which a very cynically 
conceived ‘love’ is often founded. The film ends with all the characters fighting in the 
sea except the woman and the Tramp, leading to both his victory over the other suitors 
and justifying the attitude of cynical envy with which he entered the film from the 
outset. While in later films the Tramp’s childish attempts and failures at romance 
would be deeply related to the Tramp’s perpetual alienation from social relationships 
(and a clear source of pathos), this early film delivers a scheme of romance and a code 
of practice that differs markedly from the genteel, sentimental tradition.  
 
Where Twenty Minutes of Love allows everyone to behave irresponsibly and rewards 
the Tramp as the most cunning of them all, such competitive and ruthless instincts are 
suppressed in favour of moral protocol in later films. The Tramp now emerges as a far 
more complex subject that knows how to behave socially yet whose instincts, and 
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seemingly ineradicable identity of outsider, tragically disrupts any easy insertion into 
bourgeois subjectivity. In The Tramp, much as though the Tramp is attracted to 
working on a farm as a means of wooing the farmer’s daughter with whom he initially 
finds favour (by rescuing her from thieves), his incompetence and ineptitude for the 
work prefigure his ultimate rejection by her. As a social outcast, the Tramp is 
unemployable, struggling with his desires for continued freedom that sit in tension 
with desires for social belonging. When the girl’s fiancé emerges in the last section of 
the film, quashing all chances of romance between her and the Tramp, it is with 
knowing resignation that the Tramp famously walks away from the camera, 
disappointed with how the world has rejected him once again yet determined 
nevertheless to keep trying. From the ruthless individual among other ruthless 
individuals in Twenty Minutes of Love to the confused victim of a middle-class 
society that he both desires and rejects, the Tramp now becomes the plucky loner that 
aspires to middle-class respectability but is rarely able to achieve it, or even truly 
want it. Rather than simply lower-class, the Tramp becomes a figure existing outside 
the class system entirely, a status that has always gone hand in hand with a unique 
moral sensibility that now distinguishes him from other characters.  
 
In such respects, Chaplin’s appeals to bourgeois standards of respectability become 
highly ambiguous, for the sensibility valorised in the Tramp figure fails to correlate 
with bourgeois subjectivity any more than with that of the working-class. Indeed, 
Chaplin’s films rarely confirm middle-class values of hard work or a place of one’s 
own, the latter rather more often represented as impediments to the Tramp’s 
symbolization of freedom, the latter invested more than any perhaps in the joys of 
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flânerie, spatial interstitiality and plain luck.4 Such an ‘outsider’ subjectivity enhances 
the critical insights of such films, as a function of the spectator’s engagement with a 
figure that only partially ascribes to the codes of all established class categories. If 
working class labour conflicts with the Tramp’s aspirations to gentlemanly comfort 
and freedom, middle-class status remains elusive and dependent on one’s capital or 
that of one’s family, neither of which the ‘outsider’ possesses nor strives too hard to 
attain. The pathos of failure is thus always offset by the Tramp’s invocation of 
freedom and moral independence. 
 
In order to appeal to as many sectors of his potential audience as possible, Chaplin 
nevertheless succeeds in diversifying the Tramp’s identity, with increased attention to 
character realism and pathos. If slapstick (in the films of Chaplin and others) invoked 
the anarchistic spirit that many audiences, trapped in regimented itineraries of work 
and urban life, found comically liberating, it did so at the risk of remaining 
fundamentally separate from the spectator’s world, with little attempt to hide its 
artifice. The early Chaplin’s petty criminality, violence and insubordination to 
authority figures could not be met by the same harsh consequences as they would 
have been in the real world, or else comedy would have quickly turned to tragic 
realism. Such comic fantasies of lawlessness were, of course, hugely appealing to 
audiences, including the middle class. It would, however, also be precisely this 
discrepancy between cinematic and actual world that Chaplin’s ‘sentimental turn’ 
would redress. If realism served as an index of ‘seriousness’ for genteel audiences, 
                                                
4 While the flâneur has traditionally been discussed in terms of the urban space he/she surveys and 
takes enjoyment in, it is the Tramp figure, epitomized by Chaplin but also invoked by such novels as 
Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and London, that nuances the concept to incorporate both urban and 
rural locations while maintaining its emphasis on indeterminate observation and social alterity. See 
Benjamin’s celebrated account of Baudelaire’s original concept in Walter Benjamin, Charles 
Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, Harry Zohn (trans.), London: Verso, 1983. 
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what we would now best describe as the ‘cartoon-like’ elements of Chaplin’s early 
cinema consigned him to the low rank of vaudevillian, trading above all in an 
aesthetic of comic spectacle. Chaplin’s augmentation of pathos and romance in his 
films widened the terms of identification, or in Murray Smith’s terms, character 
‘engagement’.5 Such a transition arguably forged correspondences between his films 
and the requirements of a more ‘genteel’ middle-class audience that was similarly 
won over to the cinema through the latter’s appropriation of the ‘legitimate’ theatre’s 
classical narrative. Charles Maland similarly finds in his detailed study of Chaplin’s 
career and varied reception that the ‘refining’ of ‘The Tramp’ from the amoral 
slapstick outlaw to the pathos-driven romantic lead was a matter of maximising 
audiences. This was achieved by accommodating the tastes of middle-class 
constituencies that were feared to be excluded by the Keystone films. Maland shows 
therefore that it is the pathetic romance that becomes central to most of these later 
shorts and subsequent feature films. Acknowledging Chaplin’s awareness and 
appeasement of the ‘Genteel Tradition’ outlined by Santayana, Maland argues that 
such themes of unrequited love and the virtuous do-gooder spurned by the world 
come to invoke morally ‘serious’ connotations: 
Although in later films Chaplin handles his romantic 
relationships and pathos more effectively, it is important to 
reiterate here that Chaplin’s romances increased his appeal to 
men who had been rejected in love because of inadequate wealth, 
prestige or power; to women who admired his tender and 
nurturing spirit; and to viewers with genteel sensibilities for 
whom the romance helped to ‘negate’ the vulgarity that worried 
them.6 
                                                
5 Smith’s formulation nuances the much used concept of identification by both focusing on that which 
Christian Metz would refer to as ‘secondary identification’ (in The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis 
and Cinema, trans. Ben Brewster, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 89-98), and underlining 
the importance of distinctions between a spectator’s ‘alignment’ with onscreen characters and a more 
moral ‘allegiance’ with them. See Murray Smith, Engaging Characters, Fiction, Emotion and the 
Cinema, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 73-109. 
 
6 Maland, Chaplin and American Culture, p. 23. Maland reveals that Chaplin, earning ever more 
directorial control of his films, nervously asked the writer Charles McGuirk what he thought of The 
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It would appear, in fact, that Chaplin’s shift in emphasis echoes, rather than abandons, 
the vaudeville tradition, which was far more eclectic in its repertoire than knockabout 
comedy alone, both within and between acts. Associations with an exclusively lower-
class audience were constantly rectified by vaudeville managers through the 
employment of stars and adaptation of shows from the ‘legitimate’ theatre of classical 
drama. Henry Jenkins, for instance, provides a valuable account of how the 
sentimental operated alongside, rather than antithetically to, slapstick comedy in his 
discussion of early 20th century vaudeville theatre.7 While vaudeville is celebrated for 
the great comedians of cinema that learned their craft in the chaotic atmosphere of the 
variety circuit  (including of course Chaplin, not to mention Buster Keaton, Harold 
Lloyd and Stan Laurel), Jenkins charts the period (between roughly 1907-1912) that 
saw the inclusion of ‘dramatic sketches’ or ‘playlets’ within the already highly varied 
billings. With employment of actors that had been working on the ‘legitimate stage’ to 
perform the non-comic scenes to which they were accustomed, Jenkins discusses how 
such inclusions on the vaudeville roster constituted both deliberate attempts at 
courting higher-class credentials while nevertheless remaining entertaining to the 
lower-class audiences of variety, melodrama or music-hall.  
 
Equally pertinent to the binary of the 'well-made play’ versus popular affect (or high 
versus low tastes) however was the extent to which such sketches were subject to 
‘compression and intensification’ in order to fit the time-slots allocated to them. 
                                                                                                                                       
Tramp, admitting to having taken ‘an awful chance’ by incorporating a romantic plot for the first time, 
(Chaplin and American Culture, p. 23). 
 
7 Henry Jenkins, What Made Pistachio Nuts: Early Sound Comedy and the Vaudeville Aesthetic, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 81-5. 
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While such dramas may largely have been drawn from the ‘realist’ theatre, Jenkins 
shows how modifications would serve to create a ‘series of emotionally intensified 
“moments” of drama’ as opposed to the subtle, well-timed narrative sequencing of 
more naturalistic versions. With the criteria for well-developed or ‘rounded’ 
characters a lesser priority, Jenkins continues that ‘emphasis was placed’ instead 
‘upon the performer’s ability to move an audience toward an outward display of 
emotion, not toward the more thoughtful or contemplative reaction promoted by the 
legitimate theatre.’ His analysis shows, therefore, that despite the intermittent 
suspension of realism or naturalism in such vaudeville playlets, their underlying 
pathos and drama continued to be as ‘popular’ in the 20th century music hall as it was 
at the time of sentimental comedy or 19th century melodrama. Indeed, studies such 
Bordwell, Staiger and Thompsons’s monumental work, The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema, discuss the ‘playlet’ as a direct influence on precursors to the first full-length 
narrative cinematic features, many of which had to similarly compress long novels or 
plays to fit the duration of standard features (perhaps most famously, Porter’s 1903 
version of Uncle Tom’s Cabin).8 Despite modifications between low and high 
theatres, easy distinctions between vaudeville as ‘low affect’ and the legitimate 
theatre as detached thought become flawed, for at root, sentimentality was common to 
both aesthetic spheres. The tastes of a hypothetical middle-class, ‘genteel’ audience 
could not have been as monolithic as presumed, for even the ‘legit’ theatre itself was 
largely a sphere of sentimental affect, save for the more radically modernist plays of 
such innovators as Shaw, Chekhov or Ibsen, for whom naively sentimental schemes 
                                                
8David Bordwell, Janet Staiger & Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 159-61. 
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such as the romance narrative were actively excluded.9 By the standards of the 
legitimate theatre, the possible persistence of vulgarity in vaudeville was thus 
signified not by affect per se, but by the latter’s ‘intensification’ and presumed 
divorce from naturalist standards of verisimilitude, as applicable to comedy as much 
as to pathos.  
 
However, such aesthetic distinctions did not always coincide with moral ones. Maland 
provides evidence for certain moral constituencies within a broadly middle class 
milieu, centred especially around church and other civic institutions, for whom the 
pre-classical cinema displayed vulgarity and immorality, yet such objections had 
more to do with content and conditions of consumption than with form.10 Intense 
affect was fine, indeed desirable, as long as the moral message (or sentiment) was 
appropriate. This is borne out by more recent studies that account for clear 
developments in the moral tenor of cinematic productions from the earliest cinematic 
era, 1906-7 to a pre-classical or classical period starting in the early 1910s. Tom 
Gunning shows, for instance, how the film industry took such protests seriously and 
itself set up a censorship board charged with validating the morality of new 
productions, as a means of accommodating such charges.11 Motivated, of course, by 
business interests and the fear of offending middle-class audiences, the film industry’s 
efforts to refine its product were both PR exercise and textual reality, and as Gunning 
                                                
9 See for instance Shaw’s introduction to Pygmalion, which comments on the play's reception by some 
audiences as a sentimental romance when he intended it to be nothing of the kind. 
 
10 See Lee Greiveson’s account of the censorship of early American cinema in terms of both text and 
context in Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early Twentieth Century America, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004. 
 
11 Tom Gunning, ‘From the Opium Den to the Theatre of Morality: Moral discourse and the Film 
Process in Early American Cinema,’ in The Silent Cinema Reader, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 145-
54.  
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shows, can be verified by key contrasts in films produced within as little as six years 
of each other. His main example illustrates the contrast between a 1906 film that 
unashamedly showed the enjoyments of an ‘Opium Den’ to a later film about the 
reform of an alcoholic father for the sake of his family, demonstrating a discernible 
change in moral attitude with regards to the issue of adult drug-use. Others have 
written on how similar social pressures contributed to the demise of the original 
nickelodeons and the rise of the movie theatre and the eventual ‘Picture Palace’. The 
latter’s emulation of the more highly regarded theatre is commonly explained as the 
forging of a more cultivated image for ‘cinema’ than that represented by the 
nickelodeon and its predominantly working class, immigrant audiences; the 
curtailment of what was deemed sleaziness, rowdy behaviour and sexual license could 
was both onscreen and off-screen endeavour.12  If the period spanning 1908-9 
constituted therefore for American cinema, as Gunning claims, a ‘conscious 
movement into a realm of moral discourse’13, the moral tensions signified by such a 
shift would have been well established by 1913-14, when Chaplin had just taken on 
directorial control of his films for the first time. The courting of ‘high’ critical tastes 
becomes, then, a means of increasing audience attendance and maximising an already 
lucrative business in a fast-changing industry. Moreover, as Chaplin suspected early 
on, sentimental pathos (related to, but not an exclusive attribute of, the ‘legit’ theatre) 
could enhance one’s own artistic credentials, as it was approved by bourgeois tastes in 
a way that slapstick, circus acts and mime were less so.14 
                                                
12 See Russell Merritt, ‘Nickelodeon Theaters, 1905-1914: Building an Audience for the Movies,’ in 
The American Film Industry, Tino Balio (ed.), Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976, 83-102.   
 
13 Gunning, ‘From the Opium Den’, p. 146. 
 
14 Chaplin’s gamble with pathos can also be understood as a shift in the direction of what has been 
termed the ‘classical Hollywood cinema’ as it crystallized in the mid 1910s. In place of the trick films, 
chase-films, curiosities and other shorts that made up the ‘cinema of attractions’ (and its theatrical 
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However, it is crucial to reiterate the difficulties of equating Chaplin’s deployment of 
sentiment exclusively with middle-class standards of detached observation. His films 
became highly melodramatic and comical where once they were more predominantly 
comic, diversifying the already ‘intensified’ affect of its vaudeville underpinnings. If 
a sense of ‘moral legibility’ becomes more explicit, such elements may well have 
appealed more to ‘genteel’ sectors of society but cannot be discounted as any less 
popular with the ‘non-genteel,’ for whom the moral tone of melodrama was far from 
unfamiliar. The point was to maximise audiences. The Tramp’s failures or difficulties 
in winning the girl or succeeding at work speak of far more than the tragic misfortune 
of the hobo as a pitiable low-class figure, for the Tramp becomes a paradigm for all 
contemporary subjectivities, irrespective of class, race or gender. The vulnerability of 
the Tramp spoke to widespread anxieties and insecurities concerning physical 
deficiency, insufficient capital or underemployment precisely to the extent that all 
such problems had an impact on ‘getting the girl’ or merely surviving in modernity.15 
As opposed to the manly defiance of the Keystone slapstick, the newer shorts are far 
more emphatic as to the emotional and personal stakes of ‘losing’ in modern society. 
Even when the Tramp succeeds romantically at the film’s climax (such as in The 
Vagabond), his potential abandonment defines the stakes of the film’s overall 
narrative.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
cousin, vaudeville), longer films are produced (resulting in the standard feature length) and a set of 
editing techniques becomes established for a film practice that relies above all on continuities of 
narrative and character(see Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson, Classical Hollywood Cinema, note 10). 
 
15 While The Immigrant would convey the recent hardships and injustices of life for immigrants 
entering America, and The Bankalludes to class divisions between the ‘urban poor’ and the ‘idle rich’, 
Maland emphasises the difficulty with which one would discern a sustained politically progressive 
viewpoint or moral message from such films taken as a whole, (despite the ‘Progressivism’ of some of 
their themes). See Chaplin and American Culture, p. 29-30. 
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Connoting such loss amidst fantasies of freedom, subversion and escape from social 
convention, the Tramp thus articulates both the desirable and problematic elements of 
American petty bourgeois identity, not least in terms of the emotional and bodily 
constraints that such an ideology imposes on the subject. When the Tramp meets Edna 
Purviance on board the sea-swept ship bound for New York in The Immigrant, taking 
her hand and offering her his seat with a courteous gesture of love-at-first-sight 
goodwill, he can’t help but look at his hand to see if her dirty hand has left a residue 
on his, deflating the romance of the moment with comic effect. Likewise as he leaves 
the ship’s galley, smiling back at his new love interest, a barely concealed belch once 
again undermines his ability to remain within the ideal scheme of bourgeois romance. 
Tom Gunning writes on this aspect of Chaplin’s persona in such films as The 
Pawnshop (1916, Mutual), where a poor old man’s story of woe provokes such 
sympathetic tears on the Tramp’s part that he begins to spit out the crackers he was 
eating. Archetypal scenes of sympathy or bourgeois romance embodying established 
sentimental ideals of pity or love are thereby expressly undermined by the other 
consequences attendant on the Tramp’s inability to control his body.16 Other 
subversions of sentiment of this kind abound in Chaplin’s corpus, such as the scene in 
The Idle Class (1921, First National) that sees a rich drunkard of a husband learning 
that his wife abandoned him owing to his continued drinking and neglect of her. With 
his back facing camera and shaking from apparent sobs, he turns back to camera to 
reveal his movements to have been the effort to merely shake a cocktail, his face 
comically unmoved by the news. Gunning concludes thus that Chaplin’s subversion 
of sentiment is closely bound up with what he terms a ‘body of modernity’ that is 
explicitly fuelled by the puncturing of the sentimental as a monolithically ‘genteel’ 
                                                
16 See Tom Gunning, ‘Chaplin and the Body of Modernity’, Early Popular Visual Culture, Vol. 8, No. 
3, (2010), pp. 239-40. 
 
 
 
194 
ideology. Lest the romance or the scene of sentiment be taken at face-value, Chaplin 
self-consciously stages a challenge to these set-pieces through the foibles, neuroses 
and indelicacies revealed by the body.  
 
 
Cool Chaplin 
Although never dispensing with his trademark physical comedy, Chaplin’s 
‘sentimental’ turn did prove questionable for certain modernist or radical voices of 
that era, for whom Chaplin’s alignment with the dynamism of slapstick still proved 
his most radical and progressive of attributes. Nevertheless, as examined in the 
previous chapter, the extent to which such modernist values were necessarily 
dismissive of a humanistic or sentimental tradition is highly debatable given the wide 
variance in critical response to such a figure as Chaplin throughout the ‘high-
modernist’ period, both between radical writers and within the body of work of 
certain critics. For instance, Siegfried Kracauer’s responses to Chaplin and slapstick 
ranges from an early modernism informed by a left-fordist opposition to American 
capitalism and mass culture and later hermeneutic analyses of the ‘mass ornament’ 
embodied by the Tiller Girls, urban movie-going and indeed Chaplin.17 In a 1926 
review, Kracauer regards slapstick as a redemptive subversion of an American-led 
industrial, capitalist order, commenting: 
One has to hand this to the Americans: with slapstick films they 
have created a form that offers a counterweight to their reality: if 
in that reality they subject the world to an often unbearable 
discipline, the film in turn dismantles this self-imposed order 
quite forcefully.18 
                                                
17 See Siegfried Kracauer, Thomas Y. Levin (trans.), The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
 
18Frankfurter Zeitung, 29th Jan, 1926, cited in Miriam Hansen, ‘ “With Skin and Hair”: Kracauer’s 
Theory of Film, Marseille 1940,’ Critical Inquiry, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 437-469. 
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If the above already isolates particular aspects of American culture that signify an 
emancipatory spirit that undermines an overwhelming system of oppression, Kracauer 
is here unspecific as to the chief affect associated with this process of ‘dismantling’, 
the latter term perhaps still most suggestive of slapstick’s violent disruption of order 
(that Henry Jenkins aligns with a sensibility of the ‘anarchistic’19). In a 1931 piece on 
Chaplin, however, Kracauer expands upon the full import of Chaplin’s affective 
power as one that depends on more than his ‘gags’ alone. In a review of City Lights 
(1931, United Artists), he writes that:  
Chaplin, a storyteller of the Dickens school, knows very well how 
gags and harmless clowning have to be used to reduce narrative 
tension, and uses them willingly. But then he always plunges 
again into that abyss where the Comic originates, and lays it 
bare.20 
 
Chaplin’s work is celebrated as an exemplar of the modern subject’s encounter with 
the ‘abyss’, with the sentimental climax of City Lights providing the ‘most resonant’ 
of moments. Situated as the chief source of ‘narrative tension’, the melodrama of this 
sequence is privileged aesthetically over comic relief, and its sentiment becomes 
equated with the full disclosure of the film’s socio-political meaning; Chaplin’s 
‘display of facial expressions’ in this sequence is now situated as ‘among the most 
shattering achievements of his art.’ If the ‘clowning’ of slapstick has now become a 
‘harmless’ formal device, it may no longer serve such radical purposes unless 
                                                                                                                                       
 
19 Jenkins, What Made Pistachio Nuts, 6-25. A key theoretical text in such regards is Mikhail 
Bahkthin’s delineation of grotesque comedy as a violent, carnivaleqsue inversion of bourgeois values 
in Rabelais and His World, (1941)Hélène Iswolsky (trans.), Reprinted Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1993. 
 
20 Siegfried Kracauer; John MacKay (trans.), ‘Two Chaplin Sketches,’ Yale Journal of Criticism,Vol. 
10, no. 1 (1997), p. 117. 
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complemented by the more legible signifiers of oppression and struggle exemplified 
in the pathos of Chaplin’s face at the climax of City Lights. In such respects, 
Dickensian sentimentality, now deployed by Chaplin, once again seems far from 
antithetical to the transformative ideals of modernist theory.  
 
This is not to deny that other critics such as Gilbert Seldes still inhabited a certain 
perspective in film criticism of that era that understood comedy (slapstick in 
particular) as the most critically innovative of genres for the cinema’s particular 
capacities, rather than ‘drama’. Before aligning this thinking immediately with a 
European, particularly French, praise for the anarchic ‘Charlot’, it is also important to 
consider the popularity of what Henry Jenkins describes as the ‘New Humor’ taking 
place in America itself. While Santayana and other literary naturalists had condemned 
the overly feminized aesthetic of the earlier century’s ‘genteel’ literature, a related 
vein of thinking deemed comedy as potent a force of aesthetic disruption of the 
‘Genteel Tradition’ as the more formally modernist works of Conrad, Dreiser or 
Joyce. Both more accessible to mass audiences than the anti-realist novel or symbolist 
poetry, the comic promised to re-orient the subject once again in terms of the 
enhanced ‘affective immediacy’ outlined above. For Jenkins, a fundamental conflict 
could be traced between the ‘New Humor’ of gags, intense laughter and bodily shock 
(vaudeville, slapstick cinema) and a ‘thoughtful’ comedy of kindly humour and moral 
sentiments (theatrical comedy), which he accounts for in terms of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
sociological theory: 
The working class of the country’s expanding cities, for whom 
entertainment dollars were scarce and leisure time limited, placed a 
greater emphasis upon the “use-value” of cultural experience, upon 
the amount of pleasure received per expenditure. The aesthetic 
choices of the working class, Bourdieu argues, often reflect a 
desire for “maximum ‘effect’…at minimum cost, a formula which 
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for bourgeois taste is the very definition of vulgarity.”  Hunger for 
immediate gratification and intense stimulation grows from an 
insistence on the ultimate return on one’s investment and a need 
for an immediate, though short-lived, release from the rigors of 
one’s environment.21 
 
If slapstick was structurally aligned therefore with the tastes of a ‘working class’ 
audience that hadn’t the income nor the emotional aptitude for sentimental comedy 
owing to oppressive environmental and monetary conditions, what emerges is a mass 
audience whose tastes in comedy and much else would be divided along class lines. 
This division alone would no doubt contribute to how writers such as Seldes might 
have felt with regards to the ‘lower’ entertainments when he writes of the 
‘remorseless hostility of the genteel’ that was threatening to ‘corrupt the purity of 
slap-stick.’ While no doubt enamoured by its ‘driving energy’ and the fact that it was 
‘funny,’ there is also the undoubted disdain of the ‘elite’ intellectual for the 
hypocrisies of his own class and the latter’s policing of the ‘vulgar.’ If such a taste 
hierarchy undermined the ‘drama’ and its ‘good sentiments’ by aligning the latter 
aesthetic with middle-class hypocrisy and ideological self-validation, the only choice 
for this bourgeois intellectual becomes the polemical siding with the oppressed 
classes in terms of cultural taste.  
 
Going back to some of the definitions for sentiment discussed in prior chapters, what 
might seem at issue here are questions concerning how beliefs concerning the heroes 
of sentimental narrative influence their emotional claims on the spectator. A chief 
question that Chaplin always seems to invoke in this regard concerns the extent to 
which his tramp is willing to countenance the troubles he or she encounters. If, as 
                                                
21 Henry Jenkins, What Made Pistachio Nuts, p. 45. 
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Richard Steele argued in the 18th century, it is ‘through no fault of his own’ that 
misfortune must befall the sentimental hero, with pathos invoked most forcefully with 
the perception of an unwilling victim of circumstance, then the Tramp becomes a 
highly ambiguous instance of ‘virtue in distress’. In as much as Chaplin’s films give 
us grounds for seeing the Tramp as partially complicit with his lot, as desiring his 
social annexation as much as having it foisted upon him, a specifically sentimental 
reception of him becomes an issue of critical belief. When the Tramp is abandoned at 
the end of The Tramp, could his plucky gesture of resolve not instead be interpreted as 
the jouissance of renewed freedom for one that was perhaps better off anyway? The 
bodily gesture as he walks away from camera could be deemed a renewal of energy 
that visibly courses through the Tramp’s entire body as much as a stoical ‘picking 
oneself up after a knock’. Where the latter concerns a pitiable subject re-enlivened by 
brave thoughts (‘things aren’t too bad’, ‘maybe its for the best,’ I’ll live to fight 
another day’), the former gives greater prominence to the body itself, relieved of 
fetters and stress, re-energized without the intervention of bourgeois ideology.22 
Despite the ambiguity concerning the Tramp’s victimization, slapstick must have 
seemed to certain critics more explicitly irreverent and radical through its more 
comprehensive expunging of ‘feminizing’ pathos. In order to be radical, the Tramp 
had to be the irreverent and virile anarchist of the slapstick film, not the pathetic 
underdog that may or may not have been more accepting of his lot in the later films.  
 
Not for all modernist critics however; for it was those films of Chaplin’s oeuvre that 
were perhaps the most sentimental and reluctantly resigned in their acceptance of 
oppressive ideology that proved for other critics to be the most inspirational. If we 
                                                
22 Charles Musser also discusses this aspect of Chaplin’s persona, discussed below. 
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recall the comments of Béla Balázs, it is the extent to which the ‘melancholy 
optimism’ of the Tramp ‘expresses the opposition of all of us to an inhuman order of 
society’ that Chaplin’s rhetoric was deemed to succeed. The issue becomes not how 
Chaplin could be read as embodying a heroic, virile defiance of the repressive status 
quo but how the pathetic, vulnerable and ‘sentimental’ Tramp inspired a spectatorship 
that deemed him ‘revolutionary’ specifically for such attributes, not least in the eyes 
of that era’s modernists and even Marxists. In such respects  a ‘genteel’ middle-class 
spectatorship was far from mutually exclusive with politically radical voices of the 
era, for Chaplin’s sentimental turn could be deemed both ‘artistic’ by classical 
standards and ‘radical’ in more modernist terms.  
 
When we turn to the reception of Chaplin in the Germany of the 1920s, we find a 
Chaplin that was celebrated by left-liberal intellectuals from a middle-class that 
Chaplin had as yet failed to successfully attract through slapstick or sentiment. Joseph 
Garncarz, for instance, has shown how Chaplin’s films did not poll so highly during 
this decade in Germany, and concludes that while popular with working-class 
audiences, ‘the middle class did not like him.’23 Intellectuals that celebrated Chaplin 
therefore had less reason to isolate aesthetic superiority in a specific corpus of 
Chaplin films, unlike Seldes, for whom slapstick was applauded above all for 
embodying a working-class or popular voice. Thus much of the writing of such 
figures as Benjamin and Balázs (and Kracauer) is more immediately attuned to the 
pathetic elements of Chaplin’s persona without condemnation of them as regressively 
sentimental. Balázs writes that Chaplin’s creation:  
is not the revolutionary image of the exploited factory worker or 
                                                
23 Joseph Garncarz, ‘Films that are applauded all over the world: Questioning Chaplin’s Popularity in 
Weimar Germany’, Early Popular Visual Culture, Vol. 8, No. 3, (2010), pp. 291-92. 
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agricultural labourer, but that of a 'Lumpen-proletarian who defends 
himself with charming cunning against the heartlessness of the rich 
and revenges himself by petty means.24 
 
As such, Chaplin is understood and applauded far more as a sympathetic figure that 
can only counter his oppression by ‘petty means’, rather than as the rogue that takes 
down the bourgeoisie in a more effective, revolutionary fashion. What might be lost 
by accepting Chaplin as a figure of pathos (in terms of his not embodying the soldier-
like role model for revolutionary action) is recuperated in the cultural work of such a 
figure, specifically as a figure of moral sympathy. Walter Benjamin was enthused by 
the ‘laughter’ that such a figure as the Tramp could evoke in an international 
audience, commenting in 1929 that ‘Chaplin has directed himself toward both the 
most international and most revolutionary affect of the masses—laughter’.25 
However, if Benjamin perceived the humour of Chaplin’s work as its redemptive 
force, such humour is indistinguishable from Benjamin’s recognition of its function in 
relation to the sad and disturbing facts of capitalist oppression. Thus when he writes 
of the ‘American farce’ as an exemplar of an internationalist ‘collective’ cinema, 
laughter takes on a portentous rather than escapist function.  
Such a film is comical, after all, only in that the laughter it 
inspires hovers over the abyss of horror. The reverse of a 
ridiculously unrestrained technique is the mortal precision of a 
fleet of naval vessels on manoeuvre, relentlessly captured in 
Potemkin.26 
 
                                                
24 Béla Balázs, Theory of Film, trans. Edith Bone, London: Dennis Dobson, 1952, p. 55. 
 
25 Rudolph Arnheim, Walter Benjamin, and John Mackay (trans), ‘Walter Benjamin and Rudolph 
Arnheim on Charlie Chaplin,’ The Yale Journal of Criticism, Vol. 9, no. 2 (1996), p. 311.   
 
26 Walter Benjamin, ‘A Discussion of Russian Filmic Art and Collectivist Art in General,’ in Weimar 
Republic Sourcebook, Martin Jay, Anton Kaes, & Edward Dimendberg (ed.), Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995, p. 626-7. 
  
 
 
201 
Where the ‘New Humor’ seems in Seldes’ view to promise a different form of 
sociality that supersedes genteel decorum and ossified Victorian values altogether, 
Benjamin leaves one with the sense of laughter as ironic counterpoint to the ‘abyss of 
horror.’ As a therapeutic desensitization to the traumas of modernity signified on the 
body of the Tramp, Chaplin’s cinema becomes necessarily driven by the imperative of 
representing the possibility of subjectivity in an unjust society. Echoing Kracauer 
above, it is the ‘abyss’ that must be acknowledged as the chief emotional catalyst of 
humour, slapstick or otherwise, wherein the spectacle of human suffering remains the 
vital currency. Even for a Benjamin exhilarated by technology and a Brechtian form 
of critical spectatorship, Chaplin’s sympathetic figure still serves radical purposes, or 
indeed, effectively embodies them. In a review of Chaplin’s The Circus (1928, United 
Artists), Benjamin saves his skepticism for Chaplin’s plans of making films on 
‘Napoleon’ and ‘Christ’, deeming them ‘giant screens behind which the great artist is 
hiding his weariness.’27 While the Chaplin of 1929, suffering from creative blockage 
or excessive compromise with the film industry, is criticized by Benjamin for turning 
his hands to the epic rendering of grand, historical or religious figures (a genre 
identified and condemned here for its implicit recourse to reverential biography, 
further discussed in relation to Chaplin below), Benjamin privileges Chaplin’s earlier 
corpus (slapstick and sentiment combined) as Chaplin at his most unrestrained and 
radical. 
 
Perceptions of the Tramp as a ‘radical’ persona rested on more therefore than his 
inhabiting a working-class subjectivity or posing a virile challenge to bourgeois 
respectability. If the ‘refining’ of Chaplin introduced the Tramp’s desires for upward 
                                                
27 Benjamin, ‘on Charlie Chaplin,’, p. 311. 
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mobility, romantic love and social belonging, it also revealed their emotional stakes, 
and intensified the critical stakes of his outcast status by ‘humanizing’ him. Before 
class, gender or political persuasion, the Tramp was human, fallible and vulnerable. 
Seldes’ implicit binary of masculine/working-class/popular/aggressive/subversive 
versus the genteel/feminine/middle-class/disingenuous comes radically unstuck in the 
light of these other critiques and no doubt explains his preferences for the Keystone 
slapstick that for him more forthrightly pitted the former against the latter. Yet if the 
binaristic logic of such a rubric may be considered a somewhat vulgarized 
appropriation of a modernism that is rather less dismissive of Dickensian or 
Chaplineqsue humanism, it still informs subsequent perceptions of Chaplin’s persona 
as regressively ‘sentimental’, especially when compared to Buster Keaton.  
 
 
 
A Re-Victorianized Chaplin 
Since such praise from left-wing intellectuals of the Weimar period, one might argue 
that Chaplin’s reputation soured in the aftermath of the high-modernist moment 
documented in the last section. If Chaplin seemed a ‘cool’ exponent of the Jazz age, 
urban modernity and even the ‘New Objectivity’28, such a reputation itself has been 
tempered by reappraisal and reconfigurations of Chaplin’s classicism and melodrama, 
and often once again reconceived as anachronisms of a Victorian past, not just that of 
a bygone silent era. The same modernist calls for formal innovation and medium 
                                                
28 The New Objectivity was a movement across the arts in Weimar Germany (Neue Sachlichkeit) that 
worked against what were deemed sentimental, expressionistic or romanticized approaches to music, 
architecture and painting etc, praising instead such attributes as functionality, simplicity and 
mathematical precision. See Janet Ward,Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Culture in 1920s Germany, 
London: University of California Press, 2001. 
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reflexivity found auteur heroes from Brecht to Godard to Sirk, and in the case of 
silent film comedy itself, in Buster Keaton. Chaplin’s sympathetic protagonist of 
classical cinema gives way to Keaton’s ‘deadpan’ modernist. While certainly not 
championing the latter’s work over the former’s, Tom Gunning compares Chaplin’s 
and Keaton’s comedy by commenting that whereas ‘Chaplin used film to create a 
startling intimacy with his audience, allowing them insight into his most private 
moments of romantic longing and disappointment (as in the final sequence of City 
Lights), Keaton's relation to the audience remained distanced.’ Keaton’s physiognomy 
becomes in Gunning’s view bound up with a numbed acquiescence to, and 
accommodation of, modernity’s traumas (‘mechanical reproduction’) as opposed to 
Chaplin’s indignant or panicked opposition. Thus: 
If Chaplin's reaction to industrial production was one of Luddite 
destruction or anarchic hysteria, Keaton tried constantly to adjust 
his body to the new demands of systematic environments. These 
adjustments unmasked the absurdity of the system itself, its 
anxiety-causing, infantilizing power.29 
 
If Gunning accounts for Keaton’s impassivity as a radically different, though by no 
means superior, affect experienced in relation to modernity, he nevertheless adds how 
such an attitude appealed to certain ‘avant-garde’ sensibilities in a way that Chaplin 
did not. Reflecting the ‘nonconsciousness of the machine,’ Keaton’s response to 
technology, as ‘one of victimization and mastery of this inhumanely ordered 
environment’, paradoxically promised a better solution to man’s conflict with modern 
industry than Chaplin’s defiant hysteria. Keaton has also often won out as the 
modernist player with cinematic form compared to Chaplin, whose apparent ease with 
the conventions of melodrama are foregrounded as grounds for dismissal within a 
                                                
29 Tom Gunning, ‘Buster Keaton or the Work of Comedy in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, 
Cineaste, Vol.21, No. 3 (Summer 1995), p.14. 
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strictly formalist aesthetics. While such Keaton films as Sherlock Jr. (1924, Metro 
Pictures) may be deemed to subvert the ‘classical realism’ of Hollywood cinema, 
Chaplin is considered innovative only at the level of individual performance: his 
cinematic value is constrained by the allegedly uncritical reproduction of 
melodramatic conventions. 
 
However, such evaluative comparisons tend to overlook the ideological work of the 
films themselves (as a function of their socio-historic conditions) in favour of a facile 
categorization of the two comedians within separate aesthetic agendas, playing the 
modernist off against Victorian sentiment as a means of defining the terms of a new 
canon of cinematic modernism (that supersedes realism or melodrama). In such 
respects, as Henry Jenkins humorously notes, the classical canon of Chaplin, Griffith 
and Ford taught in the film class of the ‘liberal-humanist…Professor Oldman’ are 
superseded by the Keaton, Godard and Sirk films taught by the modernist ‘Professor 
Youngman’.30 Both rubrics, however, renew a binary of low art/high art, where the 
classical Chaplin becomes the sentimental storyteller, enforcing spectator sympathy at 
the expense of formal progressivism achieved through a more experimental, self-
reflexive or ironic aesthetics. Consigned now to the status of ‘eternal clown’ or 
apolitical ‘humanist’, Chaplin becomes either the Victorian anachronism or even 
worse, the universal sign that foreshadows an omnipresent, sentimental Hollywood 
culture that dominates the globe and inhibits alternative practices and subjectivities. 
Charles Musser indeed argues that the cultural work of Chaplin’s films needs to be 
recuperated as a socio-historical and political phenomenon, and critiques the Tramp’s 
                                                
30 See Henry Jenkins, "'This Fellow Keaton Seems to be the Whole Show”: The Interrupted 
Performance in Buster Keaton's Films,’ in Andrew Horton (ed.) Buster Keaton's Sherlock Junior, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 30-33. 
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mutation in a contemporary global image-culture to an icon of ‘vague humanism’ or 
‘philosophical’ everyman, his image having been subjected to an ‘ideological 
cleansing’ (his example is the use of Chaplin’s image in IBM commercials of the 
1980s). Musser claims that such iconography fails to acknowledge or find interest in 
Chaplin’s contributions to debates concerning issues of class, poverty and the work 
ethic that beset early 20th century America and that, for Musser, resonate to this day. 
Like many critics during Chaplin’s own time, Musser redeems Chaplin’s Tramp as a 
historical figure of both pathos and alternative subjectivity amidst Fordist and 
Taylorist standardization and the concomitant undermining of working-class rights. 
While rarely specifically political, Chaplin’s films return as ‘social comedies’ that 
reflect the issues of class, gender and privilege in their own historical moment, not 
least in terms of the Great Depression that exacerbated the inequities of American 
society.31 
 
Musser’s argument concerning Chaplin’s ‘sentimentalized’ status in contemporary 
culture identifies once again some rather old alignments between the Tramp and a 
reductive symbolic humanism. A correct critical response rests for Musser not on 
wholesale dismissal (as intimated by preferences for Keaton) of Chaplin as an 
intrinsically apolitical icon of modern commodity culture but on a historical 
resituating of the Tramp as a figure of urban modernity, industrialization, poverty and 
inequality. I would add furthermore that the Tramp’s reappearance in modern 
consumer culture then takes on an expanded valence, beyond ‘ideological cleansing’, 
pointing to important cultural continuities between then and now in terms of global 
                                                
31 Musser, underlining the extent to which Chaplin’s films functioned as significant engagements with 
social reality, situates the Tramp in terms of his accurate resemblance to real-life counterparts in early 
20th century society, despite the latter becoming more casual in dress as the century progressed. 
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image culture. For while a cultural memory of Chaplin may be invoked as a merely 
comic and congenial persona that gives a ‘human’ face to an impersonal corporation 
(much like Mickey Mouse or Ronald Macdonald), such deployments might also 
accord with the original imperatives of the sentimental tradition. The IBM ads 
foreground once again the bumbling, incompetent yet human individual’s struggle 
with the world, shown now to be dominated not by cinema or even television but by 
corporate culture’s indeterminate array of screens, moving images and cross-
marketed, synergized commodities.  
 
In most of these commercials, we see the Tramp (still dressed as such) struggling with 
the heavy workload of a modern office worker, overwhelmed by an absurdly high 
volume of paper documents in the inbox that requires processing. To all such 
problems, the PC is posed as an ideal solution that transforms the Tramp, as always 
stressed out by a modern work culture, into a productive, happy worker that is able to 
achieve his goals. If sentimentality has always functioned ideologically, it does so 
here once again not only as ‘false consciousness’ but as a moral language of 
continued struggle and subjective atomization--a legacy of modernity ostensibly now 
brought to an end by the personal computer. Chaplin finally masters the work 
environment with a computer that now allows him to avert the nervous breakdown he 
incurs in the first 15 minutes of Modern Times (1936, United Artists, which was 
explicitly referenced in these ads32), yet the PC is not the solution but the latest 
solution to a rather more intractable set of problems invoked by the Tramp and his 
continued struggles with labour, capital and his own ‘body of modernity.’ As if to 
                                                
32 Available for viewing online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LR1Xvvch18&feature=related 
and  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rtE-pnwVbOo&feature=related, accessed on 5th July 2010. 
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bear this out, Youtube.com now also brings us one of the IBM ads that was not 
permitted to be aired on national television, owing to its depiction of a corporate CEO 
(the Tramp’s boss) as one of the hulking, large-moustached men that Chaplin would 
have hilariously hoodwinked and defeated in his Keystone shorts, a framing of 
corporate authority that was clearly found to be problematic for corporate culture.33 
We might complain here that this ad’s exclusion from the airwaves derives exactly 
from the power of capital to ‘sanitize’ sentimental rhetoric of a subversive edge, 
ensuring that the modern corporation is depicted within a more productive and 
cooperative frame and less in terms of the weakly dominated and the aggressively 
dominant. Such a claim indeed is highly valid in terms of ‘ideological cleansing’, yet I 
would argue that it need not therefore dampen the sense to which the presence of the 
Tramp himself serves also as a sign for a continued historical conflict between labour 
and capital. Moreover, while the ads neutralize the discontent and madness with 
which the protagonist of Modern Times is left after his encounter with modern 
industrial machinery, there remains a sense to which the image of the Tramp sitting 
contentedly at a computer alongside fellow office workers rings hollow, or even 
invokes the uncanny in such a deployment of the silent era star. 
 
I would argue therefore that such appropriations of Chaplin’s legacy do rather more 
than dampen the Tramp’s significance, for they reveal precisely the extent to which 
capitalist modernity constitutes a still active historical problem. Moreover, it takes 
only one more interpretative step to see cinema itself signified in such ads, 
represented by Chaplin and now struggling like him to come to terms with these new 
screens that threaten the worker with obsolescence as technology creates more 
                                                
33 Available for viewing online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJrpYZGjd4g, accessed on 5th 
July 2010. 
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versatile forms of capital. In such respects, it is Hollywood that finds itself on the 
back heel as it were, competing with many more moving-image technologies than at 
the time of Chaplin’s rise to fame, becoming as vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
market capitalism as its original hero and subject also to similar identity confusions. It 
should not be surprising therefore that Chaplin, and many Chaplin clones, are returned 
to time and again in the contemporary moment by a Hollywood that has had to 
continually promote itself through continuous reinvention and repurposing of a 
melodramatic legacy. With Richard Attenborough’s Chaplin (1992), it was able to do 
so through an effective deployment of synecdoche, re-introducing the Tramp as a 
figure almost as old and certainly as iconic as itself. Embodying and re-validating 
cinema’s own historical and sentimental contributions, both the genre of biopic and 
Chaplin are canonized as experiences brought to us only by cinema. Where IBM 
delivers a series of comicbook slapstick set-pieces that ironically reveal the Tramp’s 
encounter with technology, cinema responds with a full, sentimental exposition of the 
man, the character, the career and the life. 
 
 
Chaplin: Tears of the Clown 
Chaplin effectively demonstrates a set of ideologies that coalesce to situate Chaplin as 
one of cinema’s first ‘men of feeling’ as it follows the conventions of the modern 
biopic. It is a sentimental treatment that nevertheless situates Chaplin’s life within the 
period of social and cinematic history discussed above for both pedagogical and 
reflexive purposes. Indeed, as if conscious of how such a ‘golden age’ of cinema has 
passed into an era of streamlined, corporatized image culture, the narrative 
nostalgically invokes a bygone cinema, for which Chaplin serve admirably as 
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synecdoche. As discussed above, the film both acknowledges its own act of 
sentimental memorializing of this possibly misremembered cinema while still 
indulging in such nostalgia, using Chaplin’s own acts of self-fashioning as a 
legitimating mirror for its own displays of self-appropriation. At both levels, the 
question of how to get remembered is foregrounded, facilitated of course by the 
biopic genre in its own right, and becomes a driving concern in relation to Chaplin 
and the cinemas of past and present that he stands in for. In such respects, a certain 
version of Chaplin’s work and life become the paradigm for Hollywood’s own self-
image of virtuous enterprise and humanistic endeavour. 
 
Within what Carolyn Anderson and John Lupo consider to remain in many respects 
the ‘deeply conservative’ genre of biopic,34 Chaplin’s life and work is worked through 
a melodramatic lens that ultimately affirms a status of cinematic legend, artistic 
genius and emotionally vulnerable clown. The film serves in the context of 1990s 
cinema to articulate a place and time in which cinema and America shared the same 
innocence and adventurism as those pioneers, in accordance with an aesthetic that has 
been described by Jim Collins as a ‘new sincerity’. In this aesthetic that avoids irony 
in favour of nostalgic reverentiality for the past, biopic emerges as a particularly 
suitable vehicle for sentiment. Films displaying ‘new sincerity’ are for Collins 
‘hyperconscious’ of the postmodern ‘array’ of images circulating in contemporary 
image culture, yet respond not through hybridization, allusion or irony but through a 
mode of address that nostalgically re-asserts a lost ‘authenticity,’ a place anterior to 
the world’s and cinema’s own commodification into images. Thus:  
                                                
34 Anderson & Lupo, ‘Hollywood Lives’, p. 96. 
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Rather than trying to master the array through ironic manipulation, 
these films attempt to reject it altogether, purposely evading the 
media-saturated terrain of the present in pursuit of an almost 
forgotten authenticity, attainable only through a sincerity that 
avoids any sort of irony or eclecticism.35 
 
Citing such films as Field of Dreams (1989, Dances with Wolves (1990) and Hook 
(1991), in each the recovery of a ‘never-never land of wish fulfilment’ symbolically 
redresses the problems of the present through the willed return to an imaginary and 
impossible past. Contemporary imperatives of cathartic redemption and ‘self-
actualization’ impose themselves on the re-writing of past ‘folk culture’, as 
represented by the idealisation of Native Americans, early baseball players or 
childhood itself. Through the ‘fetishizing of “belief” rather than irony as the only way 
to resolve conflict,’36 such texts posit ‘escape’ and ‘fantasy’ as parallel responses to 
the postmodern array of images and the ‘ironic mastery’ of them. I contend that this 
‘new sincerity’, as Collins coins it, might similarly be employed as a means of 
comprehending the treatment of Chaplin’s image as it circulates in the array addressed 
by Attenborough’s Chaplin. As a biopic, sincerity is connoted by a ‘conservative’ 
story structure that, for scholars like Lupo and Anderson, remains in the service of the 
‘subject’ and the latter’s ‘personal struggle’ for success. Highlighting such struggle as 
central to sentimentality, they continue their survey of the 1990s biopic by 
commenting that:  
Biopics continued to depend heavily on sentimentality. An 
ironic approach to the biographical enterprise or the 
biographical subject was rare and, even then, incomplete; 
however, more attention (proportionally) was directed towards 
conflicted, eccentric or irascible subjects. Overall, 1990s 
                                                
35 Jim Collins, ‘Genericity in the Nineties: Eclectic Irony and the New Sincerity,’ in Jim Collins, Hilary 
Radner and Ava Preacher Collins (eds.), Film Theory Goes to the Movies, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 
257. 
 
36 Ibid., p. 259. 
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biopics continued a psychological approach to storytelling, 
with personal struggle as the nodal dramatic action which 
incorporated a presumption of the US (and often the world) as 
a meritocracy.37 
 
In Chaplin, the protagonist’s story seems admirably to fit such a schema, starting 
from a childhood in the London slums and the emotionally volatile audiences of the 
music hall, to the status of mogul in a grandiose Hollywood that has come of age 
amidst huge financial successes. Yet with the film concerning itself with Hollywood 
cinema as much as with Chaplin’s role in it, the film’s at times cloying reverence 
needs to be examined precisely in terms of its self-reflexivity and awareness of the 
ideological conditions of its own reception. The sequence showing Chaplin’s creation 
of the Tramp discussed in this chapter’s introduction demonstrates the competing 
modes of address with which the contemporary biopic now accommodates a hip irony 
despite enduring conventions of character engagement that continues to attract 
contemporary spectators. If the sentimental ultimately wins out in that sequence, this 
and other scenes nevertheless reveal the contradictions with which the film itself 
struggles in order to enforce the biopic’s rhetoric of reverence in relation to Chaplin.  
 
A scene showing Chaplin’s triumphant arrival to his Los Angeles set, driven in a 
chauffeured Rolls Royce and wearing the clothes of a wealthy gentleman, is a case in 
point in terms of its excessive invocation of communal recognition of Chaplin’s 
achievement. With a cast and crew for the next production assembled dutifully and 
ceremoniously as the car arrives, their applause for Chaplin signifies the culmination 
of the film’s narrative to a highpoint of his success. With the attention of cameras (the 
press), a largely male crew (his employees) and a group of adoring women directed 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 92. 
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solely at him, the scene’s excessive adulation of course seems to undermine such 
grievances as might have been as evident in the working force of film production as 
of any other industry. Partially acknowledging such artifice, a dapperly dressed 
Chaplin reverts to the now well-known gestures of the Tramp as if to legitimate such 
applause by directing it at an image of a virtuous man of feeling as opposed to a 
newly ascendant film mogul. His Asian chauffeur, customarily bowing after Chaplin 
tips his hat at him, momentarily represents an identity of otherness that threatens to 
upstage Chaplin’s moment of uniqueness, prompting Chaplin to re-do his greeting, 
this time once again reverting to the Tramp but not reciprocating the chauffeur’s bow. 
While his initial greeting inserts Chaplin into an identity of the wealthy patriarch with 
colonialist connotations, performing the Tramp diffuses the evocation of any such 
hierarchy, and sustains an implicit ideology of unalloyed virtue rewarded. As 
Chaplin’s second gesture is met with laughter by the crowd, the now also laughing 
chauffeur recedes into the background, an ‘immigrant’ now educated as to the 
Tramp’s symbolic import and brought into line with everyone else.  
 
As an image of virtue transcending oppression and difference, even one’s own, one 
might say the Tramp not only therefore courts, but demands, universal legibility. 
Despite the chauffeur’s grounds for dissent in terms of both race and class, one might 
argue that Chaplin as universal icon of virtue ideologically neutralizes any claims to 
victimhood on the part of worker and immigrant. I would argue that the sentimentality 
of this scene is precisely dependent on such conflicts yet nevertheless indulges in its 
larger project of communal celebration of Chaplin and cinema as a means not of 
effacing them but of representing them, albeit in displaced form, through Chaplin 
himself. Chaplin’s negotiation with Hollywood history thus reveals the inherent 
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perversities of reconstruction and memory, whereby the Tramp is revealed as an 
instance of potent visual ideology that both symbolizes and effaces. If the sentimental 
focus on this man of feeling serves like the fetish to repress other claims to virtue 
rewarded, it is nevertheless excessively frank in its disclosure as to where such 
historical or political repressions have taken place at the textual level. In Chaplin, 
both Chaplin and cinema unite to address such conflicts in the spirit of humanistic 
virtue and liberalism that they stand for. 
 
Such juxtapositions reinforce the aims of the biopic of foregrounding a historical 
figure whose contributions reflected the needs of his or her time. In Chaplin, as with 
Attenborough’s other biopic of Gandhi (1982), the life of a great man is followed to 
the point not only of socio-political or cultural significance but most importantly to 
the point of his concordance with an identity as universal icon of ‘humanism’ 
recognized by many. To many critics, not least post-colonialist scholars, such a 
treatment undermined the necessity of retaining Gandhi as a historical figure of 
political struggle that responded to actual historical oppression.38 In both Ghandi and 
Chaplin, the veneration of these figures becomes legitimated by a sense of the moral 
contribution of these men to world affairs, be it in political or cultural terms. As icons 
of moral victory, however, their idealization necessarily shifts virtue, victimhood or 
struggle from historically locatable groups to their own mediatised images. In Ghandi, 
according to Shailja Sharma, the ‘saintly figure of Ghandi[…] becomes a signifier for 
the liberalism of Britain’s colonial policies, rather than for the strengths of India’s 
                                                
38 The film for instance was deemed to achieve objectives related to a ‘liberal, neocolonialist 
historiographic project’ in Shailja Sharma, ‘Citizens of the Empire: Revisionist History and the Social 
Imaginary in "Gandhi"’, Velvet Light Trap, Vol. 35 (Spring 1995), p.61. See also Salman Rushdie, 
‘Attenborough's Gandhi’ in Imaginary Homelands: essays and criticism 1981-1991, London: Granta in 
association with Penguin, 1991. 
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freedom movement’; Chaplin’s virtue and humanism likewise reflect the pioneering 
spirit, freedom and liberalism of Hollywood itself, effacing the film industry’s 
mutations and synergies with other media and reinforcing values of spirited virtue as a 
continuous attribute of Hollywood enterprise.  
 
With Chaplin’s successes shown to both correlate with and facilitate the fortunes of 
the film industry, the final scene showing Chaplin’s return to Hollywood for his 
tearful 1972 Oscar tribute thus invokes a pathos that resonates with contemporary 
perceptions of Hollywood’s fall from a ‘golden age’. Now an old man that has long 
lived in exile in Switzerland after being denied re-entry after McCarthy’s communist 
witch-hunts, a wheelchair-bound Chaplin becomes a clear identificatory symbol for a 
film industry that now competes with television and other communication 
technologies for what was once its sole audience to address. Thomas Elsaesser argues 
that  
In the biopics the code that ensures unity is ultimately congruent 
with one of the most naturalized paradigms of all: that of a Life. 
[…]The biopic is a genre of special interest if it can be understood 
as trying to inscribe the spectator as an individual (the classical 
subject-position of American cinema) and as a member of a 
collectivity, a civic audience (a more specific, historical mode of 
inscription) held together by the force of personality (in this case 
the authenticated historical individual represented by the performer 
as specialist of metamorphosis rather than the star who is always 
identical with himself.39 
 
Through the ideology of a ‘Life’ Chaplin tells the story not only of one of cinema’s 
great pioneers but also of itself, expressing sympathy and recognition of virtue in 
response to its own arguable decline as much as to that of Chaplin. Moreover, the 
film’s persistent mode of address is one that encompasses the audiences that Chaplin 
                                                
39 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Film History as Social History: The Dieterle/Warner Brothers Bio-pic’, Wide 
Angle,Vol.8, No. 2 (1986), pp. 30-31. 
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and cinema address, a fickle collective bound by differences of class, nationality and 
political persuasion yet one that is addressed most effectively in terms of a common 
‘humanity’. As the Oscars crowd cheer for Chaplin’s famous scenes during the 
tribute’s sequence of clips, Chaplin’s spectator is addressed most importantly as part 
of a cinema spectatorship for whom Chaplin (and more importantly, Hollywood) has 
provided a universal vernacular. By unifying individual and collective subjectivities 
within a rubric of sentimental nostalgia for a ‘golden age’ of Chaplin and Hollywood, 
the biopic here implores the spectator to recognize ‘virtue in distress,’ to right a 
wrong perpetrated by external malign forces. While the sequence begins with 
Chaplin’s best-known comic episodes (including The Circus and The Gold Rush 
[1925]), it follows through to two scenes from The Great Dictator (1940), implicitly 
underscoring Chaplin’s political allegiance with Western democracy and 
condemnation of the genocide of European Jews.  
 
However, the final clips are reserved for Chaplin at his most pathetic, the rescue scene 
from The Kid followed by the Tramp’s abandonment and famous walk away from 
camera at the end of The Tramp. As Chaplin now watches these scenes, tears fill his 
eyes as sympathy for his character and his own story finally coalesce through the 
cathartic process of cinematic spectatorship. While the Oscars seemed another 
demand on his time and energy on the part of a country and industry that had done 
little since his exile to deserve his return, it is the phenomenon of Hollywood cinema 
and its capacity to invoke self-integration that justifies itself amidst the still-present 
signifiers of hype, glitz and excess. The Tramp’s adjustment of gait and walk away 
from camera, severed from the preceding material of The Tramp that is not shown, 
may become the clichéd message of what Charles Musser translates as ‘c’est la vie’ or 
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‘easy come, easy go’,40 a take-home message of optimistic self-control when seen 
outside its narrative context. Yet Chaplin’s tearful reaction proves an investment of 
meaning in the sequence after all, as a direct reflection of his personal ‘life’ that 
Chaplin has also now delivered to the spectator. Only cinema itself is thus capable of 
such emotional orchestration, intensifying pathos with this final alignment of 
perspectives between the onscreen Chaplin, the elder Chaplin, the Oscar’s audience 
and, of course, the spectator of Chaplin. If this is ‘ideological cleansing’, it has 
arguably done its job, a nostalgic cinematic montage foregrounded as the only means 
of educating Chaplin himself, and us, as to his import. It is ultimately shown to be the 
collective cultural memory of Hollywood itself that redeems Chaplin’s dispirited elder 
self by serving in many ways as the most reliable biographer of all.  
 
Accentuating the ‘troubled artist’ through the hackneyed ‘tears of the clown’, Chaplin 
may well be filtered of the ‘laughter’ that Benjamin and others once claimed as 
Chaplin’s most ‘revolutionary affect’, yet the revelation of the man (mirroring the 
Tramp) as a ‘man of feeling’ becomes itself invested with historical and moral 
significance concerning the sentimental subject’s self-realization. Cinema is advanced 
as a key medium in such respects, deploying character pathos as a means of 
intensifying rather than merely undermining the failure of certain critical ideals. In a 
scene showing a tuxedoed Chaplin leaving a gala and asked for an autograph by a pair 
of fans during the Great Depression, Chaplin acquiesces, while the elder Chaplin says 
morosely in voiceover ‘I wished they’d wanted my money.’ A reversal of the 
sentimental fallacy of the beggar on the street being ignored by the gentleman, here 
Chaplin’s sad guilt disavows an important alignment between the interests of the poor 
                                                
40 Charles Musser, ‘Work, Ideology and Chaplin's Tramp,’ Radical History Review, Vol. 41 (1988), p. 
48. 
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and needy and Chaplin’s radical persona. Similarly, near the film’s denouement, the 
elder Chaplin says self-dismissively to his biographer that ‘I didn’t change 
things…I…he just cheered people up’. With such statements, Chaplin echoes the 
assessments discussed above that consigned the Tramp persona to the melodramatic 
and theatrical as opposed to the radical or the transformative. Yet it is arguably the 
purpose of Chaplin (in accordance with the biopic’s mode of address) to bracket and 
refute such disillusioned claims and dismissals, re-validating cinema’s and Chaplin’s 
success as owing precisely to their sentimental inspiration. What Chaplin’s cinema 
failed to deliver in material or concretely political terms (making it comparable with 
most cinema surely) is addressed in sentimental terms, providing hope and moral 
‘feeling’ precisely amidst the pathos of being unable to ensure all round prosperity, 
offer a clear course of political action, or end suffering definitively.  
 
If the values invoked by such affect have become synonymous with a certain kind of 
naïve or regressive sentiment assumed of Hollywood and biopic in particular, the 
above discussion of Chaplin’s historical reception and such films as Chaplin reveal 
the extent to which Hollywood has been consistently aligned with the pedagogical and 
morally idealist ideology of the sentimental. Indeed, such a figure as the Tramp 
becomes a crucial precursor to a wide array of contemporary cinematic icons that 
renew the same sentimental tropes. If Jerry Lewis in America, Totò in Italy and 
Norman Wisdom in Britain explicitly renewed the slapstick and pathos of the original 
tramp, Chaplin’s aesthetic is also invoked by films further removed from slapstick as 
such. Examples such as the acrobatic down-and-out drug addict of Leos Carax’s Les 
Amants du Pont Neuf (1991),41 Roberto Benigni’s clownish father in La Vita è Bella 
                                                
41 USA - The Lovers on the Bridge. 
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(1997)42 and even Woody Allen’s clumsy neurotic persona in many of his films 
(Bananas, 1971; Sleeper, 1973) testify to the enduring versatility of the Tramp’s 
original formula of comic pathos in relation to a host of morally dramatic aims. Some, 
but not all, such films avoid accusations of naive sentimentality through recourse to 
an aesthetics of European arthouse or ‘indie’ cinema or a more pronounced use of 
formal irony or a cautious avoidance of melodramatic cliché. More explicitly 
historical or political referentiality might also mitigate such charges, invoking a wider 
scope of enquiry than that invoked by the ‘narrow’ focus on the melodramatic hero, 
offered and epitomized by the biopic. 
 
In such respects, the extent to which Hollywood conventions become subject to 
nuance, irony and stylization becomes a key consideration in relation to whether films 
are deemed regressively sentimental in contemporary cinema. Intertextuality and 
reflexivity run alongside melodramatic narratives and sentimental tropes in post-
classical blockbuster culture, as we have seen in Chaplin. We have seen how its hero 
very much embodied the problematics of the sentimental, his films animating its core 
concerns with the alienation of the individual in a hostile industrial, capitalist society 
while nevertheless invoking redemption through a bourgeois scheme of romance and 
pathos. Chaplin’s gamble with the sentimental paid off, of course, the filmmaker 
realizing and depicting that which many before already knew to be a successful and 
truthful formula, concerning the interdependence between the comedic and the tragic. 
Moreover, and contrary to frequent assumptions, the socio-political significance of 
Chaplin’s art was not lost on many of the modernist theorists discussed above, 
exhilarated as they were precisely by the sentimental impact of these ‘social 
                                                                                                                                       
 
42 USA – Life is Beautiful, dir. Roberto Benigni. 
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comedies’ and their inspiration (critical or otherwise) of a global spectatorship. 
‘Feeling’ was clearly considered vital to any lasting project of social change, and 
Chaplin’s work was applauded as a paradigm of a certain classical Hollywood cinema 
that Miriam Hansen has recently persuasively described in terms of a ‘vernacular 
modernism’, in its fusion of classical and modernist elements.43 I now turn to Steven 
Spielberg, who arguably is and continues to be a major exponent of the sentimental 
tradition in today’s post-classical cinema, albeit subject to a host of critical detractors. 
 
                                                
43 Hansen nuances the classical v modernist binary inherited from literature and philosophy as an 
opposition with limited applicability to the cinema, examining in particular the cross-influences 
between early American film technique and Soviet modernist technique. See Miriam Hansen, ‘The 
Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema as Vernacular Modernism,’ Modernism/modernity 
Vol. 6, no. 2 (1999), pp. 59–77. 
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Chapter Five 
Redemption amidst Trauma: Spielberg’s Sentimental Pedagogy  
 
In Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan (1998), the ‘action’ juxtaposed with the 
loss of life during the Normandy landings is an old man’s visit to the graves of his 
WWII comrades and captain. This visit bookends the film and is the only part that 
takes place in the present. In the final battle scene of the film, Ryan’s captain (played 
by Tom Hanks) has been fatally wounded by an exploding shell and addresses Ryan 
(Matt Damon) with his departing words. Having rescued the private for return back to 
the United States and his surviving family, Captain Miller and many squad members 
sacrificed themselves so that the Ryan family did not lose all their sons that went to 
war. Miller’s final words to Ryan are ‘Earn this,’ an imperative that these losses, 
including his own life, be redeemed through Ryan’s own actions. As an order from a 
dying man who recognizes that his time is up, Miller’s demand is that his death be not 
in vain, that ‘pathos’ be productive. When he dies, the camera tracks back slightly but 
remains on his body and face, signifying an immediate response to this event through 
an adjustment in the camera’s framing. As the spectator may be moved, the camera is 
analogically reframed.  The film then cuts to another soldier who responds tearfully 
followed by a similar reaction shot of Ryan himself, who is also clearly moved by 
Miller’s death.  
 
Paradoxically, such scenes of ‘pathos’, comprised of facial close-ups and respondent 
reaction-shots of emotional characters, are remarkable for how little action occurs in 
the diegesis and how near such close-ups come to the stasis of the photographic still. 
Passive suffering is registered in the minute facial movements of mourners that almost 
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mimic death itself. When the film dissolves to Ryan’s face in the present, now much 
older, yet holding precisely the same countenance as when he stood before the body 
of his captain, the emotional stakes of the sacrifice have changed as little as Ryan’s 
physiognomy. A temporal shift therefore is demonstrated to have no effect on the 
immutable truth of human sentiment. The stasis of this response negates Miller’s call 
to action (“Earn this.”), a passive helplessness before such a potentially monumental 
order. It is the film itself that provides a possible answer in the following shot. As 
Ryan’s family enter the frame where Ryan initially stands alone, the film asserts its 
principal rhetorical response to Miller’s demand - family.  The film becomes so pared 
down throughout this sequence to passive shots of Ryan’s and others’ faces, that it 
renders any additions to the mise-en-scène as especially enunciatory and loaded with 
meaning. The film here operates on the symbolic level, with Ryan’s family standing 
in for all families, which in turn repeats the film’s original moral imperative - the 
preservation of family against the agonies and inevitable sacrifices of war.  
 
There is little question that sentimentality applies to these interlocking scenes of Ryan 
at war in the past and Ryan with his family in the present. But sentimental about what, 
and who exactly is being sentimental? Is it Ryan, Spielberg or the spectator/audience? 
Or is the scene, problematically for some, an evocation of all three projected as a 
community of shared emotions and beliefs? Discourses of sentimentality are invoked 
in many critiques of Spielberg’s work, both explicitly and, as is the case with much 
scholarly analysis of his work, when the term is not deployed specifically. In 
contemporary cinema at least, there is probably no more visible nor successful 
filmmaker to whom sentimentality, as a pejoratively evaluative accusation, is more 
commonly levied or implied. To use the imperative laid down in Ryan by Miller, 
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(“Earn this”), Spielberg is all too often accused of not earning his endings, allowing 
implausible characterization and plot outcome or awe-inspiring scenes of spectacle to 
yield superficial and insufficient resolutions to the social, historical and psychological 
problems set out by his films. The endings to his films are by no means the only 
objects of scorn, but are often the most obvious, as instances of an emotional veering 
from realism and narrative cohesion to the Utopian pathos of melodrama.  
 
Where many critics employ the term ‘sentimentality’ as a means of accusing 
Spielberg of manipulatively eliciting ‘unearned’ emotions from the spectator, others 
see sentiment as one of a great number of ‘affects’ that his oeuvre can and should 
evoke. In terms of critical film theory, and in relation to film spectatorship, the 
distinction between realism and melodrama suggests a concomitant distinction in 
emotional response between the two modes: critical detachment and the clear 
apprehension of truth for the former, emotional absorption and optimistic idealism in 
the latter. However, film theory has more or less dispensed with the notion of any 
unified and coherent ‘subject position’ in relation to a film-text, preferring a 
subjectivity that occupies a plurality of identities and belief-systems and performs a 
heterogeneous variety of reading strategies.1 Accusations of manipulation and 
‘pressing the buttons’ of the spectator have long given way to an acceptance of the 
repetitions and continuities of generic conventions across films, now fully accepting 
rather than dismissive of those implicated in the elicitation of strong, sentimental 
emotions.2 Moreover, binaries such as realism versus melodrama or modernism 
                                                
1 For an incisive introductory discussion of the transformations in ‘subject position’ theory, see Thomas 
Elsaesser, ‘Studying TV Audiences Today: Voodoo, Shamans and Prospectors?’, in Jostein Gripsrud & 
Kathrine Skretting (eds.), History of Moving Images, Oslo: Levende Bilder, 1994, pp. 171-79. 
 
2 See the discussions about ‘sentimentality’ and genre in Ed S. H. Tan, and Nico, H. Frijda, ‘Sentiment 
in Film Viewing’, in Carl Plantinga & Greg M. Smith (eds.), Passionate Views: Film, Cognition and 
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versus sentiment are often considered far from mutually exclusive sets of aesthetic 
criteria, as illustrated above as a key feature of the sentimental tradition itself. Indeed, 
as we have seen in other chapters, finding the ‘poetics’ of sentiment distasteful or 
unearned can be looked upon as a mean-spirited rejection of popular entertainment, 
one that is grounded in an elitist and anachronistic stoicism that seeks to sustain 
hierarchies of high and low art (in the previous chapter, this is most manifest in the 
‘vulgar’ modernism that privileged Keaton over Chaplin or slapstick over sentiment). 
This process in turn becomes implicated in the reproduction of an agenda of class, 
race or gender divisions as determined and policed by categories of ‘taste.’3  
 
It is perhaps this kind of critical taste that Lester Friedman has in mind when he writes 
of a continued dismissive attitude towards Spielberg’s oeuvre on the part of a 
scholarly majority, that for him still considers this popular filmmaker’s work 
unworthy of critical examination. Thus:  
The standard scholarly view resolutely positions Spielberg as 
little more than a modern P.T. Barnum, a technically gifted 
and intellectually shallow showman who substitutes spectacle 
for substance and emotion for depth. Read any extended 
account of his work, and you will quickly recognize the party 
line echoed by most academic writers: Spielberg (along with 
his pal George Lucas) is responsible for two of the greatest 
sins in modern cinema history- the Blockbuster mentality that 
permeates the commercial film industry and the infantalization 
of contemporary movies.4 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Emotion, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 48-64, 261-2; Carl Plantinga, ‘Notes on 
Spectator Emotion and Ideological Film Criticism’ in Richard Allen & Murray Smith (eds.), Film 
Theory and Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp.  372-93. 
 
3 For a detailed discussion of taste hierarchies, see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of 
the Judgement of Taste, Richard Nice (trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. As 
applied to cinema, see Jeffrey Sconce, ‘Trashing the Academy: Taste, Excess, and an Emerging 
Politics of Cinematic Style’, Screen Vol. 36 , No. 4 (1995), pp. 371-93 and Joan Hawkins, Cutting 
Edge: Art Horror and the Horrific Avant-garde, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.  
 
4 Lester D. Friedman, Citizen Spielberg, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p. 2. 
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Such widespread and ubiquitous dismissal of Spielberg implies a scholarly 
community stuck in an ivory tower mentality that has little truck with mainstream 
film culture. The underlying rubric of a critical attitude of this kind is that the critic or 
scholar sees greater complexity or reality beyond that which is depicted by the 
straightforward characterization or plot of a Spielberg film. The critic’s reading 
strategy is attuned to the intertextuality of a film, whereby one’s knowledge of the 
texts or devices that Spielberg has drawn upon allows one to be distanced from the 
effects of the film’s mode of action. Secondly, a “naïve” spectator is assumed who is 
wholly “taken in” by a Spielberg film’s rhetoric, one who weeps at the onset of 
sentimental cues, feels aggressive at the onset of action and violence, or is 
immersively awestruck by scenes of special-effects. Nigel Morris, in his book on 
Spielberg’s films, Empire of Light,5 likens this binary of spectatorial positions to the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary of Christian Metz’s Imaginary Signifier.6 The dualism of 
critic and naïve spectator, he argues, works on a facile assumption that the naïve 
spectator enjoys a wholly Imaginary relation to the text, immersed passively in 
narrative and emotional cueing processes, whereas the critic occupies a superior, 
Symbolic position, comprehending the text as a set of signs and asserting a critical 
distance between himself and the text. Morris is very sceptical that either position can 
ever apply to an actual spectator or actual type of spectator, and wonders why 
‘sentimental’, with its potentially dismissive connotations, cannot instead be 
substituted by ‘emotional’ as an appropriate adjective for Spielberg’s work.7  
                                                
 
5 Nigel Morris, Empire of Light: The Cinema of Steven Spielberg, London: Wallflower Press, 2007, pp. 
17-8.  
 
6 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, Celia Britton. Annwyl 
Williams, Ben Brewster and Alfred Guzzetti (trans.), London: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 301-304. 
 
7 Morris, Empire of Light, p. 381. 
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Indeed, despite Friedman’s serious engagement with such critical voices in his 
detailed analysis of Spielberg’s oeuvre, I would suggest that scholarly and critical 
approaches to Hollywood cinema, including Spielberg’s films, have for some time 
constituted its objects of analysis in more nuanced and complex terms than suggested 
by the kind of Frankfurt-school negativism implied by Friedman above. Whether it be 
analysis of the ‘Woman’s film’8, melodrama as a pervasive Hollywood ‘mode’,9 
Hollywood violence and masculinity,10 the ‘guy-cry’ genre11 or studies of filmmakers 
ranging from James Cameron12 to Bryan Singer13, popular culture and contemporary 
film have certainly been considered a serious and significant object of study for some 
time.  
 
 
When considering sentimentality in relation to popular cinema, Spielberg’s in 
particular, it may be tempting to begin by assuming a solid constituency of theoretical 
opposition to sentiment as a means of mounting a straightforward defence. As 
                                                
 
8 See Mary-Ann Doane, The Desire to Desire: The Woman’s Film of the 1940s, Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1987. 
 
9 See Linda Williams, 'Melodrama Revised', in Nick Browne (ed.), Refiguring American Film Genres: 
History and Theory, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 42-88. 
  
10 See Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies: Hollywoood Masculinity in the Reagan Era, New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1994. 
 
11 A phrase in common coinage within popular film criticism, corresponding with the Hollywood 
tradition of the ‘male weepie’ discussed by Thomas Schatz in Hollywood Genres, Formulas, 
Filmmaking, and the Studio System, Philadephia: Temple University Press, 1981, pp. 239-242. See also 
John Mercer & Martin Shingler, Melodrama: Genre, Style, Sensibility, Wallflower Press, 2004, pp. 98-
104. 
 
12 See James Kendrick, ‘Marxist Overtones in Three Films by James Cameron’, Journal of Popular 
Film and Television, Vol. 27, No. 3 (199), pp. 36-44. 
 
13 See Jonathan Eig, ‘A Beautiful Mind(Fuck): Hollywood Structures of Identity’, Jump Cut, Vol. 46 
(2003). 
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previous chapters have established, to conceive of the sentimental as a ubiquitously 
dismissed aesthetic both fails to grasp the concept’s full import and implies a 
spectatorship that approaches art from a strident anti-humanism, a case that is not 
borne out by many scholarly studies of Spielberg and melodrama. Unambiguous 
dismissals of naïve sentimentality in cinema can nevertheless be located in more 
middlebrow film journalism that remains committed to film evaluation and a more 
conservative upholding of taste categories. Moreover, given the extent to which film 
journalism contributes very significantly to the cultural reputation of actors and 
filmmakers, these latter channels of discourse are of crucial interest to a study such as 
this that seeks to examine the overall reception of such figures as Chaplin and 
Spielberg, rather than their treatment within exclusively scholarly circles. Indeed, 
given the extent to which the sentimental is intimately bound up with notions of 
bourgeois pedagogy and the social functions of art in relation to ordinary spectators, 
Spielberg’s reputation becomes important precisely in relation to film culture writ 
large, as represented most visibly by film critics.  
 
 
Friedman’s claims may seem simplistic concerning Spielberg’s academic dismissal 
yet the extent to which his scholarly reception is influenced by popular opinion should 
not be discounted. Spielberg, as discussed below, continues to elicit a sometimes 
vitriolic criticism from more theoretically-inclined voices that rehearse objections to 
his films more commonplace in film criticism. What remains of interest to this study 
is therefore the extent to which, despite intensive scholarship on melodrama, affect 
and emotion in film, sentimentality as a specific and identifiable aspect of Spielberg’s 
cinema may continue to be subject to qualification and bracketing compared to other 
 
 
227 
attributes that are more easily recognized as markers of aesthetic significance. I argue 
in such a vein that such attributes as irony, reflexivity, ideological contradiction, and 
the stylistic continuities of an auteur’s corpus impact significantly on how we 
conceive of Spielberg as a director of note. I further contend that each has a specific 
bearing on how we might also conceive of this director’s sentimental attributes, not 
least if the latter are sometimes considered as such at the expense of or despite the 
presence of the former attributes. 
 
 
Spielberg the Ironist? 
 
In many respects, Spielberg’s brand of storytelling and technique has earned him a 
reputation as anything but an ironic filmmaker. Irony has been historically perceived 
as a marker of self-reflexivity and ‘excess’ in relation to the ‘conventional’ 
Hollywood narrative, endowing the overall work with critical significance through 
‘defamiliarisation’ or the presence of a detached voice in relation to a ‘dominant 
mode of address’, Spielberg is often lambasted for his alleged overenthusiasm for 
reproducing generic conventions without modification. Peter Biskind argues 
disparagingly that Spielberg and George Lucas returned audiences to the ‘simplicities 
of the pre-'60s Golden Age of movies’ by a combination of processes summed up as:  
infantilizing the audience, reconstituting the spectator as child, then 
overwhelming him and her with sound and spectacle, obliterating 
irony, aesthetic self-consciousness, and critical reflection.14 
 
 
                                                
14 Peter Biskind, Easy Riders, Raging Bulls: How the Sex-Drugs-and-Rock n‘ Roll Generation Saved 
Hollywood, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1998, p. 344. 
 
 
 
228 
In these comments, Biskind concisely rehearses what has become a standard criticism 
of Spielberg and his sometime co-producer George Lucas, specifically that neither 
trades in the irony that has become de rigeur for a (post)modernist sensibility. 
Sentimentality within such a rubric serves as a signifier once more of both kitsch and 
cheaply elicited emotion, and particularly with Spielberg, of a glossy, melodramatic, 
optimistic mode of address in relation to potentially dark themes. It is crucially also 
marked by an absence of self-reflexivity in favour of more direct, unmediated modes 
of address. 
 
However, one of the key interventions on the part of a widespread critical assessment 
of Spielberg’s work concerns precisely the extent to which such work may be 
considered to possess the marks of self-awareness and self-quotation, such as in the 
analysis of Artificial Intelligence: AI (2001) below. Through such work, I argue that 
Spielberg has more recently been analysed precisely within such terms (including 
their Brechtian senses), such that some of his work becomes realigned with modernist 
ideas of defamiliarisation and alienated subjectivity. AI ‘s final scene, at once 
sentimental (and widely panned for bathos), is ‘redeemed’ for its ironic foregrounding 
of its status as ‘fantasy.’ 
 
Such accounts now negotiate with shifts in critical theory itself where such attributes 
as irony, intertextuality and aesthetic self-consciousness are not quite the attributes of 
unmistakeable ‘critique’ that they once were. Theories of melodrama and Hollywood 
narrative have clearly moved on from the ‘Sirkian’ moment where the identification 
of Brechtian irony in the text, through interventions in sound, music and colour, 
proved sure indicators of progressive defamiliarisation from the conventional 
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Hollywood narrative.15 The key shift in such respects concerns the extent to which 
self-reflexivity could no longer be considered proof of a text’s adherence to a 
‘political-modernist’ agenda, and can just as easily denote the indulgent self-
referentiality of an apoliticised postmodern culture.16 This is indeed precisely where 
Spielberg enters the field, for he is commonly recognized far more as a film buff and 
playful quoter of retrograde genres than as any kind of proponent of modernist irony. 
He is seen as the ‘eternal kid’17 who unthinkingly reproduces the genres of his and the 
‘baby-boomer’ generation’s coming of age.  Acts of reference and self-consciousness 
are more often deemed complicit with the propagation of nostalgic escape and 
regression rather than a means to aesthetic critique. Much criticism levelled at 
Spielberg indeed concerns the extent to which this filmmaker’s deep knowledge of 
American cinema is considered to yield little more than self-indulgent allusions to the 
retrograde genres reproduced for a mass audience. Updating B-movie genres and 
offering knowing nods or in-jokes in relation to his own exercises of revision lead 
many critics to consider Spielberg a figure so immersed in the ‘movies’ that he can 
only  reproduce the regressive ideology of earlier genres. From Close Encounters’ 
direct references to De Mille’s The Ten Commandments, to The Indiana Jones 
trilogy’s repackaging of the 1930s Republic serials, Spielberg has always openly 
                                                
15 See Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama’, in 
Christine Gledhill (ed.), Home is Where the Heart Is: Studies in Melodrama and the Woman's Film, 
London: BFI Publishing, 1987, pp. 43-70; Christine Gledhill, ‘The Melodramatic Field: An 
Investigation’, in Home is Where the Heart is, pp. 1-39; Laura Mulvey, ‘Notes 
on Sirk and Melodrama', in Home is Where the Heart Is, pp 75-83; David N. Rodowick, ‘Madness, 
Authority and Ideology: The Domestic Melodrama of the 1950s’, in Home is Where the Heart is, pp. 
268-80. 
 
16 See Frederic Jameson’s arguments concerning ‘blank parody’ in Postmodernism, or, The Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991, pp. 16-25, and a less pessimistic 
appraisal of postmodern parody in Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth 
Century Art Forms, Illinois: University of Illinois, 2000. For a defence of Spielbergian pastiche in 
particular, see Nigel Morris, Empire of Light: The Cinema of Steven Spielberg, London: Wallflower 
Press, 2007, pp. 160-4.       
 
17 Derek Malcolm, ‘Empire of the Eternal Kid,’ The Guardian (London), June 17, 1989. 
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acknowledged and celebrated his influences and precursors. He even references his 
own past work, such his spoof of Jaws (1975) in an early sequence of his wartime 
comedy 1941 (1979), using the same actress that was killed by the shark in the earlier 
film and substituting the submarine for a shark, which for some invokes smug self-
congratulation rather than any kind of reflexive critique in such respects. Such 
intertextuality and revisionism (or lack thereof) becomes equated with the kind of 
‘blank parody’ that Frederic Jameson deems a key feature of a fatally apoliticised 
postmodernity.18 Such referentiality looms large indeed in Lester Friedman’s concise 
list of the standard faults levied at Spielberg’s films, which he lists as: 
 
1). Their highly ritualized and formulaic character, 2). Their 
interminable solipsism (self-celebrating and self-referential; 3) 
their flattering of the spectator with his or her familiarity with 
conventional forms; 4) their escapist sensibility; 5) their refusal to 
challenge the viewer; 6) their overt signalling of how audiences 
ought to feel; 7) their simplistic resolution of tensions and anxieties 
8) their pleasurable obviousness; and 9) their insistence on their 
unreality, playfulness and detachment from real issues. 
 
Such objections are confined not merely to those of 1980s critics that proclaimed 
Spielberg (and his sometime co-producer George Lucas) as a purveyor of ‘Reaganite 
entertainment’ nor are they directed solely at films of that decade.19 Writers such as 
Wheeler Winston Dixon have rather more recently listed ‘the malign influence of 
Steven Spielberg and George Lucas’ in 2001 as one of  ‘Twenty-Five reasons Why 
                                                
18 Jameson argues, in reference to the genre revisionism of American Graffiti (George Lucas, 1973) and 
Chinatown (Roman Polanski, 1974) for instance, that ‘Faced with these ultimate objects – our social, 
historical, and existential present, and the past as ‘referent’ – the incompatibility of a postmodernist 
‘nostalgia’ art language with genuine historicity becomes dramatically apparent.’ (Postmodernism, p. 
19). 
   
19 See Robin Wood, Hollywood From Vietnam To Reagan, New York: Columbia University Press and 
Andrew Britton, ‘Blissing Out: The Politics of Reaganite Entertainment’, in Barry Keith Grant (ed.) 
Britton on Film: The Complete Film Criticsm of Andrew Britton, Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, pp. 97-154. 
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It’s All Over,’ referring to the demise of contemporary American cinema in a critical 
anthology focusing on precisely such a decline.20 
 
However, as discussed above, I would suggest that a more fine-tuned discussion is 
made necessary by Spielberg’s frequent invocations of self-reflexivity and 
sentimentality. As with Chaplin and as discussed below in relation to AI, Saving 
Private Ryan, and Schindler’s List (1993), sentimental and ironic modes of address 
often function simultaneously in Spielberg’s work, challenging the spectator to 
occupy multiple levels of reception at once. In such respects, a sentimental mode of 
address becomes bracketed by a host of historical, generic, and stylistic intertexts, as 
well as contexts of reception that make the spectatorship of Spielberg’s films a far 
more complex affair. Through frequent appeals to moral instruction, Utopian 
idealism, alongside a keen fidelity to historical actuality, a Spielberg film’s naïve 
sentimentality from a late 20th century/21st century perspective should be considered 
within the rather more longstanding and inclusive parameters of the term offered by 
this thesis’s early chapters. If sentimentality’s purpose was at one time to instruct the 
spectator or reader, to put the latter in a position of moral, social and political 
‘knowledge’, it is a Spielberg film’s clear adherence to such priorities that 
problematizes the supposed naïveté that is fostered by their recourse to sentimentality. 
If the key opposition of naïve sentiment and ironic reflexivity have at times seemed 
mutually exclusive attributes of the text or spectator reception, such an aesthetic 
provides what we might consider “a third way” between such models, fostering 
neither the regressive naïveté of the former nor the cool detachment of the latter. As a 
true inheritor, like Chaplin, of a sentimental tradition analysed above, Spielberg’s 
                                                
20 Wheeler Winston-Dixon, ‘Twenty-five Reasons Why It’s All Over’, in Jon Lewis (ed.), The End of 
Cinema As We Know It, London: Pluto Press, p. 361. 
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films adhere to an aesthetic that negotiates between sentiment and irony or melodrama 
and modernism in order to maintain cinema as an above all communicative, 
pedagogical and affective art. 
 
The film AI: Artificial Intelligence, particularly its ending, exemplifies the extent to 
which sentiment and irony become interwoven textually in Spielberg’s work, and is 
fascinating in terms of how critics have attempted to recuperate Spielberg for his 
fostering of precisely the kind of critical spectatorship associated with a quasi-
Brechtian model of disengagement and realism. The following analysis of AI’s finale 
therefore unpacks how a typical Spielberg move is recuperated in such terms. 
Although many critics have come to regard Artificial Intelligence: AI as a film that 
marks Spielberg’s transition to more thoughtful territory, the film’s ending split the 
critics between those that regarded it as Spielberg’s inevitable descent into bathos, 
and those that accepted and applauded the director’s rhetorical style as one that 
engages mimetic emotion and displays a sophisticated intertexuality. Scenes of love 
and reconciliation are a chief attraction of Spielberg’s work, whether between mothers 
and sons, boys and aliens (E.T.:The Extra-Terrestrial [1982]) or benevolent patriarchs 
and the victimized groups that they come to rescue (Schindler’s List, Amistad [1997]). 
The end of AI represents a sequence that encodes the ‘perfect day’ between a mother 
and her son, David, a day comprised exclusively of the child experiencing his 
mother’s uninterrupted attention and love. It is only in consideration of the narrative 
that precedes this scene and its sad facts that this scene’s pathos can be actualized, for 
David is not a real boy but an artificial life-form, designed and purchased in order to 
love his human mother unconditionally and without her necessary reciprocation.  
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The “perfect-day” sequence takes place 2000 years after David is abandoned by his 
human mother/owner in favour of her own son, who after David is bought and 
activated, recovers from a coma and returns to his family. The sequence is a 
simulation created for David by other far more sophisticated artificial life-forms of the 
future, after he has endured 2000 years of abandonment and solitude and is finally 
rediscovered under a massive sheet of ice that covers what was New York City. It is 
his birthday, a day that allows this robot-child to be particularly indulged by his 
immediate family, except there are strangely no other people around, no siblings and 
no father. Mother and child go about happily playing games, painting pictures and 
eating birthday cake as if no one else exists. At the end of the day, his mother, tired 
from the day’s fun and games, needs to take to bed. She falls asleep with David next 
to her. The narrator tells us that for the first time David fell asleep and went to that 
place where ‘dreams are born.’ The film ends with softly played piano music, a child-
like, restful happy ending with which to fade to black. Pathos is intensified with the 
knowledge that David’s mother, reincarnated by these super robots from a lock of her 
hair, cannot live longer than one day; she does not simply sleep at the day’s end but 
also dies. 
 
The film scholar James Naremore has likened this final scene to a ‘Freudian wet 
dream’ considering the clear Oedipal trajectory of David’s desires.21 He admits 
nevertheless to being moved to tears by it. This is certainly a sentimental scene, 
although it is one, according to Naremore, that never lets the spectator forget its status 
as artifice, and indeed thematizes that artificiality at the levels of both form and story. 
Indeed, the whole scene can be seen as a self-conscious masterclass in the 
                                                
 
21 James Naremore, ‘Love and Death in AI Artificial Intelligence,’ Michigan Quarterly Review Vol. 44, 
No. 2 (2005), p. 258.   
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sentimental: softly-played music that runs through the sequence; the use of soft-focus 
camera lenses, bathing characters in sunlight thereby accenting their idealized status 
in the story; extreme close-ups of characters gazing at one another with love; and the 
face of a character moved to a single tear that falls slowly down his cheek. The latter 
trope in particular has of course become a staple of Hollywood melodrama, a moment 
of sentimental catharsis where inner pain is expressed alongside the sense of a 
character’s enlightenment, or resignation to a sad state of affairs. From such classic 
final scenes as Casablanca’s (1942) farewell between lovers, and a socially 
abandoned Stella’s witnessing of her own daughter’s wedding from afar in Stella 
Dallas (1937), to those of E.T.(1982) and Ghost (1990), the single tear expresses a 
pathos that almost dare not be felt by the subject in distress. A sign of the intellect’s 
struggle to hold back emotion and its evident, righteous defeat, the falling tear 
epitomizes the sentimental tradition in its visual articulation of the latter’s principle 
oppositions. In AI’s final scene too, such a trope, among other conventions, are 
present and correct, and can be recognized by any spectator with a reasonable 
familiarity with the movies.  
 
Viewing sentimentality pejoratively is often, however, about the recognition of 
devices such as those above and dismissing them as kitschy manipulations of the text 
that produce desired responses in a vulnerable spectator. David Denby, in the New 
Yorker, for instance, accusing Spielberg of excess in AI, writes: 
Spielberg likes warmth and sentiment in his pictures. In the past, 
children have been the perfect vehicle for his emotion, but in "AI," 
with a brilliant child actor on hand, he loses his common sense and 
milks the kid to death.[…] David is not only the ultimate goody-
goody; he's the spirit of pure, yearning adoration[…]The movie 
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weirdly pours treacle over a foundation of despair, and any genuine 
emotion drops out of it.22  
 
 
Here, Denby identifies the key tropes of Spielbergian ‘treacle’, as it were - a child 
actor playing a character that encapsulates what the literary scholar R.F. Brissenden 
first termed ‘Virtue in Distress,’23 a key ingredient of sentimental fiction and drama.  
The face of the child, as Denby recognizes it, has the capacity to display hyperbolic 
levels of pathos and innocence, is over-played by Spielberg. Denby evokes an age-old 
scepticism in relation to the idealized figure of the benevolent protagonist - here, the 
‘goody-goody’ child who can do no wrong yet who is persecuted by a cruel society. 
Rehearsing Oscar Wilde’s comments in relation to Little Nell, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, Denby continues a longstanding suspicion of the idealized child and the latter’s 
invocation of a cloying Victorianism. 
 
 
The critic that dismisses the idealized representation of children as sentimental thus 
calls for something that David Denby earlier on terms ‘common sense’; an attribute 
that either filmmaker or spectator is implored to possess as immunization to ‘feeling’ 
in relation to morally one-dimensional characters. Another critical term for this 
‘common sense’ might be ‘realism,’ which although ambiguously employed in 
various critical discourses, is often opposed to the extreme moral polarities and 
simplicities of melodrama. However, the theorization of such spectatorship fails to 
acknowledge the spectator’s ability to read a film intertextually, especially with films 
                                                
 
22 David Denby, ‘FACE; OFF; Steven Spielberg meets Stanley Kubrick,’ The New Yorker, July 2, 
2001, p. 86. 
 
23 R. F. Brissenden, Virtue in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade, 
Macmillan: London, 1974. 
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such as Spielberg’s, whose oeuvre is suffused with references to other films. Indeed, a 
Spielberg film may seem a strange target for such charges, given the frequency with 
which this director foregrounds the status of his films as works of great artifice, from 
the astounding special effects of many of his films to the frequent games he plays by 
misdirecting spectator expectations, in such movies as Jaws, Duel (1971) and 
Schindler’s List. The final scene of AI is certainly no exception, and indeed has been 
identified as a key instance of bracketed sentiment. Evoking the influence of the fairy-
tale genre in its employment of a storybook narrator, the sequence is tacked onto the 
narrative of AI itself as an artificially engineered performance of David‘s Oedipal 
desires for his mother. All the clichés mentioned earlier are there, drawn from long-
established literary and movie traditions, of which Spielberg is himself a 
contemporary proponent. The Blue-Fairy that David hopes will grant him his wish of 
return to his mother, is directly referenced from Pinocchio but also invokes such 
fairies as Peter Pan’s Tinkerbell or Cinderella’s Fairy Godmother. The narrator that 
relates the events of David’s ‘happiest day’ possesses the even-toned, calming timbre 
of a parent’s voice during a bedtime story. The awakening of David’s artificially 
engineered mother recalls the famous awakenings of such heroines as Sleeping 
Beauty and Snow White, for whom David represents a bizarre incarnation of a junior 
Prince Charming. David’s best friend Teddy, an artificial teddy bear that stays loyal to 
him to the end, also of course invokes childhood and belongs to the world of fairy-
tale.  
 
In such respects, the end sequence serves as a mechanically-reproduced prosthetic that 
fits on the end of AI with its joins and seams intentionally showing, in terms of its 
obvious allusions to fairy-tale and cinematic tropes. Indeed, if some see AI as the 
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glossing over of Kubrick’s modernist ending with a gratuitous Spielberg veneer that 
provides the obligatory feelgood ending, others defend the latter’s treatment in 
postmodern terms. For it is precisely in the extent to which genericity is foregrounded 
by the scene, that other critics and theorists have deemed the scene as approaching 
parody or, more accurately, pastiche. In a short essay on Spielberg’s sentimentality, 
Dag Sødtholt argues that with this scene, ‘Spielberg here at last rids himself of his 
most troublesome artistic Achilles' heel, by a brave and paradoxical act: actually 
magnifying his patented 'happy ending' to its extreme.’24 Michael Koresky similarly 
problematizes whether this ‘wish-fulfilment finale was to be taken literally’, and 
questions most forcefully those ‘cynical viewers’ that considered it merely another 
Spielbergian ‘happy ending.’ Koresky instead deems the scene’s vital asset as its 
envisioning of a ‘domestic warmth so chilly that the line between reality and fantasy 
never becomes fully delineated.’25 What becomes at issue therefore is the extent to 
which spectators would be attuned to such hyperbole and could appreciate such 
blurring, as distinct from those that might have preferred the more ‘modernist’ 
ending: what Koresky terms ‘existential angst’ invoked by David’s remaining trapped 
in a frozen ‘amphibicopter’ looking up at the Blue Fairy for eternity. For both critics, 
irony and disjuncture are incontrovertibly present in the scene - whether the scene 
‘works’ becomes a question of the spectator’s recognition of such complexity.  
 
                                                
 
24 Dag Sødtholt, ‘Warning: Sentimentality!’, in ‘The Question Spielberg: A Symposium’ at 
http://archive.sensesofcinema.com/contents/03/27/spielberg_symposium_films_and_moments.html#so
dtholt, accessed 1st March 2009. 
 
25 Michael Koresky, ‘Twilight of the Idyll’, in ‘The Question Spielberg: A Symposium’ at 
http://archive.sensesofcinema.com/contents/03/27/spielberg_symposium_films_and_moments.html#ko
resky, accessed 1st March 2009. 
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In such respects, Spielberg’s work is redeemed owing to how he shows himself able 
not only to quote his own style but to deliver a cathartic moment, while at the same 
time undermining its reality. It is possible to take the scene both at face-value and as a 
philosophical meditation on the constructedness of a child’s seemingly natural 
desires. Whether the spectator is a connoisseur of films and film technique or a more 
‘naïve’ viewer who responds more to story than to formal concerns, Spielberg makes 
it clear that he is aware that both kinds of spectator can respond to this scene and, 
indeed, that neither position is mutually exclusive nor preferred. It can be considered 
both the epitome of Spielberg’s sentimental oeuvre as well as a cleverly self-
conscious riposte to those who condemn his sentimentality on the grounds of the 
latter’s alleged distortions and artificiality.  
 
AI’s ‘change of gear’ can thus very well be considered evidence of Spielberg’s self-
consciousness as an auteur and as an ironic commentary on the sometimes jarring 
leaps of logic that characterizes his brand of rhetoric. The conflation of modes fosters 
an ambiguous mode of reception that is both sentimental and ironic, consoling and 
alienating. Feelings of ‘warmth and sentiment’ conveyed by the scene compete with 
the ‘chilly’ uncertainties of its truth claims, unanswered questions and foregrounding 
of parodic intent. The film thereby remains within the parameters of a ‘melodramatic 
mode’ outlined by Linda Williams while deflecting accusations of sentimental naiveté 
with respect to its ending. A brief comparison between the endings of Kubrick’s 
2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) and AI illustrates a key difference in tone in such 
respects, despite the films’ thematic and philosophical similarities. When Dave 
Bowman shuts down HAL 9000 near the end of 2001, his actions are clearly those of 
a man who seeks to survive in an environment controlled by an amoral and evidently 
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hostile artificial lifeform. Yet as he persists in his deactivation of HAL, disabling one 
memory bank after another, with his face largely unmoved and resolved, he engages 
compassionately with a HAL who knows precisely what’s going on and tries to 
persuade Dave to stop. While HAL, nearing his complete deactivation, sings ‘Daisy-
Daisy’ as an evocation of his own nursery days, showing the spectator how HAL too 
had a virtual childhood and an actual ‘father-creator’ in ‘Dr. Chandra’, there is little 
question that Kubrick has nuanced the spectator’s perception of HAL from evil 
monster to a complex lifeform with an acute sense of mortality. Like David in AI, 
HAL is constructed by humans and therefore is shown to be at least partially human 
and more than capable of eliciting sympathy. Whether HAL does this manipulatively 
or unintentionally is less important than the question of how human sympathy 
responds so powerfully to coded data and pre-existent schemata. Similar questions are 
applicable of course to cinema too, in relation to its own genericity, or in ‘new-media’ 
terms, programmability.  
 
It is no big analogical leap to see AI’s final scene as a re-enactment of the cinematic 
scenario itself, with David standing in as the paradigm of the spectator who knows 
what he sees to be a transient illusion, but nevertheless performs his part in this 
fantasy scenario unhesitatingly. Informed at the outset by a beneficent life-form of the 
future that his artificially engineered mother will be with him for only one day, David 
knows that what he experiences that day is an illusion, yet holds on to the belief that 
she will remain. Programmed with a child’s mentality that finds death and 
impermanence to be particularly incomprehensible, AI’s hero foregrounds the latent 
disavowals of cinematic spectatorship itself, not least in relation to the sequence 
within which he participates. Epitomizing the credulity of childhood, this surrogate 
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spectator is unable to fully accept the image’s unreality despite clear evidence to the 
contrary, buoyed rather by the cathartic stakes of the sentimental moment and the 
melodramatic justice that it embodies. The sequence invites us to act on a similar 
disavowal of our own disbelief, while acknowledging the problematics of doing so in 
its own mode of action. 
 
 
In such respects, 2001 and AI both foreground cinema’s own role in meditating on the 
blurred meanings of “human” as opposed to “artificial”. However, despite the pathos 
of the final scenes described above, the films ultimately proceed in discursively 
distinct and arguably opposite directions. To the extent that 2001 remains focused on 
‘man’ and the latter’s struggle with mortality, Dave Bowman emerges as a man who 
has severed ties with humanity and his last pseudo-human companion in order to 
survive, a fate that leads him to a strange, alienated transcendence in the final 
sequence of the film. Entrusted with the secrets of the monolith, Bowman must now 
live a solitary existence in a strange set of rooms decorated in classical style, the grey 
hair of one of his incarnations signifiying the experience of trauma, the extreme aging 
of his other incarnation invoking a long duration or even an inhuman immortality. AI 
does the inverse, by suggesting that existence begins and ends with acts of love and 
familial bonds and where it is better to ‘love’ for a single day than live an alienated 
eternity in a parallel cosmic dimension, as Bowman does. David may or may not 
know he is experiencing a temporary and unmistakeably artificial reconstruction of a 
blissful scenario, despite a crushing rejection by his mother earlier on in the film, but 
he is still able to desire her fictional reincarnation.  
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This of course has deeply philosophical implications. If ‘love’ can be so clearly 
encoded as a series of operations that would satisfy a long-persecuted robot, Spielberg 
asks us what it means for us to be so emotionally invested in the happy resolution of 
this pseudo-human’s longings. At the same time, however, such reflexivity in relation 
to cinema and its relation to artificial intelligence serves only to intensify the scene’s 
pathos rather than diminish it. The film asserts that if artificial intelligence is all that 
remains in the long-distant future, or if its vision serves as an analogy for our own 
contemporary media-saturated world, it is better that cultural values of kindness and 
‘humane’ modes of address be upheld than the alienated solitude of 2001’s future. In 
such respects, AI adheres to a sentimental tradition of emotional pedagogy that 
affirms the importance of moral civility despite the death of humanity, the latter 
becoming the ultimate condition of constructed and self-reflexive truth or reason. If 
2001 affirms in HAL that a perfect simulation of reasoned humanity acts as little 
guarantee of moral stability, HAL’s conduct and deactivation contrasts markedly with 
AI’s staging of the ‘perfect day’ for David, the latter serving as a moral rather than a 
necessarily pragmatic response to the existence of machines that have developed 
vulnerabilities that are all too ‘human’. 
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History Lessons 
AI exemplifies Spielberg’s frequent deployment of the family as both a site of great 
devotion and great pain, in its fragmentation (a central thematic also of E.T., Close 
Encounters and Hook [1991], and perhaps most overtly of Poltergeist [1982]26). This 
hardly, however, exhausts the possibility for discussing sentimentality in Spielberg’s 
cinema, nor its reflexive aspects, for another significant strand of his work concerns 
the sentimentalization of male heroism, exhibited at times of war or racial 
persecution. Often epitomizing the ‘action blockbuster’ genre, such films as Saving 
Private Ryan, Amistad or Schindler’s List provide a different generic context within 
which the melodramatic ‘mode’ continues to be drawn upon by Spielberg, bringing 
with them a different set of critical questions. Indeed, Spielberg’s recourse to 
sentimentality has been dismissed as kitschy distortion most forcefully in those of his 
films concerned with recounting real historical events. This has led film scholars such 
as Bill Nichols to argue, for instance, that Spielberg’s historical films of the 1990s 
have ‘replaced ethics with spectacle and history with fantasy,’27 targeting aspects of 
these films such as the sterotypicality of supporting characters, the idealization of 
‘white male heroes of gentle character’ and the Manichean divide between good and 
bad characters (of which Nazis are the most frequently and unambiguously vilified). 
Despite ‘documentary trappings’, such films as Ryan are deemed disingenuous by 
Nichols in their maintenance of Hollywood-style ‘psychological realism’, ‘suspense’ 
and ‘spectacle’. As such, the cultural values articulated by Spielberg’s historical war 
films provoke Nichols to argue the following with palpable irony:  
                                                
26 Directed by Tobe Hooper, but produced by Spielberg and very much bearing the latter’s signature in 
terms of theme and style. 
 
27 Bill Nichols, ‘The 10 Stations of Spielberg's Passion: "Saving Private Ryan." "Amistad." "Schindler's 
List."’, Jump Cut  43, July 2000, p. 11. 
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Great wars serve great principles. Individual soldiers, though, 
don't trust the noble rhetoric of their leaders. Still, Schindler's 
List they know real values when they see them. They willingly 
sacrifice for others. They give their lives to a greater cause. And 
those who survive combat, slavery or the Holocaust dare not 
forget the price others paid so that they might live. Pvt. Ryan, 
for example, in the bookend scenes of flashback plaintively asks 
his wife, ''Am I a good man?'' There is nothing like war to 
produce a sense of honourable conduct and noble purpose in 
citizens, if they survive.28  
 
Nichols’ comments exemplify the extent to which Spielberg’s melodramatic treatment 
of history has been met with ironic cynicism in some critical quarters. Where 
Spielberg attempts to make the moral stakes of war legible in terms of a melodramatic 
Hollywood tradition, such an approach is deemed an instance of gross manipulation, 
with invocations of patriotism serving merely to ‘inoculate itself from criticism’, to 
coin Nigel Morris’ words,29 while maximising popularity and profit.  In a similar vein, 
in Wheeler Winston Dixon’s listing of the ‘the malign influence of Steven Spielberg 
and George Lucas’,30 it is the melodrama of Saving Private Ryan that most offends, 
for it demonstrates how:  
 
One can cobble together a stunning opening sequence by 
duplicating (or replicating) actual battle footage, and then graft it 
onto a thoroughly sentimental and ordinary combat narrative, 
with Tom Hanks standing in for Jimmy Stewart.31 
 
 
For Dixon, Spielberg’s early films (citing also Duel and the Indiana Jones trilogy) at 
least proved him to be a ‘superb action filmmaker’ while it is the sentimental narrative 
                                                
 
28 Ibid., 
 
29 Morris, Empire of Light, p. 296. 
 
30 Dixon, ‘Twenty-Five Reasons Why It’s All Over’, p. 361. 
 
31 Ibid., p. 361. 
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of Saving Private Ryan that best evidences Spielberg’s ‘distressing lack of depth.’ 
While ‘action’ and the ‘sentimental’ are both presumed as genres with their own 
cinematic traditions, it is the latter that epitomizes Ryan’s genericity and ordinariness 
in excess of the former.  
 
Yet as a director who has often operated in the action ‘genre’, Spielberg has always 
ensured that spectator engagement with characters is as important as astonishment at 
spectacle and special effects. To this end, and in accordance with an established 
Hollywood tradition, focalisation on key characters remains a vital means of 
conveying the emotional stakes of all events that take place in his films. Saving 
Private Ryan arguably exemplifies Spielberg’s mastery of showing how grand events, 
the Normandy landings no less, impact on individuals, through his focus on a small 
band of soldiers that are re-deployed from the grand offensive to a rescue mission. In 
such respects, the film’s pedagogy is motivated by the will to convey the experience 
of war on individuals in as complete a manner as possible, with an above all 
polysemic mode of address encompassing an aesthetics of simulation (the landings 
themselves), more theatrical models (honourable speeches, death scenes and 
soliloquy) and a plurality of political stances in relation to war, patriotism and 
bravery.  
 
The chief flaw of the film for critics is the alleged grafting of redemptive meaning 
onto war, despite the opening scene's nods to the senselessness of slaughter via 
graphic realism. Indeed, given the realism of the latter sequence, it is the perception of 
a jarring shift towards the melodrama and redemption of the rescue party narrative 
that provokes such critique even further, for it is deemed a sentimental falsification of 
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the earlier sequence's horrors. Through melodrama's emphasis on story, character and 
empathy, the film instead identifies war as an opportunity for individual development 
and  moral lessons or redemption. It therefore effaces the rhetoric of nihilistic 
meaninglessness that conventionally characterises the ‘anti-war’ film’s rhetoric. 
Indeed for Gabbard: 
 
Spielberg departs from the more recent paradigm of war films in the 
1970s and 1980s by suggesting, sentimentally and without irony, 
that war is about building character and not about brutality and 
stupidity. Most disturbingly, he joins those who have promoted 
conservative retrenchment through nostalgia for the war years.32 
 
 
Once more favouring the more explicit anti-war films of 1970s and 1980s auteur 
cinema (M*A*S*H* [1974], Apocalypse Now [1979], Born on the Fourth of July 
[1989], Full Metal Jacket [1987], and possibly The Deer Hunter [1978]) over 
Spielberg's exercise of ‘revisionism’, such criticism of Ryan condemns a mode of 
address that is deemed to approach WWII with no apparent irony or ambiguity (thus 
reading the movie indeed as a particularly untimely mythical legitimating of 
American military might in light of its continued deployments in Bosnia and the 
Middle East during the 1990s). Through what Gabbard terms a ‘fascination and 
reverence for war’, Ryan is considered nothing less than propaganda for an overly 
self-righteous nation that continues to enforce an ideology of war as both ‘necessary 
and life-defining.’33 While the ‘anti-war’ film promoted a nihilistic, post-Vietnam, 
post-Watergate cynicism in relation to state power and the egotistical individual 
                                                
 
32 Ibid. p. 132. 
 
33 Krin Gabbard, ‘Saving Private Ryan Too Late’, in Jon Lewis (ed.), The End of Cinema as We Know 
It: American Film in the Nineties. New York: New York University Press, 2001, p. 138. 
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carried along and necessarily corrupted by its momentum, Ryan is situated as a 
conservative backlash fuelled by nostalgia, patriarchal values and moral vapidities. 
 
The death of Captain Miller, for instance, is critiqued as a 'bloodless movie death', 
that omits screaming and gore, contributing to an illusion of sentimental dignity in the 
face of death. Lacking the realism of other deaths in the film, not least those of the 
graphic opening sequence, recourse to the sentimental is here deemed by Gabbard to 
permit an evocation of Miller's moral authority as he dispenses ‘life-changing advice’ 
to Ryan.34 Aligned with the benevolent authority of General Marshall (depicted at the 
film’s outset), Gabbard argues that the film nostalgically valorises the entire military 
structure that fought the ‘good war’ as being endowed with a similarly unambiguous 
moral authority, thereby invoking a time when ‘the system worked and morality was 
unambiguous.’35 In a similar vein, Miller becomes for Frank P. Tomasulo ‘another in 
a series of sacrificial “Spielbergian Christ surrogate(s)”’, 36 citing Robert Kolker’s 
original coinage,37 examples of which might include Roy Neary of Close Encounters, 
the eponymous alien hero of E.T., Indiana Jones in The Temple of Doom (1984) and 
Schindler in Schindler’s List.  
 
A problem arrives, therefore, when defenders of Ryan and other Spielberg films detect 
precisely such moral ambiguity in the same scenes that some critics find to be 
complacently simplistic and triumphalist. For Lester Friedman, the death of Miller 
                                                
 
34 Krin Gabbard, ‘Saving Private Ryan Too Late’, p. 136. 
 
35 Ibid., 
 
36 Frank P. Tomasulo,’Empire of the Gun: Steven Spielberg's Saving Private Ryan and American 
Chauvinism’, in Jon Lewis (ed.), The End of Cinema as We Know It: American Film in the Nineties. 
New York: New York University Press, 2001, p. 126. 
 
37 See Kolker’s A Cinema of Loneliness, 3rd ed, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 306. 
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serves to question war as much as to valorise it patriotically, insisting that Ryan 
problematizes the brutality of war and its sacrifices precisely from the disillusioned, 
post-Vietnam perspective that informed war films of the ‘New Hollywood’. As proof 
of a jaded ‘cynicism’ worthy of such auteurs as Kubrick or Scorsese, Ryan is 
distinguished from the rather more straightforwardly patriotic or triumphalist war 
films of earlier generations such as Sands of Iwo Jima (1949), The Longest Day 
(1962) or Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970). Friedman responds to Tomasulo’s criticisms of 
Miller’s death, for instance, by aligning such critique with a modernist distaste for 
mimetic engagement or empathy that dismisses the act of mourning for the 
sentimental death scene. Rejecting the implicit appeals to a disinterested rationality 
necessary for the disavowal of such a scene, Friedman claims: 
The important point remains that Spielberg will not allow 
viewers to retreat into abstract logic, alternately weighing one 
carefully reasoned set of options against another. Instead, he 
puts human faces on universal ethical dilemmas and forces us 
to acknowledge the individual consequences intrinsic with 
every moral decision.38 
 
 
Under this rubric, Spielberg’s infamous manipulation of affect is now appraised as an 
ethical act of humanism, where emotional impartiality becomes a suspect model of 
spectatorship and critique in its insistence that we must ignore ‘individual 
consequences.’ Indeed, the above has been a key assumption of sentimental 
philosophy from its earliest manifestations, from Diderot and Hume onwards to 
Balázs and Bazin, whereby the abstractions of intellectual literature or cinema 
jeopardize the moral imperative of art to reveal human nature. Such a defence of 
Ryan’s dramaturgy is echoed by the ‘special affect’ that Michael Hammond considers 
                                                
 
38 Friedman, Citizen Spielberg, p. 241. 
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the result of Ryan’s conflation of the sentimental and action movie. Belonging to the 
genre of ‘epic war movie’, Hammond distinguishes Ryan from the mere 
entertainment of the action-adventure genre, citing the former genre’s appeals to 
pathos (an ‘obligato of melancholy’) through music, and ‘anguished voices’ and the 
highlighting of ‘poignant fear, suffering and loss.’39  
 
Given such arguments that prefer to perceive the film as epic melodrama rather than 
as identifiably distinct modes of sentiment and action, Ryan’s mode of address now 
appears rather more ambiguous than many critics such as Nichols, Wheeler-Dixon, 
Gabbard or Tomasulo consider. Both formally and rhetorically, Ryan serves as an 
admirably slippery text, visualizing the human costs of war yet constantly 
problematizing its own act of representation and the ethical questions it claims to 
address. If the film’s melodrama serves only as optimistic relief to its otherwise 
oppressively realistic depictions of war and death, it is notably only once the rescue 
mission is well underway that the platoon members discuss their situation as 
‘FUBAR’ (military slang for ‘fucked-up-beyond-all-recognition’). While their 
original remit of invading Northern France at least makes sense as part of the grand 
Allied incursion (as it does also for the spectator with a moderate familiarity with 
WWII history), it is the new mission that clouds as much as clarifies moral legibility, 
defamiliarising the soldiers from their accustomed roles and demanding renewed 
commitments of loyalty and compassion despite fear and disorientation. Likewise, 
Ryan’s own confused and desperate call to his wife that she confirm that he has ‘led a 
good life’ similarly constitutes a critical stance in relation to war that is far from 
                                                
 
39 Michael Hammond, ‘Saving Private Ryan's "Special Affect"’, in Yvonne Tasker (ed.), Action and 
Adventure Cinema, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 153.  
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unambiguous. Ryan’s insecurity indeed becomes a cause not just for ethical, but also 
epistemological, justification. Faced with the gravestones of his comrades, the 
memories invoked (and the film’s narrative) contribute to an overall confusion of 
identity, where Ryan is identified neither as hero, villain nor any of the other ethnic or 
generic stereotypes that comprise the platoon. As if to inhibit the spectator’s 
familiarity with the elder Ryan, he is played by an unknown actor who offers little 
opportunity for engagement that a Hollywood star might have brought to the role. 
With his rescue serving as a ‘McGuffin’ within a rather more conventional war 
movie, and his identity deliberately presented as indeterminate or ‘in development’ 
compared to his comrades’ ethnic and generic security, Ryan’s rescue and identity 
take on a profound meaninglessness compared to the more linear progress and 
straight-forward moral imperatives of D-Day. It is in such instances as the rescue 
mission’s near mutiny or Ryan’s moral confusion that the nihilistic self-preservation 
of such films as M*A*S*H* or the self-introspection of Apocalypse Now are both very 
much in evidence, but bracketed nevertheless in favour of sentimental principles of 
sacrifice, duty and honour, these principles communicated through ‘feeling’ as much 
as through reason. 
 
Indeed, with much of the film following a platoon differentiated in purpose from the 
grand offensive of the Normandy landings, Ryan invokes such films as Apocalypse 
Now or Kelly’s Heroes (1970), precisely in its focalization on a mission distinguished 
from the wider events of a high-profile war. Whether in relation to Apocalypse Now’s 
assassination mission, the heist operation of Kelly’s Heroes’ or Ryan’s own rescue 
mission, FUBAR logic and mutinous intent seem to predominate as key affects of 
such missions, a profound defamiliarisation between dominant historical narrative and 
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these lesser known anomalous, special case modes of combat. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that Ryan also demands to be contrasted with such films through its own significant 
re-framing of the ‘mission’ sub-genre, redressing the now rather established 
association between the small combat mission and a lack of moral legitimacy or 
credible leadership. If Kelly’s Heroes used the Second World War merely as the 
backdrop for a conventional heist caper, deploying the Allied war machine’s 
manpower for an ultimately self-serving, freelance bank robbery, Apocalypse Now 
invokes an even greater sense of moral futility in relation to war. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than when Willard’s voiceover claims that ‘charging a man with 
murder in this place was like handing out speeding tickets in the Indy 500’ alongside 
his clear expressions of skepticism concerning his own generals’ motivations for 
dispensing with Kurtz.40 Not only is criminal killing commonplace in the Vietnam of 
Apocalypse Now, but it goes right to the very top of the American military. Ryan 
directly contrasts with the above film not only in terms of the fact that its mission 
involves the rescue rather than the assassination of a man (significant though that is), 
but also in the sense to which the rescue mission is represented as a legitimate moral 
endeavour within its own diegetic world, both for the individual ‘grunts’ that come to 
realize its moral stakes, and for General Marshall himself, who indeed gives his 
blessing to the mission with a morally stirring speech that draws on the authority of 
Abraham Lincoln himself. While morality and moral purpose is rendered more or less 
bogus in Apocalypse Now, or surplus to requirements in Kelly’s Heroes, it is very 
much recuperated as a driving legitimation of the Allied struggle, in all its 
manifestations, in Ryan. 
                                                
40 For instance Willard says in voiceover, ‘I began to wonder what they really had against Kurtz. It 
wasn't just insanity and murder; there was enough of that to go around for everyone’, and later, ‘No 
wonder Kurtz put a weed up Command's ass. The war was being run by a bunch of four star clowns 
who were gonna end up giving the whole circus away.’ 
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If critics consider Ryan’s most grievous flaw to be its avoidance of anti-war nihilism 
and irreverence, it is the film’s insistence on the individual and the moral priorities 
that surround his or her survival that dares nevertheless to bring moral clarity back to 
the war genre, and in particular to the special mission sub-genre discussed above. If 
Kurtz of Apocalypse Now represented the ‘Heart of Darkness’ that instigates a 
mission bent on the latter’s elimination, the nihilistic meaningless he inspires serves 
to underscore the futility of the war that brought him there. War corrupts the 
individual, which in turn inspires the horrors of more killing. Such a cycle of ‘the 
horror’ is overturned in Ryan, in favour of locating redemption in the individual 
despite the film’s epic sweep. Ryan urges us to desire Ryan’s survival despite our 
knowledge and experience of mass death as an inevitability in war, indeed, one in 
which such sacrifices were known to result in Allied victory and our survival. 
Nihilism is conjured by the film’s going against the grain of history, as reflected in the 
cynicism and fear of the platoon members and the spectator’s experience of generic 
hybridity (combat clashed with melodrama, the epic clashed with the personal). Yet it 
is precisely such polysemy that intensifies the pathos of the film’s overall moral 
pedagogy, where the spectator understands sacrifice even if characters therein fail to. 
Commentators such as Nigel Morris thus describe the film’s self-reflexive polysemy 
as its most critical function: 
Yet, as the film aspires to canonical status within its genre, it 
dialogises movie warfare to challenge assumptions. Gung-ho 
masculinity of John Wayne movies, ‘anti-bourgeois and anti-
authoritarian dropout values’ of the Vietnam generation. And 
‘patriotism, nationalism and militarism’ of the 1980s all 
constitute the discursive formation mediating warfare, and 
veterans’ experiences in the 1990s.41 
                                                
 
41 Morris, Empire of Light, p. 296. 
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If such hybridity brings about an ambiguous mode of address that relativizes its 
ideological discourses, Morris notes how such an attribute remains of principal value 
for ‘20th century critical theory’ and arguably provides a chief means by which the 
film ‘inoculates itself against criticism’ in the eyes of its critics. Moreover, rather than 
implying the necessity for scenes of sentiment to underscore their genericity or 
regressivity through ‘excess’, such scenes and their specific emotional effects are 
permitted without stylistic intervention as such, understood now as part of a larger 
‘mode’ comprised of various genres and attendant discourses.  Sentimental pedagogy 
remains a key function of such a film, its aims intensified rather than undermined by 
its accommodation of variegated discourses. Where the affirmation of ‘You are’ by 
Ryan’s wife to Ryan’s plea for moral clarity conforms to a sentimental brand of 
‘moral legibility’, its appeals run alongside other ‘discursive formations’ conveyed 
with equal weight by the film, such that taking such an affirmation at face-value is 
both encouraged and problematic. Sentimentality is no longer the aesthetic ‘lapse’ that 
critics may dismiss in favour of formal defamiliarisation, emotional detachment or 
common-sense realism but an overriding ideological imperative laid down in the face 
of a culture still at war and once more ostensibly governed by FUBAR logic.  
 
Teaching Compassion 
 
If Saving Private Ryan was deemed problematic for its depiction of redemption in 
Normandy, Schindler’s List would similarly court controversy in its allegedly 
sentimental approach to the Holocaust. Spielberg is accused in its final scenes of 
imposing a morally unequivocal conclusion concerning its central protagonist who, up 
to that point, had seemed too self-concerned and calculating to be a purely virtuous 
hero. A common denominator of many of Spielberg’s films is that of a protagonist 
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(often male) that, in typical matinee-film style, saves the day and learns new values. 
Be it in a fictionalized third-world country where a local cult has stolen children to 
use as slaves (Temple of Doom) or in the faithfully recreated environs of the Krakow 
ghetto and concentration camps (Schindler’s List), Spielberg enhances the emotional 
stakes of his stories through focalisation on a protagonist who learns to both act and 
react morally.  Yet the trope of male redemption that predominates in Spielberg’s 
films has been fraught with ideological contradiction for many commentators, despite 
the ostensibly ‘liberal’ connotations of such transformations in male subjectivity. 
Such critique is exemplified once more by Bill Nichols’ criticisms concerning the 
Spielbergian hero who sees the light: 
In each film, the saviours of those less fortunate and farsighted than 
themselves are white male heroes of gentle character, empathetic 
nature and altruistic impulse, in short: Christ figures. Liam 
Nelson’s conscience-stricken Nazi, Anthony Hopkin's 
compassionate ex-President, and Tom Hank's wise platoon leader 
are pointedly not Jews, or blacks. They do not speak for the plight 
of their own people; instead, they act on behalf of others whom 
they do not fully know or understand. They give of themselves so 
that others might live. They act sacrificially and nobly in the 
manner of the classic Christian narrative.42 
 
 
As Christ figures, the Spielbergian hero is deemed by Bill Nichols to be the catalyst of 
excessive manipulation of historical fact and evidence in favour of a more sentimental 
scheme of moral intervention. By saving his Jewish employees from the genocide of 
the Holocaust, Schindler (Liam Neeson) of Schindler’s List is also arguably shown to 
save himself, and thereby becomes emblematic of how humanity (represented by a 
self-centred Nazi at the film’s outset) could transcend the moral quagmire of Nazi 
involvement in the Holocaust. Such a narrative (following a very similar 
                                                
 
42 Bill Nichols, ‘The 10 Stations of Spielberg's Passion: "Saving Private Ryan." "Amistad."  
"Schindler's List."’, Jump Cut  Vol. 43 (July 2000), p. 11. 
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representation of male ‘lack’ as Citizen Kane, both stylistically and thematically43), 
depicts a businessman and member of the Nazi party who finds moral purpose 
through the discovery of his altruism towards Jews in wartime Poland; prior to this is 
a vacuity and emptiness that it is the narrative’s purpose to fill. Yet the film’s tearful 
ending famously divided the critics, owing once more to its alleged descent into 
bathos.44 Once the Jews have been saved from Auschwitz and the Allies have finally 
won the war, Schindler must take his leave from the now relatively safe Jews. Before 
doing so, however, Spielberg provides a scene of Schindler tearfully berating himself 
for not saving more Jews by using the remainder of his wealth. This self-immolation 
takes place in front of the Jews he has saved, who are there to present him with a 
collective symbol of their gratitude (a gold ring) and to say goodbye to their 
benefactor. This scene confirms Schindler as a ‘good’ man who realises the moral 
stakes of what he has successfully or, in his estimation, unsuccessfully achieved. The 
film as a whole takes Schindler through a narrative of redemption, from the charming, 
egocentric and self-serving entrepreneur at the film’s outset to a heroic, self-
sacrificing man of compassion at the end. For the critic David Thomson, this scene is 
excessive. He argues, 
In the end, this Schindler sacrifices his all to be good, even to the 
point of a breakdown scene that is beyond Neeson and which is the 
most pointed failure in the picture. 
How much truer it might have been if this Schindler had stayed 
matter-of-fact and jovial to the end, laughing off the chance of 
                                                
 
43 Miriam Hansen comments for instance that Spielberg’s ‘relative restraint and witholding of 
interiority’ in his treatment of Schindler rehearses Orson Welles’ in the latter’s depiction of Kane. See 
Miriam Hansen ‘Schindler’s List is not Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and 
Public Memory’, Critical Inquiry Vol. 22, No. 2 (1996), p. 307. 
 
44 For criticisms of Spielberg’s treatment of the Holocaust in Schindler’s List, see Claude Lanzemann, 
‘Why Spielberg Has Distorted the Truth’, Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 14th 1994; Bill Nichols, 
‘The 10 Stations of Spielberg's Passion’ (see note 50); Leon Wieseltier, ‘Close Encounters of the Nazi 
Kind’, The New Republic, Vol. 210, No. 4 (1994). 
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friendship with Stern (for, really, Stern isn't his type) and 
recollecting-- as a rough joke--that the getaway car might have 
meant another handful of lives. But Spielberg won't permit that 
brusqueness with his big finish in sight. So Schindler becomes, 
simply, a ruined but saved man, a character such as Capra might 
have liked.45 
    
Thomson’s mention of Capra immediately evokes a tradition of sentimental narrative 
and characterization in Hollywood. Capra’s It’s A Wonderful Life (1946), it should 
also be noted, has become a paradigm of Hollywood sentimentality (pejoratively 
implied or otherwise) to which all other films within such a ‘mode’ are compared. 
Both Schindler’s List and It’s a Wonderful Life tell stories of men who come to realise 
the ‘important things in life’ such as family, community or charity, over the 
materialistic concerns of finance, business and entrepreneurial expansion. Thomson 
asks how fitting it is, however, for Spielberg to overlay a narrative about the 
Holocaust onto a generic, namely sentimental, narrative arc of redemption for its 
central character. Considering this redemptive climax inappropriate, Thomson argues 
his case largely on the grounds of what would have been, as he says, ‘truer’. He wants 
continuity from the cynical, business-like Schindler of earlier on in the film through 
his farewell scene and no doubt beyond. He does not believe in the central character’s 
sudden overwhelming sadness at the gift upon his departure. He hints that Spielberg is 
pulling the strings, manipulating the narrative in order to produce his ‘big finish.’  
 
This ‘big finish’ presents us with the culmination of the film’s own narrative, 
emphasising above all the survival of these particular Jews. Despite the wide sweep of 
the prior narrative through key historical traumas of the Holocaust (the deportation 
from the Krakow Ghetto, children separated from their parents, Jews entering the 
                                                
 
45 David Thomson, ‘Presenting Enamelware’, Film Comment, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 44-6. 
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Auschwitz gas chambers) Schindler’s List controversially looks to those that survive. 
The tracking shot of their faces reflected in the car’s windows as it moves along gives 
the impression of their abundance. Their number exceeds that which can be taken on 
in the frame, motivating the tracking shot and delivering a cathartic sense of virtue 
finally rewarded. In its dramatization of the Holocaust and its emphasis on a story of 
rescue and survival, Schindler’s List therefore contrasts markedly with other films 
about the Holocaust.  For example, Shoah (dir. Claude Lanzmann, 1985, France), in 
which the representation of actual Holocaust events is deemed taboo, largely favours 
a modernist aesthetic of emptiness, faded memories, and distorted testimonies, all of 
which signify the stark absence of those that have died rather than those that survive. 
Spielberg’s finale does the inverse. Where six million have died, Spielberg represents 
more than 1200 that survived; where many Nazis were unambiguously obedient to the 
Führer, Spielberg presents just one that acted against such ghastly conformism.  
 
The conflict of responses to the film exemplify the extent to which the Holocaust in 
particular divides the hopes of sentimental philosophy (with its roots in 
Enlightenment thought) and a modern post-Holocaust disillusionment with such 
ideals. Indeed, as this thesis argues, it is precisely a contemporary cynicism with 
regards to sentimental tropes and their underlying philosophy that fuels a modernist 
approval of conveying trauma and alienation as an epistemologically superior mode 
of representation. The Holocaust serves as a paradigm in such regards, yet its factual 
representation (although crucial) is constituted in Schindler’s List as just one of 
various priorities of the film’s overall project. Adhering to the sentimental tradition, 
the film had to inform not only intellectually but through ‘feeling’, allowing 
Hollywood’s appropriation of melodrama to represent the Holocaust accurately but 
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also in terms of emotional pedagogy. Yet as film scholar Miriam Hansen notes, 
Schindler’s List was guilty both of being too realistic and not realistic enough, as 
coming as close to a comprehensive, representational survey of the Holocaust as any 
other film in history, while at the same time allowing generic conventions such as an 
upbeat ending, a last-minute rescue, or a hopeful narrative arc and climax to detract 
from its claims to post-Enlightenment realism.46 Such attributes, however, are 
precisely those that allow us to see such films as instances of postmodern 
‘heteroglossia’ that draw on a plurality of stylistic and thematic intertexts. By doing 
so, cinema certainly modifies the reality of such events as the Holocaust but does so 
less in terms of distortion (which suggests deception and emotional naiveté) and far 
more in terms of emotional pedagogy.  
 
Spielberg’s deployment of the reformed male hero becomes therefore an instance of 
his larger project of finding exceptional stories that have gone against the grain of 
history. As a story of unlikely Jewish survival and of a German that experienced 
uncommon remorse and regret while his country was in the grip of Nazism, the 
rhetoric of Spielberg’s film uses such exceptions as a means of inspiring hope in the 
face of what Benjamin termed the ‘abyss’.47 Noting how Spielberg’s film invokes the 
‘synecdoche’ of an original Talmudic saying (where the part stands in for the whole), 
Thomas Elsaesser contrasts Spielberg’s ‘theodicy’ with the European modernism of 
Shoah as follows: 
By affirming that whoever saves one life, saves mankind, 
Spielberg accepts the principle that the one can represent the 
many, that the part can stand for the whole. Shoah is based, 
                                                
 
46 Miriam Hansen, ‘Schindler’s List is Not Shoah’: The Second Commandment, Popular 
Modernism, and Public Memory,’ Critical Inquiry Vol. 22, No. 2 (1996), pp. 292–312. 
 
47 As discusssed in Chapter Three. 
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explicitly and emphatically, on the exact opposite premise: that 
no one can stand in for anyone else, no one can speak for 
anyone else.48   
 
 
In accordance with other defenders of Spielberg’s vision, therefore, focalisation and 
engagement with a moral ‘hero’ is comprehended as part of an aesthetic that runs 
counter to the austere anti-mimeticism of modernist film aesthetics. This is also to 
recall the theory of Béla Balázs on film narrative, for whom the Hollywood 
protagonist enables the fiction film to resonate emotionally while avoiding the 
abstractions of avant-garde practice on one hand, and the arrogant claims to objective 
truth made by documentary on the other. If genocide seems to demand the non-
mimetic, either by avoiding the graphic representation of atrocities or by underlining 
its impact on a collective of people above all else, Balázs’ theory here corresponds 
with synecdoche in its insistence that such events be filtered through the 
consciousness of a diegetic individual.  
 
Such defences of Spielberg very much echo those qualified defences of Chaplin, 
Mickey Mouse, and other Hollywood entertainment figures discussed in previous 
chapters by such writers as Benjamin and Kracauer, where a sentimental mode of 
address ironically underscores the sad facts of modern oppression and hegemony. In 
Spielberg’s films, the articulation and foregrounding of hopeful, idealized outcomes, 
such as the reform and remorse of the central male protagonist, provide poignant and 
instructive counterpoint to instances of historical trauma against which they occur, 
where moral subjectivity continues to be fraught with contradiction and violence, yet 
remains an ideal nevertheless. The film concords with Steve Neale’s arguments 
                                                
 
48 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Subject Positions, Speaking Positions: From Holocaust, Our Hitler, and Heimat 
to Shoah and Schindler's List’, in Vivian Sobchack (ed.), The Persistence of History: Cinema, 
Television and the Public Event, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 178. 
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concerning melodrama’s invocation of the ‘too late’, where displays of humanity and 
sentiment (often maternal sacrifice in the ‘Woman’s Film’) partially resolve a local or 
familial problem but fail to remedy the larger conditions that produced them and 
necessitate such acts.49 
 
In such respects, the film’s central relationship between Schindler and the 
concentration camp commandante Goeth (Ralph Fiennes), underscored as a kind of 
alter-ego to Schindler, mitigates charges concerning the film’s unalloyed optimism. 
Demonstrating not only that for every Schindler that took the risk of disobeying 
Nazism, there were many others that did not, Goeth’s crimes in particular testify to 
the pedagogical problems of Schindler’s exemplary actions. One of the film’s most 
interesting scenes shows Schindler’s attempts at inspiring compassion in Goeth’s 
treatment of the Jews in his camp. By suggesting to Goeth that the latter’s feelings of 
power could be enhanced rather than diminished by ‘pardoning’ the life of camp 
victims rather than by murdering them, Schindler tests a key premise of ‘moral 
sentiment’ theory that foregrounds the potential of compassion for moral change. By 
doing so, the test not only foregrounds the film’s moral pedagogy as an overriding 
philosophical concern, but also crucially serves as a rebuttal to those who condemn 
the film on the grounds of distorted optimism, for it is a test that resolutely fails. Once 
Goeth attempts to pardon a Jewish boy who has failed to clean grime off his bath (‘Go 
ahead, go on, leave. I pardon you’), he kills the boy anyway as he leaves the 
commandante’s house, finding the rewards of empathy inferior to those of murder. 
Owing in no small way to the terms upon which it is formulated, whereby power is 
still invested in the one who ‘pardons’, which is in turn commended by Schindler as a 
                                                
 
49 See Steve Neale, ‘Melodrama and Tears,’ Screen, Vol. 27, No. 66 (1986), pp. 6-22.  
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pleasure of virtuous power rather than any kind of categorical imperative, Goeth 
returns to murder within minutes. Remorse and compassion are shown as such to be 
far from ‘innate’ to the human soul, which is just as likely to be invested in sadism 
during times of war and racial persecution.  
 
The film’s foregrounding of Schindler as a man who ultimately refused to follow 
orders becomes radically more condemnatory of those that didn’t (and a culture that 
succumbed to totalitarianism) than the most graphic or factually accurate 
representation of Nazism. If the final farewell scene seems a cloyingly sentimental 
falsification of a pragmatic and self-interested Nazi up to that point, its point is as 
much to underline the tragedy of Schindler’s exceptionality as to present him as a 
hope for mankind. Just as Chaplin’s tramp ultimately represented the same kind of 
idealized figure that worked against the grain of history, history and its failures 
nevertheless remain signified as much as effaced by them. In both instances, such 
excessively desired presences serve to signify mankind’s ‘too late’s.  
 
 
 
Emotional Pedagogy 
The scene analysed above between Goeth and Schindler also provides a powerful 
rejoinder to arguments concerning the function of reflexivity both in Schindler’s List 
and Spielberg’s films generally. In portraying the literal attempt on the part of a 
would-be moral teacher (Schindler) to inspire empathy and moral sentiment in a 
figure so far removed from its core principles (Goeth), the film comments on its own 
 
 
261 
sentimental project as one that is necessarily idealistic while often unsuccessful.50 Yet 
as much as the film’s historical realism prevents any sustained moral reform on 
Goeth’s part, the scene nevertheless foregrounds the extent to which such pedagogy 
should constitute a vital process towards improving humanity. Its inclusion serves as 
far more than a merely ‘clever’ exercise of mirroring between the sequence and the 
film’s overall rhetoric as an instance of technical self-reflexivity, least of all in terms 
of an attempt to dampen or undermine the film’s sentimental rhetoric. The sequence’s 
full implications are that such appeals to our better selves might succeed where they 
have not in the past, where this time contrary to synecdoche, the part indeed may not 
always represent the whole. Schindler’s action here is an exercise of representation 
with unpredictable results, his role aligned with the film director (or screenwriter) 
who tries to feed a different set of lines to his chief protagonist, not knowing quite 
how it will turn out. The sequence’s power stems from the extent to which reality fails 
to follow such a script so easily, underlining with renewed force the significance of 
scripting and instruction as the only means of effectuating moral order. In other 
words, as opposed to considering the sequence’s rhetoric as ironic commentary on the 
film’s sentimental idealism (as a means of disrupting any clear ideology of feelgood 
optimism on the film’s part), such doubling between sequence and film serves more to 
bolster reflexivity in the name of intensifying the film’s overall power to teach and 
inspire. Critical detachment and a cynical response to ideology tout court gives way to 
                                                
 
50 Indeed, the well-documented incident in Oakland’s Castlemont high school, where students laughed 
at a scene of the a murder of a Jewish woman during the screening of the film, creating public and 
media uproar, reinforced and publicised further the particular aims of the film as much through its 
failures as its successes in moving its genuinely ‘moved’ spectators. See Omer Bartov, ‘Spielberg’s 
Oskar’, in Yosefa Loshitzky (ed.), Spielberg’s Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on Schindler’s List, 
Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, pp. 49-51. 
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the invocation of increased critical engagement when that ideology conforms to moral 
principles, as made salient by a longstanding sentimental tradition. 
 
In such respects, Spielberg’s film once again exhibits a self-reflexivity that serves 
purposes more noble than mere ‘blank parody’ of allusion and quotation on one hand 
or quasi-Brechtian modes of emotional detachment invoked by more cooly modernist 
cinematic practice on the other. If instances of the latter could range from 2001: A 
Space Odyssey or Shoah to American structuralist film or modern avant-garde 
practice, it is in Spielberg’s commitment to inspiring moral sensibility through 
‘feeling,’ as much as through intellectual conceit, that proves such work as the true 
inheritor of a sentimental tradition writ large. Displaying a polysemy that invokes 
Utopian idealism alongside moral instruction while remaining committed to history 
and socio-political emancipation, such films may indeed  ‘inoculate themselves 
against criticism’, but do so in the name of a sentimental pedagogy that remains 
largely respected as a key civil right and duty. In such a vein, they serve an important 
pedagogical function that is distinct from the mere conveyance of factual information, 
that has been widely considered the remit of such sober forms as documentary or 
naturalistic drama, providing emotional, rather than merely informational, instruction. 
If a critic such as David Denby complains that the ending of AI lacked a degree of 
‘common sense’ in the way that it exploits the use of a child actor to drive home its 
rhetoric, such a film might rightfully be considered aligned therefore with critical 
theory’s rather longstanding distrust of that which is signified by such a term. For if a 
central project of critical theory concerns the necessity of unpacking the ostensible 
normativities of our own ‘common sense’ and reveal its basis as a matrix of arbitrary 
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constructs and assumptions about the world,51 its attendant aesthetic necessarily 
approves of such art that aims to facilitate such a process. As such, and in as much as 
sentimentality in Spielberg’s art alerts the spectator to its own deviance from a 
‘common sense’ model, it should be less surprising than it is to consider such films as 
profoundly engaged with critical endeavours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
51 A key theoretical presumption of many critical theorists including Gramsci, Benjamin and Adorno.  
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Chapter Six 
 
‘Sympathy for a Kitsch Devil’: Postmodern Sentiment 
 
In the above chapters, the sentimental has been examined as a concept key to modern 
aesthetic theory, one that has undergone radical shifts in meaning and value in its 
history of deployment, while remaining in common usage to the present. The key 
development concerns its shift from a denotative to a connotative status, from a term 
that maps out a new philosophy of ethics driven by an optimum balance between 
‘reason’ and the ‘passions’, to one that cannot escape connotations of ‘gross 
sentimentality’: the excessive affect of the subject and a set of textual effects 
implicated in that same affective process. However, reassessments and revisions of 
melodrama (and genres that heavily reproduce its tropes such as the ‘action 
blockbuster’) in film studies and renewed emphasis on emotions, the body and 
technology in a wide field of philosophical enquiry bring us to a contemporary 
moment in which the sentimental enjoys a renewed, postmodern acceptability. Yet the 
terms upon which this legitimacy is attained require careful analysis so that we are 
clear as to which specific elements of the sentimental are being favoured at this 
particular cultural moment. The postmodern has been itself widely associated with the 
über cool ‘affect’ of a post-classical, post-Freudian spectatorship, a trend that is 
aligned not so much with a return to the sentimental as with a conceptual 
foregrounding of the body and its receptivity to everyday phenomena. Theories of 
‘affect’ in particular, often dependent conceptually on a radical anti-humanism, posit 
a subjectivity reducible neither to the emotions nor to the individual that experiences 
them. It rather betokens a philosophical movement and critical hermeneutic (arguably 
with Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze as its founding fathers) that, like the 
sentimental, concerns itself with the body and the embodied image, while arguably 
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carrying far less baggage. To be sure, such a term’s intellectual genealogy charts a 
non-identical terrain from the sentimental, yet I suggest below the productivity of 
considering theories of affect and the sentimental as being in possession of similar 
philosophical roots. Furthermore, I would suggest that such comparisons in turn help 
us to better comprehend the emotional appeals of a set of distinctly post-classical 
films, discussed below. In each, sentimental tropes are deployed within an eclectic 
array of stylistic and generic signifiers that significantly alters the extent to which 
such films can be comprehended as sentimental in any modern sense of the term. As 
examples of what I argue below has come to be understood within a rubric of a 
postmodern ‘smart’ aesthetic, as coined by Jeffrey Sconce,1 such films illustrate how 
sentimental tropes are still reproduced in some of the most challenging of 
contemporary films, while their sentimental idealism is reined back ideologically.   
 
It is necessary here to briefly review the main points concerning the theoretical 
genealogy of the sentimental covered above. In a pre-Kantian field of thought, 
thinkers as diverse as Shaftesbury, Hume, Diderot and Adam Smith advance the idea 
that ‘sympathy’, tender emotions and the power of communicated feelings between 
subjects (and between the subject and art) might promise the best hope for the 
achievement of civilized society. As invoked by the sentimental novel and early forms 
of theatrical melodrama, a cultivated response to art was one that by the mid-
eighteenth century was dominated by the customs of the ‘cult of sensibility’. Tears 
and the emotions of admiration, gratitude and moral elation were deemed not only 
enjoyable but crucial ingredients of an enlightened culture and a key signifier of art’s 
power to improve society. The fostering of a moral, compassionate citizenry becomes 
                                                
1 Jeffrey Sconce, ‘Irony, Nihilism and the New American “Smart” Film’, Screen, Vol. 43, No. 4, 
(December 2002). 
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for many a key priority for art, wherein an aesthetic of reading ‘for the sentiment’ is 
aligned with a pedagogical project that goes beyond church and school and out to the 
less regulated but obviously powerful interactions between citizens, media and 
feeling. If classical tragedy aimed to invoke ‘pity and terror’ in its audiences, the new 
dramas sought, as Peter Brooks argues, to make morality legible through pathos. 
While church and school aimed to instil values through the ‘precept’ of Judeo-
Christian scripture and the belief in God, sentimental art could inspire a more humane 
subject through an ‘interactive’ process of moral spectatorship. In this, an 
Enlightenment faith in man and society’s progress could continue on through the 
subject’s attainment of moral knowledge through ‘feeling.’ 
 
Yet if the sentimental begins as a term that represents the ambitions of Enlightenment 
thinkers to found ethics in a renewed formulation of emotion or ‘moral sense’, critical 
undercurrents running alongside them and certainly following them have continually 
sought to expose the underlying assumptions of sentimental theory as naïvely wrong-
headed, not least in relation to actual moral agency and political action. If Kant’s 
emphasis on the subject’s ‘disinterest’ as a crucial principle of judgment evacuated 
moral action of the subject’s motivations and ‘interests’, then an emotion-driven 
apprehension of truth or beauty became once more problematic.2 As critics of the 
cheaply sentimental literature that proliferated through the course of the 18th century 
claimed, the experiencing of ‘noble’ feelings before art might fail spectacularly in 
engendering allegiance to (moral) Reason on the part of an actual person. With the 
                                                
2 For instance, Kant’s position on compassion is one that demands ‘disinterest’ over pity as the only 
ethical response to another’s suffering. Pity for another’s misfortune negates a Stoical devaluing of 
external goods. Thus ‘such benevolence is called softheartedness and should not occur at all among 
human beings.’ (Doctrine of Virtue, 34). See also Kant’s ‘Critique of Judgment’ for further discussion 
of ‘disinterest.’ 
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subject wedded firmly to the abstracted moral action of the ‘categorical imperative’, 
the sentimental becomes aligned more exclusively with the subjective and the 
irrational, and not in a particularly cool or radical way. If Romanticism’s veneration 
of the irrational sublime recuperated subjectivity as a vital corrective to the ultimately 
impossible objectivities of scientific enquiry and knowability, its sentimental cousin 
would come to signify the distinctly unsublime and down-home spaces of the 
feminine, the infantile, the local and the domestic, sites of both idealization and 
ubiquity alongside unprecedented sexual repression, boredom, and as Freud would 
later discern, hysteria.3 The Victorian bourgeois home indeed becomes the model and 
the pervasive reality of a newly-industrialized and increasingly middle-class populace, 
with theatrical melodrama and the sentimental idealism of works ranging from the 
‘penny dreadful’ to the classics of Dickens and Hugo providing a constellation of 
bourgeois models to revere, and later to call into question. Both form (the realist novel 
and melodrama) and content (virtue in distress, belated recognitions of virtue, the 
domestic sphere, infant martyrdom, reunited long-lost family members) coalesce to 
form the ever more clichéd sentimentalism that both modernity and modernism had to 
eclipse in order to be modern at all. 
 
Given that recognizing the grief over Little Nell’s death was the test and the badge of 
Victorian moral subjectivity, Oscar Wilde’s ironic suggestion of ‘laughter’ in its place 
serves indeed as a frustrated appeal for a playful species of reception that should be 
anything but sentimental, pointing the way to the subversive humour (discussed in 
                                                
3 See Freud’s most famous analysis of female hysteria (Dora) in Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of 
Hysteria (1905 [1901], Standard Edition Vol.7, pp. 1–122). 
 
 
 
268 
Chapter Four) that might take down an insipidly genteel melancholia.4 Moreover, 
with readers here implicitly asked to consider and react to a Dickens’ novel from the 
more distanced perspective required for the full apprehension of its kitsch elements, 
one of modernism’s key roles become clear. At least as far as high modernism is 
concerned, art had to become less obvious, less intuitive and more self-reflexive if it 
was to have any real purchase on modern subjectivity, the latter now subsisting in a 
world of exploded fragments and incongruities offering apparently nothing of the 
wholesome coherence of the bourgeois subject in his or her ever dependable hearth 
and home. As Susan Buck-Morss argues in relation to the theory of Walter Benjamin, 
and pointing the way to postmodern theory, the modern subject had become a jaded 
figure of ‘anaesthesia’, shocked into emotional numbness and urban servitude, no 
longer able to respond to, or feel, real emotion realistically rendered, except perhaps 
through the larger-than-life technology of cinema.5 In its own simulations of shock, 
whether construed as a formal property of Soviet montage, the emphasis on an 
atomized urban experience from Lang’s Metropolis to Ruttmann’s Berlin: Die 
Sinfonie der Großstadt, or of the mere scale of the cinematic image brought before the 
spectator’s eyes in the dark movie theatre, cinema might serve modernism’s project of 
bringing dispersed fragments together again into a new synthetic whole. Bearing more 
resemblance to a Picasso painting than to a Victorian street scene or a still life, 
modernism’s last ditch efforts to find coherence would thus also by definition avert 
                                                
4 Oscar Wilde is famously said to have remarked, ‘One would need a heart of stone to read of the death 
of Little Nell without laughing.’ 
 
5 See Susan Buck-Morss, ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered’, New Formations, No. 20, (Summer 1993), pp. 123-143. For a discussion particularly 
focused on the concept’s application to film theory, see Tom Gunning, ‘An Aesthetic of Astonishment: 
Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator,’ Art & Text, No. 34, (Spring 1989), pp. 31-32. 
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our eyes from nostalgic evocations of prelapsarian wholeness, as deemed most clearly 
epitomized in the Victorian model of sentimental idealism and moral virtue. 
 
Sentimentality or sentimentalism as such became a term that now contended with a 
burgeoning set of other ‘isms’ (Dadaism, Futurism, Surrealism, Expressionism, 
Neorealism, Postmodernism etc.), each having the advantage of their novelty as both 
attribute and driving ideology, as most clearly exemplified by the manifesto form that 
accompanied so many of these projects.6 Where the politicized aesthetics of most of 
the historical avant-gardes advanced that same modernist call for an alternative space 
of radically constructed coherence through ‘difficult’ but more truthful engagements 
with the world’s fragmentation, the sentimental is accentuated as a rigidly old-
fashioned insistence on the virtues of common-sense realism alongside an optimistic 
and idealist faith in humanist (or latently Christian) values of protestant struggle, 
redemption and sacrifice. Contrary to both modernist imperatives of undermining the 
integrity of realist representational culture or to a relatedly postmodern attachment to 
free-floating signifiers without reliable referent, the sentimental continues to fuel its 
often didactic project with a reliance on knowability, legibility and a kind of intuitive 
common-sense (which itself becomes a mere byword for the acceptance and approval 
of moral truism and conservative ideology). Where the 20th century saw an 
epistemological reorientation towards an attention to pure form, ‘Weimar’ surfaces 
and anti-illusionist objectivity, the sentimental represents an oft derided but still 
potent nostalgia for the possibility of an intimate relation between appearance and 
reality. If the postmodern period, as Frederic Jameson claims, represents the death-
                                                
6 Marinetti’s Futurist manifesto, Breton’s The Surrealist Manifesto and Nadja or indeed Zavatinni’s 
arguments on Italian Neorealism (see ‘Some Ideas on the Cinema’, Sight and Sound, Vol. 23, (October-
December 1953), pp. 64-9) all conform in such respects with a modernist underwriting of a set of 
political and aesthetic aims attached to an art movement. 
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knell of hermeneutic ‘depth models’ in relation to contemporary subjectivity, the 
sentimental becomes doubly anachronistic in its insistence on a vital integrity 
pertaining to both subject and image. 
 
Yet cinema has of course faithfully and indeed ruthlessly reproduced such a tradition 
despite the great promise it held for many as an exemplar of high modernist 
dynamism, depicting time and again the pathetically vulnerable subject and his/her 
vain struggles with oppression and cruelty. Auteurs such as Chaplin and Spielberg 
(not to mention all those in between such as Griffith, De Mille, Murnau, Capra, 
Disney, Lean, and Ford) clearly invoke this tradition in their work and are rightly 
deemed sentimental in the extent to which the narrative tropes deployed in their films 
so frequently adhere to the melodramatic ‘if only’, returning time and again to a 
pedagogical relaying of cultural values. We have clearly moved on from a high-
modernist denigration of such emotion in favour of analyses that have both 
recuperated the appeals of pathos and melodrama to politically humanist purposes and 
underscored a more emotionally and ideologically eclectic dynamic at play in such 
films. In place of an insistence on an austerely modernist attachment to apparatus, 
institution, experimentation and non-realist forms, ‘classical’ Hollywood cinema is 
considered in some cases postmodern avant la lettre in its inevitable fusions of 
sentiment and irony, affect and intertextuality. Where modernist parody might have 
interrogated and dismembered a potentially sentimental scene to the point of its no 
longer resembling the sentimental at all, postmodern pastiche more likely brackets the 
sentimental trope within a larger polysemic stream, allowing the sentimental its own 
internal integrity while juxtaposing it alongside a multitude of other generic tropes. 
Chaplin’s slapstick persona coexists and is emotionally intensified by the pathetic 
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moments of weakness, frailty and plucky resolve that resonated with the social 
conditions of his era. Equally, Saving Private Ryan’s Captain Miller’s embodies the 
ethos of Spielberg himself, serving mutually-inclusive roles of teacher, pro-active 
leader, family man, ‘unknown’ soldier and anti-war nihilist. While only the latter film 
can be understood as a ‘post-classical’ film, owing to considerations of its period of 
production and its enhanced intertextuality, the register of sentiment shared by these 
films reveals the throughline of melodrama that has in many ways dominated 
Hollywood from early to post-classical eras. 
 
Indeed, as an ‘action-blockbuster’, Saving Private Ryan overwhelms the spectator 
with high-octane special effects and kinetics, yet recourse to the sentimental has been 
noted as an equally key ingredient to this particularly post-classical of genres. As 
Barry Langford notes, a genre that incorporates output ranging from Spielberg to 
Simpson and Bruckheimer has become a ‘New Hollywood’ dominant not only 
through ‘high-concept’ genre hybridity, cross-media cooptability and rampant generic 
self-consciousness, but also through an adherence and indeed a revitalization of 
Hollywood’s melodramatic tradition. Langford argues that as: 
ultra-modern – even postmodern – as in so many ways the action 
blockbuster obviously is, it also manifests abiding continuities 
with and through the history of Hollywood genre. In its 
combination of visual spectacle, sensational episodic storylines, 
performative and presentational excess, and starkly simplified, 
personalized narratives, the action blockbuster is umbilically 
linked to the foundational melodramatic tradition of Hollywood 
film.7 
 
Post-classical film is marked indeed both by a startling contemporaneity and 
reflexivity that seductively foregrounds the cinematic apparatus as capitalist 
                                                
7 Barry Langford, Film Genre: Hollywood and Beyond, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, 
p. 236. 
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commodity and marketing vehicle, while nevertheless time and again revealing its 
continuities with its ‘domestic/pathetic melodramatic traditions.’8 If a certain 
modernism’s streamlined rupture with the past is negated by such continuities, the 
sentimental becomes once again a legitimate player within a thoroughly inclusive 
postmodern aesthetic. 
 
Or does it? Indeed, what is postmodernism and its underlying philosophy of emotion? 
Moreover, what place (if any) does sentimentality have in a postmodern cultural 
landscape now apparently characterized by the collapse of high/low categories of taste 
and an appreciation for sentimentalism that can only be enjoyed ironically as kitsch? 
While the sentimental once represented the core of moral aesthetics, its status within 
postmodern culture now becomes far more ambiguous, for while the latter may herald 
‘affect’ and the body as newly politicized regimes, sentimentality itself continues to 
signify subjectivist triviality, moralistic manipulation and a conservative 
impermeability to new experience. Modernism’s ‘cool’ detachment continues, albeit 
under a revised set of parameters. 
 
 
Camp, or the ‘Waning of Affect’ 
 
As many commentators have noted, postmodernism does not chronologically (and for 
some even theoretically) supersede its supposed predecessor (as modernism was 
wished to do, in relation to its own forbears), but represents precisely the 
impossibilities of such a ‘paradigm shift’, despite its ‘post’-ness. Whether put in terms 
                                                
8 Ibid., p. 236. 
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of Lyotard’s relegation of ‘grand narratives’9, Baudrillard’s ‘simulacra’10, the slow 
and agonized falling out of favour with Western Marxist discourse, or Foucault’s 
related insistence on ‘Power’ as the pervasive play of ideology and dominance 
without a metaphysical centre11, the postmodern questions the possibilities of a 
radically achieved purity of the political-modernist project in favour of an at once 
disillusioned but celebratory carnival of omnipresent representation and 
‘différance’.12 Where the progressive, ‘writerly’ text promised to jolt the reader or 
spectator into a new, rather sobering recognition of the political Real, the postmodern 
text is one above all of ‘shallowness’, demystifying the ideology of an ultimate 
totality or referent (or the ‘meta-subject’ in Hegelian terms13) in favour of the 
perpetual deferral of meaning and a deliriously playful calculus of images, tropes and 
‘readymades’.14  
 
This arguably sits at odds therefore with how the sentimental has for a long time been 
firmly aligned with a ‘depth’ model of perception, assuming an alliance between 
                                                
9 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, Geoffrey Bennington & Brian Massumi 
(trans.), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.  
 
10 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, Sheila Faria Glaser (trans.), Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1994. 
 
11 For instance, Foucault dismisses a Hegelian ‘transcendental subject’ in favour of attending to the 
‘various enunciative modalities’ that ‘manifest his dispersion.’ Methodologically, therefore, an 
‘archeology of knowledge’ is foregrounded over and above a more teleological ‘history of ideas.’ (See 
Archeology of Knowledge, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 55-61). 
 
12 Jacques Derrida’s term for the post-structuralist emphasis on textuality and the infinite permutations 
of identity inherent to a world structured by language. See ‘Différance’ in Alan Bass (trans.), Margins 
of Philosophy, Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1982. 
 
13 As discussed by Martin Jay in Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to 
Habermas, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, p. 54. 
 
14 Although Duchamp’s ‘readymade’ of course epitomizes the self-critical collapsing of high and low 
art as a chief aspect of modernism itself, such a figure has proven particularly resilient in postmodern 
discourse in terms of the already-existent status of tropes in contemporary media culture. 
 
 
 
274 
cognition and emotion that seems fundamentally challenged by a postmodern 
foregrounding of context, intertextuality and moral relativization.15 The subjective 
experience of emotion is considered so fluid, fickle and manipulable that its 
importance to critical theory often pales in comparison to renewed efforts to grasp at 
more productive differentials at play in a plurality of image economies, fleeting 
articulations of actual conditions of sexual, racial, ethnic and national identity. This 
‘piecemeal’ and arguably more rigorous approach characterises how the media are 
approached in much of cultural studies and how film spectatorship is analysed by 
much cognitive film theory, a shift that has itself inspired continued enquiry and 
debate.16 Up to an extent, the postmodern announces the death of emotion altogether 
amidst the omnipresence of simulacra and the collapse of subjectivity implied in such 
theory. For Frederic Jameson, there is a profound ‘waning of affect’ in the images of 
postmodern culture, aligned with a fundamental undermining of humanist and 
metaphysical models of truth and progress. Emotion aligned with heartfelt belief is no 
longer tenable within such rubrics, where the only life for sentimentality is one where 
it can be recognized in inverted commas. Like postmodern images, emotions for 
Jameson are ‘free-floating and impersonal and tend to be dominated by a ‘peculiar 
kind of euphoria.’17 Such pronouncements are echoed in the title of Steven Shaviro’s 
article, ‘The Life, After Death, of Postmodern Emotions.’18 Meanwhile Jeffery 
Sconce identifies an entire genre of the 1990s, the ‘smart film’, which invokes a 
                                                
15 See Frederic Jameson’s key comparison between Van Gogh’s peasant shoes and Andy Warhol’s 
‘Diamond Dust Shoes’ as archetypes of modern and postmodern art respectively in Postmodernism, or, 
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991, pp. 6-10. 
 
16 Nöel Carroll for instance calls for an above all ‘piecemeal’ approach to theoretical film study in his 
and David Bordwell’s Post Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, University of Wisconsin Press, 1996, 
pp. 37-68. 
 
17 Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 16. 
 
18 Steven Shaviro, ‘The Life, After Death, of Postmodern Emotions’, Criticism, Vol. 46, No. 1, (2004). 
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contemporary nihilism and ‘blankness’. Through a static mise-en-scène and longer 
shot lengths (that contrast with classical Hollywood editing), such films ‘are highly 
stylized, their sense of authorial effacement and blank presentation achieved not 
through a feigned verité but through a series of stylistic choices mobilized to signify 
dispassion, disengagement and disinterest.’19 
 
Meanwhile the ‘euphoria’ to which Jameson alludes shares connotations with ‘camp’, 
a key mode of the postmodern. The moment of camp (arguably subsuming the 
modernist one) represents the relativization of an artistic ‘common-sense’ or ‘quality’ 
that has implicitly underpinned a set of formal conventions deemed acceptable in 
terms of its emotional appeals. A certain ‘classical’ mode of address (whether 
implicitly patriarchal, heteronormative or repressive of female, queer or racial identity 
is still open to debate) that has itself borrowed aspects from avant-garde, documentary 
and mainstream cinema, is now used within a more pluralistic array of popular forms. 
Its own possible policing and editing of ‘excess’, whether of the sentimental, the 
effeminate, the violent, the amateurish, the cheaply-made or the plain ‘bad’, is 
likewise called into question as a set of culturally constructed and latently political 
criteria.20 In relation to the cinema, camp rejects a tasteful classicism that rests above 
all on what Warren Buckland names a film’s ‘organic unity’, where all elements 
function harmoniously and invisibly in the service of linear narrative.21 The 
                                                
19 Sconce, ‘ “Smart” Film’, p. 359. Sconce’s examples of the genre include Crash (David Cronenberg, 
1996), Happiness (Todd Solondz, 1998) Safe (Todd Haynes, 1995), The Ice Storm (Ang Lee, 1997) 
and Your Friends and Neighbours (Neil LaBute, 1998).  
 
20 Sconce discusses the continuing impulse for media scholars and fans of ‘trash’ to discover ‘counter-
cinemas’ that may be distinguished from classical Hollywood cinema in terms of the style and the 
pleasures offered by alternative forms, in ‘Trashing the Academy: Taste, Excess, and an Emerging 
Politics of Cinematic Style,’ Screen, Vol. 36, No. 4, (1995),  pp. 371-93. 
 
21 A term Buckland deploys in relation to the overall coherence of form and style valorised by V.F. 
Perkins in Film as Film, and further elaborated by Bordwell, Thompson and Staiger as the stylistic 
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paradigmatic camp spectator is also characterized by a healthy postmodern distrust of 
classical pathos, seeing all appeals to ‘conventional’ emotions as precisely that – 
appeals, and moreover, ones that the spectator always sees coming. The laying of 
inverted commas over any such appeal, resulting in what Jeffrey Sconce calls the 
‘dampened affect’ invoked by the contemporary ‘smart’ film, characterizes a 
spectatorship that has seen it all before and cannot be impressed upon in the same way 
that a more classical audience might.22 Only through parody (or what Jameson calls 
‘blank parody’) can the postmodern spectator be reminded of that appeal, albeit one 
that is now distorted and rendered disingenuous by its own acknowledgement of that 
spectator effect.  
 
Of course, if one were to offer an example of the aforementioned aesthetic against 
which camp rails, one might be tempted to suggest Schindler’s List or one of many of 
Spielberg’s ‘serious’ films as key paradigms. The film has the technical virtuosity, 
sophisticated mode of address and emotional seriousness that exemplifies the 
common-sense quality against which so many other films are deemed inferior. The 
latter are consumed with glee however by a camp sensibility that relishes such 
stylistic shortcomings and reclaims them as ‘paracinema’23, and it is with a punkish 
sneer at the mainstream canon that such films are applauded as unintentional 
masterpieces. Although Schindler’s List was itself widely deemed to embody a 
regressive sentimentalism, and was both recognized and repudiated by various critics 
                                                                                                                                       
parameters of the ‘classical Hollywood film’ in The Classical Hollywood Cinema, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985. See Warren Buckland, Directed by Steven Spielberg: Poetics of the 
Contemporary Hollywood Blockbuster, Continuum, 2006, pp. 29-52.  
 
22 See ‘New American “Smart” Film’, pp. 359. 
 
23 For discussions of paracinema, see Sconce’s ‘Trashing the Academy’ and Joan Hawkins, Cutting 
edge: Art-Horror and the Horrific Avant-Garde, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. 
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as such, such an attribute could not possibly qualify it for recuperation as camp. 
Displaying mainstream Hollywood’s high production values, its emotional appeals are 
considered calculatedly excessive rather than accidentally or ironically so. While 
postmodern in terms of its intertextuality and self-conscious referentiality, the film 
necessarily contrasts in tone with the ‘smart’ cinema of such filmmakers as Tarantino 
or Solondz discussed below. Where the latter stand as paradigms of an ironic and 
über-stylized approach to the melodramatic mode, Spielberg remains committed in 
such films as Schindler’s List to more traditional invocations of pathos. Whether 
motivated by artistic aims, a very ‘smart’ business strategy, or most likely both, it 
certainly caters to a variety of what Thomas Elsaesser terms ‘speaking positions’,24 
invoking the sentimental alongside more critical concerns with form. However, 
although indicative of a ‘flashy rhetorician’, as James Naremore argues,25 Spielberg’s 
work is still largely deemed to exemplify ‘organic unity’ according to Warren 
Buckland, significantly balanced in terms of both pedagogical, legible signifieds and 
excessive signifiers.  
 
It is often however in accordance with a marked disdain for such tasteful economy in 
relation to a film’s emotional registers that a ‘smart’ sensibility processes excess in a 
particular way, favouring the unintended, unconscious or ironic attributes of camp 
over the deliberate, didactic and sometimes manipulative features of sentimentality. If 
the films of Sirk exemplified melodrama’s potential for camp as a function of 
excesses in mise-en-scène, colour and music, ‘paracinema’ is celebrated by a camp 
                                                
24 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Subject Positions, Speaking Positions: From Holocaust, Our 
Hitler and Heimat to Shoah and Schindler’s List,’ in Vivian Sobchack (ed.), The Persistence of 
History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 149-72. 
 
25 James Naremore, ‘Love and Death in A.I. Artificial Intelligence,’ Michigan Quarterly Review, Vol. 
44, No. 2, (2005), p. 258. 
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sensibility informed above all by what Sconce terms a ‘particular reading protocol’, 
marking out members of a subculture that aesthetically ‘valorize all forms of 
cinematic ‘trash.’26 While the many tropes of sentimental virtue, the martyred moral 
soul and the belated recognitions of goodness became hackneyed formulae before 
even the latter half of the 18th century, their denigration, through such terms as kitsch, 
the formulaic and the emotionally gratuitous, now return as instances of postmodern 
camp. In sympathy with the feminine and ‘queer’ identities implicitly repressed by 
what is considered an ideologically patriarchal, heteronormative system of aesthetic 
value, camp becomes an ironic championing of unjustly derided discursive forms. A 
postmodern sentimentality in turn serves as a politically refreshing but ambivalent 
‘excess’ that both reproduces and punctures the aesthetic conservatism of a now 
institutionalized set of tropes, character types and narrative patterns. As Shaviro notes 
of camp, its 
 
affectations and exaggerations […] ridiculed the straight world's 
values and norms. But at the same time, they also secretly 
allowed gay men to affirm those values, an affirmation that was 
otherwise forbidden to them. The camp value of bad 
performance lies in the way that it both expresses forbidden 
desires and simultaneously protectively disavows those very 
desires through parody and excess. In this way, camp is deeply 
ambivalent: it has both a subversive, desiring edge and a 
conservative, conformist edge.27  
 
If camp’s recuperation of the ‘bad performance’ rests on the pervasive relativism 
fostered by modernism’s (deliberate?) collapsing of aesthetic criteria, sentimental 
tropes (precisely in their ‘gross’ manifestations) have afforded a means by which 
                                                
26 Sconce, ‘Trashing the Academy,’ p. 372. 
27 Shaviro, ‘Postmodern Emotions’, p. 131. 
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minority identity groups express the contradictions of their social belonging.28 
However, cultural studies’ foregrounding of the reader or spectator’s agency in 
relation to an expanded host of popular texts has problematized alignments between 
camp and the minority cultures it once seemed to define in terms of taste. As Barbara 
Klinger has observed, ‘mass camp’ becomes available to a far wider audience, no 
longer defining the tastes of an actual gay or female community and arguably 
becoming so ‘mainstream’ as to no longer serve as a ‘subculture’ discourse at all.29 
The artistry and craft of performers and directors loses significance compared to their 
contributions to a new carnival of exaggerated form, pastiche and radical 
incompetence.30 In such respects, much ‘reality television’ indeed might be deemed 
camp’s coup de theatre in its wilful foregrounding of the amateur and his/her 
knowing performances of contemporary social identity. 
 
The political materiality once revealed through austerely modernist difficulty, 
defamiliarisation and reflexivity may now thus be equally, if not more, discernible in 
the omnipresent excesses of the generic, the cringingly trite or the cloyingly 
sentimental images of popular culture. Indeed, the ‘pathetic’ has been appropriated in 
some sectors as a new aesthetic unto itself, one that revels in the camp appropriation 
                                                
28 Richard Dyer for instance notes the parodic excesses of camp as a key feature of both underground 
gay and lesbian cinema, while remaining a key attribute to certain other underground films that aren’t 
specifically gay in content, such as the films of John Waters. See Now You See It: Studies in Gay and 
Lesbian Film, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 109-200. 
 
29 See Barbara Klinger, Melodrama and Meaning: History, Culture and the Films of Douglas Sirk, 
Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 132-156. 
 
30 See also Susan Sontag’s original highlighting of camp sensibility in ‘Notes on Camp’ (in Against 
Interpretation, London: Penguin Classics, 1964), and further discussions of camp in Angela McRobbie, 
Postmodernism and Popular Culture, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 82-95. Tania Modleski has also 
addressed questions of gender and popular culture in many works, see ‘The Search for Tomorrow in 
Today’s Soap Operas,’ in Marcia Landy (ed.), Imitations of Life, pp. 446-465. For a good overview, see 
See Fabio Cleto (ed.), Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999. 
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of sentimental kitsch, for which even an online manifesto of ‘patheticism’ exists.31 
One of its aims is worth looking at carefully, where patheticism is defined ‘as a desire 
to move beyond the bounds of irony via an unapologetic occupancy of a position 
which is from the outset acknowledged to be untenable in any heroic sense yet very 
human.’ While at the same time asserting that ‘pathetic art hates the ethical and the 
moralistic’ such a manifesto approaches kitsch through the lens of ‘camp’ humanism 
or in its own terms, ‘sympathy for a kitsch devil.’ As with the Surrealists and their lost 
objects, it is in the pure triteness of the pathetic that a camp sensibility finds aesthetic 
value, connoting freedom in the collapsing of aesthetic criteria invoked by such acts 
of contemplation in relation to kitsch. The more such objects fail to connote value in 
capitalist, aesthetic terms, the more value they attain as aesthetic excesses. 
Embodying a sentimental narrative of its own, the useless media object (itself lost in 
an omnipresent image culture and signifying mass culture in a way that a Spielberg 
film cannot) attains aesthetic value in its own epitomization of failure, rejection and 
depersonalized helplessness. 
 
Indeed, if the camp sensibility recuperates all forms of ‘trash’, it is still a certain 
category of  ‘melodrama’ that wins out here over the sentimental as such. ‘Camp’ 
functions in postmodern culture as a hermeneutic attuned to the excessive signifiers of 
desire, denial and hysterical repetition that an abstract high culture has failed 
ultimately to register. Yet in a curious turnaround of what one might be tempted to 
call camp’s ‘inverted snobbery’, the sentimental becomes a certain regressive, above 
all conservative, ‘quality’ of melodrama that still wrong-headedly aspires to such 
‘high’ aims, despite its own historical alignments with kitsch. Where camp revels in 
                                                
31 See http://www.kurtbrereton.com/pathman.html, accessed online 3rd July 2010. 
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the provisional realities of the shallow and the raw, the sentimental seems stills to 
represent a repugnant stylistic ‘gloss’ that strains for feeling and deeper, more static, 
meaning. If camp valorises John Wayne, the Queen Mother, the films of John Waters 
and Todd Haynes, daytime soap operas and a whole host of rediscovered 
paracinematic classics, it is because their ‘schlock’ is either unintentionally gratuitous 
or intentionally, ironically parodic.32 Yet camp, even ‘mass camp,’ is rather less 
concerned with melodrama that remains within a sentimental category of taste, the 
latter delivering pathos without the apparent irony and parodic intent that so defines a 
‘trash’ aesthetic of its own. Chaplin’s patheticism and Spielberg’s redemptive models 
do not connote camp as the above examples have, for they still embody a certain 
classicism represented by a repertoire of affects that are neither archly ‘smart’ nor 
casually ‘incompetent.’ Indeed, regressive sentimentalism is more often associated 
with full intentionality, and indeed seriousness, the chief grounds upon which charges 
of emotional manipulation are levied. Amidst the increasingly complex image 
economies within which sentimental tropes circulate, as outlined above, it is still in 
terms of the sentimental’s connotations of earnest pedagogy (or ‘new sincerity’), in 
accordance with its genealogical roots, that its own effects continue to court dismissal. 
 
So the sentimental seems not to have lost all conceptual significance within a culture 
of emotion characterised for Jameson, quoting Lyotard, as the fleeting ‘intensities’ of 
an image culture perpetually in flux.33 One can indeed say with some certainty that 
the sentimental clearly has survived conceptually for a very long time and most likely 
                                                
32 See Richad Dyer’s brief list of camp icons in ‘It’s Being So Camp As Keeps Us Going,’ (1976), in 
Fabio Cleto (ed.), Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject,’ University of Michigan Press, 
1999, pp. 110-16. 
 
33 Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 16. 
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will continue to do so, albeit in forms guided by a contemporary postmodern 
sensibility. The aesthetic ‘bracketing’ of emotions need not in such a context imply a 
loss of potency but a rather more complex interaction between subject, technology 
and memory. In such respects, Steven Shaviro’s deployment of ‘sentimentalism’, in 
his article on ‘postmodern emotions’, rests on the concept’s continuing invocation of 
a vital bridging of the conceptual divide between reason and emotion. He argues as 
follows: 
There are good reasons why we can no longer take emotions 
seriously. We are far too jaded, cynical, and ironic ever to trust 
the heart rather than the head. And a good thing too. But this 
condition of terminal irony is also what allows us to reinvent the 
much-maligned state of aesthetic disinterest. And in that cool, 
impersonal, and disaffected state we encounter the life (after 
death) of postmodern emotions. I am calling, therefore—and I 
think that Warhol would have approved—for a new sort of 
emotionalism or even sentimentalism, that is to say, for feelings 
that are playful, perverse, whimsical, wasteful, futile, 
dysfunctional, extravagant, and ridiculous.34 
 
By underscoring what I have above referred to as a historical denigration of emotion, 
Shaviro redeems sentimentality for its invocation of a kind of sensual eclecticism, that 
depends above all, I would agree, on the continuing tendency of the media to engage 
the spectator both intellectually and emotionally. Because our emotional lives have 
changed from the enthralled immersion of cinema to Warhol’s distracted 
spectatorship of a television that’s always switched on, the postmodern allows for a 
far wider spectrum of aesthetic experience, of an omnipresent image culture that 
perpetually feeds on ‘feeling.’ 
 
With disaffected irony now thus the virtual precondition of a postmodern sensibility, 
the sentimental project of guaranteeing moral civility through art’s transmission of 
                                                
34 Steven Shaviro, ‘Postmodern Emotions’, p. 131. 
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particular moral values remains a largely bankrupt idea, yet pathos and the pathetic 
remain vital to aesthetic theory. Getting ‘beyond the bounds of irony’ (as the 
‘patheticism manifesto’ calls for) requires a sympathy that must still not be equated 
with a conservative moralism, necessitating a shift towards the abstract, for which 
Shaviro is quite right to invoke Kant. From tears as tangible evidence of moral 
character to tears as a momentary bodily reaction cued by a particular constellation of 
stimuli, the latter is nevertheless accorded importance as the ‘affect’ generated by 
aesthetic experience. If it is not subversive, affect can no longer be dismissed as 
apolitical either. Neither progressive nor regressive, the political promiscuousness of 
sentiment becomes its most promising attribute, as experienced by a subject 
unmoored from both rigid ideology, and, if the most radical postmodern voices are to 
be believed, from herself. If irony and media-literacy deflate the newness of 
experience and any notion of a naively moral spectator, po-mo sentimentality must 
necessarily be considered within a more expansive rubric than that defined within 
reductive moral parameters. This begs the question of how contemporary moral 
philosophy has itself responded to the changes prompted by post-modernity. 
 
Postmodern Moral Philosophy 
 
Academic philosophers would be the first to announce the problems lying at the heart 
of moral philosophy and ethics in the post-modern era; yet the set of problems they 
articulate look very different from those addressed by media aesthetics. A moral 
philosopher such as Alisdair MacIntyre echoes the revisionist impulses of the 
postmodern moment with his 1981 book After Virtue,35 a work that announced the 
failure both of Enlightenment notions of the moral individual and its nihilistic 
                                                
35 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. 
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aftermath, in favour of a return to an Aristotelian understanding of morality founded 
in man’s interaction with society. Identifying the same late 19th century moment of 
the Enlightenment’s collapse in Nietzsche’s attacks on a universalist morality, 
McIntyre nevertheless attacks the latter’s own emphasis on the individual as an 
Übermensch. While a faith in Enlightenment’s universalism was bound, he argues, to 
fail, solutions resting on the political philosophy of Nietzsche to John Rawls fail 
owing to their reliance on ‘emotivism’, a philosophical movement that McIntyre 
implicitly aligns with the modernist age and its rejection of 19th century Victorian 
culture. Thus he asks: 
What was it about the culture of the late nineteenth century which 
made it a burden to be escaped from? […] But we ought to notice 
how dominant the theme of that rejection is in the lives and writings 
of the Woolfs, of Lytton Strachey, of Roger Fry. Keynes 
emphasised the rejection not only of the Benthamite version of 
utilitarianism and of Christianity, but of all claims on behalf of 
social action conceived as a worthwhile end. What was left? 
 The answer is: a highly impoverished view of how ‘good’ may be 
 used.36 
 
 
Without unpacking all of McIntyre’s arguments, which remain outside the scope of 
this chapter, I would emphasise that the period identified in the above largely 
coincides with the period of proto- or high-modernism discussed at length in the 
chapters above. Philosophically, it becomes aligned with a vitriolic, Nietzchean 
retreat from moral discourse altogether: by rejecting the baby of Enlightenment 
reason, it throws out the bathwater of the possibility of a social theory of the ‘good.’ 
Ironically, McIntyre refers to this movement with the term ‘emotivism’, yet this is not 
meant as a repudiation of emotion per se but rather a critique of what he argues 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 16. 
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constituted a downsizing of moral discourse to the mere ‘feelings and attitudes’ of 
writers that nevertheless purported to make philosophically objective claims.  
 
The sentimental as such comes to represent an Enlightenment doctrine that is rejected 
in the twentieth century by a movement that paradoxically is not so much too rational 
as too subjectivist. If all prior models of the ‘good’ had to be rejected for their false 
claims to universal truth, McIntyre argues that emotivism leaves us with little but our 
own untestable preferences and feelings. His solution nevertheless returns to 
Aristotelian notions of the ‘moral’ as grounded in shared standards of social life, or 
‘telos’, a criterion with which the sentimental has always itself been associated, 
despite its own reputation with vulgar subjective irrationalism.37 It remains however 
continuously problematized by its conflation of the objective and subjective, the 
rational and the irrational. This becomes most evident in Macintyre’s critique of 
Hume’s concept of ‘sympathy’ as a ‘philosophical fiction’ that cannot bridge these 
binaries. While Hume subjected ‘rationality’ to qualification and Kant discounted the 
‘passions’, Macintyre argues that both major Enlightenment philosophers failed to 
found morality in rational discourse and precipitated emotivism. Thus: 
The project of providing a rational vindication of morality had 
decisively failed; and from henceforward the morality of our 
predecessor culture – and subsequently of our own – lacked any 
public, shared rationale or justification. In a world of secular 
rationality religion could no longer provide such a shared 
background and foundation for moral discourse and action; and the 
failure of philosophy to provide what religion could no longer 
furnish was an important cause of philosophy losing its central 
cultural role and becoming a marginal, narrowly academic 
subject.38  
                                                
37 Conceptualisation of a communitarian ethics that oppposes the individualism of John Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice, is central also to the thought of such philosophers as Charles Taylor, see Sources of 
the Self, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
 
38 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 50. 
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The above passage echoes claims made by such scholars as Peter Brooks that use such 
a philosophical context to explain the advent of melodrama, an aesthetic that could be 
considered to make ‘ethical forces’ legible39 in the absence both of religion and, as 
McIntyre claims, an adequate moral theory. Yet just as Hume and Kant both fail to 
fully account for morality, so the sentimental has always courted accusations of its 
attempting to provide evidence for an ungrounded and unfoundable ‘sympathy’, an 
issue that has always made the theorisation of the sentimental a difficult one, and 
arguably also prefigures the modern problematics of sentimental art.  
  
For McIntyre then, emotivism has been both an inevitable and inadequate response to 
ethics writ large, and requires renewed efforts to found moral discourse as something 
more than the relativistic conflict of individual preferences. This however has not 
stopped many other contemporary philosophers from engaging in the codification, 
explanation and recuperation of emotions. No longer the blind spot of rationalist 
enquiry, the question of emotion’s interdependence with reason has now come centre 
stage, producing a wealth of work concerning the validity of emotional experience. A 
key intervention concerns the debunking of emotion’s subjectivist connotations.40 
Particularly pertinent to this discussion is Martha Nussbaum’s recent accounts of 
compassion and a tradition of detractors that have assumed, since Plato and the Stoics, 
compassion’s fatal association with particularism and individual preference.41 If the 
Stoics original validation of disinterested judgment has enjoyed a rich legacy in 
                                                
39 Peter Brooks, ‘The Melodramatic Imagination’, in Marcia Landy (ed.), Imitations of Life, p. 64. 
 
40 For an overview of contemporary philosophical approaches to emotion, see Robert C. Solomon (ed.), 
Thinking About Feeling, Oxford University Press, 2004.  
 
41 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavels of Thought, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 297-456. 
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philosophy, Nussbaum provides evidence of a strong counter-tradition (‘pro-
compassion’) that for her has largely succeeded in opposing such ancient objections. 
Of particular interest to discussions of melodrama is Nussbaum’s dismantling of what 
she terms the Stoic’s ‘egalitarian cosmopolitanism.’42 The family, for example, within 
this rubric, represents a unit that wrongfully courts a ‘disproportionate measure of our 
concern and energy’ in its members, who attend to a particular sub-group of 
community at the expense of society’s wider, cosmopolitan circle. Echoing 
communist ideology of course, it is compassion that is blamed here for prompting the 
subject to attend morally only to those perceptually close to him. When individuals 
outside of such close circles (whether family, national territory, imagined community) 
are out of sight, they are also out of mind, and receive undeserved neglect on the part 
of a subject overly focused on the nearest and dearest.  
 
Of course, such has been a key rationale in relation to the promotion and distribution 
of films and other art projects that bring the experience of marginal or under-
represented groups to the attention of filmgoers deemed overly accustomed to 
sentimental Hollywood entertainment and its allegedly narrow repertoire of characters 
and heroes. While the American family and its white, heterosexual patriarch may be 
deemed the paradigmatic commonplace in the actual lives of many Western filmgoers 
and in the cinema that reflects it, the need to broaden the field of experience has 
rightfully constituted a core ethos of arts funding, the festival circuit and quality film 
criticism for a long time. Such policy of course rests on the notion that a broad-
minded subject must be persistently apprised of marginal figures and minority 
experiences in order to act morally in the interest of the wider social and global 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 359. 
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community. While compassion is certainly invoked in such a process, representation 
and the being made aware come first and foremost, or else compassion (as one, and 
perhaps not the most necessary, of various appropriate responses) will be immorally 
constricted to a limited set of objects.  
 
Yet it is precisely the common assumptions often underpinning such thinking that 
Nussbaum has sought to problematize in her defence of compassion itself. Rather than 
attack such a policy in its own right, her pro-compassion position seeks to defend the 
emotions of compassion in all its evocations, irrespective of interest group. While 
sentimentality is often associated with compassion felt in relation to an over-
represented figure of sympathy, Nussbaum is careful to point out that it can’t be the 
emotions of compassion itself that are to blame here, but rather the nexus of values 
and politics that bring about such interactions, due to either the Hollywood movie 
factory or the spectator that wants a cheap cry for its own sake. In itself however, 
compassion is defended as having an intimate connection to a ‘core theory’ of value 
that she expounds upon as follows: 
The standard occasions for compassion, throughout the literary and 
philosophical tradition - and presumably in the popular thought on 
which the tradition draws – involve losses of truly basic goods, 
such as life, loved ones, freedom, nourishment, mobility, bodily 
integrity, citizenship, shelter. Compassion seems to be, as 
standardly experienced, a reasonably reliable guide to the presence 
of real value.43 
 
In itself therefore, and as Hume wrote long ago, moral sentiment is a rather 
dependable human activity which, if at times problematic, is too important to be 
dispensed with on the grounds of its closeness to sentimental abuse. Compassion and 
its regular evocations ground the subject as a properly social being that, only through 
                                                
43 Ibid., p. 374. 
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such pedagogically inflected experience, can become a truly moral agent. Evaluation 
and discrimination are necessary checks to unencumbered compassion, but they do 
not necessarily for Nussbaum undermine the emotions associated with the 
compassionate process itself. Indeed, such rational checks on compassion are 
ultimately also reliant on compassionate impulses focused elsewhere, as part of an 
overall economy of ‘real value.’ She thus asserts a vital link between ‘compassion’ 
and such ‘agency’, because it is ‘only when we see to what extent need for external 
goods is involved in the development of agency itself that we have the deepest 
possible basis for respecting and promoting human freedom.’44 
 
The dangers of sentimental abuse are not ignored though, wherein the enjoyment of 
neediness or victimhood for its own sake through cheap signification is acknowledged 
as an ancient objection on the grounds of unwarranted or self-indulgent compassion. 
In response to such objections, Nussbaum is once again careful to qualify their 
traditional implications in relation to condemning compassion tout court. This she 
does first through the denial that compassion’s cognitive component need necessarily 
be the desire to maintain misfortune and disaster as a means of ensuring a perpetual 
flow of pitiable objects. As proof, she allows compassion a cognitive component that 
understands ‘need’ and ‘victimhood’ to be normal phenomena of everyday life while 
at the same time able to allot value to their elimination or reduction. Once more 
asserted as the ‘reliable guide to the presence of real value’, compassion is here given 
the benefit of the doubt through Nussbaum’s assertions concerning the mutual 
interdependence of emotional and systemic thought. She argues that ‘compassion 
needs to be combined with an adequate theory of the basic human goods: but there is 
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no reason to assume that it must have a bad such theory.’45 Put simply, compassion in 
Nussbaum’s reasoning need not undermine or impair the subject’s ability to 
discriminate between the various claims to ‘need’ that he encounters, but instead 
constitutes the core motivation to such acts of discrimination. Compassion requires us 
to ‘get it right’46, in order to avoid a regressive sentimentality (among other 
unfavourable consequences such as anger and violence, see below), but there is 
nothing according to Nussbaum in its own mode of action that should prevent this 
from happening. Informed by an ‘adequate theory of the basic human goods’, 
sentiment can and must operate despite the possibility of various manifestations of 
sentimental distortion, either as textual or subjective phenomena.  
 
It is here that we discern most clearly a set of shared concerns between moral 
philosophy and postmodern visual culture, for here is expressed the possibility that 
real and imagined experiences of pathos can coexist with the subject’s ethical 
discriminations. If postmodern culture immerses the spectator in an array of images 
and texts that have apparently lost their relation to the ‘referent’, we might follow 
Nussbaum’s theory by saying that this need not necessarily imply that ‘dampened 
affect’ operates independently of compassion. Being hyper-aware of the array 
suggests not that compassion itself is eliminated as a cinematic affect but rather that 
the postmodern spectator has merely become more discerning and discriminating as to 
how ‘need’ should be recognized and verifiable. Images of ‘need’ and pathos do not 
become irrevocably lost or meaningless in this array, which sometimes seems to be 
suggested by such terms as ‘blank style’ or ‘dampened affect’. It would under this 
                                                
45 Ibid., p. 376. 
 
46 Ibid., p. 387. 
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rubric be truer to suggest that our compassion and sentiment represent important 
components in generating an overall ‘theory of basic human goods,’ parts of a 
cognitive system that can process kitsch or the gratuitous without needing to dispense 
with compassion wholesale. 
 
However, as discussed before our turn to moral philosophy, compassion and empathy 
continue to carry connotations that are not so easily defended when read against 
issues debated in the context of the ‘new humanities.’ In a post-Freudian, post-
Marxist intellectual landscape, compassion remains the property of the ‘subject’, a 
concept that invokes a philosophical humanism that has been forcefully challenged by 
Michel Foucault and the ‘deterritorializing’ theories of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari. Owing to various institutional and discursive differences (as implicitly 
questioned by MacIntyre above), such theoretical work is rarely considered directly 
alongside academic moral philosophy. If this is still attributable to an ongoing 
demarcation between Continental and Anglo-American philosophy (related no doubt 
also to distinctions between the ‘leftist’ humanities and the more ‘conservative’ 
Empiricist or Analytical philosophy traditions), the last 30 years has seen qualified 
efforts to bridge this divide.47 For despite methodological, and certainly ideological, 
differences that make comparison a thorny affair, shared genealogies can be found 
between such theorists. For instance, Deleuze and Guatarri’s critiques of Oedipal 
identity in some ways rehearse the Stoical condemnation of the family in favour of 
larger communal formations. Frequent appropriation of philosophical ‘immanence’ by 
                                                
47 A preponderance of journals and conferences have thus emerged, seeking to instigate dialogue 
between these two traditional camps. Within Film Studies in particular, significant inroads have been 
made into analytic philosophy (See Film Theory and Philosophy, Richard Allen & Murray Smith 
(eds.), Oxfod: Clarendon Press, 1997) and cognitive philosophy and psychology (See Bordwell and 
Carroll’s Post-Theory, cited above), the discipline having been traditionally associated most firmly 
with continental theory and cultural studies models. 
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Deleuze and Guatarri implicates such alternative spheres as being in a more perpetual 
state of ‘becoming’, arguably radicalizing the Stoics’ sense of a tangible communal 
formation. If the Stoics might have been happier to validate society over family, a 
similar concept of disinterest and nullification of subjective preference is nevertheless 
still implicit here, where compassion continues to constitute an inadequately moral 
discourse.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, codes of morality inherited from Christianity and other 
institutional clusters are thus rejected in favour of a Nietzchean anti-rationalism, 
wherein static codifications of the moral give way to the perpetual flux of the ethical. 
If the moral is an inherently conservative set of standards that centralizes the subject, 
the ethical comes to signify a more abstracted and fluid set of interactions between 
bodies.48 Appropriating Bergsonian psychology, Deleuze and Guattari undermine the 
integrity of the subject, positing subjective experience as a series of neuronal firings 
between sensory and motor activity, inputs and outputs with little scope for mediation. 
A philosophical anti-humanism displaces any sense of common-sense morality (with 
which compassion has so often been aligned) in favour of a ‘deterritorialized’ set of 
aesthetics. Bergson’s concept of ‘affect’, as distinct from the more humanist emotion, 
is central here, for while ‘emotion’ is felt by a subject, ‘affect’ suggests above all an 
irreducible interaction between that which moves (exemplified for Deleuze in cinema) 
and the body that is moved by it. Taking the psychoanalytic premise that locates 
desire or libido as abstracted drives, Deleuze and Guatarri reconfigure the 
Enlightenment subject as a ‘desiring machine’, a cluster of impressions and impulses 
                                                
48 For Deleuze and Guattari’s appropriation of ‘Immanence’, see ‘What is Philosophy?’, Columbia 
University Press, 1996. For good overviews of Deleuzian concepts see Patricia Pister (ed.), 
Micropolitics of Media Culture: Reading the Rhizomes of Deleuze and Guattari, Amsterdam 
University Press, 2001. 
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that share vital attributes with cinema, which itself approximates the body as an 
analogous ‘sensorium.’ While image and body are still qualitatively different objects, 
their modes of action both resemble each other and serve as channels for an ongoing 
flow of impressions.  
 
Nussbaum’s formulation of compassion, then, sits in tension with Deleuzian theory 
above all in terms of agency. Where Nussbaum depends on a conception of the 
subject as active, self-determining and compassionate, Deleuze and Guatarri follow 
the Nietzschean premise of dehumanizing the body for more expressly radical 
purposes. Capitalism still looms very large here as a commodifying logic that serves 
to concretize and identify bodies in the name of material consumption, a process 
which also includes such aspects as the continued demarcation between private and 
public or family and wider notions of community. Destabilization of bodily integrity 
constitutes a vital counter-logic here, whereby the collapsing of constructed 
boundaries (in Foucaultian terms, of gender, criminality, sanity etc) can serve to 
reconfigure perceptual experience.49 Where compassion between subjects still 
necessitates a boundary between subjective and objective, these anti-humanist 
formulations seem to call for a more radical collapse of such boundaries, reinforcing 
rather the role of a ‘materialist’ post-Freudian unconscious.  
 
Paradoxically, it is precisely in the extent to which Deleuze and Guatarri engage with 
affect over emotion that leads a literary historian specializing in 18th century 
sentimental ‘languages’, James Chandler, to claim Deleuze and Guattari as the true 
                                                
49 A key figure of such bodily fragmentation is termed the ‘Body without Organs’, which is related to 
the ‘desiring machine’, both concepts discussed in particular in Anti-Oedipus (1972), Robert Hurley, 
Mark Seem & Helen R. Lane (trans.), London: Continuum, 2004 and A Thousand Plateaus (1980), 
Brian Massumi (trans.), London: Continuum, 2004. 
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heirs of its critical project.50 The crux of the sentimental in such regards pertains not 
to moral discourse or discourses of compassion as such, but rather to the philosophical 
problems foregrounded by the sentimental with regards to defining emotion and 
affect. Cinema, as for Deleuze, stands as an ideal paradigm for such indeterminacies, 
for as a sign of ‘vehicularity’ in Chandler’s terms, it serves to materially embody 
emotion as motion. The cinematic close-up, or ‘affection-image’, for instance 
becomes a metaphor for movement despite its dependence on stillness. Thus:  The	  fact	  that	  the	  affection-­‐image	  is	  associated	  with	  an	  absence	  of	  locomotion	  becomes	  less	  significant	  when	  we	  understand	  that	  the	  movements	  in	  each	  case	  are	  meta-­‐movements	  to	  begin	  with.	  The	  resonance	  of	  this	  language	  with	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  vehicle	  –	  the	  discourse	  from	  which	  A	  Sentimental	  Journey	  initially	  emerged	  as	  a	  form	  –	  seems	  to	  me	  too	  strong	  to	  ignore,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  Deleuze’s	  self-­‐proclaimed,	  Bergson-­‐derived	  materialist	  account	  of	  affectivity.51	  
 
Situating sentimental theory within a theoretical tradition of ‘materialist affectivity’,52 
Chandler thus claims Deleuze’s discussion of the ‘movement image’ as a continuance 
of the sentimental’s preoccupation with moving and being moved, thematized notably 
for him by both ‘moral sentiment’ theory and Sterne’s Sentimental Journey. The 
famous Maria of Moulines episode in Sterne’s novel, for instance, invokes for 
Chandler the Deleuzian ‘affection-image’ in its thematization of Yorick’s response to 
the face of a distraught woman he meets and its foregrounding of a handkerchief that 
becomes a repository for their comingled tears, moments that Chandler aligns with the 
cinematic close-up and insert. What matters for this analysis revolves, as with 
Deleuze and Guatarri, less on the how Sterne or the cinema belong to a sentimental or 
                                                
50 See James Chandler, ‘The Languages of Sentiment,’ Textual Practice, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2008), 
pp. 21-41. 
 
51 Ibid., p. 38. 
 
52 Ibid., p. 22. 
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melodramatic tradition of pedagogy and communication and rather more on how the 
sentimental tableau problematizes distinctions between the static and the moving, and 
how a language of emotion that begins with Shaftesbury and Sterne remains as a 
philosophical problem regarding the representation of ‘matter and motion’.  
 
In this, we are once more on the terrain of an understanding of the sentimental as a 
term of ambiguous reflexivity that problematizes an essential dichotomy between the 
subjectivity and objectivity of emotion. Moving-image culture simulates and 
embodies emotion so effectively that its movements become analogues of emotion 
itself, feeling for the spectator and thus undermining the extent to which the latter 
constitutes a subject at all. Just as with the conditions that produce Jameson’s ‘waning 
of affect’, the emotions associated with postmodern visual culture become 
indissociable from the material conditions of image production: desubjectivized,  free-
floating and unmoored from the referent. Related to the ‘disinterest’ that Shaviro 
outlines above in relation to the postmodern spectator responding to an image culture 
of heterogeneity and ecelecticism, such affect undermines any sense of a subject’s 
authentic emotions, allowing only for a subjective experience that is necessarily 
‘promiscuous’ (or heterogeneous) in taste, desire and morality. That which is moved 
and that which moves become equivalents, neither privileged ontologically over the 
other, with such ‘depth’ rubrics as sympathy, compassion or morality becoming 
necessarily evacuated of specific content or value as such. 
 
Derived from a significant and complex plurality of aesthetic discourses, the 
sentimental has thus undergone great ‘adventures’ as a concept (to coin Martin Jay’s 
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phrase in relation to ‘totality’53), and as such provides some key insights for better 
comprehending interactions between various moral and philosophical discourses. If it 
is bound up with theories of ‘moral sentiment’, it is also that which represents the 
more expansive field of ‘affect’ and the ‘sensorium’. Where it is represented by such 
figures as Richardson, Fielding or Sterne, it also has come to include Mackenzie, 
Brooke and every other novel deemed to constitute a ‘sickly species’ of literature. If it 
is commonly aligned with trite, bourgeois Hollywood entertainment, the high 
modernist assumptions that underpin such alignments have been shown to be less 
inimical to the sentimental than might be assumed. Furthermore, postmodern theory 
once more nuances our terms of reference, calling for the centralization of emotion as 
a rubric without being altogether clear on how this can be squared with theory and 
‘Theory.’ 
 
In such a vain, and being mindful of the expansive field of affect within which the 
sentimental is still significantly implicated, a distinctly postmodern set of films from 
the last 15 years can be identified that clearly reflect such multivocalities in the 
sentimental project. While traditional elements of the melodramatic mode are 
appropriated by such films, they also illustrate the ways that the sentimental has been, 
and continues to be, subject to ironic qualification. Camp arguably plays a key role in 
each of the films discussed below, yet it operates rather less in terms of a specifically 
queer aesthetics and rather more in terms of a ‘mass camp’ of parody and pastiche. I 
purposefully select a set of films that reach beyond American cinema, for while a 
‘smart’ aesthetic has become an increasingly salient attribute of American ‘indie’ 
                                                
 
53 Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept, see note 12. 
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cinema, a very similar set of concerns pertains to the ‘arthouse’ cinema further afield. 
It hardly needs to be recalled that European cinema, from Bunuel and Godard to Sirk 
and Fassbinder serve as undeniable historical precursors to an aesthetics of formal, if 
not ‘smart’, irony. At the same time, a key concern of the analysis below concerns the 
extent to which American cinema might be deemed to have reconfigured that tradition 
of European cinematic modernism in accordance with its own postmodern version. 
Not least in terms of the particularly camp self-reflexivity that underscores all the 
films discussed below, the sentimental traces of melodrama are subject to a 
postmodern hollowing-out of ‘depth’ in favour of ‘shallow’ eclecticization.  
 
 
Arthouse Melodrama: Dancer in the Dark (Lars von Trier, 2000) 
 
Sentimental tropes are to be found in some of cinema’s most distinctly non-
mainstream channels, yet the pathos invoked by the postmodern narrative is subject to 
significant modifications compared to more classical forms of the melodramatic 
mode. One such film is Lars von Trier’s Dancer in the Dark (2000, Zentropa), a film 
that in true arthouse tradition maintains a sense of perceptual, emotional and generic 
instability, despite an ostensibly clear melodramatic trajectory. Its jarring shifts 
between musical and realist drama also mark it out as an instance of camp, while von 
Trier’s use of the Icelandic pop star Bjork as the central protagonist serves an 
ambiguous function of foregrounding her non-actorly star persona while maintaining 
a focus on the tragedy of the character she portrays. Such stylistics earned the film 
much praise (and the Cannes festival’s top prize) yet there was also much criticism of 
its camp pretentiousness, such as in the following: 
For its sheer effrontery, for its browbeating melodrama and pseudo-
tragedy, Lars von Trier's Dancer in the Dark has to be the most 
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sensationally silly film of the year - as well as the most shallow and 
crudely manipulative. Everything about it is silly, from the faux 
naivety and implausibility of its plot to the secret little idiot savant 
smile on the face of its Victim Heroine played by Björk - a 
squeaking, chirruping diva turn sufficient to curdle every carton of 
milk within a 10-kilometre radius.54 
 
Rehearsed in the above of course are standard critical objections to sentimentality, 
and once again the energy of such condemnation stems from the sense to which a 
filmmaker contrived to provoke compassion as a function of the blatant recourse to 
clichéd melodramatic tropes. If von Trier was living up to his reputation of self-
stylized prankster, as evidenced most notably by his playful publication in 1995 of the 
Dogme manifesto along with fellow director Thomas Vinterberg, the film’s ability to 
‘curdle every carton of milk within a 10-kilometre radius’ was taken by some, such as 
Bradshaw, as both serious flaw and a mark of auteurist complacency. 55 Both ‘silly’ 
and ‘manipulative’, the film could be neither written off as Hollywood dross nor did it 
conform to a more stable, if not by now conservative, critical conception of an 
experimental thematics and stylistics.  
 
Dancer in the Dark was the third film in von Trier’s ‘Golden Heart’ trilogy, which 
also included The Idiots (Danish: Idiotern, 1998) and Breaking the Waves (1996). 
Inspired by a book von Trier read as a child telling the sentimental tale of a girl that 
goes into the woods and gives away all her possessions to animals, each of the 
‘Golden Heart’ trilogy’s films featured a ‘Victim Heroine’ that sacrifices her own 
                                                
54 Peter Bradshaw, Review of Dancer in the Dark in The Guardian, Friday 15 September 2000. 
 
55 His and Vinterberg’s intervention appeared to perform the established codes of a European film 
movement, with calls for a greater, or an at least modified, realism and a variety of technical 
parameters advocated to that purpose (compulsory hand-held camera, no props transported to location, 
use of colour film only), Dogme 95 proved less a manifesto for all future filmmaking but a kind of self-
reflexive experiment that both called attention to itself and its founders while deconstructing the very 
notion of a modernist movement and its aims. See Jan Simon’s argument for comprehending von 
Trier’s self-stylization and formal experimentation as following game logic in Playing the Waves: Lars 
von Trier’s Game Cinema, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007. 
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interests to save or help others, only to be severely punished by a society that fails to 
recognize such virtue.56 Dancer’s central character Selma, an immigrant to the US 
from Czechoslovakia, works in a factory in the US state of Washington in order to 
save up money for an eye operation for her son, Gene, so that he will not go blind. 
Selma suffers from the same condition, and the film follows the deterioration of 
Selma’s sight to blindness and her initially friendly relationship with her landlord Bill 
to an eventually exploitative one, as he steals her savings in order to fund his wife’s 
overspending. When Selma demands the stolen money back, he ashamedly exhorts 
Selma to kill him, and because she eventually does so under extreme duress, she is 
subsequently caught, put on trial, and finally executed for murder at the film’s end. 
Although she commits murder, her act becomes one of both compassion (Bill begs her 
to do it) and justified retribution, with an aura of martyr established around her from 
the film’s outset. 
 
As with other von Trier films about rural to semi-urban life in America in particular, 
the narrative of Dancer begins with the possibility that members of a capitalist society 
can help and support one another, even where poverty seems entrenched (a similar 
premise of von Trier’s subsequent film Dogville [2003] for instance). When Selma is 
not able to buy a present for Gene’s birthday, Bill and Linda buy him a bicycle, a gift 
that Selma warily accepts despite its ostensible foregrounding of her failings as a 
mother. Similar goodwill is apparent in her factory work, a place where Selma 
becomes increasingly unable to perform her duties owing to failing eyesight. While 
her supervisor Norman excuses her mistakes that could possibly lead to a machine 
                                                
56 Von Trier comments on the DVD audio commentary of Dancer (New Line Platinum Series) that his 
father (a man he later found out not be his true father) would repudiate the sentimentality of the end of 
the children’s book that inspired the trilogy, thus motivating von Trier to ask ‘was it so stupid after 
all?’ as a driving question of the ‘Golden Heart’ trilogy. 
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breakage, Selma’s friend and colleague Kathy (Catherine Deneuve) turns up to help 
Selma perform her night-shift without being paid. However, as the film progresses, 
such acts of benevolence prove either insufficient to preventing catastrophe (Selma 
still loses her job) or indeed prove more directly instrumental to her downfall. Despite 
the bicycle gift, we learn only two scenes later from Bill’s conversation with Selma 
that it is precisely such expenditure on the part of Linda that has brought him (as 
breadwinner) to financial ruin. A society of goodwill functions fine in von Trier’s 
films as long as conditions remain unrealistically stable, with poor individuals shown 
to benefit from the kindness of more wealthy neighbours and friends. Yet it is 
precisely owing to the untenability of such stability, where poverty comes to dominate 
without any welfare on the part of state or employers that crime and murder start to 
encroach on such pastoral idylls. Bill’s theft of Selma’s money and his death follow 
as direct consequences of such changes in circumstances. That Bill is too ashamed to 
admit to Linda that they’re broke and that this financial situation has arisen from 
Bill’s failure to curb her consumption serves to underline failings on the part of the 
married couple and its traditional propagation of imbalanced gender roles. The film 
shows that if such an anachronistic scheme of marriage is permitted to subsist, the 
wider society, represented by friends, neighbours and colleagues, suffer equally if not 
more. While statuses of American, landlord, paid employee and husband afford a 
certain respectability, it becomes nothing short of parasitical on those that fall short of 
such criteria. Such figures as the stranger, the immigrant or the destitute (exemplified 
by Selma) become subjects at risk of abuse in such conditions. In the film’s 
courtroom scene for instance, where Selma is put on trial for Bill’s murder, the 
prosecuting lawyer brands Selma a ‘communist’ invoking the knee-jerk, mindless 
accusation of mid-20th century American society.  
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In such respects, as with the tradition of Sirk films and the classic melodrama, the 
film serves as a critique of American society while appropriating and arguably 
celebrating two of its principle genres, the melodrama and musical. As a European 
artfilm, the film might be construed as another instance of anti-American rhetoric 
emanating from countries and filmmakers that perceive themselves as more closely 
aligned with socially democratic principles.57 However, it is precisely in Dancer’s 
evocation of Hollywood melodrama and the musical that situates its project as one 
more of negotiation with American movie culture and its sentimentality. The musical 
in particular is subject to postmodern re-appropriation in Dancer, in which it 
maintains a shallowness of affect in its incomplete validation of the genre’s ideology. 
Selma’s rehearsals for an amateur production of The Sound of Music (Robert Wise, 
1965) are shown, like the films’ musical numbers, to break up the monotony of 
alienated, factory labour or, later on, the miseries of social isolation and rejection. 
While factory work imposes a crushing solitude on its workers, the rehearsal scenes 
show drama and music as episodes of social cohesion, support and love. Moreover, it 
is the musical numbers themselves that provide marked ironic counterpoint, as often 
with the traditional musical, to the grim conditions that surround them. In musicals 
such as West Side Story, Oliver! and The Sound of Music, to name but a few, musical 
numbers provide relief from the tense events of their plots, invoking moral legibility 
and Utopian idealism despite the profusion of tragic events that take place around 
them. Moreover, the classic musical number often clearly serves a pedagogical 
purpose, bringing characters together romantically or socially despite their initial 
                                                
57 As winner of the Palmes d’Or at the Cannes’ film festival, such a film becomes aligned with other 
recent winners that similarly have mounted powerful ideological critiques of American capitalist 
society such as Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 911 (2004). 
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disagreements and conflicts.58 In Dancer however, music serves to unite characters as 
a more direct counterpoint to how they interact in the film’s non-musical segments. 
Characters in the latter sequences are either as indifferent to one another as atomized 
factory workers, or are more likely actively working against each other’s interests, 
such as Linda in relation to Selma after Bill’s death or the death-row officers that 
transport Selma to the execution room. During musical numbers, such differences 
become effaced in the spirit of larger ideals, where characters act with far greater 
compassion and express sympathy with each other’s motives—emotions which are 
later exposed as expressions of idealistic unreality in non-musical segments. 
 
The moral legibility of the Hollywood musical thus becomes blurred, as musical 
escapism fails to effectuate cohesion in the non-musical numbers that follow. In the 
same scene in which Bill confesses his bankruptcy to Selma while she reveals her 
saving plans for Gene’s operation, they discuss Hollywood musicals and their 
capacity to transport the spectator. A discourse is here foregrounded that poses music 
as a transcendent force over oppressive conditions (poverty for both Selma and Bill) 
so that they might survive psychologically. Yet when such escapism fails to prevent 
the theft, deceit and murder between these characters, such a discourse is at least 
partially shown to fail. Likewise, despite the extent to which Selma and Katherine are 
shown to enjoy their amateur rehearsals of The Sound of Music, their rehearsal space 
becomes a place of distrust and danger later on in the film. Informed by the police of 
Selma’s crime, Selma’s director deceptively stalls her at rehearsal so that the police 
have time to arrive and arrest her, underlining in a particularly overt way how the 
enjoyment of music can only be justified for its own sake rather than in more moral 
                                                
58 See Richard Dyer’s ‘Entertainment and Utopia’ in Bill Nichols (ed.), Movies and Methods: Vol. 2, 
University of California Press, 1985, pp. 220-32. 
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terms. Betrayal and deceit more often than not persist in non-musical numbers and we 
are confronted with a more overt failure of moral legibility to translate beyond the 
formal confines of the musical number. Unlike West Side Story for instance, where 
tragedy and music eventually precipitate recognitions of thwarted love and virtue 
between the two warring New York gangs, music remains interior, even delusionarily 
psychotic in Dancer, ensuring nothing but its own abstracted logic.    
 
Closer to Dancer therefore are the revisionist musicals of Dennis Potter’s TV series 
for the BBC such as Pennies From Heaven59 and The Singing Detective60, that 
explicitly clashed grim reality with a man’s delusional flights into musical numbers 
that take place all around him.61 Like Dancer, such series’ revelled in camp parody, 
informed nevertheless by a more serious subtext suggesting that such musical forms 
could no longer be trusted as sites of genuine emotional reality. Once more 
interiorized as the imaginings of a sick man (immobilized in a hospital bed by severe 
psoriasis), the musical number here becomes a key symptom of a profound identity 
confusion and mental disorder. As with Potter, grim reality is similarly subjected to 
the camp artifices of cinema in Dancer, such as when Bill’s corpse (his head having 
been graphically bludgeoned by Selma) comes back to the life with the onset of the 
song ‘Smith and Wesson’ in order to reassure Selma about the killing. The film 
immediately becomes saturated with colour compared to the washed-out resolution of 
                                                
59 1978, UK, aired on BBC television. 
 
60 1986, UK, aired on BBC television. 
 
61 Derived from Marlowe’s imagination rather than the more literal bursts into song of the traditional 
musical, performances by the doctors, nurses and other patients that surround him are underlined as a 
similar kind of psychosis as Selma’s reimaginings of her work environment as percussive music. Using 
standards from the 1930s, Detective’s excursions into song thus both alluded to the long-established 
escapism of Hollywood and jazz while underlining the extent to which such songs (and the imaginer’s 
psyche) signify both an irrecoverable past and Utopian idyll. 
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the film’s non-musical sequences and Selma’s appearance becomes magically cleared 
of blemishes from her struggle with Bill. With the music still playing, Linda appears 
outside of the house and helps Selma escape from the police she’s just called in the 
film’s non-musical narrative, now seemingly aware that Selma needs to get the money 
to a doctor for Gene’s operation. With Gene himself then circling on his bicycle 
singing the refrain ‘You Just Did What you had to Do’, the entire sequence here 
becomes dominated by the musical number’s attempts to align the perceptions of 
characters with that of the omniscient spectator, despite its impossibility in the actual 
story. 
 
In such respects, Dancer appropriates and defamiliarises the conventions of a 
sentimental Hollywood genre, calling attention to how the musical number in 
particular functions ideologically and nuancing a simpler kind of melodramatic 
pathos. While Selma is certainly misunderstood and unjustly punished (as an instance 
of virtue in distress), it is her unhinged remove from reality (her blindness serving as a 
good metaphor) that motivates the musical number’s entertainment function, putting 
the spectator in a difficult position emotionally. The film seems to assert that while 
the number may be diverting for Selma and entertaining for the spectator, there is a 
price to be paid for its artificial consolations, in the form of Selma’s ultimate 
execution. Furthermore, rather than allowing for such punishment to be perceived as 
the sad conditions of a melodramatic universe of destiny, sacrifice and martyrdom, 
Dancer implicates the spectator him- or herself as an integral element of that unjust 
economy. Unless our enjoyment of the musical number is one of camp detachment, it 
just might be possible that we ourselves are as much part of the problem as the state 
apparatus that ostensibly destroys Selma. By recognizing the genre and being 
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‘entertained’, we are implicated in such a process at the same time as being permitted 
an ironic subject position. As with Sirkian melodrama, sentimental tragedy is 
counterposed with formal excesses in music and colour, yet the latter are now 
foregrounded as more overt symptoms of delusion and escapism than a subtle stylistic 
gloss on narrative. Embodying a rather grosser kind of postmodern parody, Dancer 
invokes sympathy for Selma while complicating the extent to which identification is 
truly possible. Is this Bjork or a fictional character? To what extent are we supposed 
to sympathize with her off-kilter character? In such respects, Dancer certainly 
succeeded in distancing a fair number of critics and spectators, yet as the Cannes jury 
seemed to acknowledge, such a fostering of camp detachment seemed to be part of 
von Trier’s game all along. 
  
 
American ‘Indie’ Cinema - Palindromes (Todd Solondz, 2004)  
 
If von Trier’s project suggests that such experimental approaches to narrative cinema 
require the seasoned familiarity with modernist technique that comes with a European 
background, America’s own thriving ‘independent’ cinema has for some time also 
subjected the melodramatic tradition to irony. One such film in recent American 
cinema is Todd Solondz’s Palindromes (2004, USA), a film that addresses underage 
sex both between children and between children and adults. In its foregrounding of 
children as objects of the adult gaze, the film addresses a core theme of the 
sentimental in terms of its unstable relationship with sexuality. Invoking a mode of 
address with frequent recourse to the parodic and camp, Palindromes also epitomises 
the ‘dampened affect’ of Sconce’s American ‘smart’ cinema. It tells the story of a 13-
year old girl, Aviva, that runs away from her middle-class suburban home once she is 
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forced to have an abortion by her parents. The character is played by seven different 
actors varying in age, race and even gender, who play Aviva through different stages 
of her journey. Such a formal device problematizes the extent to which Aviva 
constitutes a subject at all, for while the diverse casting at one level widens the 
spectrum of identification, such a device also serves to ‘defamiliarise’ the spectator 
from a more continuous experience of character, once again undermining a ‘depth’ 
model of spectatorship in favour of more episodic engagements and an enhanced 
consciousness of film form.  
 
As a middle-class teenage girl desperate for a baby from a young age, Aviva 
deliberately gets pregnant with the teenage son of family friends. Once Aviva very 
reluctantly goes through with an abortion, and is unknowingly given a hysterectomy 
due to medical complications, she runs away from home and hitchhikes to the 
American Midwest where she ends up at a rural foster home run by evangelical 
Christians. This extended middle section of the film, a camp and dark parody of 
‘bible-belt’ values, serves ultimately less as validation of ‘East-Coast’ or more 
notionally (sub)urban values than as further invocation of the latter’s already 
‘shallow’ values, irrespective of location and religiosity. Both spaces (the suburban 
and the rural) are essentially debunked as places of ostensible security and nurture. 
The Midwest part of the film sees Aviva initially happily accepted into a troupe of 
disabled orphans that have apparently found sanctuary from a cruel world, loved and 
cared for by their surrogate evangelical mother, Mama Sunshine. Happily going about 
household chores, children’s games and rehearsing performances of pop musical 
numbers for the ‘Gospel circuit’, the Sunshiner’s home invokes so excessively 
saccharine a vision of Utopian innocence and moral values that an ironic perspective 
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becomes inescapable. While typical of an evangelical Christian dance group that 
appropriate the performances of modern popstars and ‘boybands’ like Madonna, 
NSync and Britney Spears and redirects such rhetoric in relation to Jesus, such 
reappropriations retain the traces of their earlier signification in terms of sexualized 
lyrics (‘Nobody else could ever love me this way, Nobody, Jesus, but you’) amidst 
emulation of such performers’ sexualized dance movements. Jarring though it is when 
such numbers are performed by children, such performances are shown to be enjoyed 
in a particularly unironic way by their foster mother Mama Sunshine, a seemingly 
responsible, morally upstanding adult. Where the spectator is permitted a knowing 
irony in relation to the film’s recourse to parody, it becomes also apparent how their 
diegetic counterparts do not share this distance (aside from Aviva herself who is 
rather more mutedly enthused). A discomforting kitschy upbeatness and innocence 
remains in such a scene, challenging the ‘smart’ spectator to examine the extent to 
which her own ‘sophisticated’ distaste might itself require qualification. If the kids are 
happy, the film slyly intimates, who are we to object to such an idyll with our own 
irony-inflected standards of taste. How is it also that spectators such as we are more 
sensitive to the jarring sexuality of such performances than their onscreen mother, the 
embodiment of Madonna-like (the biblical one) Christian virtue? 
 
The film thus clearly provokes the spectator to take on subject-positions that it only 
ambiguously itself endorses, and invokes an above all postmodern loss of critical 
viewpoint. One of the world’s most popular ‘grand-narratives’, Christianity, is 
subjected to the simulacrum, its value system still expressed in terms of charity for the 
weak, poor and vulnerable, but now made legible through sensationalism as much as 
mere sentiment, with recourse to pop music and modern celebrity culture. Such 
 
 
308 
kitschy performance epitomizes a postmodern pastiche aesthetics, infusing the pop 
culture of the MTV video with Christian rhetoric, clashing the ‘shallow’ culture of 
image, fame and ‘bling’ with a ‘depth’ model of moral value. Yet while both modes 
are subject to critique emanating from different aesthetic agendas, their fusion in 
some way inoculates them from criticism altogether, one apparently redressing the 
excesses of the other. As discussed above, if camp allows us to laugh at the tacky and 
the grossly clichéd, it also has the ‘double-edged’ attribute of taking pop culture at 
more than face value i.e. seriously.  
 
Innocent virtue therefore also shares this double-valence in the film. While it 
represents a condition that produces a potentially dangerously blinkered view of the 
world that fails to register its cruelties and perversions, it is also that which (might) 
prevent agents from descending into darker crime and malice. For while Solondz’s 
depiction of the suburban family and the devoutly Christian home are constituted by 
children and adults participating in a carnival of sentimentalisms and benevolent 
artifices, they are offset by the ubiquity of the extreme, the graphically explicit and 
the criminal. As in David Lynch’s films, Solondz has a fascination with detritus and 
trash as places of intensified social reality, with aborted foetuses dumped en masse or 
a baby doll found in a dumpster with its anal orifice violated with a beer bottle. As 
Lynch counterposed the idealized American suburban garden (complete with an 
absurdly artificial chirruping Robin) with the image of a human ear being broken 
down by hordes of insects just below the lawn’s surface in Blue Velvet (1986, USA), 
Solondz’s similarly juxtaposes the campy-sentimental with the rotten and dead. 
Likewise, despite the sunny appeal of Mama Sunshine’s home and its seeming 
epitomization of naively sentimental goodwill among its residents, Aviva’s stay is 
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punctuated by reminders of moral uncertainty, such as in her visit to a dumpsite for 
aborted foetuses and her discovery of plots to assassinate abortion doctors organized 
by Mama Sunshine’s husband, Bo. With murder plotted downstairs alongside cruel 
proclamations of Aviva as a ‘child-whore’ and ‘slut’ in the basement of the house, the 
Sunshiners’ homestead becomes a place of danger to be escaped, the first floor’s self-
consciously saccharine tableaux of happiness serving as unconscious over-
compensations for the evil acts plotted one level below. The excessive tableaux in 
such regards become ultimately suggestive of displaced cruelty and repressed sexual 
desire as much as spaces of pure innocence.  
 
Aviva’s story thus suggests not so much innocent virtue preserved but a rather more 
pervasive questioning of how innocence (especially that of children) can be reliably 
represented at all. Child sexuality becomes the critical subject here, in relation to 
which Aviva’s sexuality becomes paradigmatic. Subject to sentimentalization as 
spectacle and repression as morally inappropriate, child sexuality is omnipresent but 
still problematic for American society. Aviva’s overt sexuality makes her not the 
‘child-whore’ of radical evangelist discourse but neither does it allow her to represent 
a sentimental ideal of ‘virtue rewarded.’ Indeed, it is ultimately made clear that Aviva 
cannot herself remain a purely virtuous subject amidst the morally ambivalent 
conditions through which she progresses. Surviving a variety of dangerous contexts, 
her life is one of self-preservation, offering few opportunities for her own 
benevolence and altruism. In her insistences that the appointed hitman, Earl, goes 
through with the killing of the doctor that aborted her own foetus, Aviva’s own moral 
compass is clearly here shown to have shifted from passive victim to retributive agent. 
Rather than forgive, Aviva here takes on the self-righteousness of Bo’s evangelical 
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libertarianism, resorting to murder for justice. The revenger’s role might elsewhere 
serve to deliver moral legibility, yet here it is taken on by an underage victim of 
trauma that has been keeping bad company. Her actions are shown not to have the 
moral validity usually expected of the melodrama, whether justice is enacted or 
remains in the register of the ‘if only’. We are left instead with a postmodern sense of 
existential uncertainty concerning a moral outcome, a state of mind symbolized 
indeed by the palindrome that cannot but end as it begins.  
 
That the violent events of Palindromes’ closing scenes turn out to constitute an 
unexpected tragedy (the accidental killing of the abortion doctor’s daughter) serves to 
confirm the film’s evocation of chaos and chance at the expense of any sense of 
successfully executed moral vengeance. Where violence and moral retribution are 
revealed as blunt, destructive instruments of justice, often instead leading to further 
injustices, the film offers few indications as to where to gain a more ‘morally legible’ 
viewpoint. The film’s foregrounding of the abortion debate and its intractable moral 
complexities sets the tone for the entire film, wherein divisions in contemporary 
American society between liberal and libertarian, urban and pastoral, are represented 
as ongoing conflicts. Aviva, in such respects, serves as the chief metaphor for 
‘dampened affect’ in this universe, her formal fragmentation into several actors 
foregrounding her artificiality as a coherent subjectivity, at the same time that her 
story remains the central focus of the film. A ‘depth’ model of character continuity is 
thus both undermined formally while still reproduced at the narrative level. 
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An Exterminating Angel: The Jewish Orphan in Inglourious Basterds 
(Quentin Tarantino, 2009) 
Questioning the morality of violent retribution contrasts with a long Hollywood 
tradition, not least in such genres as the Western, that have explored the extent to 
which violence can be legitimate when enacted by moral agents. This idea is both 
continued and problematized by Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds, which 
mobilizes key sentimental tropes while remaining wedded to a ‘smart’ and ironic 
representation of violence. With the film’s central character Shoshanna, Tarantino 
delivers an almost uncharacteristically ‘straight’ mode of melodramatic narration that 
recounts the killing of her Jewish family at the hands of a Nazi death squad, and her 
efforts a few years later to exact revenge on the Nazi top-brass (including Hitler). 
Basterds therefore constitutes an interesting instance of an über-violent ‘smart’ film 
(replete with Tarantino’s trademark gore) whose central character nevertheless 
rehearses a key sentimental trope of the orphaned Jewish girl. Such allegiance to 
dramatizing Holocaust events within required standards of taste carries with it a set of 
constraints that Tarantino is almost uncharacteristically careful to observe, reserving 
his trademark pulp violence for episodes that depicts the ‘Basterds’ on a violent 
mission through Northern France, a platoon of American Jews ordered simply to find 
Nazis to torture, maim and kill with gleeful, sadistic intent.  
 
Indeed the film’s first scene faithfully depicts the disturbing discovery and execution 
of Shoshanna’s family hiding under the floorboards of a French farmer’s house in 
occupied France. It is here that historical realism is largely adhered to, both in terms 
of how the farmer must give up the location of the family under duress of saving his 
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own family and the genuine emotions of guilt and betrayal he displays when he 
eventually does so. The process through which the German SS Colonel Landa 
(Christoph Waltz) expertly leverages the farmer’s confession is shown through a 
barely-interrupted 20-minute long conversation/interrogation, allowing the spectator 
to register the subtle shifts of emotion in the farmer’s face as he gradually is made to 
realise he has no option but to betray the location of the family. Despite its serious 
subject matter, the scene is not without either instances of allusion, irony or even dark 
comedy. The introductory intertitle reads, ‘Chapter 1: Once Upon a Time…’ 
suggesting both the classical European fairy tale but also a number of films that begin 
with that phrase, not least Sergio Leone’s ‘Once Upon a time in the West’, a work 
frequently drawn upon by Tarantino both stylistically and thematically. As ‘in Nazi 
Occupied France’ appears, completing the chapter title, the film is already signalled as 
occupying a space of sharp contrast between grim, historical period and fairy tale, 
serious themes and something more fanciful. Such disjuncture continues in the 
opening images of pastoral life (a farmer chopping wood, a young girl hanging 
clothes to dry) offset by the arrival of a Nazi motorcade, with music that fuses 
Beethoven’s Für Elise and the Spaghetti Western guitar flourishes of Ennio 
Morricone. Moreover, with Landa invoking a well-worn trope of the genius, clinically 
precise Nazi, Waltz’s camp performance serves to ironically underscore the extent to 
which we are not on particularly original territory.  
 
Yet despite such indications of what is to come, in terms of generic hybridity, 
intensified intertextuality or comedic performance, the scene remains faithful to the 
task of conveying the execution of the Jewish family once their location is revealed by 
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LaPadite. Climactic music accompanies the act of Nazi soldiers machine gunning 
through the floorboards of the farmer’s house, yet no gore or dead bodies are 
presented in its aftermath, allowing this scene to remain within a certain category of 
taste where later scenes, mostly involving the ‘Basterds’, cross over into 
‘exploitation’ gore. LaPadite moreover remains a moral anchor for the scene, visibly 
agonized by his necessary disclosure and the shooting, and further disgusted by the 
‘masquerade’ Landa implicitly demands he go along with in order to keep the hiding 
family ignorant of their fate (so that they attempt no escape). Finally, the sentimental 
trope of female virtue in distress is established as the only surviving daughter, 
Shoshanna, escapes the house and runs for her life across the fields, while Landa (as 
the classical ‘rake’), chooses not to shoot her and then mocks her escape with ‘Au 
revoir, Shoshanna,‘ upon which the chapter ends.  
 
As a self-contained section that conveys a tragic outcome and establishes the key 
Manichean opposition between Landa and Shoshanna, a narrative arc is clearly 
established where victim and oppressor (notwithstanding the latter’s pro-Allies 
actions later on in the film) are identified and motivated. Sympathy, or in Murray 
Smith’s terminology, ‘allegiance’ remains with Shoshanna throughout the film. As 
owner of a Parisian cinema in occupied Paris showing the great classics of the day, 
her encounters with Nazis put her in continual danger of being found out as Jewish, 
despite the great suffering she has already been put through. When Landa meets 
Shoshanna in a Parisian café, his clear suspicion, recognition and implicit 
interrogation of her rehearse the grossly uneven power relations of their equivalent 
characters in Schindler’s List. Although more sexually charged, the scenes between 
Amon Goeth (Ralph Fiennes) and Helen Hirsch (Embeth Davitz) also reproduce the 
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sentimental trope of Jewish female virtue in distress, the latter surviving in terror at 
the mercy of a powerful, amoral Nazi. In both instances, female virtue seems 
foregrounded as that which prevents Nazis from fully executing their orders, the 
trope’s potent connotation of the ‘human’ overriding a Jewish identity that makes 
such women apparently sub-human. However, although women are subjected to 
extreme violence at the hands of the same male characters in both SL and IB, the films 
ultimately differ in their understanding of the emotional motivations for violence. 
While Helen is severely beaten by Goeth for resisting his sexual advances, Landa’s 
violence is tempered by his pragmatic concerns in relation to his survival. Shoshanna 
escapes Landa’s violence ultimately not owing to his recognition of her female virtue 
in distress but because of her (masculinized) efforts to blow up the Nazi party, a 
mission that might ultimately serve his own interests. While Goeth feels a perverse 
‘love’ for Helen, Landa’s ostensible compassion for Shoshanna’s vulnerability turns 
out to be highly self-motivated. When his most savage violence does come, it is 
directed not at Shoshanna, but at the treacherous German actress Bridget von 
Hammersmark, revealing a savage hatred of deceptive women (Shoshanna no 
exception) that must nevertheless be tempered by a ‘smart’ strategy. Violence is here 
legitimated not as Goeth’s expression of thwarted love and desire but as an equally, if 
not more, aggressive man’s displaced hatred, Bridget serving as the unfortunate 
channel for a deeply repressed savagery. While all other channels have required 
Landa’s ‘dampened affect’ of strategy and calculation, here Landa reveals his true 
thuggery, aligning him with Goeth after all albeit now nuanced by a more postmodern 
set of camp faces that he must wear at all other times. 
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In such respects, Shoshanna’s victimhood establishes the film’s moral centre in both 
thematic and stylistic ways, yet the film pushes against the Manichaeism that such a 
figure might commonly engender, maintaining a core opposition of good versus evil 
while nuancing the usual signifiers through which such a binary is normally invoked. 
The heavily stylized and excessive exploits of the ‘Basterds’ themselves and their 
part-Apache leader Colonel Raine (Brad Pitt) indeed represent the film’s most overt 
upending of the moral semiotics usually reserved for the genre with which IG 
negotiates. The former Nazi soldier turned ‘basterd’, Stiglitz, who sadistically tortures 
and maims his Nazi victims is introduced in typical Tarantino style by a blast of 70s 
exploitation soundtrack music and a period comic-book graphic bearing his name. 
Another ‘basterd’, Sgt. Donny Donowitz (Eli Roth), known as ‘The Bear Jew’, is 
introduced WWE–style by the striking sounds of a baseball bat emanating from a 
cavernous lair-like railway arch. His summoning for the execution of a Nazi officer 
sees his emergence from the tunnel, bat in hand, followed by the graphically explicit 
killing of the officer by repeatedly smashing the latter’s head. Such violence is 
governed not by rational calculation and strategy but by sheer bloodlust amidst the 
moral imperative to punish. Their graphic scalping of victims proves paradigmatic in 
such regards, serving no other function than as a symbolic memento of a successful 
killing and as posthumous humiliation of each Nazi killed.62 Similarly, Raine defaults 
on Landa’s pragmatic bargaining for US real estate with the Allies HQ in exchange 
for his betrayal of the Nazi top-command, by carving a swastika into Landa’s 
forehead with a large Apache knife at the film’s end.  
 
                                                
62 Scalpings also of course invoke the practice of Native-Americans as depicted in the Western genre, 
once again aligning the ‘Basterds’ with minority resistance to hegemony and unwarranted occupation. 
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In such respects, with such acts committed for aesthetic enjoyment (Raine says to one 
of his German officer victims “Frankly, watchin’ Donny beat Nazis, to death, is the 
closest we ever get to goin’ to the movies.”), violence here becomes subjected to a 
radical de-sentimentalization. While the soldiers of a more traditional war genre go 
into battle and kill reluctantly in service of a greater, honourable cause (Saving 
Private Ryan and Captain Miller paradigmatically), the ‘Basterds’ here indulge in 
violence as nothing short of self-conscious, aestheticized spectacle. While 
diminishing Nazi morale is stated as an objective of such ‘guerrilla’ operations, their 
mode of action serves more as viscerally experienced retribution, a radical challenge 
to the technocratic pragmaticism of Nazi ideology and its über-rationalized ‘war-
machine’. While Landa goes about his deadly job with disinterested impartiality and 
leaves it up to his henchmen to shoot Jewish families, violence takes on for the 
Basterds what can only be described as a cathartic jouissance. With Nazis subjected to 
the same disregard for humanity as the Jews historically were, the film celebrates 
‘exploitation’ violence as a fitting response to historical trauma. Unlike Shoshanna, 
the ‘Basterds’ are not designated as models of humanity but ‘shallow’ cartoon-like 
icons, singlemindedly intent on immediate, bodily violence without exhibiting the 
more human attributes of compassion, forgiveness or even rationalization. If 
Shoshanna’s story largely resonates with melodrama’s traditional ‘if only’,63 we 
might say the Basterds encode justice more in alignment with the present tense 
temporality of the ‘on time’, that which Linda Williams claims for the genre of 
pornography.64 
                                                
 
63 Steve Neale, ‘Melodrama and Tears’, Screen, Vol. 27, no. 6 (1986), p. 12. 
  
64 See William’s ‘Film Bodies: Gender, Genre, And Excess’, in Braudy & Cohen (eds.), Film Theory 
and Criticism: Introductory Readings, 1999, p. 711. 
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Yet if the film revolves around two stark extremes within its Allied ranks, from a 
‘straight’ depiction of Shoshanna’s passive endangerment to the ironic fanfare of the 
Basterds’ belligerent scalpings, it is nevertheless in its final sequence that the 
sentimental and its radical other coincide. The raw material of cinema itself, a pile of 
film stock, is ignited in a locked cinema auditorium full of Nazis watching Goebbels’ 
latest propaganda ‘masterpeice’, and it becomes evident to what extent cinema itself 
becomes entrusted with returning the world to a state of order and peace. In a 
Deleuzian vein, cinema achieves that which is beyond the subject, foisting disorder 
and chaos on some of the most historically static images of cinema, not least of which 
include the sentimenalized Jew and Hitler himself. In order to do so, it must also 
reconcile the distinct modes of representation that occupy the preceding narrative, 
allowing Shoshanna a highly aestheticized vengeance while upstaging the exploits of 
the Basterds. As Colonel Raine and his sergeant are detained by Landa as the 
suspected conspirators that they are, the Basterds’ plot is put on hold, allowing 
Shoshanna to occupy central stage. As Goebbels’ tampered film cuts to her face at 
extreme-close, she states to the Nazi audience her true identity and their imminent 
fate, whereupon the film stock located behind the screen ignites and two uncaptured 
Basterds begin machine-gunning the already fleeing Nazis. As Shoshanna laughs 
maniacally onscreen at the Nazis as the screen burns, her transition to the subject-
position of a Basterd’s vengeance is confirmed, invoking a radically different identity 
to that of sentimentalized Jewish victim. Cinema emerges as that which provides this 
denouement, in sad contrast moreover with Shoshanna’s actual plight that sees her 
finally suffer at the hands of her Nazi admirer and would-be suitor Private Zoller. As 
he shoots her in response to her shooting him (having threatened to rape her), 
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Shoshanna ironically suffers not because she is Jewish, but because she is female, 
making her cinematic incarnation therefore all the more necessary. Likewise, Hitler 
does not escape retribution through the ‘dignified’ suicide of historical fact; he is 
subjected to a graphic pepper-spray of machine-gun rounds to his face, once again 
aligning humiliation with moral legibility. Cinema, and a larger aesthetic project, 
arguably provide this enhanced melodramatic legibility that goes beyond the 
constraints of the subject’s bodily suffering and death, promising to deliver as much 
action and pathos as are necessary to effectuate justice and closure. While the 
sentimental may have settled for unjust martyrdom and melancholic sacrifice, cinema 
is foregrounded as the ‘exterminating angel’ that can finish the job, albeit through a 
transcendent, necessarily aestheticized mode of action.  
 
All three films examined above indicate the extent to which independent or ‘smart’ 
cinema is distinguished from the ‘blockbuster’ aesthetic arguably engendered by 
Spielberg and his forebears, at the same time that such a mode still reproduces various 
sentimental tropes. Inglourious Basterds revels in the conventions of the melodrama 
in order to achieve justice for one of the worst crimes in history, yet as a ‘Holocaust 
movie’ comparable to Schindler’s List, reveals significant distinctions between the 
sentimental and the melodrama. Dancer in the Dark and Palindromes offer visions of 
an American pastoral society in crisis, while offering a qualified and uncertain hope in 
those that suffer from its ills (Selma) or in those that manage to survive (Aviva). Both 
films thus set the conventions of the sentimental novel (female virtue-in-distress) in 
dialogue with newer versions of the sentimental: kitsch in the case of Palindromes, 
the musical genre in the case of Dancer. What emerges from all such films is a sense 
of irony and referentiality that intensifies the critical stakes of each films’ thematics. 
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What might be lost in terms of a ‘depth model’ of sentimental idealism is gained by 
the foregrounding of sentimental tropes as ‘shallow’ signifiers that must now 
necessarily be reproduced within the conditions of postmodern intertextuality. The 
sense of irony or the ‘waning of affect’ heralded by such films signifies in turn not 
simply a cynical postmodern nihilism but precisely that which Steven Shaviro above 
refers to as ‘aesthetic disinterest’. The sympathetic melancholia of the sentimental 
gives way to excess, the ‘playful’ and the ‘perverse’, while sentimental tropes remain 
as components of a now more eclectic aesthetic heterogeneity. 
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Conclusion 
 
In a recent article for the New York Times, literary theorist Stanley Fish commented 
on recent manifestations of the ‘Crisis in the Humanities’ in the form of language 
department closures at US universities such as at SUNY Albany. Defending a ‘liberal 
arts’ education in the face of cynical economic decisions that now seem to dominate 
higher education funding, Fish is nevertheless highly critical of a fellow respondent’s 
claims concerning the value of the humanities. This respondent asks in his letter, 
‘What happened to public investment in the humanities and the belief that the 
humanities enhanced our culture, our society, our humanity?’ Fish however advises 
caution concerning this line of defence, arguing:  
 Well, it won’t do to invoke the pieties informing [the above 
 respondent’s] question – the humanities enhance our culture; 
 the humanities make our society better – because those 
 pieties have a 19th century air about them and are not even 
 believed in by some who rehearse them.1 
 
In the above we have what Fish acknowledges as another articulation of a far older 
debate, intimately related to the sentimental problematics covered in the above 
chapters, that has predominated in such disciplines as philosophy, literary criticism, 
film studies and other disciplines for some time. On one side comes what may be 
considered a ‘humanist’ discourse that situates art and aesthetics as cultural activities 
that are both improving to individuals and central to a sense of universalized 
progress and purpose in society. This is countered by a more modern voice that has 
nevertheless been long emergent ever since culture was thought of less in terms of 
teleology and utility and more as what Adorno once termed an ‘autonomous’ entity. 
                                                
1 Stanley Fish, ‘The Crisis in the Humanities Officially Arrives,’ The New York Times, 11th October, 
2010. 
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The humanities become reconsidered far less in terms of social or moral function and 
more in terms of an unashamedly self-justifying study of literature, discourse and 
cultural codes. Just as the lay person now apparently enjoys the cultures of film, 
television and the Internet for reasons owing more to do with entertainment and 
epistemology than self-improvement or moral instruction, so the academy adopts a 
methodology that subjects texts of many kinds to discursive analysis of ‘cultural 
function’ before any pronouncements on morality, canonicity, or even political 
progressivity. Furthermore, critique itself becomes that which is important rather 
than improving, insightful or informative rather than a key to the society’s moral or 
political betterment. 
 
 
It is not my intention here, nor has it been in the above chapters, to mount a strident 
defence for the civilizing, improving influences of the humanities or indeed of the 
arts in the face of Fish’s comments, for as I hope to have shown in the above 
chapters, such ‘sentiments’ do indeed derive from the problematic hopes and 
aspirations of an era very different to our own. As I have shown, the sentimental 
remains with us as a critical category but it almost always now signifies the 
invocation of a past informed by a more moralistic intellectual code, whether 
manifest in the theories of ‘moral sentiment’, tropes revolving around virtue-in-
distress, the Manichean opposition or the behavioural codes of the ‘cult of 
sensibility’. The Victorian era indeed was all too comfortable with still rigid 
divisions in class and imperial colonial ambitions, where the study of the humanities 
(or rather classics, theology and philosophy) was very much a privilege of an upper 
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bourgeois class (or an Arnoldian clerisy2) that could make pronouncements on the 
betterment of society as a function of their own tastes, values, and ultimately, 
interests too. Discourses of the sentimental emerged and were popularised within 
such a society, one that was still in thrall to the Enlightenment ideas that had forged 
such concrete and tangible developments as the French and American Revolutions 
and arguably the British reform acts and poor laws. If the Romantics and Nietzsche 
were beginning to assert the experience of subjectivity itself as the only form of truth 
attainable to the subject, they were living in a world where such cultural relativisms 
and nihilisms had yet to go ‘mainstream.’ Bolstered by an expanding bourgeois class, 
the humanities and such aesthetic doctrines as ‘realism’ and ‘didacticism’ came 
about as a function of still widespread sentimental assumptions concerning the 
subject and the society she lived and worked in. If the history of cinema has 
illustrated how resilient such a model continues to be, it has nevertheless been 
equally subject to significant challenges, whether in terms of avant-garde practice, 
feminist theory and practice, increased media and cine-literacy, Hollywood’s own 
intertextual eclecticism, arthouse cinema or the contemporary ‘smart’ film. 
 
 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, there is a valid sense in which the 
‘law of the heart’ and its attendant ‘pieties’ continue to hold cultural currency in 
contemporary media culture, albeit alongside a host of critical qualifications. From 
the quasi-highbrow discourses of cultural humanism above to the everyday displays 
of pathos, popular psychology and self-help that characterise daytime television, the 
attractions of sentimental discourse are still obviously, evidently omnipresent in 
                                                
2 See Raymond Williams’ illuminating account of Arnold’s outline for the values of an enlightened 
elite class in Culture and Society 1780-1950, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961, pp. 120-137. 
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visual culture while nevertheless hounded by the spectre of a ‘disaffected’ 
(post)modernist subjectivity. If Peter Brooks’ formulations still hold, there remains a 
sense to which the ‘melodramatic imagination’ continues to stand in for and provide 
succour for the loss of belief and value that characterises a ‘post-sacred era’. ‘Pieties’ 
indeed seems a pertinent word here, for it invokes precisely the matrix of religious 
values and certainties that sentimental art has striven to make legible since the 
apparent ‘death of god’. Yet it is also with obvious acknowledgements of the 
profound epistemological consequences of Nietzsche’s original coinage that the 
sentimental has come to connote its own gross excesses in the modern period. The 
‘crisis in the humanities’ continues arguably as a function of such losses of certainty 
in what can be meant by ‘Culture’ therefore, humanities departments hoisted by their 
own petard as it were, undermined by reconfigured beliefs in relation to the 
pedagogical project, while rightly unwilling to appropriate a sentimental language 
that would articulate the humanities within such an apparently uncritical rubric as 
‘virtue-in-distress.’ 
 
 
In the above chapters I have examined how sentimentality, as a term central to film 
criticism, has been mobilized, denigrated, quarantined or ignored for over 300 years 
of aesthetic debate. In such respects, I have demonstrated the extent to which 
disenchantment with the ‘heart’ is hardly a recent development, despite its particular 
resonances with a variety of post- (feminist, Marxist, Freudian) positions. Indeed, the 
sentimental very much coincides with the melodramatic in its acknowledgement and 
dramatization of this long-established ‘post-sacred’ era, essentially one of 
‘enlightened’ disbelief. Charting the chronology of multiple strands of sentimental 
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aesthetics in the 18th century: ‘moral sentiment’ theory, the ‘sentimental novel’ and 
theatrical melodrama, we start with a state of affairs that sees sentiment enjoying an 
almost cultish popularity as a mode of tearful reception prescribed as both fitting and 
satisfying in relation to tales of ‘virtue in distress.’ Not merely a popular fad however, 
such theoretical luminaries as Shaftesbury, Diderot, Rousseau, Hume and Smith, in 
albeit distinct ways, claim aesthetic value in the revelation and propagation of noble 
virtue and centralize the experience of sympathy or compassion in relation to its 
fictional paradigms. If reflection and the exercise of Enlightenment reason was still of 
principle importance in the formation of an ethical subject, emotions or the ‘passions’ 
become at the very least vital allies to such ideals, valid channels for empirical ‘sense’ 
without which the subject cannot achieve full actualization. In such respects, the 
sentimental begins (and persists) as a concept concerned with the problematics of 
relaying ethics between ‘feeling’ subjects and has constituted a vital underpinning for 
considering art as a pedagogical and/or progressive practice.  
 
At the same time, the sentimental also began, and retains traces as a sign of genteel 
fashion; it was ‘en vogue’ for Lady Bradshaigh in her question to Samuel Richardson 
concerning the definition of the ‘sentimental’.3 Aligned from the start with the tastes 
of a bourgeois class that culminates in the great 19th century Victorian societies 
depicted by Dickens and Hugo, sentimentality took on connotations of an excessive 
idealism or affective optimism in its increasingly kitschy textual instances. As a 
‘Characteristic’ that might once have denoted a core set of politically human attributes 
that might usurp the intellectual libertinism of aristocratic feudalism, it came to 
suggest as early as the mid-18th century a rather more ‘sickly’ kind of indulgent, 
                                                
3 See Chapter One, Note 7. 
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feminizing affect in the reception of art, and indeed in relation to a society now often 
inescapably perceived within sentimental, and apparently uncritical, parameters. A 
mark of critical self-delusion at best and hypocritical disingenuity at worst, the 
sentimental became very much aligned with the emotional excesses and political 
complacencies of bourgeois Victorian society, hegemonic in its impact, apolitical and 
uncritical in its appeals to the universality and timelessness of innocence and virtue, 
exemplified best of course by such fictional children as Little Nell and her many 
imitations. Moreover, its alignment with the ‘sensibility’ of effeminacy, troubling 
even to the earliest proponents of ‘moral sentiment’ theory, persisted as a negative 
attribute of an art that needed to be more muscular, clear-headed and less emotionally 
inclined. 
 
The sentimental, make no mistake, was thus a theory and practice subjected to 
critical scorn and suspicion from its very earliest uses and manifestations, both 
during the ‘cult of sensibility’ and beyond, while remaining a key attribute of popular 
culture ever since. The history of cinema and its theorization has nevertheless been 
considered in the above chapters as a particularly dramatic period in the genealogy of 
the sentimental, not least in terms of its evident persistence as a critical term in 
modernity. Sentimental idealism was that which animated the melodramatic ‘mode’ 
inherited by cinema, fuelled by a rhetoric of ‘moral legibility’ that demanded the 
articulation of justice and virtue despite evidences to the contrary in the form of 
disenchantments with religion, precept and indeed Enlightenment progress itself. 
Such figures as Chaplin indeed seemed to embody the concerns of the first world war 
period and after, not by offering an insipidly rose-tinted view of the world (as is 
sometimes invoked by criticisms of his sentimentality) but by precisely offering a 
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bittersweet vision of a society that was ceaselessly and mercilessly inimical to the 
paradigm of society’s losers. If the Tramp invoked melancholic hope and inspiration, 
such affect was less a sentimentality of false optimism or mollifying conservatism 
and rather more one of disenchanted fellow-feeling between global subjects, 
acknowledging the often futile struggles, oppressions and frustrations that 
characterised life in industrial modernity. 
 
Yet in as much as Chaplin’s Tramp is still understood as a hero of melodrama, whose 
pathos and indignation stemmed from a disillusion in urban modernity, he can and 
indeed is still framed as trademark of a tradition that has hoped in vain for a better 
society. Embodying the ‘if only’ of melodrama, I have suggested that his rhetorical 
appeal still thereby conflicts with a certain strand of modernism that has shifted 
focus away from the ‘humanist’ subject (be it in terms of art or aesthetics) in favour 
of an attention to form, experimentation and the linguistic building blocks of such a 
‘myth’ as the inspiring sentimental hero. Justified in terms of autonomy and linked to 
the academic independence and impartiality demanded by such figures as Fish 
discussed above, such practices and their attendant discourses have continued to find 
something troubling about the sentimental. Whether manifest as a particularly 
‘humanist’ cultural memory of Chaplin or of the Hollywood that he would so 
strongly influence, their sentimentalism is often equated with the anachronistic, 
conservative or ideological in comparison to modernist imperatives of 
demythologisation, critical analysis and fresh perspectives.  
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My discussion above has thus also followed such debates to their most recent 
manifestations, in terms of the reception of such a figure as Steven Spielberg and his 
own distinctive brand of post-classical blockbuster melodrama. Rather less invested 
in the elliptical anomie of his auteur contemporaries in the 1970s, Spielberg and his 
frequent homage and appropriation of ‘classic’ Hollywood cinema (such as that of 
Ford, Lean and Capra) could hardly but court the critique of more auteur-focused 
critics, ever sceptical of the Hollywood ‘hack’ artists that reproduced the tropes and 
sentimental clichés of the melodramatic ‘mode’. At the same time, I have shown how 
such assumed dismissal and repudiation of Spielberg’s oeuvre has itself been subject 
to hyperbole and misrepresentation, not least in terms of his academic reception. 
Alongside a very significant turn towards popular culture and such directors as 
Spielberg as possible sites of more ‘serious’ discursive activity, I have examined the 
extent to which the theorization of melodrama has changed too, most significantly 
perhaps in terms of its sentimental appeals to pathos. Analysing the reflexivity of 
such Spielberg films as AI and Schindler’s List in particular, we see such tropes as 
virtue-in-distress within a representational frame that is highly ‘knowing’ about its 
own acts of appropriation. In one sense, as in AI, sentimental idealism is laid very 
much in quotation marks, with Spielberg more or less outdoing himself in terms of 
sentiment. While some may still see this is as ‘blank parody’, I argue that there are 
significant grounds for regarding such pastiche as a highly sophisticated frame 
within which to articulate the ethical problematics of artificial intelligence. 
Reflexivity become a significant aspect too of Spielberg’s war films, continually 
undermining the extent to which such films as Saving Private Ryan can be dismissed 
as mere nostalgia or patriotism. Schindler’s List meanwhile serves less as a 
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‘feelgood’ Holocaust movie by tackling the problematics of Nazi culpability and 
guilt in as direct a way possible i.e. in its depiction of a Nazi that chose to be good. 
 
In such respects therefore, and in accordance with the arguments of theorists whose 
modernism might never have been so inimical to sentiment as might be assumed, 
melodrama (and implictly the sentimental) has been widely re-imagined by a critical 
community less hostile to its direct emotional appeals. Indeed, I have demonstrated 
how some of even the most formalist positions of ‘classical film theory’ could 
accommodate sentiment too, whether manifest in Eisenstein’s qualified approval of 
Dickens, Bazin’s ontological realism or Balazs’ insistence on a diegetic hero for that 
which he considered film’s best deployment, the narrative film. While not wishing to 
discount or invalidate such positions as Brecht’s or Adorno’s in relation to the 
emotional conditions of Hollywood entertainment and the necessity for critical 
detachment, I have nevertheless striven to underscore the extent to which such 
positions were themselves less rigidly stoical than is often assumed. Adorno would 
realise for instance, despite his cultural elitism, that ‘autonomous’ art and the 
‘cultural industry’ were ‘torn halves of an integral freedom, to which however they 
do not add up.’4 In this is surely an acknowledgement that sentimental art, for all its 
fallacies and contrivances, could not merely be dismissed, and indeed might contain 
what Frederic Jameson has since coined ‘Utopian’ elements. More recently, the 
‘bodily turn’ in film theory, shifting attention away from the eye and cognition to the 
sensory, embodied experience of cinema, further raised the stakes of discounting 
emotion and ‘affect’ and indeed re-centralized the body as a key paradigm for 
modernist art in particular. 
                                                
4 Letter from Adorno to Benjamin (II), London, 18th March 1936, accessed online at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/11510904/Adorno-Letters-to-Walter-Benjamin, visited June 4th 2009. 
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If all this brings us to a moment of great ambivalence concerning the sentimental 
stakes of cinema, I would suggest along with other scholars of melodrama that such a 
situation is of course preferable to the great dismissals of kitsch that characterized an 
earlier era’s more rigid divisions between high and low culture. Assumed alignments 
of the sentimental with femininity on one hand, or with a relatedly middle-class taste 
on the other, have been fundamentally nuanced by an established revisionism in 
relation to our notion of popular culture and melodrama’s role within it. Yet if 
academic ‘cultural studies’ has for some time sought to recuperate such instances of 
popular culture in critical, historical and sociological terms, this has not dampened 
the extent to which sentimentality in particular is still held in contempt by a more 
broadly perceived critical film community. Furthermore, as discussed in relation to 
Spielberg, an inevitable and obvious permeability between critical spheres allows for 
significant influence and shared discourse between academic and more middlebrow 
voices, neither mutually exclusive of the other. Where some consider the distaste for 
sentimentality as a latent snobbish stoicism endemic to film critics securing cultural 
capital, I have shown how time and again the critic’s subject position corresponds 
with ongoing intellectual positions in relation to emotion, art and the film spectator.   
 
Indeed, the final chapter of this thesis demonstrates the extent to which the ‘heart’ 
continues to present conceptual difficulties for postmodern approaches to film. While 
‘affect theory’ represents a significant shift in discourse towards the body and 
emotion as a necessary concession to decentralizing the text and the ‘gaze’ as sole 
determinants of meaning, significant qualifications remain in relation to the 
subjective experience of film. While the ‘heart’ invokes the wrong-headed gut 
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reactions of a real spectator, the ‘head’ remains a vital corrective in terms of its 
alleged compatibility with polysemy, ambiguity and irony, key communicative 
attributes of a dialectical postmodern culture. If compassion must necessarily be 
understood in terms of a vital cognitive component of ‘sense’, or as Nussbaum 
argues a ‘system of values’, the postmodern film constitutes economies in terms of 
gender, race, class and sexuality that require a distinct set of critical, cognitive (and 
emotional) capacities in the spectator. While the body and emotion (or ‘haptics in 
Laura Marks’ terms5) have constituted extremely fruitful paradigms within which to 
explore film spectatorship, they nevertheless continue to imply what I agree is an 
often ‘healthy’ distrust of the sentimental. As much as though such theorists as 
Jeffrey Sconce apply a term such as ‘cool melodramas’ to much postmodern cinema, 
it is the coolness of his corpora that is rendered salient, without which their recourse 
to melodrama alone might become excessively safe or uncritical once more. Films 
such as Dancer in the Dark and Palindromes continue to dramatize a sense of good 
and evil in melodramatic fashion, yet they do so with a palpable sense of irony and 
qualified sympathy, undermining a straight-forward ‘allegiance’ towards 
conventional heroes and heroines in favour of a more uncertain perceptual 
‘alignment’ with their fates (Murray Smith’s terminology proving useful again6). The 
sentimental model of sympathy likewise becomes nuanced by its now frequent 
juxtaposition with various other genres and semes, a means of diminishing its 
invocation of kitsch and formula in favour of accentuating its core critical concerns 
with injustice, redemption and ethics. 
                                                
5 Who in turn draws on the phenomenology and sensory theory of such figures as Merleau-Ponty, Reigl 
and Deleuze and Guatarri. See also Laura U. Marks, The Skin of Film: Intercultural Cinema, 
Embodiment, and the Senses, Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.   
 
6 Concepts discussed in Murray Smith, Engaging Characterss: Fiction, Emotion and the Cinema, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
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If Fish’s claims were to be countered therefore, it might have to be in consideration 
not of the disillusionments of the post post-structuralist humanities but of 
mainstream popular culture itself that one might most effectively make the case 
concerning the extent to which ‘19th century pieties’ still justifiably live and breathe. 
For despite the extent to which we do indeed live in a world of free-markets, moral 
cynicism and the inauthenticity of the simulacrum, the desire to articulate moral 
clarity and to narrativize justice still clearly motivates much of what counts as 
entertainment in the 21st century. From James Cameron’s latest 3D blockbuster 
Avatar (2009), (widely lambasted for its simplistic melodrama yet still a global box-
office smash), and the Lord of the Rings trilogy (2001-3), to the ‘Rom-Com’, the 
newly emerging ‘Bromance’7, and such successful US TV series as The Pacific 
(2010), The Wire (2002-2008) or Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003), the 
Manichean opposition and the rhetorical idealization of virtue is hardly going out of 
fashion even if it is continuously subjected to intertextual nuance and ambiguation. 
Owing to a separate history and arguably a different mode of address and reception, I 
have not discussed television in any significant detail, yet any brief survey of 
daytime soap operas, prime-time miniseries and heart-warming CNN news features 
would reveal the extent to which the sentimental looms large here and warrants 
investigation. The model of ‘distracted’ spectatorship applicable to various theories 
of television spectatorship may seem to make the medium inimical to sentimentality 
compared to the ‘immersive’ experience of cinema, were it not for the extent to 
which ‘apparatus’ theory and the notion of a fully ‘passive’, immersed spectator 
                                                
7 See for instance Justin Wyatt, ‘Identity, Queerness and Homosocial Bonding: The Case of Swingers’, 
in Peter Lehman (ed.), Masculinity: Bodies, Movies, Culture, London Routledge, 2001, pp. 51-66. 
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subject has been itself significantly revised in the last 30 years of film theory. Seen 
differently indeed, television’s aesthetic of ‘distraction’ lends itself rather well to the 
various problematics of ingenuous, fleeting emotion covered above in relation to the 
sentimental,8 one for which Andy Warhol and his ever switched-on television indeed 
remains salient as a conceptual touchstone. If one recalls the initial objections to 
Henry Mackenzie’s ‘The Man of Feeling’ in 1771 for instance, one finds indeed that 
it was in terms of Harley’s distracted pursuit for ever new tableaux of the sufferings 
of the London poor that the novel was first deemed ‘sickly’ in its straining for 
pathos.  
 
Furthermore, in awareness of the increased emphasis on ‘global’ media, wherein 
Western discourses are decentralized in favour of a wider nexus of cultures, another 
avenue for research concerns precisely the extent to which discourses surrounding 
neglected media cultures conform to sentimental models. Whether in terms of a post-
colonialist theory that continues to shed insights on the rhetorical status of global 
Others (in terms of ‘Orientalism’9 or otherwise) or the related conceptualizations of 
3rd world cinema as alternative public spheres, the sentimental seems applicable as a 
very significant model for comprehending fast-changing media cultures around the 
world. Relatedly, a key future direction for related projects to my own, and one that 
I’m sure is already underway, concerns the extent to which new media might be 
deemed to reproduce the ‘melodramatic mode’, or whether this is even possible 
given the new parameters within which information is made available in cyberspace. 
Of particular interest in such regards, although it has been beyond the scope of this 
                                                
8 See Ben Calvert et al., Television Studies: The Key Concepts, Routledge, 2007, pp. 109-115. 
 
9 Edward Said’s concept for a post-colonialist Other-ing of Asian and Middle Eastern cultures in 
Western hegemonic discourse. See Orientalism, New York: Random House, 1978. 
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study, are precisely those performances of online subjectivity that conform to models 
of virtue in distress, whether that be deemed as such of online conspiracy theorists, 
campaigners against their own totalitarian regimes or one’s own self-delimited 
Facebook community, all of whom invoke sentimental tropes as part of their 
rhetorical appeals.  
 
Lastly, however, and shifting towards a more historical methodology, I would like to 
stress the importance that further studies continue to examine the critical apparatus 
applied to cinema as a function of its many cultural antecedents, to see how the 
discursive patterns in relation to our current media culture share vital attributes to 
predecessor texts and forms. Research continues to be undertaken in relation to a 
host of ever newly emergent texts, genres and media with recourse to a critical 
language that often fails to be as self-evident as might be assumed. If I have focused 
on the conceptual difficulties and indeterminacies surrounding the ‘sentimental’, 
similar if not even greater ambiguities surround such terms as the ‘romantic’, 
‘classical’ or ‘humanist’, for which updates and refreshers to our knowledge are 
urgent before we can begin to satisfactorily refer to such films or practices as ‘post-
romantic’ or ‘post-classical.’ In such a vein, I hope to have shed some light on a term 
that has for some time wallowed in semantic and conceptual limbo, and by doing so, 
made a small contribution to our collective critical vocabulary. To coin the terms 
Fish dismisses above, it might not make our ‘society better’, but it might add to the 
conversation concerning the cultural values that make such an endeavour possible.
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